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KARL MARX

SELECTED WORKS, VOLUME I

KARL MARX

SELECTED WORKS

IN TWO VOLUMES

Prepared by the
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VOL. I

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Most of the documents included in this volume have either been specially translated for this edition or are revised translations of earlier publications of the works of Marx and Engels. We acknowledge with thanks the permission of Messrs. Allen and Unwin to reprint Engels' preface to *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, originally written in English. The old English translation of the text of this pamphlet is not quite accurate and we give in this volume a new translation based on our edition of *Anti-Dühring*. All references in the footnotes to works of Marx and Engels are to our publications unless otherwise stated.

The Publishers

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PREFACE

THE year 1933 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx—the genius who is the founder of scientific communism. Marx was the first to reveal the historical mission of the proletariat—to conquer political power, destroy the world of capitalist slavery and build communism. Marx gave the theoretical foundation for this task and organised the struggle for its practical realisation.

The name of Marx is widely known throughout the world. It is held dear by tens of millions of proletarians and toilers as the name of their leader and teacher. In his doctrines they see the banner of their struggle, their theoretical weapon. Marx's works point out the path of the emancipation of all toilers.

The bourgeoisie detests the teaching of Marx. At the outset it attempted to prevent the spread of his doctrines by a conspiracy of silence. It endeavoured to subvert his authority by malicious inventions, by furious slanders. But the influence of Marxism on the proletariat has been assured in the stubborn struggle for the correct theoretical expression of the interests and tasks of the proletariat, and for their practical realisation.

The masses of workers and toilers themselves have verified the correctness of Marxist theory by their own experience. They are becoming convinced in practice that there is no other path for the defence of their interests and for their emancipation from the yoke of poverty and exploitation than the revolutionary path pointed out by Marx and along which the Communist vanguard leads them.

In the face of the enormous authority and influence which Marx's teaching has acquired among the masses of the proletariat and toilers, the bourgeoisie has been forced to alter its

tactics. While hypocritically acknowledging the scientific services of Marx, the bourgeoisie, through its lackeys, tries to distort his teachings. The opportunists who, consciously or unconsciously—this in the long run scarcely changes matters—play the part of lackeys of the bourgeoisie, assist the latter in its disgusting work. They attempt to hide the real meaning of Marx's teaching, to falsify it in a bourgeois sense, in order to strengthen bourgeois influence over the proletariat, to save and maintain the crumbling edifice of bourgeois society and to strengthen the power of the bourgeoisie and its class domination. Lenin says:

> "During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes relentlessly persecute them, treat their teachings with malicious hostility, the most furious hatred and the most unscrupulous campaign of lies and slanders. After their death, attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonise them, so to say, and to surround their *names* with a certain halo for the 'consolation' of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping them, while at the same time emasculating the *content* of the revolutionary doctrine, vulgarising it, and blunting its revolutionary edge. At the present time, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists in the labour movement concur in this 'revision' of Marxism."[1]

One of the most essential conditions for the successful development of the struggle of the proletariat is a really wide mass distribution of the works of Marx. The best memorial to the founder of scientific communism is the publication of his works. Besides the complete collected works of Marx and Engels, it has been found necessary to publish a popular edition which can be distributed much more widely and which will reach those to whom the edition in many volumes would be inaccessible. The present two volumes are a first experiment in publishing the selected works of Marx. They contain the most popular of his works together with some works of Engels, his constant companion-in-arms and life-long friend. The works of Engels reproduced here are those which give a characterisation of the personality of Marx, expound the latter's teaching and reflect the historical situation in which Marx's practical activity and the development of his theoretical views took place.

From 1844, Marx and Engels produced their works in the

[1] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, 1935 edition, p. 13.—*Ed.*

closest collaboration with one another. They worked together, side by side, both in the practical leadership of the proletarian class struggle and in the scientific sphere. In a number of passages Engels has himself spoken of his mutual relations with Marx.[1] He repeatedly emphasised that to Marx belongs the first place in their joint scientific work, that to him belongs the final formulation of the views which Engels as well as Marx developed and defended throughout his life. As Engels himself says, in relation to Marx he had to play second fiddle; but this does not diminish in the slightest the theoretical and practical services rendered by Engels, his share in the elaboration of Marxist theory and in the struggle for communism. Marx valued his friend extremely highly. Marx always imparted his scientific discoveries to Engels and consulted him on theoretical questions. Marx also constantly consulted Engels on questions of the practical leadership of the labour movement.

Beginning approximately with the 'seventies, the following division of labour was established between Marx and Engels: Marx was almost exclusively occupied with his work on *Capital*, while Engels undertook the obligation of appearing in public and also of popularising the theory. Engels writes:

> "As a consequence of the division of labour that existed between Marx and myself, it fell to me to present our views in the periodical press, that is to say particularly in the fight against opposing views, in order that Marx should have time for the elaboration of his great basic work."[2]

Later on, after Marx's death, Engels continued the work begun by him in collaboration with Marx.

Marx's works are models for us in every respect. But the life of society does not stand still. The growth and development of production and exchange bring about changes in classes, and this is reflected in all spheres of the class struggle—political, economic and theoretical. A diligent study of Marx's works and struggle, and the co-ordination of all this with the works of Lenin, with the struggle conducted by the latter throughout his

[1] Preface to *The Communist Manifesto*, 1883 edition. Footnote in *Ludwig Feuerbach.—Ed.*

[2] Engels, Preface to *The Housing Question*, which contains articles written by him in 1872. 1935 edition, p. 10.—*Ed.*

life against opportunism and the treachery of the Second International, clearly reveals that Lenin in all his theoretical and practical activity stood firmly on the ground of Marxist theory, and that both in theory and in policy he continued Marx's line in the new circumstances of the imperialist stage of development which capitalism entered upon after the death of Marx. Marx's theory was concretised and further developed by Lenin.

The material of the present edition is arranged as follows. The first volume contains works dealing for the most part with general questions of theory, in which are given the theoretical bases of the world outlook (dialectical materialism, economic theory, the theory of the proletarian party and its strategy and tactics, the doctrine of the historical task of the proletariat and its historical role). In the second volume are collected mostly historical and political works of Marx. Marx, in expressing himself on contemporary historical events, furnished brilliant models of the application of the method of materialist dialectics worked out by him in the investigation of definite sections of history. Through the historical material, Marx's views were verified and made concrete. By studying historical experience he developed the policy and tactics of the proletarian party.

The works of Marx and Engels represent a single whole, they are permeated by the integral world outlook of scientific communism. From the theoretical point of view, they represent models of materialist dialectics. It is impossible to understand them outside their connection with the mass struggle of the proletariat.

Scientific communism draws its theoretical content from the whole historical development as it actually takes place. The task does not consist in inventing some sort of perfect social order as was done by the utopians, but in "investigating the historical economic process," the necessary historical consequence of which is the emergence of the classes—the bourgeoisie and proletariat—and in finding, in the economic situation created by the historical process, the means for deciding the struggle.[1] Marx uses the terms

[1] See Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, in the present volume. —*Ed.*

"scientific socialism," "scientific communism" as a contrast to utopian socialism which "would rather spin new fantasies of the brain for the people, instead of limiting its study to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself."[1]

Engels in 1847, criticising the erroneous views of the bourgeois democrat Karl Heinzen, who theoretically adopted a fully idealist position and who asserted that Marx's communism was a doctrine which "proceeds from a particular theoretical principle as its nucleus," wrote:

> "Communism is no doctrine but a *movement;* it proceeds not from principles but from *facts.* The Communists take as their postulate not some philosophy or other, but the whole of previous history and especially its present day actual results in the civilised countries. Communism has arisen from large-scale industry and its consequences, from the establishment of the world market and the unrestrained competition this involves, from the ever more powerful and ever more general trade crises which have already become complete crises of the world market, from the rise of the proletariat and the concentration of capital, from the resulting class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Communism, in so far as it is theoretical, is the theoretical expression of the position of the proletariat in this struggle and the theoretical summing up of the conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat."[2]

The struggle of the proletariat cannot be successful without a revolutionary theory which completely reflects and explains the whole complicated process of historical movement and serves as a guide in changing the world. Scientific communism includes practical revolutionary activity as an indispensable constituent part. But this activity must be guided by scientific theory. Marx considers it the task of science "to reveal all the forms of antagonism and exploitation" in order to assist the proletariat to abolish them. Thus, in the hands of Marx, Engels and Lenin, science serves the proletarian revolution; it accomplishes the greatest work of history.

On the basis of a close study of the system of capitalist relations in all its details and an examination of the revolutionary position of the working class under capitalism, Marx put for-

[1] Marx, Notes on Bakunin's book, *Statehood and Anarchy.—Ed.*

[2] F. Engels, *Die Kommunisten und Karl Heinzen* [*The Communists and Karl Heinzen*].—*Ed.*

ward the idea of the leading role of the proletariat in the struggle for communism.

"Only the proletariat—by virtue of the economic role it plays in large-scale production—is capable of acting as the leader of *all* the toiling and exploited masses, whom the bourgeoisie exploits, oppresses and crushes not less, and often more, than it does the proletarians, but who are incapable of waging an *independent* struggle for their emancipation."[1]

Marx generalised the whole historical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the working class in his teaching concerning *the dictatorship of the proletariat* as the organisation of the rule of the proletariat indispensable for the transition to classless society.[2] According to Marx's teaching, the dictatorship of the proletariat is "the *class rule* of the workers over the survivals of the old world which resist them." This class rule will last "until the economic foundations for the existence of classes are destroyed." In estimating the role of revolutionary force, Marx explained the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the following way:

"This means that as long as the other classes exist, especially the capitalist class, as long as the proletariat is engaged in a struggle against them (for on its assumption of governmental power, its enemies and the old organisation of society have not yet disappeared), it must employ forcible means, that is to say governmental means; as long as it itself still remains a class and as long as the economic conditions on which the class struggle is based, and the existence of classes, have not yet disappeared and must be forcibly removed from its path or transformed, the process of their transformation must be forcibly accelerated."[3]

After establishing its dictatorship, the proletariat continues to lead the masses of the peasantry. It assists the mass of small producers to pass from small individual economy to large-scale social economy, producing a radical revolution in agriculture.

"Where peasants exist in large numbers as private landowners, where they even constitute a more or less considerable majority, as in all the states on the Western European Continent, where they have not disappeared and been replaced by agricultural day labourers as in England, the following

[1] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, 1935 edition, p. 30.—*Ed.*

[2] See Marx's letter to Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852 (p. 377 in this volume), Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (in Vol. II of this edition) and other passages.—*Ed.*

[3] Marx, Notes on Bakunin's book, *Statehood and Anarchy* (1874).—*Ed.*

cases occur: Either they prevent, bring to nought, every revolution of the workers, as they have so far done in France, or the proletariat (for the peasant proprietor does not belong to the proletariat, and even where he does belong to it by his position he does not believe that he does), as the government, must adopt measures whereby the peasant obtains an immediate improvement of his position, therefore winning him for the revolution; measures which in germ facilitate the transition from private property in the soil to collective property, so that the peasant of himself arrives at this economically. The proletariat, however, must not antagonise him, *e.g.*, by proclaiming the abolition of inheritance or the abolition of his property; the latter is only possible where the capitalist farmer has driven out the peasant and the real cultivator of the land is just as much a proletarian, a wage worker, as the urban worker."[1]

We see how Marx sketches here the identical policy in relation to the peasantry which Lenin put into effect and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is now carrying out, and which is the sole correct policy for the revolutionary proletariat which is building communism.

The opportunists of the Second International were silent about this teaching of Marx on the dictatorship of the proletariat and tried to relegate it to oblivion. Lenin restored this teaching and developed it further; he enriched its content by the summed-up experience of all the later development of the proletarian revolution.

"The doctrine of the class struggle, as applied by Marx to the question of the state and of the socialist revolution, leads inevitably to the recognition of the *political rule* of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, *i. e.*, of power shared with none and relying directly upon the armed force of the masses. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming transformed into the *ruling class*, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organising *all* the toiling and exploited masses for the new economic order.

"The proletariat needs state power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of *leading* the great mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians—in the work of organising socialist economy.

"By educating the worker's party Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and of *leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organising the new order, of being the teacher, guide and leader of all the toiling and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie. As against this, the now prevailing opportunism breeds in the

[1] *Ibid.—Ed.*

ranks of the workers' party representatives of the better-paid workers, who lose touch with the rank and file, 'get along' fairly well under capitalism, and sell their birthright for a mess of pottage, *i.e.*, renounce their role of revolutionary leaders of the people against the bourgeoisie.

"Marx's theory: 'The state, *i.e.*, the proletariat organised as the ruling class', is inseparably bound up with all he taught on the revolutionary role of the proletariat in history. The culmination of this role is the proletarian dictatorship, the political rule of the proletariat."[1]

From what Marx and Engels said about their theory, from their attitude to the proletarian class struggle, to the proletarian revolution, it is fully evident that their theory is no stereotyped formula which, once learnt, can without further trouble or thought be complacently applied to all cases occurring in life. Lenin wrote in 1899 in the article *Our Programme*:

"We do not in any way regard Marx's theory as something final and inviolable, we are convinced, on the contrary, that it only laid the corner-stone of the science which socialists *must push* further in all directions, if they do not wish to be left behind by life. We think that the *independent* working out of Marx's theory is especially necessary for Russian socialists, for this theory provides only the general *guiding* propositions, which in specific instances are applied in England differently from in France, in France differently from in Germany and in Germany differently from in Russia."[2]

In his article, *Karl Marx*, in the chapter, "Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat,"[3] Lenin shows what a difficult task is involved in working out the correct tactics in the great class war which is being waged by the proletariat of the whole world for the emancipation of all the oppressed and exploited.

Marx's theory does not give solutions, ready-made for all time, but it teaches how, through the study of historical conditions and the facts of the class struggle, to foresee the course of social development and to determine the immediate tasks in each case in strict accordance with the concrete situation.

"It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, conceives to be the goal for the moment—it is a question of *what it is* and what it will historically be driven to do in accordance with its

[1] Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, pp. 30-31.—*Ed.*
[2] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. II, p. 492.—*Ed.*
[3] See present volume, p. 48.—*Ed.*

being. Its goal and its historical action is tangibly and irrevocably marked out both by its own life situation and by the whole organisation of present-day bourgeois society,"[1]

But what is said here must in no case be understood as meaning that in history everything proceeds automatically. No, history is made by men. Conscious practical activity is precisely the most distinguishing characteristic of Marxism. It is just this that distinguishes the dialectical materialism of Marx from the metaphysical, speculative materialism before Marx. "The philosophers have *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it."[2]

An indispensable condition for the struggle of the proletariat is its organisation. The proletariat must conduct its struggle, guided by revolutionary theory, in an organised fashion, only in this way does it acquire an invincible force. Its leading section is the *Communist Party* which is the highest form of organisation of the working class. The beginning of this organisation was made by Marx and Engels as early as 1847 with the creation of the *Communist League*. The programme of the Party was *The Communist Manifesto*.

In close connection with the revolutionary mass movement of the proletariat, in systematic struggle against petty bourgeois socialism and opportunism, which replace the class struggle by dreams of class harmony, Marx and Engels defended the class party of the proletariat, which leads the latter's class struggle, and worked out its strategy and tactics. The immediate continuation of the work of Marx and Engels, of their struggle for the proletarian party, was the struggle conducted by Lenin and the Bolsheviks against all forms and varieties of opportunism and against the social traitors, a struggle which is being carried out at the present time by the C.P.S.U. and the Communist International under the guidance of Stalin, who is the best disciple of Marx and Lenin, and is continuing their work.

The discovery of the materialist conception of history made by Marx is of enormous significance for the working class strug-

[1] Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family* (1845).—*Ed.*
[2] Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, p. 473 of present volume.

gle. It revealed the perspective of the greatest revolution of all times—the proletarian revolution.[1] It furnished the proletariat with an irreplaceable theoretical weapon to serve it as a guide in the struggle for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, for the destruction of classes, for communism. It is on this theoretical basis, on the basis of the concrete investigation of current historical events, with the aid of the method created by Marx, that the science which is indispensable for the working class in its struggle, the theory of Marxism-Leninism, is being built up.

"Theory," declares Stalin, "is the experience of the labour movement in all countries, taken in its general form. Of course, theory becomes immaterial if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become the greatest force in the labour movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice, for it, and it alone, can give to the movement confidence, the power of orientation and an understanding of the inner connection between events; for it, and it alone, can help us in our practical work to discern how and in which direction classes are moving not only at the present time, but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future. Lenin himself said and often repeated his well-known thesis, that: 'Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.' "[2]

The close study of the works and activity of Marx enables us to understand his method of work, to learn his approach to historical phenomena and to the class struggle. His activity provides a model for guiding us in the present-day struggle of the proletariat for communism. For those who are continuing Marx's work, his labour and his writings must serve as a guide in the study of new social phenomena, in the solution of new practical tasks.

The articles of Engels, Lenin and Stalin, reproduced at the beginning of the first volume, serve as an introduction to this volume and to the whole work. Engels' article, *Karl Marx*, and Lenin's article with the same title, give both a general characterisation of Marx's teaching as a whole and a characterisation of

[1] This is dealt with in a number of articles in this volume, as well as in Volume II. See Engels' article, *The History of the Communist League*, in Volume II.—*Ed.*

[2] Stalin, *Leninism*, Volume I, "Foundations of Leninism," p. 27.—*Ed.*

his personality, life and activity.[1] Lenin's articles describe the struggle for revolutionary Marxism which Marx and Engels conducted, and which Lenin himself continued throughout his life. Stalin's article gives a conception of what Lenin added that was new to the treasury of Marxism and of the questions in regard to which he developed further both Marxist theory and the cause of the practical struggle of the proletariat for communism.

The writings immediately following the articles mentioned above—*Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*—are the best introduction to the essence of the views of scientific communism. These works deal with the three constituent parts of Marxism; they give a general understanding of the theoretical basis of Marxism—materialist dialectics, the laws of the development of capitalist relations, and the revolutionary position of the proletariat in capitalist society and, consequently, its historical task—to destroy classes and to create communist society. *The Communist Manifesto* gives the bases of the programme and tactics of the proletarian party, which retain their significance up to the present day. Speaking of the *Manifesto*, Lenin points out that,

> "With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines a new conception of the world—a consistent materialism extending also to the realm of social life; it proclaims dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of evolution; the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat as the creator of a new Communist society."[2]

The first volume further deals with the economic theory of Marx and with dialectical materialism in its application to the investigation of nature (dialectics of nature) and the historical development of human society (historical materialism).

Of Marx's works devoted to economic theory, there are reproduced the lectures which he delivered in the Workers' Club in Brussels in 1847—*Wage-Labour and Capital*, and his lecture

[1] In order to give the reader as complete a picture as possible of Marx's personality, we insert here reminiscences of Marx by P. Lafargue and W. Liebknecht. Liebknecht's reminiscences, in view of their considerable volume, are only given in extracts. These extracts are the parts dealing with Marx's personality.—*Ed.*

[2] See Lenin, *Karl Marx*, p. 21 in the present volume.—*Ed.*

to the General Council of the First International—*Value, Price and Profit.* Both these works are models of popular exposition, they are an introduction to the essence of Marx's economic theory, the complete development and establishment of which is to be found in *Capital*—the basic work of scientific communism. On this main work of his, Marx was engaged throughout his whole life.

We reproduce in the present volume only one small portion of chapter XXXII of the first volume of *Capital*, in which Marx summarises the results of his investigations and draws a general conclusion from the mass of material worked upon by him. Engels gives a popular characterisation of the fundamental content of the first volume of *Capital* in two articles on *Capital* and in the extract from the preface to the second volume of *Capital* reproduced here. In the parts reproduced of chapter XXXII of the first volume of *Capital* the general law of the development of capitalist society is expounded, and the inevitability is demonstrated of the collapse of capitalism and of the destruction of the capitalist order by the working class through the dictatorship of the latter. This is an example of the scientific prevision based on a thorough investigation of facts which we encounter in Marx's works and the accuracy of which has been brilliantly confirmed and is being confirmed by the further course of history.

The above-mentioned works do not offer any difficulties in reading. The articles given after these, beginning with Marx's preface to his book, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* will be found more difficult. These works, as already mentioned, deal with the philosophy of Marxism—dialectical materialism, and its application to the study of nature and society.

In his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx describes the course of his scientific studies and gives an extremely condensed and at the same time exhaustive exposition of the bases of his historical theory. Engels, in two articles on Marx's book, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, characterises the significance and theoretical content of Marx's scientific theory. In a number of the letters of Marx and Engels reproduced here, as well as in Engels' article *On Historical Materialism* and in the last chapter of *Ludwig*

Feuerbach, an admirable characterisation of dialectical materialism, of the materialist conception of history and of its materialist investigation is given.

Finally, Engels' work, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, gives an excellent description of the development of the theoretical views of Marx and Engels, a criticism of the defects of pre-Marxist (Feuerbachian) materialism and a concise exposition of the views of dialectical materialism in regard to nature and history.

In the works of Marx and Engels, clarity of exposition is combined with profundity of content. In them, as Lenin says, "one can have confidence in every phrase, confidence that every phrase is not uttered at random but is written on the basis of enormous historical and political material." [1] Consequently it is much easier and more fruitful to study Marxism directly from the original texts than from various expositions. One who studies Marx and Engels goes through a most serious school of scientific work. In spite of all difficulties, the reading of their works is always extraordinarily fruitful. The study of the works of Marx and Engels collected here is the best introduction into the sphere of their ideas, the best way of becoming acquainted with their method, and the best preparation for the study of the more extensive and less popular works, above all for the study of *Capital*.

In Marxism, as Lenin says, there is

"nothing . . . resembling 'sectarianism' in the sense of a secluded, ossified doctrine originating somewhere *away* from the high road of development of world civilisation." Marx relies "on the lasting foundations of human knowledge acquired under capitalism. Through his study of the laws of development of human society, Marx understood the inevitability of the development of capitalism, leading to communism, and, what is most important, he proved it solely on the basis of the most exact, detailed and profound study of this capitalist society, by the aid of the most complete assimilation of everything achieved by science hitherto. Everything that human society created he subjected to critical examination, not leaving a single point without attention. Everything that human thought created he examined anew and subjected to criticism, testing it by the experience of the labour movement, and he drew conclusions which persons circumscribed by bourgeois limitations or fettered by bourgeois prejudices could not draw."

[1] Lenin, *On the State*, a lecture delivered at Sverdlov University, July 11, 1919.—*Ed.*

We have quoted these words of Lenin here because they testify with exceptional clarity to the whole significance and the whole theoretical content of Marx's scientific and practical work. Lenin's words give an idea of the wealth of content to be found in Marx's works. Consequently, bearing in mind the gigantic volume of the material worked upon by the author, the exceptional richness of content of the works here reproduced and the great importance of the subject matter dealt with in these works, it is clear that their study also demands special attention from the reader.

To utilise the works of Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific communism, against Social-Democratic and other distortions of Marxism in the contemporary theoretical and practical struggle for communism—this is the end which must be served by a study of their works, this is what Lenin's example teaches.

The works assembled need to be attentively studied and repeatedly read through from beginning to end; one must connect this study with practical work, relying on this scientific basis. Every worker taking part in the class struggle in his country, every fighter for the triumph of the working class over the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet power, will derive from the study of these works a clear knowledge of the tasks of the struggle which he is conducting and an invincible confidence of victory, based on a scientific understanding of the class struggle and the communist revolution which is taking place before our eyes.

It will not be superfluous to mention here that the present edition, issued first in Russian on the initiative of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., is in fact the first of its kind. Up to now there has been no popular edition of Marx's selected writings, none which embraces all periods of his activity and all constituent parts of his theory. The Social-Democrats never even set themselves this task. This task now devolves on the Communist Parties, which are the sole inheritors of the revolutionary work begun by Marx and Engels and continued by Lenin and Stalin.

V. ADORATSKY

January 20, 1933.

KARL MARX

SELECTED WORKS, VOLUME I

KARL MARX [1]

KARL MARX, the man who was the first to give socialism, and thereby the whole labour movement of our day, a scientific foundation, was born at Treves in 1818. He studied in Bonn and Berlin, at first law, but he soon threw himself exclusively into the study of history and philosophy, and in 1842 was on the point of becoming lecturer in philosophy when the political movement which had arisen since the death of Frederick William III turned him into a different course. With his collaboration, the leaders of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie, Camphausen, Hansemann, etc., in Cologne, had founded the *Rheinische Zeitung* and in autumn 1842, Marx, whose criticism of the proceedings of the Rhenish provincial diet had excited very great attention, was put at the head of the paper. The *Rheinische Zeitung* naturally appeared under censorship, but the censorship could not cope with it.[2] The *Rheinische Zeitung* almost always got through the articles which mattered; the censor was first supplied with insignificant fodder for him to strike out, until he either gave way of himself or was compelled to give way by the threat that then the paper would not appear the next day. Ten newspapers with the same courage as the *Rheinische Zeitung* and whose publishers would have allowed a few hundred extra talers

[1] This biography was written by Engels in 1878 for the *Volkskalender* [*People's Annual*], issued by the Social-Democrat W. Bracke in Brunswick.—*Ed.*

[2] The first censor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* was Police Councillor Dolleschall, the same man who once struck out an advertisement in the *Kölnische Zeitung* of the translation of Dante's *Divine Comedy* by Philalethes (later King John of Saxony), with the remark: One must not make a comedy of divine affairs. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

to be expended on type-setting—and in 1843 the censorship would already have been made impossible in Germany. But the German newspaper owners were petty minded, timid petty bourgeois and the *Rheinische Zeitung* carried on the struggle alone. It used up one censor after another; finally it came under a double censorship: after the first censorship the *Regierungspräsident* had once more and finally to censor it. That also was of no avail. In the beginning of 1843, the government declared that it was impossible to keep this newspaper in check and suppressed it without more ado.

Marx, who in the meanwhile had married the sister of von Westphalen, later minister of the reaction, emigrated to Paris, and from there in conjunction with A. Ruge, published the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in which he opened the series of his socialist writings with *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie* [*A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law*]. Further, together with F. Engels, *Die heilige Familie. Gegen Bruno Bauer und Konsorten* [*The Holy Family. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.*], a satirical criticism of one of the latest forms assumed by German idealist philosophy at that time.

The study of political economy and of the history of the Great French Revolution still allowed Marx time enough for occasional attacks on the Prussian government; the latter revenged itself in the spring of 1845 by securing from the Guizot ministry his expulsion from France—Alexander von Humboldt is said to have acted as intermediary. Marx shifted his domicile to Brussels and he published there in French in 1847: *Misère de la Philosophie* [*The Poverty of Philosophy*], a criticism of Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* [*Philosophy of Poverty*], and in 1848 *Discours sur le libre échange* [*Discourse on Free Trade*]. At the same time he made use of the opportunity to found a *German Workers' Union* in Brussels and so commenced practical agitation. The latter became still more important for him when he and his political friends in 1847 entered the secret *Communist League* which had already been in existence for a number of years. Its whole structure was now radically changed; this organisation which previously was more or less conspiratorial was

transformed into a simple organisation of communist propaganda, which was only secret because necessity compelled it to be so, the *first* organisation of the German Social-Democratic Party. The League existed wherever German workers' unions were to be found; in almost all of these unions in England, Belgium, France and Switzerland, and in very many of the unions in Germany, the leading members belonged to the League and the share of the League in the incipient German labour movement was very considerable. Moreover, our League was the first which emphasised the international character of the whole labour movement and realised it in practice, which had Englishmen, Belgians, Hungarians, Poles, etc., as members and which organised international labour meetings, especially in London.

The transformation of the League took place at two Congresses held in 1847, the second of which resolved on the drawing up and publication of the fundamental principles of the Party in a manifesto to be edited by Marx and Engels. Thus arose the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* which appeared in 1848 shortly before the February Revolution and which has since been translated into almost all European languages.

The *Deutsche Brüsseler Zeitung*, in which Marx participated and which mercilessly exposed the blessings of the police regime of the fatherland, caused the Prussian government to try to effect Marx's expulsion once more, but in vain. When, however, the February Revolution resulted also in popular movements in Brussels, and a radical change in Belgium appeared to be imminent, the Belgian government arrested Marx without ceremony and deported him. In the meanwhile the French Provisional Government sent him through Flocon[1] an invitation to return to Paris, and he accepted this call.

In Paris, he came out especially against the swindle which was widespread among the Germans there, according to which the German workers in France were to be formed into armed legions in order thereby to introduce the revolution and the re-

[1] Flocon. Democrat, editor of the bourgeois-democratic newspaper *Réforme* which was published in Paris and in which Engels published his articles in 1847-48.—*Ed.*

public into Germany. On the one hand, Germany had to make its revolution by itself, and on the other hand, every revolutionary foreign legion formed in France was betrayed in advance by the Lamartines[1] of the Provisional Government to the government which was to be overthrown, as also occurred in Belgium and Baden.

After the March Revolution, Marx went to Cologne and founded there the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, which was in existence from June 1, 1848, to May 19, 1849—the only paper which represented the standpoint of the proletariat within the democratic movement of the time, as shown already in its unreserved championship of the Parisian June insurgents of 1848, which cost the paper almost all its shareholders. In vain the *Kreuzzeitung* pointed to the "Chimborazo[2] impudence" with which the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* attacked everything sacred, from the king and *Reichsverweser* [the imperial vice-regent] down to the gendarme, and that, too, in a Prussian garrison town with 8,000 troops. In vain was the rage of the Rhenish liberal philistines who had suddenly become reactionary. In vain was the paper suspended by martial law in Cologne for a lengthy period in the autumn of 1848. In vain the Imperial Ministry of Justice in Frankfort denounced article after article to the Cologne Public Prosecutor in order that judicial proceedings should be taken. Under the eyes of the Military Guard, the paper went on being edited and printed, its distribution and reputation increased with the vehemence of its attacks on the government and the bourgeoisie. When the Prussian *coup d'état* took place in November 1848, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* at the head of each issue called upon the people to refuse to pay taxes and to meet violence with violence. In the spring of 1849 both on this account and because of another article it was prosecuted before a jury, but on both occasions it was acquitted.

[1] Lamartine. Head of the so-called "Provisional" bourgeois government which was formed in France after the victorious people's rising in February 1848.—*Ed.*

[2] Chimborazo, one of the highest mountain peaks in South America.—*Ed.*

Finally, when the May risings of 1849 in Dresden and the Rhine province had been suppressed, and the Prussian campaign against the Baden-Palatinate rising had been begun by the concentration and mobilisation of considerable masses of troops, the government believed itself strong enough to suppress the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* by force. The last number—printed in red ink—appeared on May 19.

Marx again went to Paris, but only a few weeks after the demonstration of June 13, 1849, he was faced by the French government with the choice either of shifting his residence to Brittany or of leaving France altogether. He preferred the latter and emigrated to London, where he has lived since.

An attempt to continue to issue the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in the form of a review (in Hamburg, 1850) had to be given up after a short while in view of the ever increasing violence of the reaction. Immediately after the *coup d'état* in France in December 1851, Marx published: *Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte* [*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*] (Boston, 1852, second edition, Hamburg, 1869, shortly before the war). In 1853 he wrote: *Enthüllungen über den Kölner Kommunistenprozess* [*Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*] (first printed in Basle, later in Boston, and again recently in Leipzig).

After the condemnation of the members of the Communist League in Cologne, Marx withdrew from political agitation and for ten years devoted himself on the one hand to the study of the rich treasures offered by the library of the British Museum in the sphere of political economy, and on the other hand to collaboration in the *New York Tribune*, which up to the outbreak of the American Civil War not only published signed contributions from his pen but also numerous leading articles on conditions in Europe and Asia. His attacks on Lord Palmerston, based on detailed study of English official documents, were reprinted in London as pamphlets.

As the first fruit of his many years of study of economics, there appeared in 1859: *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Erstes Heft* [*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*,

Part I] (Berlin, Duncker). This work contains the first comprehensive exposition of the Marxian theory of value, including the theory of money. During the Italian war, Marx (in the German newspaper *Das Volk* appearing in London) attacked both Bonapartism, which was then pretending to be liberal and playing the part of liberator of the oppressed nationalities, and also the Prussian policy of the time, which under the cover of neutrality was seeking to fish in troubled waters. In this connection it was also necessary to attack Herr Karl Vogt, who at that time, on the commission of Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon), and being in the pay of Louis Napoleon, was carrying on agitation for the neutrality, and indeed the sympathy, of Germany. When Vogt heaped upon him the most abominable, deliberately lying calumnies, Marx answered with: *Herr Vogt* (London, 1860) in which Vogt and the other gentlemen of the imperialist sham democratic gang were exposed and Vogt himself on the basis of both external and internal evidence was convicted of receiving bribes from the December empire. The confirmation came just ten years later: in the list of the Bonaparte hirelings, found in the Tuileries in 1870 and published by the September government, there occurred under the letter V: "Vogt—handed over to him in August 1859—Frs. 40,000."

Finally, in 1867 there appeared in Hamburg: *Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Erster Band* [*Capital, a Critique of Political Economy*, Volume I], Marx's chief work, which expounds the basis of his economic socialist conceptions and the main features of his criticism of existing society, of the capitalist mode of production and its consequences. The second edition of this epoch-making work appeared in 1872; the author is engaged on the elaboration of the second volume.

In the meanwhile the labour movement in various countries of Europe had so far regained strength that Marx could realise a long-cherished wish: the foundation of a Workers' Association embracing the most advanced countries of Europe and America, which would demonstrate, so to speak, in person the international character of the socialist movement both to the workers themselves and to the bourgeois and the governments—

for the encouragement and strengthening of the proletariat, for striking fear into its enemies. A mass meeting in favour of Poland, which was just then again being crushed by Russia, held on September 28, 1864, in St. Martin's Hall in London, provided an occasion for bringing forward the matter, which was enthusiastically taken up. The *International Working Men's Association* was founded; a Provisional General Council, with its seat in London, was elected at the meeting, and Marx was the soul of this as of all subsequent General Councils up to the Hague Congress. He drafted almost every one of the documents issued by the General Council of the International, from the *Inaugural Address*, 1864, to the *Address on the Civil War in France*, 1870. To describe Marx's activity in the International is to describe this Association itself, which in any case still lives in the memory of European workers.

The fall of the Paris Commune put the International in an impossible position. It was thrust into the forefront of European history at a moment when it had everywhere been deprived of all possibility of successful practical action. The events which raised it to the position of the seventh Great Power simultaneously forbade it from mobilising its fighting forces and employing them in action, on pain of inevitable defeat and the setting back of the labour movement for decades. In addition, from various sides elements were pushing themselves forward which sought to exploit the suddenly enhanced fame of the Association for purposes of personal vanity or personal ambition, without understanding the real position of the International or without regard for it. A heroic decision had to be taken and it was again Marx who took it and who carried it through at the Hague Congress. In a formal resolution, the International disclaimed all responsibility for the activities of the Bakunists who formed the central point of all the ignorant and unsavory elements. Then, in view of the impossibility, in the face of the general reaction, of meeting the increased demands which were also being imposed upon it, and of maintaining its complete efficacy other than by a series of sacrifices which would have drained the labour movement of its life-blood—in view of this situation,

the International withdrew from the stage for the time being by transferring the General Council to America. The results have proved how correct was this decision—which was at the time, and has been since, so often censured. On the one hand, it put a stop then and since to all attempts to make useless *putsches* in the name of the International, while on the other hand the continuing close intercourse between the socialist workers' parties of the various countries proved that the consciousness of the equality of interests and of the solidarity of the proletariat of all countries evoked by the International is able to find expression even without the bond of a formal international association, which for the moment had become a fetter.

After the Hague Congress, Marx at last again found peace and leisure for resuming his theoretical work and it is to be hoped he will be able before long to have the second volume of *Capital* ready for the press.

Of the many important discoveries through which Marx has inscribed his name in the history of science, we can here mention only two.

The first is the revolution brought about by him in the whole conception of world history. The whole previous view of history was based on the conception that the ultimate causes for all historical changes are to be looked for in the changing ideas of human beings, and that of all historical changes, political changes are the most important and are dominant in the whole of history. But the question was not asked as to whence the ideas come into men's minds and what the driving causes of the political changes are. Only upon the newer school of French, and partly also of English, historians had the conviction forced itself that, since the Middle Ages at least, the driving force in European history had been the struggle of the developing bourgeoisie with the feudal aristocracy for social and political domination. Marx has now proved that the whole of previous history is a history of class struggles, that in all the simple and complicated political struggles what has been at issue has been only the social and political rule of social classes, the maintenance of domination by older classes and the con-

quest of domination by newly arising classes. To what, however, do these classes owe their origin and their continued existence? They owe it to the particular material, physically sensible conditions in which society at a given period produces and exchanges its means of subsistence. The feudal rule of the Middle Ages rested on the self-sufficient economy of small peasant communities which themselves produced almost all their requirements, in which there was almost no exchange and which received from the arms-bearing nobility protection from without and national or at least political cohesion. When the towns arose and with them separate handicraft industry and trade intercourse, at first internal and later international, the urban bourgeoisie developed and even during the Middle Ages achieved, in struggle with the nobility, its inclusion in the feudal order as a privileged estate as well. But with the discovery of the extra-European world, from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, this bourgeoisie acquired a far more extensive sphere of trade and therewith a new stimulus for its industry; in the most important branches handicrafts were supplanted by manufacture, already on a factory scale, and this again was supplanted by large-scale industry, which became possible owing to the discoveries of the previous century, especially that of the steam-engine, and which in its turn reacted on trade by driving out handicraft labour in the backward countries, and creating the present-day new means of communication, steam-engines, railways, electric telegraphy, in the more developed ones. Thus the bourgeoisie came more and more to combine social wealth and social power in its hands, while it still for a long period remained excluded from political power, which remained in the hands of the nobility and the monarchy supported by the nobility. But at a certain stage—in France after the Great Revolution—it also conquered political power and from then on became a ruling class over the proletariat and small peasants. From this point of view all the historical phenomena are explicable in the simplest possible way—with sufficient knowledge of the particular economic position of society, which it is true is totally lacking in our professional his-

torians, and in the same way the conceptions and ideas of each historical period are most simply to be explained from the economic conditions of life and from the social and political relations of the period which are in turn determined by these economic conditions. History was for the first time placed on its real basis; the obvious but previously totally overlooked fact that men must first of all eat, drink, have clothing and shelter, therefore must *work*, before they can fight for domination, pursue politics, religion, philosophy, etc.—this obvious fact obtained at last its historical rights.

This new conception of history, however, was of supreme significance for the socialist outlook. It showed that all previous history moved in class antagonisms and class struggles, that there have always existed ruling and ruled, exploiting and exploited classes, and that the great majority of mankind has always been condemned to arduous labour and little enjoyment. Why is this? Simply because in all earlier stages of development of mankind production was so little developed that the historical development could only proceed in this antagonistic form, that historical progress as a whole was dependent on the activity of a small privileged minority, while the great mass remained condemned to producing by their labour their own meagre means of subsistence and also the increasingly rich means of the privileged. But the same investigation of history, which in this way provides a natural and reasonable explanation of the previous class rule, otherwise only explicable from the wickedness of man, also leads to the understanding that, in consequence of the so colossally heightened productive forces of the present time, even the last pretext has vanished for a division of mankind into rulers and ruled, exploiters and exploited, at least in the most advanced countries; that the ruling big bourgeoisie has fulfilled its historic mission, that it is no longer capable of the leadership of society and has even become a hindrance to the development of production, as the trade crises, and especially the last great collapse and the depressed condition of industry in all countries, has proved; that historical leadership has passed to the proletariat, a class which owing to its whole position in society can only free

itself by abolishing altogether all class rule, all servitude and all exploitation; and that the social productive forces which have outgrown the control of the bourgeoisie are only waiting for the associated proletariat to take possession of them in order to bring about a state of things in which every member of society will be enabled to participate not only in production but also in the distribution and administration of social wealth, and which so increases the social productive forces and their yield by planned operation of the whole of production that the satisfaction of all reasonable needs will be assured for everyone to an ever increasing degree.

The second important discovery of Marx is the final elucidation of the relation between capital and labour, in other words, the demonstration how, within present society under the existing capitalist mode of production, the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist takes place. When once political economy had put forward the proposition that labour is the source of all wealth and of all value, the question became inevitable: "How is this then to be reconciled with the fact that the wage worker does not receive the whole sum of value created by his labour but has to surrender a part of it to the capitalist?" Both the bourgeois economists and the socialists exerted themselves to give a scientifically valid answer to this question, but in vain, until at last Marx came forward with the solution. This solution is as follows. The present capitalist mode of production has as its presupposition the existence of two social classes; on the one hand that of the capitalists, who are in possession of the means of production and subsistence, and on the other hand that of the proletarians, who, being excluded from this possession, have only a single commodity for sale: their labour power; and who therefore have to sell this labour power of theirs in order to obtain possession of the means of subsistence. The value of a commodity is, however, determined by the socially necessary quantity of labour embodied in its production, and therefore also in its reproduction; the value of the labour power of an average human being during a day, month or year is determined therefore by the quantity of labour embodied in the quantity of means of

subsistence necessary for the maintenance of this labour power during a day, month or year. Let us assume that the means of subsistence of a worker for one day require six hours of labour for their production or, what is the same thing, that the labour contained in them represents a quantity of labour of six hours; then the value of labour power for one day will be expressed in a sum of money which also embodies six hours of labour. Let us assume further that the capitalist who employs our worker pays him this sum in return, pays him, therefore, the full value of his labour power. If now the worker works six hours of the day for the capitalist, then he has thereby completely replaced the latter's outlay—six hours' labour for six hours' labour. In this it is true there is nothing which falls to the share of the capitalist and the latter therefore looks at the matter quite differently. He says: "I have bought the labour power of this worker not for six hours but for a whole day," and accordingly he makes the worker work 8, 10, 12, 14 or more hours, according to circumstances, so that the product of the seventh, eighth and following hours is a product of unpaid labour and falls in the first place into the pocket of the capitalist. Thus the worker in the service of the capitalist not only reproduces the value of his labour power, for which he receives pay, but over and above that he also produces a *surplus value* which, appropriated in the first place by the capitalist, in its further course is divided according to definite economic laws among the whole capitalist class and forms the basic stock from which arises ground rent, profit, accumulation of capital, in short all the wealth consumed or accumulated by the non-toiling classes. But this also proved that the acquisition of riches by the present-day capitalists consists just as much in the appropriation of the unpaid labour of others as that of the slave owner or the feudal lord exploiting serf labour, and that all these forms of exploitation are only to be distinguished by the difference in manner and method by which the unpaid labour is appropriated. This, however, also removed the last justification for all the hypocritical phrases of the possessing classes to the effect that in the present social order right and justice, equality of rights and duties and a general harmony

of interests prevail, and present-day bourgeois society no less than its predecessors is exposed as a grandiose institution for the exploitation of the huge majority of the people by a small, ever diminishing minority.

Modern scientific socialism is based on these two important facts. In the second volume of *Capital* these and other hardly less important scientific discoveries concerning the capitalist system of society will be further developed, and thereby those aspects also of political economy not touched upon in the first volume will undergo revolutionisation. May it be vouchsafed to Marx to be able soon to have it ready for the press.

SPEECH AT THE GRAVESIDE OF KARL MARX

(Delivered at Highgate cemetery, London, March 17, 1883[1])

On the 14th of March, at a quarter to three in the afternoon, the greatest living thinker ceased to think. He had been left alone for scarcely two minutes, and when we came back we found him in an armchair, peacefully gone to sleep—but forever.

An immeasurable loss has been sustained both by the militant proletariat of Europe and America, and by historical science, in the death of this man. The gap that has been left by the death of this mighty spirit will soon enough make itself felt.

Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history; he discovered the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, religion, art, etc.; and that therefore the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, the art and even the religious ideas of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which these things must therefore be explained, instead of *vice versa* as had hitherto been the case.

But that is not all. Marx also discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created. The discovery of surplus value suddenly threw light on

[1] Published in the Zurich *Sozialdemokrat*, No. 13, March 22, 1883.—*Ed.*

the problem in trying to solve which all previous investigators, both bourgeois economists and socialist critics, had been groping in the dark.

Two such discoveries would be enough for one lifetime. Happy the man to whom it is granted to make even one such discovery. But in every single field which Marx investigated—and he investigated very many fields, none of them superficially—in every field, even in that of mathematics, he made independent discoveries.

Such was the man of science. But this was not even half the man. Science was for Marx a historically dynamic, revolutionary force. However great the joy with which he welcomed a new discovery in some theoretical science whose practical application perhaps it was as yet quite impossible to envisage, he experienced quite another kind of joy when the discovery involved immediate revolutionary changes in industry and in the general course of history. For example, he followed closely the development of the discoveries made in the field of electricity and recently those of Marcel Deprez.[1]

For Marx was before all else a revolutionary. His real mission in life was to contribute in one way or another to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the present-day proletariat, which *he* was the first to make conscious of its own position and its needs, of the conditions under which it could win its emancipation. Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion, a tenacity and a success such as few could rival. His work on the first *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842), the Paris *Vorwärts* (1844), the Brussels *Deutsche Zeitung* (1847), the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848-49), the *New York Tribune* (1852-61), and in addition to these a host of militant pamphlets, work in revolutionary clubs in Paris, Brussels and London, and finally, crowning all, the formation of the International Working Men's Association[2]—this was indeed an achieve-

[1] Marcel Deprez (1843-1918). French physicist who made the first experiments at transmission of power from a distance. — *Ed.*

[2] The First International.—*Ed.*

ment of which its founder might well have been proud even if he had done nothing else.

And consequently Marx was the best hated and most calumniated man of this time. Governments, both absolutist and republican, deported him from their territories. The bourgeoisie, whether conservative or extreme democrat, vied with one another in heaping slanders upon him. All this he brushed aside as though it were cobweb, ignoring it, answering only when necessity compelled him. And now he has died—beloved, revered and mourned by millions of revolutionary fellow-workers—from the mines of Siberia to California, in all parts of Europe and America—and I make bold to say that though he may have many opponents he has hardly one personal enemy.

His name will endure through the ages, and so also will his work!

KARL MARX [1]

KARL MARX was born May 5, 1818, in the city of Treves (in the Rhine province of Prussia). His father was a lawyer—a Jew, who in 1824 adopted Protestantism. The family was well-to-do, cultured, but not revolutionary. After graduating from the *gymnasium* in Trier, Marx first entered the university at Bonn, later Berlin University, where he studied jurisprudence, but devoted most of his time to history and philosophy. At the conclusion of his university course in 1841, he submitted his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. Marx at that time was still an adherent of Hegel's idealism. In Berlin he belonged to the circle of "Left Hegelians" (Bruno Bauer and others) who sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

After graduating from the university, Marx moved to Bonn in the expectation of becoming a professor. However, the reactionary policy of the government—which in 1832 deprived Ludwig Feuerbach of his chair and in 1836 again refused to allow him to teach, while in 1841 it forbade the young professor, Bruno Bauer, to give lectures at Bonn—forced Marx to abandon the idea of pursuing an academic career. The development of the ideas of Left Hegelianism in Germany was very rapid at that time. Ludwig Feuerbach, in particular, after 1836 began to criticise theology and to turn to materialism, which by 1841 had gained the upper hand in his conceptions (*Das Wesen des Christentums* [*The Essence of Christianity*]); in 1843 his

[1] This article of Lenin was written between July and November, 1914, and was first published in the seventh edition of the Granat Encyclopædia.—*Ed.*

Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft [*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*] appeared. Of these works of Feuerbach, Engels subsequently wrote: "One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of these books." "We" (the Left Hegelians, including Marx) "at once became Feuerbachians." [1] At that time the radical bourgeois of the Rhine province, who had certain points of contact with the Left Hegelians, founded, in Cologne, an opposition paper, the *Rheinische Zeitung* (first appeared on January 1, 1842). Marx and Bruno Bauer were invited as chief contributors, and in October 1842, Marx became editor-in-chief and moved from Bonn to Cologne. As the revolutionary-democratic tendency of the paper under Marx's editorship became more and more pronounced, the government first subjected the paper to double and triple censorship, then decided on its complete suppression as from January 1, 1843. So Marx had to resign his post as editor before that date, but his resignation did not save the paper, which was forced to suspend publication in March 1843. Of Marx's larger articles that were published in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, besides those indicated below (see *Bibliography*[2]), Engels notes an article on the situation of the peasant wine-growers in the Moselle Valley. Marx's newspaper work revealed to him that he was not sufficiently acquainted with political economy, and he set out to study it diligently.

In 1843 Marx married, in Kreuznach, Jenny von Westphalen, a childhood friend to whom he had been engaged since his student years. His wife came from a reactionary family of the Prussian nobility. Her elder brother was Prussian Minister for the Interior in one of the most reactionary epochs, 1850-58. In the autumn of 1843, Marx went to Paris in order to publish a radical magazine abroad, together with Arnold Ruge (1802-80; a Left Hegelian; in prison, 1825-30; a political exile after

[1] Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach.—Ed.*

[2] Lenin appends to this article a bibliography of Marxism, here omitted, which includes Marx's criticism of the debates in the Rhenish Diet on freedom of the press and on the law against thefts of wood as well as articles in defence of the emancipation of politics from theology.—*Ed.*

1848; a Bismarckian after 1866-70). Only one issue of this magazine, entitled *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* appeared. It was discontinued owing to the difficulties of distributing the magazine in Germany in a secret way, also due to disagreements with Ruge. In his articles published in that magazine, Marx already appears as a revolutionary, advocating "merciless criticism of everything in existence," particularly "criticism with weapons," and appealing to the *masses* and to the *proletariat.*

In September 1844, Frederick Engels came to Paris for a few days and henceforth became Marx's closest friend. Both of them took a very active part in the seething life of the revolutionary groups of Paris (where Proudhon's doctrine was then of particular importance; later Marx settled thoroughly with that doctrine in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, 1847). While vigorously fighting the various doctrines of petty-bourgeois socialism, they worked out the theory and tactics of revolutionary *proletarian socialism*, or communism (Marxism). See Marx's works of this period—1844-48—in the *Bibliography.* In 1845, at the insistence of the Prussian government, Marx was banished from Paris as a dangerous revolutionary. From Paris he moved to Brussels. In the spring of 1847 Marx and Engels joined a secret propaganda society bearing the name "Bund der Kommunisten" [Communist League], at whose second congress they took a prominent part (London, November 1847), and at whose behest they composed the famous *Manifesto of the Communist Party* which appeared in February 1848. With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines a new conception of the world—a consistent materialism extending also to the realm of social life; it proclaims dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of evolution; the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat as the creator of a new communist society.

When the February Revolution, 1848, broke out, Marx was banished from Belgium. He returned to Paris and from there, after the March Revolution, to Cologne, in Germany. From June 1, 1848, to May 19, 1849, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published in Cologne with Marx as editor-in-chief. The

new doctrine found excellent corroboration in the course of the revolutionary events of 1848-49, as it has subsequently been corroborated by all the proletarian and democratic movements of all the countries of the world. Victorious counter-revolution in Germany first instigated court proceedings against Marx (he was acquitted February 9, 1849), then banished him from Germany (May 16, 1849). He first went to Paris, from where he was also banished after the demonstration of June 13, 1849. He then went to London, where he lived to the end of his days.

The life of an emigrant, as revealed most clearly in the correspondence between Marx and Engels (published in 1913), was very hard. Poverty weighed heavily on Marx and his family. Were it not for Engels' self-sacrifice in rendering financial aid to Marx, he would not only have been unable to complete *Capital*, but would inevitably have perished under the pressure of want. Moreover, the prevailing theories and trends of petty-bourgeois and of non-proletarian socialism in general forced Marx to carry on a continuous and merciless fight, sometimes to repel the most savage and monstrous personal attacks (*Herr Vogt*). Keeping aloof from the emigrant circles, Marx developed his materialist doctrine in a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), giving most of his time to the study of political economy. This science was revolutionised by Marx (see below, *Marx's Teaching*) in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (Vol. I, 1867).

The period of the revival of democratic movements at the end of the 'fifties and the beginning of the 'sixties again called Marx to political activity. In 1864 (September 28), the International Working Men's Association—the famous First International—was founded in London. Marx was the soul of this organisation, the author of its first Address and of a host of its resolutions, declarations, manifestoes. Uniting the labour movement of the various countries; striving to direct into the channel of joint activities the various forms of the non-proletarian, pre-Marxian socialism (Mazzini, Proudhon, Bakunin, Liberal trade unionism in England, Lassalle's vacillations to the Right in Germany, etc.); fighting against the theories of all these sects and schools,

Marx hammered out the common tactics of the proletarian struggle of the working class in the various countries. After the fall of the Paris Commune (1871)—which Marx analysed with so much penetration, pertinence and brilliance, with such *effectiveness*, such revolutionary spirit (in *The Civil War in France*, 1871)—and after the International had been split by Bakunists, it became impossible for that organisation to keep its headquarters in Europe. After the Hague Congress of the International (1872) Marx carried through the transfer of the General Council of the International to New York. The First International had accomplished its historic role, giving way to a period of an infinitely larger growth of the labour movement in all the countries of the world, precisely the period when this movement grew in *breadth* and *scope*, when *mass* socialist labour parties were created on the basis of individual national states.

Strenuous work in the International and still more strenuous theoretical activities undermined Marx's health completely. He continued his work on political economy and the completion of *Capital*, collecting a mass of new material and studying a number of languages (for instance, Russian), but illness did not allow him to finish *Capital*.

On December 2, 1881, his wife died. On March 14, 1883, Marx peacefully passed away in his armchair. He lies buried beside the graves of his wife and Helene Demuth, their devoted servant and almost a member of the family, at the Highgate Cemetery in London.

Marx's Teaching

Marxism is the system of the views and teachings of Marx. Marx was the genius who continued and completed the three chief ideological currents of the nineteenth century, represented respectively by the three most advanced countries of humanity: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines. The remarkable consistency and unity of conception of Marx's views, acknowledged even by his opponents, which in their totality constitute modern materialism and modern scien-

tific socialism as the theory and programme of the labour movement in all the civilised countries of the world, make it necessary for us to present a brief outline of his world conception in general before proceeding to the chief contents of Marxism, namely, the economic doctrine of Marx.

Philosophic Materialism

Beginning with the years 1844-45, when his views were definitely formed, Marx was a materialist, and especially a follower of Feuerbach; even in later times, he saw Feuerbach's weak side only in this, that his materialism was not sufficiently consistent and comprehensive. For Marx, Feuerbach's world-historic and "epoch-making" significance consisted in his having decisively broken away from the idealism of Hegel, and in his proclamation of materialism, which even in "the eighteenth century, especially in France, had been a struggle not only against the existing political institutions, and along with it against . . . religion and theology, but also . . . against every form of metaphysics" (in the sense of "intoxicated speculation" as distinguished from "sober philosophy"). (*Die Heilige Familie* [*The Holy Family*] in the *Literarischer Nachlass.*)

"To Hegel," wrote Marx, in the preface to the second edition of the first volume of *Capital*, "the life process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the idea.' With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."[1]

In full conformity with Marx's materialist philosophy, and expounding it, Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring*[2] (which Marx read in manuscript):

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. xxx, Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling's translation, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London, 1908.—*Ed.*

[2] The abridged title of Engels' celebrated work: *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* [*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*], published first as a series of articles in the Berlin *Vorwärts* during 1877-78 and issued in book form in 1878.—*Ed.*

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being. . . . The real unity of the world consists in its materiality and this is proved . . . by a long and protracted development of philosophy and natural science.[1] . . . *Motion is the mode of existence of matter.* Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be . . . . Matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter.[2] . . . But if the . . . question is raised: what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain, and that man himself is a product of nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment; whence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature, but are in correspondence with it.[3] . . . Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images" (in the original: *Abbilder* [images, copies]; sometimes Engels speaks of "imprints") "of real things and processes, but, on the contrary, things and their development were to him only the images made real of the 'Idea' existing somewhere or other already before the world existed."[4]

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach*—in which Engels expounds his own and Marx's views on Feuerbach's philosophy, and which Engels sent to the press after re-reading an old manuscript, written by Marx and himself in 1844-45, on Hegel, Feuerbach, and the materialist conception of history—Engels writes:

"The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being . . . spirit to nature . . . which is primary, spirit or nature. . . . The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other . . . comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism."[5]

Any other use (in a philosophic sense) of the terms idealism and materialism leads only to confusion. Marx decidedly rejected not only idealism, always connected in one way or another with religion, but also the views of Hume and Kant, which are especially widespread in our day, along with agnosticism, criticism, positivism in their various forms; he considered such philosophy as a "reactionary" concession to idealism, at best as a "shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting

[1] *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 52-53, 1935 edition.—*Ed.*
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 70.—*Ed.*
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.—*Ed.*
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 30.—*Ed.*
[5] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 430-31 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

materialism, while denying it before the world." [1] On this question see, besides the above-mentioned works of Engels and Marx, a letter of Marx to Engels, dated December 12, 1866, in which Marx, taking cognisance of an utterance of the well-known naturalist T. Huxley, couched "in a more materialistic spirit" than usual, as well as his recognition that "as long as we actually observe and think, we cannot possibly get away from materialism," reproaches him for once more leaving a new "loophole" for agnosticism and Humism. It is especially important that we should note Marx's opinion concerning the relation between freedom and necessity: "Freedom is the realisation of necessity. 'Necessity is *blind* only *in so far as it is not understood*' " (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*). This means the recognition of the objective reign of law in nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom (at the same time, an acknowledgement of the transformation of the unknown but knowable "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us," of the "essence of things" into "phenomena"). Marx and Engels pointed out the following major shortcomings of the "old" materialism, including Feuerbach's (and, *a fortiori*, the "vulgar" materialism of Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott): (1) it was "predominantly mechanistic," and took no account of the latest developments of chemistry and biology (in our day it would be necessary to add the electric theory of matter); (2) it was non-historical, non-dialectical (metaphysical, in the sense of being anti-dialectical), and did not apply the standpoint of evolution consistently and all-sidedly; (3) it regarded "human beings" abstractly, and not as a "synthesis" of "all social relationships" (definite, concretely-historical)—and thus only "interpreted" the world, whereas it was a question of "changing" it, that is, it did not grasp the significance of "practical revolutionary activity."

Dialectics

Marx and Engels regarded Hegelian dialectics, the theory of evolution which is most comprehensive, rich in content and

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 433.—*Ed.*

profound, as the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. All other formulations of the principle of development, of evolution, they regarded as one-sided, poor in content, as distorting and mutilating the actual course of development in nature and society (which often proceeded by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions).

"Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics" (from the collapse of idealism including Hegelianism) "and apply it in the materialist conception of nature.[1] . . . Nature is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test" (written before the discovery of radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements), "and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical."[2]

Again Engels writes:

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidents and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end—this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things." [3]

"For" dialectical philosophy "nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendency from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." [4]

Thus dialectics, according to Marx, is "the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought." [5]

This revolutionary side of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences."[6]

[1] *Anti-Dühring*, p. 15.—*Ed.*
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 29.—*Ed.*
[3] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 453 of the present volume.—*Ed.*
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 422.—*Ed.*
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 452.—*Ed.*
[6] *Anti-Dühring*, p. 31.—*Ed.*

Of former philosophies there remains "the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics." [1] Dialectics, as the term is understood by Marx in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of cognition, or gnoseology, a science that must contemplate its subject matter in the same way—historically, studying and generalising the origin and development of cognition, the transition from ignorance to knowledge.

In our times, the idea of development, of evolution, has almost fully penetrated social consciousness, but it has done so in other ways, not through Hegel's philosophy. But the same idea, as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel's philosophy, is much more comprehensive, much more abundant in content than the current theory of evolution. A development that repeats, as it were, the stages already passed but repeats them in a different way, on a higher plane ("negation of negation"); a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; a spasmodic, catastrophic, revolutionary development; "breaks of gradualness"; transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses for development, imparted by the contradiction, the conflict of different forces and tendencies reacting on a given body or inside a given phenomenon or within a given society; interdependence, and the closest, indissoluble connection between all sides of every phenomenon (history disclosing ever newer and newer sides); a connection that provides the one world-process of motion proceeding according to law—such are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of evolution more full of meaning than the current one. (See letter of Marx to Engels, dated January 8, 1868, in which he ridicules Stein's "wooden trichotomies," which it is absurd to confuse with materialist dialectics.)

Materialist Conception of History

Realising the inconsistency, the incompleteness, and the one-sidedness of the old materialism, Marx became convinced of the necessity of bringing "the science of society . . . into har-

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 31.—*Ed.*

mony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon." [1]

If materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of existence, and not conversely, then materialism as applied to the social life of mankind must explain *social* consciousness as the outcome of *social* existence.

"Technology," writes Marx in the first volume of *Capital*, "discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them."[2] In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history, in the following words:

"In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, æsthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between

[1] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 439 of the present volume.—*Ed.*
[2] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 367, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*

the social forces of production and the relations of production. . . . In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. . . ." (Compare Marx's brief formulation in a letter to Engels, dated July 7, 1866: "our theory that the *organisation of labour is determined by the means of production.*")

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or, more correctly, the consistent extension of materialism to the domain of social phenomena, obviated the two chief defects in earlier historical theories. For, in the first place, those theories, at best, examined only the ideological motives of the historical activity of human beings without investigating the origin of these ideological motives, without grasping the objective conformity to law in the development of the system of social relationships, and without discerning the roots of these social relationships in the degree of development of material production. In the second place, the earlier historical theories did not cover precisely the activities of the *masses*, whereas historical materialism first made it possible to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the masses and the changes in these conditions. *At best*, pre-Marxist "sociology" and historiography gave an accumulation of raw facts collected at random, and a description of separate sides of the historic process. Examining the *totality* of all the opposing tendencies, reducing them to precisely definable conditions in the mode of life and the method of production of the various *classes* of society, discarding subjectivism and arbitrariness in the choice of various "leading" ideas or in their interpretation, showing how all the ideas and all the various tendencies, without exception, have their roots in the condition of the material forces of production, Marxism pointed the way to a comprehensive, an all-embracing study of the rise, development, and decay of social economic structures. People make their own history; but what determines their motives, namely, the motives of people in the mass; what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and endeavours; what is the sum total of all these clashes among the whole mass of human societies; what are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all

the historical activity of man; what is the law of the development of these conditions—to all these matters Marx directed attention, pointing out the way to a scientific study of history as a unified and true-to-law process despite its being extremely variegated and contradictory.

Class Struggle

That in any given society the strivings of some of the members conflict with the strivings of others; that social life is full of contradictions; that history discloses to us a struggle among nations and societies, and also within each nation and each society, manifesting in addition an alternation between periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline—these facts are generally known. Marxism provides a clue which enables us to discover the reign of law in this seeming labyrinth and chaos; the theory of the class struggle. Nothing but the study of the totality of the strivings of all the members of a given society, or group of societies, can lead to the scientific definition of the result of these strivings. Now, the conflict of strivings arises from differences in the situation and modes of life of the *classes* into which society is divided.

"The history of all hitherto existing society," wrote Marx in *The Communist Manifesto*,[1] "is the history of class struggles" (except the history of the primitive community—Engels added).

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. . . .

"The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

"Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat."

[1] Pages 204-06 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

Since the time of the Great French Revolution, the class struggle as the real motive force of events has been most clearly manifest in all European history. During the Restoration period in France, there were already a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet, Thiers) who, generalising events, could not but recognise in the class struggle the key to the understanding of all the history of France. In the modern age—the period of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, of representative institutions, of extended (if not universal) suffrage, of a cheap daily press reaching the masses, etc., of powerful and ever-expanding organisations of workers and employers, etc.—the class struggle (though sometimes in a highly one-sided, "peaceful," "constitutional" form) has shown itself still more obviously to be the mainspring of events. The following passage from Marx's *Communist Manifesto* will show us what Marx demanded of social sciences as regards an objective analysis of the situation of every class in modern society as well as an analysis of the condition of development of every class.

"Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product. The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat." [1]

In a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), Marx gave brilliant and profound examples of materialist historiography, an analysis of the position of *each* separate class, and sometimes of that of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how "every class struggle is a political struggle." The above quoted passage is an illustration of what a complex network of social relations and *transitional stages* between one class and another, between the past and the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 216—*Ed.*

future, Marx analyses in order to determine the resultant of the whole historical development.

Marx's economic doctrine is the most profound, the most manysided, and the most detailed confirmation and application of his teaching.

Marx's Economic Doctrine

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society" (that is to say, capitalist, bourgeois society), writes Marx in the preface to the first volume of *Capital*. The study of the production relationships in a given, historically determined society, in their genesis, their development, and their decay—such is the content of Marx's economic teaching. In capitalist society the dominant feature is the production of *commodities*, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of commodities.

Value

A commodity is, firstly, something that satisfies a human need; and, secondly, it is something that is exchanged for something else. The utility of a thing gives it *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) presents itself first of all as the proportion, the ratio, in which a certain number of use-values of one kind are exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another kind. Daily experience shows us by millions upon millions of such exchanges that all and sundry use-values, in themselves very different and not comparable with one another, are equated to one another. Now, what is common in these various things which are constantly weighed one against another in a definite system of social relationships? That which is common to them is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products, people equate to one another most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relationships in which different producers produce various products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in exchange. Consequently,

the element common to all commodities is not concrete labour in a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, represented in the sum total of values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power. Millions and millions of exchange transactions prove this. Consequently, each particular commodity represents only a certain part of *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of the value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of the given commodity, of the given use-value.

". . . whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it." [1]

As one of the earlier economists said, value is a relationship between two persons, only he should have added that it is a relationship hidden beneath a material wrapping. We can only understand what value is when we consider it from the point of view of a system of social production relationships in one particular historical type of society and, moreover, of relationships which present themselves in a mass form, the phenomenon of exchange repeating itself millions upon millions of times.

"As values, all commodities are but definite measures of congealed labour time." [2]

Having made a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyse the *form* of *value* and of *money*. His main task, then, is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of the development of exchange, beginning with isolated and casual acts of exchange ("simple, isolated, or casual value form," in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another), passing on to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same partic-

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 45, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*
[2] *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.*—*Ed.*

ular commodity, and ending with the money form of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal equivalent. Being the highest product of the development of exchange and of commodity production, money masks and hides the social character of individual labour, the social tie between the various producers whom the market brings together. Marx analyses in great detail the various functions of money; and it is essential to note that here (as generally in the opening chapters of *Capital*), what appears to be an abstract and at times purely deductive mode of exposition, in reality reproduces a gigantic collection of facts concerning the history of the development of exchange and commodity production.

". . . if we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production." [1]

Surplus Value

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was C—M—C (commodity—money—commodity), *i.e.*, the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. But the general formula of capital, on the contrary, is M—C—M (money—commodity—money), *i.e.*, purchase for the purpose of selling (at a profit). The designation "surplus value" is given by Marx to the increase over the original value of money that is put into circulation. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist society is well known. Indeed, it is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special, historically defined, social relationship of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of the circulation of commodities, for this represents only the exchange of equivalents; it cannot arise out of an advance in prices, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalise one another; and what we are

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 148, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*

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concerned with here is not the individual but the mass, average, social phenomenon. In order that he may be able to receive surplus value "Moneybags must . . . find . . . in the market a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"[1]—a commodity, the actual process of whose use is at the same time the process of the creation of value. Such a commodity exists. It is human labour power. Its use is labour and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which is determined, like the value of every other commodity, by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (that is to say, the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for the whole day—twelve hours, let us suppose. Meanwhile, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the labourer produces sufficient to pay back the cost of his own maintenance; and in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he produces a "surplus" product or surplus value for which the capitalist does not pay him. In capital, therefore, from the viewpoint of the process of production, we have to distinguish between two parts: first, constant capital, expended on the means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), the value of which is being (all at once or part by part) transferred, without any change, to the finished product, and secondly, variable capital, expended on labour power. The value of this latter capital is not constant, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. To express the degree of exploitation of labour power by capital, we must therefore compare the surplus value, not with the whole capital, but only with the variable capital. Thus, in the example just given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this relationship, will be 6:6, *i.e.*, 100 per cent.

The historical prerequisites to the genesis of capital are: first, accumulation of a considerable sum of money in the hands of individuals under conditions of a comparatively high development of commodity production in general, and second, the ex-

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 145.—*Ed.*

istence of workers who are "free" in a double sense of the term: free from any constraint or restriction as regards the sale of their labour power; free fom the land or from the means of production in general—*i.e.*, of propertyless workers, of "proletarians" who cannot maintain their existence except by the sale of their labour power.

There are two fundamental ways in which surplus value can be increased: by an increase in the working day ("absolute surplus value"), and by a reduction in the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). Analysing the former method, Marx gives an impressive picture of the struggle of the working class for shorter hours, and of governmental interference, in order to lengthen the working day (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth) and to shorten it (factory legislation of the nineteenth century). Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working class movement in all lands provides a wealth of new facts amplifying the picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three fundamental historical stages of the process whereby capitalism has increased the productivity of labour: (1) simple co-operation; (2) division of labour, and manufacture; (3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is shown by the fact that investigations of the so-called *kustar* industry[1] of Russia furnish abundant material for the illustration of the first two of these stages. The revolutionising effect of large-scale machine industry, described by Marx in 1867, has become evident in a number of "new" countries, such as Russia, Japan, etc., in the course of the last fifty years.

But to continue. Of extreme importance and originality is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, that is to say, the transformation of a portion of surplus value into capital and the applying of this portion to additional production, instead of using it to supply the personal needs or to gratify the whims of the capitalist. Marx pointed out the mistake made in earlier

[1] Home industry.—*Ed.*

classical political economy (from Adam Smith on), which assumed that all the surplus value which was transformed into capital became variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* plus variable capital. The more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital in the sum total of capital is of immense importance in the process of development of capitalism and in that of the transformation of capitalism into socialism.

The accumulation of capital, accelerating the replacement of workers by machinery, creating wealth at the one pole and poverty at the other, gives birth to the so-called "reserve army of labour," causes a "relative overabundance" of workers or "capitalist overpopulation." This assumes the most diversified forms, and gives capital the possibility of expanding production at an exceptionally rapid rate. This possibility, in conjunction with credit facilities and with the accumulation of capital in the means of production furnishes among other things the key to the understanding of the *crises* of overproduction that occur periodically in capitalist countries—first about every ten years, on an average, but subsequently at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From accumulation of capital upon a capitalist foundation we must distinguish the so-called "primitive accumulation": the forcible severance of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants off the land, the stealing of the communal lands, the colonial system and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates, at one pole, the "free" proletarian; at the other the owner of money, the capitalist.

The "*historical tendency of capitalist accumulation*" is described by Marx in the following remarkable words:

> "The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property,[1] that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalist private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, *i.e.*, on wage

[1] Lenin adds the words: "of the peasant and artisan."—*Ed.*

labour. . . . That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." [1]

Taken as a whole, Marx's analysis, in the second volume of *Capital*, of the reproduction of social capital, is of the greatest importance and quite new. Here, too, Marx deals, not with an individual phenomenon, but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society, but with this economy as a whole. In correcting the above-mentioned mistake of the classical economists, Marx divides the whole of social production into two great sections: production of means of production, and production of articles of consumption. Giving examples in figures he makes a detailed examination of the circulation of all social capital taken as a whole—both when it is reproduced in its previous proportions and when accumulation takes place. The third volume of *Capital* solves the problem of how the average rate of profit is formed on the basis of the law of value. An immense advance in economic science is this, that Marx conducts his analysis from the point of view of mass economic phenomena, of the aggregate of social economy, and not

[1] *Capital*, Vol. 1, chap. XXXII; also pp. 351-52 of the present volume. —*Ed.*

from the point of view of individual cases or upon the purely superficial aspects of competition—a limitation of view so often met with in vulgar political economy and in the contemporary "theory of marginal utility." First, Marx analyses the origin of surplus value, and then he goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between the surplus value and all the capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a "high organic composition" (*i.e.*, with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital to an extent above the social average) yields a less than the average rate of profit; capital with a "low organic composition" yields a more than the average rate of profit. Competition among the capitalists, who are free to transfer their capital from one branch of production to another, reduces the rate of profit in both cases to the average. The sum total of values of all the commodities in a given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of all the commodities; but in separate undertakings, and in separate branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities are sold, not in accordance with their values, but in accordance with the *prices of production*, which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

In this way the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalisation of profits is fully explained by Marx in conformity with the law of value; for the sum total of the values of all the commodities coincides with the sum total of all the prices. However, the adjustment of value (which is social) to prices (which are individual) does not proceed in a simple and direct way, but in an exceedingly complicated manner. Naturally, therefore, in a society made up of separate producers of commodities, connected solely through the market, conformity to law can only manifest itself as an average, general, mass conformity to law, with individual and mutually compensating deviations to one side or the other.

An increase in the productivity of labour means a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital. Inasmuch as surplus value is a function of variable capital

alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, and not to its variable part alone) has a tendency to fall. Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency and of the circumstances that incline to favour it or to counteract it. Without pausing to give an account of the extraordinarily interesting parts of the third volume of *Capital* that are devoted to the consideration of usurer's capital, commercial capital, and money capital, I shall turn to the most important subject of that volume, the theory of *ground rent.* Owing to the fact that the land area is limited, and that in capitalist countries it is all occupied by individual private owners, the production price of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production, not on soil of average quality, but on the worst soil, not under average conditions of bringing goods to the market, but under the worst conditions. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil (or under better conditions) constitutes *differential* rent. Analysing this in detail, and showing how it arises out of variations in the fertility of the individual plots of land and in the extent to which capital is applied to the land, Marx fully exposes (see also *Theorien über den Mehrwert* [*Theories of Surplus Value*], in which the criticism of Rodbertus' theory deserves particular attention) the error of Ricardo, who considered that differential rent is only obtained when there is a successive transition from better to worse lands. On the contrary, there may be inverse transitions, land may pass from one category into the other, owing to advances in agricultural technique, the growth of towns, and so on. and the notorious "law of diminishing fertility of the soil," charging nature with the insufficiencies, limitations, and contradictions of capitalism, is a profound error. Moreover, the equalisation of profit in all branches of industry and national economy in general presupposes complete freedom of competition, the free mobility of capital from one branch to another. But the private ownership of land, creating monopoly, hinders this free mobility. Thanks to this monopoly, the products of agriculture, where a low organic composition of capital prevails, and, consequently, individually, a higher rate of profit can be

secured, are not exposed to a perfectly free process of equalisation of the rate of profit. The landowner, being a monopolist, can keep the price of his produce above the average, and this monopoly price is the source of *absolute rent*. Differential rent cannot be done away with so long as capitalism exists; but absolute rent *can* be abolished even under capitalism—for instance, by nationalisation of the land, by the ownership of the land passing over to the state. Nationalisation of the land would put an end to the monopoly of private landowners, with the result that free competition would be more consistently and fully applied in the domain of agriculture. That is why, as Marx states, in the course of history the radical bourgeois have again and again come out with this progressive bourgeois demand of land nationalisation, which, however, frightens away the majority of the bourgeoisie, for it "touches" closely upon another monopoly that is particularly important and "tender" in our day—the monopoly of the means of production in general. (In a letter to Engels, dated August 2, 1862, Marx gives a remarkably popular, concise, and clear exposition of his theory of average rate of profit and of absolute ground rent. See *Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, pp. 77-81; also the letter of August 9, 1862, Vol. III, pp. 86-87.) For the history of ground rent it is also important to note Marx's analysis which shows how labour rent (when the peasant creates a surplus product by labouring on the lord's land) is transformed into rent in produce or rent in kind (the peasant creating a surplus product on his own land and handing this over to the lord of the soil under stress of "non-economic constraint"); then into money rent (which is the money equivalent of rent in kind, the *obrok*[1] of old Russia, thanks to the development of commodity production), and finally into capitalist rent, when the place of the peasant has been taken by the agricultural entrepreneur cultivating the soil with the help of wage labour. Some subtle ideas expressed by Marx on the *evolution of capitalism in agriculture* (this is of especial importance in its bearing on backward countries, such as Russia) should be noted in

[1] Quit-rent.—*Ed.*

connection with this analysis of the "genesis of capitalist ground rent."

"The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied, but even anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers, who hire themselves out for wages. During the period of their rise, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the better situated tributary farmers of exploiting agricultural labourers for their own account, just as the wealthier serfs in feudal times used to employ serfs for their own benefit. In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and to transform themselves even into future capitalists. The old self-employing possessors of the land thus give rise among themselves to a nursery for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned upon the general development of capitalist production outside of the rural districts." [1]

"The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home market." [2]

The impoverishment and ruin of the agricultural population lead, in their turn, to the formation of a reserve army of labour for capital. In every capitalist country:

"Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat. . . . (Manufacture is used here in the sense of all non-agricultural industries.) This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing. . . . The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism." [3]

The peasant's private ownership of the land he tills constitutes the basis of small-scale production and the condition for the latter's prospering and attaining its classical form. But such petty production is only compatible with a narrow and primitive framework of society and production. Under capitalism, the "exploitation" of the peasants "differs only in form from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury; the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the state taxes." [4]

"The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the

[1] *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 928, Kerr edition, Chicago, 1909.—*Ed.*
[2] *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 771-72, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 657-58.—*Ed.*
[4] *The Class Struggles in France*, Volume II of the present edition, p. 282.—*Ed.*

capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages." [1]

As a rule the peasant hands over to the capitalist society, *i.e.*, to the capitalist class, part of the wages of his own labour, sinking down "to the level of the Irish tenant farmer—all under the pretence of being a private proprietor." Why is it that

"the price of cereals" is "lower in countries with a predominance of small farmers than in countries with a capitalist mode of production"? [2]

The answer is that the peasant presents part of his surplus product as a free gift to society (*i.e.*, to the capitalist class).

"This lower price" (of grain and other agricultural products) "is also a result of the poverty of the producers and by no means of the productivity of their labour." [3]

The small-holding system, which is the normal form of petty production, degenerates, withers, perishes under capitalism.

"Small peasants' property excludes by its very nature the development of the social powers of production of labour, the social forms of labour, the social concentration of capitals, cattle raising on a large scale, and a progressive application of science.

"Usury and a system of taxation must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite dissipation of means of production and an isolation of the producers themselves go with it." (Co-operatives, *i.e.*, associations of small peasants, while playing an unusually progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency without eliminating it. One must not forget, besides, that these co-operatives do much for the well-to-do peasants, and very little, almost nothing, for the mass of poor peasants; also that the associations themselves become exploiters of wage labour.[4]) "Also an enormous waste of human energy. A progressive deterioration of the conditions of production and a raising of the price of means of production is a necessary law of small peasants' property." [5]

In agriculture as in industry, capitalism improves the production process only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producers."

"The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks their power of resistance while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productiveness and quantity of the labour set in motion are bought at

[1] *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Volume II of the present edition, pp. 434-35.—*Ed.*

[2] *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 937.—*Ed.*

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 937.—*Ed.*

[4] Inserted by Lenin.—*Ed.*

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 938-89.—*Ed.*

the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour power itself. Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer but of robbing the soil. . . . Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the labourer." [1]

Socialism

From the foregoing it is evident that Marx deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the movement of contemporary society. The chief material foundation of the inevitability of the coming of socialism is the socialisation of labour, advancing in its myriad forms ever more rapidly, and manifesting itself with special conspicuousness, throughout the half century that has elapsed since the death of Marx—in the growth of large-scale production, of capitalist cartels, syndicates, and trusts, as well as in the gigantic increase in the dimensions and the power of finance capital. The intellectual and moral driving force of this transformation, its physical executor, is the proletariat, trained by capitalism itself. The contest of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, assuming various forms which grow continually richer in content, inevitably becomes a political struggle aiming at the conquest of political power by the proletariat ("the dictatorship of the proletariat"). The socialisation of production cannot fail to lead to the transfer of the means of production into the possession of society, to the "expropriation of the expropriators." An immense increase in the productivity of labour; a reduction in working hours; replacement of the remnants, the ruins of petty, primitive, individual production by collective and improved labour—such will be the direct consequences of this transformation. Capitalism finally breaks the connection between agriculture and industry; but at the same time, in the course of its highest development, it prepares new elements for the establishment of a connection between the two, uniting industry and agriculture upon the basis of the conscious use of science and the combina-

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 514-15, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*

tion of collective labour, of the redistribution of population (putting an end at one and the same time to rural seclusion, isolation from the world, barbarism, and to the unnatural concentration of enormous masses of population in huge cities). A new type of family, changes in the position of women and in the upbringing of the younger generation, are being prepared by the highest forms of modern capitalism; the labour of women and children, the break-up of the patriarchal family by capitalism, necessarily assume in contemporary society the most terrible, disastrous, and repulsive forms. Nevertheless,

". . . modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economical foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, taken together form a series in historic development. Moreover, it is obvious that the fact of the collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane development. . . ." [1]

In the factory system are to be found

". . . the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings." [2]

Upon the same historical foundation, in the sense of not only throwing light on the past, but also of boldly foreseeing the future and bold practical activity directed towards its achievement, the socialism of Marx propounds the problems of nationality and the state. The nation is a necessary product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch of social development. The working class cannot grow strong, cannot mature, cannot consolidate itself unless it "constitutes itself *the* nation," unless it is "national" ("though not in the bourgeois sense of the word"). But the development of capitalism tends more and more

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 496, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., London.—*Ed.*
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 489.—*Ed.*

to break down the partitions that separate the nations from one another, does away with national isolation, substitutes class antagonism for national antagonism. In the developed capitalist countries, therefore, it is perfectly true that "the workingmen have no country," and that "united action" of the workers, in the civilised countries at least, "is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat" (*The Communist Manifesto*). The state, which is organised violence, came into being inevitably at a certain stage in the development of society, when this society had split into irreconcilable classes, and when it could not exist, without an "authority" supposed to be standing above society and to some extent separated from it. Arising out of class contradictions, the state becomes

". . . the state of the most powerful, economically dominating class that, with the help of this state, becomes also the politically dominating class, and thus acquires new means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed masses. The ancient state was thus the state of the slave-owners for subduing the slaves, just as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for subduing the serf-peasants, and as the modern representative state is a tool for the exploitation of wage labour by capital." (Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, a work in which the writer expounds his own views and Marx's.)

This condition of affairs persists even in a democratic republic, the freest and most progressive kind of bourgeois state; there is merely a change of form (the government becomes linked up with the stock exchange, and the officialdom and the press is corrupted by direct or indirect means, etc.). Socialism, putting an end to classes, will thereby lead to the abolition of the state.

"The first act," writes Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, "in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' *it withers away*." [1]

"The society that is to reorganise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will transfer the machinery of

[1] *Anti-Dühring*, p. 309.—*Ed.*

state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe."[1]

Finally, concerning the attitude of Marxian socialism towards the small peasantry, which will continue to exist in the period of the expropriation of the expropriators, we must refer to a declaration by Engels expressing Marx's views:

"When we are in possession of the state power, we shall not even dream of forcibly expropriating the small peasants (with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in relation to the large landowners. Our task as regards the small peasants will first of all consist in transforming their individual production and individual ownership into co-operative production and co-operative ownership, not forcibly, but by way of example, and by offering social aid for this purpose. We shall then have ample means of showing the small peasant all the advantages of this change—advantages which even now should be explained to him." (Engels, *The Agrarian Question in France and Germany*, first published in the *Neue Zeit*.[2])

Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat

Having discovered as early as 1844-45[3] that one of the chief defects of the earlier materialism was its failure to understand the conditions or recognise the importance of practical revolutionary activity, Marx, during all his life, along with his theoretical work, gave unremitting attention to the tactical problems of the class struggle of the proletariat. An immense amount of material bearing upon this is contained in *all* the works of Marx and particularly in the four volumes of his correspondence with Engels (*Briefwechsel*), published in 1913. This material is still far from having been collected, systematised, studied, and elaborated. This is why we shall have to confine ourselves to the most general and brief remarks, emphasising the point that Marx justly considered materialism without *this* side to be incomplete, one-sided, and devoid of vitality. The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with

[1] Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, pp. 211-2.—*Ed.*

[2] The theoretical organ of German Social-Democracy, Vol. XIII, 1, pp. 301-02, 1894.—*Ed.*

[3] Lenin refers here to Marx's and Engels' works: *The Holy Family*, *German Ideology* and Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*.—*Ed.*

the general principles of his materialist-dialectical outlook. Nothing but an objective account of the totality of all the mutual relationships of all the classes of a given society without exception, and consequently an account of the objective stage of development of this society, as well as an account of the mutual relationship between it and other societies, can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the advanced class. All classes and all countries are at the same time looked upon not statically, but dynamically, *i.e.*, not as motionless, but as in motion (the laws of their motion being determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). The motion, in its turn, is looked upon not only from the point of view of the past, but also from the point of view of the future; and, moreover, not only in accordance with the vulgar conception of the "evolutionists," who see only slow changes—but dialectically:

"In developments of such magnitude, twenty years are more than a day—so later on days may come in which twenty years are embodied," wrote Marx to Engels (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 127).

At each stage of development, at each moment, proletarian tactics must take account of these objectively unavoidable dialectics of human history, utilising, on the one hand, the periods of political stagnation, or periods when things are moving at a snail's pace along the road of so-called "peaceful" development, to increase the class consciousness, strength and fighting capacity of the advanced class; on the other hand, conducting this work in the direction of the "final aims" of the movement of this class, cultivating in it the faculty for practically carrying out great tasks in great days in which "twenty years are embodied." Two of Marx's arguments are of especial importance in this connection: one of these is in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and relates to the industrial struggle and to the industrial organisations of the proletariat; the other is in *The Communist Manifesto*, and relates to the proletariat's political tasks. The former runs as follows:

"Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss,

unites them in a common thought of resistance—*combination* . . . combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups . . . and, faced with always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wages. . . . In this struggle—a veritable civil war—are united and developed all the elements necessary for a coming battle. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character." [1]

Here we have the programme and the tactics of the economic struggle and the trade union movement for several decades to come, for the whole long period in which the workers are preparing for "a future battle." We must place side by side with this a number of references by Marx and Engels to the example of the British labour movement; how, in consequence of industrial "prosperity," attempts are made "to buy the workers" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. I, p. 136), to distract them from the struggle; how, generally speaking, this prosperity "demoralises the workers" (Vol. II, p. 218); how the British proletariat is becoming "bourgeoisified"; how "the ultimate aim of this most bourgeois of all nations seems to be to establish a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat side by side with the bourgeoisie" (Vol. II, p. 290); how the "revolutionary energy" of the British proletariat oozes away (Vol. III, p. 124); how it will be necessary to wait for a considerable time "before the British workers can rid themselves of their apparent bourgeois corruption" (Vol. III, p. 127); how the British movement "lacks the mettle of the Chartists" (1866: Vol. III, p. 305); how the British workers' leaders are developing into something between "a radical bourgeois and a worker" (Vol. IV, p. 209, on Holyoake); how, owing to British monopoly, and as long as that monopoly lasts "the British workingman will not budge" (Vol. IV, p. 433). The tactics of the economic struggle, in connection with the general course (and *the outcome*) of the labour movement, are here considered from a remarkably broad, many-sided, dialectical, and genuinely revolutionary outlook.

On the tactics of the political struggle, *The Communist Manifesto* advanced this fundamental Marxian thesis:

[1] *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 145, 1935 edition.—*Ed.*

"The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement." [1]

That was why in 1848 Marx supported the Polish party of the "agrarian revolution"—"the party which initiated the Cracow insurrection in the year 1846." In Germany during 1848 and 1849 he supported the radical revolutionary democracy, and subsequently never retracted what he had then said about tactics. He looked upon the German bourgeoisie as "inclined from the very beginning to betray the people" (only an alliance with the peasantry would have enabled the bourgeoisie completely to fulfil its tasks) "and to compromise with the crowned representatives of the old order of society." Here is Marx's summary account of the class position of the German bourgeoisie at the time of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—an analysis which, among other things, is an example of that materialism, which considers society in motion, and not only that part of the motion which is directed *backwards*!

"Lacking faith in themselves, lacking faith in the people, grumbling at those above, and trembling in face of those below . . . dreading a world-wide storm . . . nowhere with energy, everywhere with plagiarism . . . without initiative . . . —a miserable old man, doomed to guide in his own senile interests the first youthful impulses of a young and vigorous people. . . . (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 1848; see *Literarischer Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 213.)

About twenty years afterwards, writing to Engels[2] (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 224), Marx said that the cause of the failure of the Revolution of 1848 was that the bourgeoisie had preferred peace with slavery to the mere prospect of having to fight for freedom. When the revolutionary period of 1848-49 was over, Marx was strongly opposed to any playing at revolution (Schapper and Willich, and the fight with them), insisting on the need for knowing how to work under the new conditions, when quasi-"peacefully" new revolutions were in the making. The spirit in which Marx wanted the work to be carried on is

[1] Page 240 of the present volume.—*Ed.*
[2] February 11, 1865.—*Ed.*

*

plainly shown by his estimate of the situation in Germany during the period of blackest reaction in 1856:

"The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility to back the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War." (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. II, p. 108.)

While the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany was in progress, Marx directed his whole attention, in the matter of tactics of the socialist proletariat, to developing the democratic energy of the peasantry. He held that Lassalle's action was "objectively . . . a betrayal of the whole workers' movement to the Prussians" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, page 210), among other things, because he "favoured the *Junkers* and Prussian nationalism." On February 5, 1865, exchanging views with Marx regarding a forthcoming joint declaration of theirs in the press, Engels wrote (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, p. 217):

". . . in a predominantly agricultural country . . . it is dastardly to make an exclusive attack on the bourgeoisie in the name of the industrial proletariat but never to devote a word to the patriarchal exploitation of the rural proletariat under the lash of the great feudal aristocracy. . . ."

During the period from 1864 to 1870, when the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany, that epoch of the fight of the exploiting classes of Prussia and Austria for completing the revolution *from above* in one way or another, was coming to an end, Marx not only condemned Lassalle for coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Wilhelm Liebknecht who had lapsed into "Austrophilism" and defended particularism. Marx insisted upon revolutionary tactics that would fight against both Bismarck and "Austrophilism" with equal ruthlessness, tactics that would not only suit the "conqueror," the Prussian *Junker*, but would forthwith renew the struggle with him *upon the very basis* created by the Prussian military successes (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. III, pp. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210, 215, 418, 437, 440, 441). In the famous Address of the International Working Men's Association, dated September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising; but when, in 1871, the uprising actually took place, Marx hailed with the utmost enthusiasm the revolutionary initiative of the masses,

who were "storming heaven." (Letter of Marx to Kugelmann.[1]) In this situation, as in so many others, the defeat of a revolutionary onslaught was, from the Marxian standpoint of dialectical materialism, from the point of view of the general course and *the outcome* of the proletarian struggle, a lesser evil than would have been a retreat from a position hitherto occupied, a surrender without battle, as such a surrender would have demoralised the proletariat and undermined its readiness for struggle. Fully recognising the importance of using legal means of struggle during periods of political stagnation, and when bourgeois legality prevails, Marx, in 1877 and 1878, when the Exceptional Law against the Socialists had been passed in Germany, strongly condemned the "revolutionary phrase-making" of Most; but he attacked no less, and perhaps even more sharply, the opportunism that, for a time, prevailed in the official Social-Democratic Party, which, on the spur of the moment, failed to manifest resolution, firmness, revolutionary spirit, readiness to resort to illegal struggle in reply to the Exceptional Law. (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. IV, pp. 397, 404, 418, 422, and 424; also letters to Sorge.)

Written in July-November, 1914.

[1] Letter dated April 12, 1871.—*Ed.*

THE THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM

THE teaching of Marx evokes throughout the civilised world the greatest hostility and hatred on the part of all bourgeois science (both official and liberal) which regards Marxism as something in the nature of a "pernicious sect." No other attitude is to be expected, since there can be no "impartial" social science in a society which is built up on the class struggle. *All* official and liberal science *defends* wage slavery in one way or another, whereas Marxism has declared relentless war on that slavery. To expect science to be impartial in a society of wage slavery is as silly and naive as to expect impartiality from employers on the question as to whether the workers' wages should be increased by decreasing the profits of capital.

However, this is not all. The history of philosophy and that of social science shows with perfect clearness that there is nothing in Marxism resembling "sectarianism" in the sense of a secluded, fossilised doctrine originating somewhere away from the high road of development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx manifested itself in that he provided the answers to questions which had already been put by the advanced brains of humanity. His teaching came as a direct and immediate *continuation* of the teaching of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy, and socialism.

The teaching of Marx is all-powerful because it is true. It is complete and harmonious, providing men with a consistent view of the universe, which cannot be reconciled with any superstition, any reaction, any defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the lawful successor of the best that has been created by hu-

manity in the nineteenth century—German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.

It is these three sources, which are also the three component parts of Marxism, that we will briefly dwell upon.

I

The philosophy of Marxism is *materialism.* Throughout the recent history of Europe, and particularly at the end of the eighteenth century in France, which was the scene of the decisive battle against every kind of mediæval rubbish, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism proved to be the only consistent philosophy, true to all the teachings of natural science, hostile to superstitions, cant, etc. The enemies of democracy tried, therefore, with all their energy, to "overthrow," undermine and defame materialism, and defended various forms of philosophic idealism, which always leads, in one way or another, to the defence and support of religion.

Marx and Engels always defended philosophic materialism in the most determined manner, and repeatedly explained the profound error of every deviation from this basis. Their views are more clearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring,* which, like *The Communist Manifesto,* are household books for every conscious worker.

However, Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it by the achievements of German classical philosophy especially by Hegel's system, which in its turn had led to the materialism of Feuerbach. Of these the main achievement is *dialectics, i.e.,* the doctrine of development in its fuller, deeper form, free from one-sidedness—the doctrine, also, of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements—are a remarkable confirmation of the dialectical materialism of Marx, despite the doctrines of bourgeois philosophers with their "new" returns to old and rotten idealism.

While deepening and developing philosophic materialism, Marx carried it to its conclusion; he extended its perception of nature to the perception of *human society*. The *historical materialism* of Marx represented the greatest conquest of scientific thought. Chaos and arbitrariness, which reigned until then in the views on history and politics, were replaced by a strikingly consistent and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how out of one order of social life another and higher order develops, in consequence of the growth of the productive forces—how capitalism, for instance, grows out of serfdom.

Just as the cognition of man reflects nature (*i.e.*, developing matter) which exists independently of him, so also the *social cognition* of man (*i.e.*, the various views and doctrines—philosophic, religious, political, etc.) reflects the *economic order* of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of modern European states serve the purpose of strengthening the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

The philosophy of Marx is a perfected philosophic materialism which has provided humanity, and especially the working class, with a powerful instrument of knowledge.

II

Having recognised that the economic order is the foundation upon which the political superstructure is erected, Marx devoted all the greater attention to the study of that economic order. The principal work of Marx, *Capital*, is devoted to a study of the economic order of modern, *i.e.*, capitalist society.

Classical political economy, before Marx, was built up in England, the most developed capitalist country. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in their investigations of the economic order, laid the foundations of the *labour theory of value*. Marx continued their work. He strictly proved and consistently developed this theory. He showed that the value of every commodity is determined by the quantity of socially-necessary labour time spent in its production.

Where the bourgeois economists saw a relation of things (the exchange of one commodity for another) Marx revealed a *relation between men.* The exchange of commodities expresses the connection between individual producers by means of the market. *Money* signifies that this connection is becoming closer and closer, inseparably combining the entire economic life of the individual producers into one whole. *Capital* signifies a further development of this connection: the labour power of man becomes a commodity. The wage labourer sells his labour power to the owner of land, of factories and instruments of labour. The worker uses one part of the labour day to cover the expenditure for the maintenance of himself and his family (wages), and the other part of the day he toils without remuneration and creates *surplus value* for the capitalist, which is the source of profit, the source of wealth of the capitalist class.

The doctrine of surplus value is the corner-stone of the economic theory of Marx.

Capital, created by the labour of the worker, presses upon the workers, ruins the petty owners and creates an army of unemployed. In industry the victory of large-scale production may be seen at once, but we also see the same phenomenon in agriculture: the superiority of big capitalist agriculture becomes greater, the application of machinery grows, peasant economy is caught in the noose of money-capital, it declines and becomes ruined under the burden of a backward technique. In agriculture, the forms of decline of petty production are different, but the decline itself is an indisputable fact.

By beating petty production, capital leads to the increase of the productivity of labour and to the establishment of a monopoly position for associations of the biggest capitalists. Production itself becomes more and more social; hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are linked up in a systematic economic organism, but the product of the collective labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists. Anarchy of production, crises, a furious hunt after markets, and the insecurity of existence for the masses of the population, are on the increase.

While increasing the dependence of the workers upon capital,

the capitalist system creates the great power of combined labour.

Marx traced the development of capitalism from the first germs of commodity economy and simple exchange, to its highest forms, to large-scale production.

And the experience of all countries, whether old or new, clearly shows year after year, to an ever greater number of workers, the truth of Marx's teaching.

Capitalism has been victorious all over the world, but this victory is only the eve of the victory of labour over capital.

III

After the overthrow of serfdom, when a "*free*" capitalist society appeared, it was at once discovered that this freedom signified a new system of oppression and exploitation of the toilers. Various socialist doctrines immediately began to arise as a reflection of this oppression and protest against it. But socialism in its first origin was *utopian.* It criticised the capitalist society, it condemned it and damned it, it dreamed of its destruction, it drew phantastic pictures of a better order and endeavoured to convince the rich of the wickedness of exploitation.

But utopian socialism was unable to show a real way out. It could not explain either the essence of wage slavery under capitalism, or discover the laws of its development, or find the *social force* which was capable of becoming the creator of a new society.

In the meantime, the stormy revolutions which accompanied the fall of feudalism and serfdom everywhere in Europe, and especially in France, revealed ever more clearly the *struggle of classes* as the basis of the whole development and its motive force.

Not a single victory of political freedom over the class of feudal lords was won without desperate resistance. Not a single capitalist country was established on a more or less free and democratic basis without a life and death struggle between the different classes of capitalist society.

Marx was a genius because he was able before anyone else to draw from these facts and consistently elaborate the conclusion which world history teaches. This conclusion is the doctrine of the *class struggle.*

People always were and always will be the stupid victims of deceit and self-deceit in politics, as long as they have not learned to discover the *interests* of one or another of the classes behind any moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises. The supporters of reforms and improvements will always be fooled by the defenders of the old, as long as they will not realise that every old institution, however absurd and rotten it may appear, is kept in being by the forces of one or the other of the ruling classes. And there is *only one* way of breaking the resistance of these classes, and that is to find, in the very society which surrounds us, and to enlighten and organise for the struggle, the forces which can and, by their social position, *must* form the power capable of sweeping away the old and of establishing the new.

Only the philosophic materialism of Marx showed the proletariat the way out of the spiritual slavery in which all oppressed classes have languished up to the present. Only the economic theory of Marx explained the real position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism.

The independent organisations of the proletariat are multiplying throughout the world from America to Japan and from Sweden to South Africa. The proletariat is being enlightened and educated in waging the class struggle, it is ridding itself of the prejudices of bourgeois society, consolidating itself ever more closely and learning to take the measure of its successes; it is hardening its forces and growing irresistibly.

March 1913.

MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

THERE is a saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would no doubt be made to refute them. Theories of natural history which came up against the old prejudices of theology caused and cause even today the most furious struggle. It is not to be wondered at then that the teaching of Marx, which directly serves the purposes of enlightening and organising the advanced class in modern society, which indicates the tasks of this class and proves the inevitable substitution of a new order for the present system, as a result of economic development—it is not to be wondered at that this teaching had to take by storm every step on its life course.

There is no need to speak of bourgeois science and philosophy, which are taught officially by official professors for the purpose of befuddling the minds of the growing youth of the possessing classes and "training" them against the enemy at home and abroad. This science will not hear of Marxism, declaring the latter to have been refuted and destroyed. Marx is attacked with equal zeal both by the young scholars who make their careers on the refutation of socialism, and the decrepit old men who treasure the testaments of all sorts of derelict "systems." The progress of Marxism and the dissemination and consolidation of its ideas among the working class cannot but result in the greater frequency and intensification of these bourgeois sallies against Marxism. But each time Marxism is "annihilated" by official science it grows ever stronger, ever more hardened, with its vitality ever more enhanced.

However, of all the doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class and mainly current among the proletariat,

Marxism did not by any means consolidate its position all at once. For the first half century of its existence (from the forties of the nineteenth century) Marxism struggled with theories which were fundamentally hostile to it. In the first half of the 'forties Marx and Engels settled with the radical Young Hegelians who maintained the standpoint of philosophic idealism. At the end of the 'forties the struggle began in the field of economic doctrine, against Proudhonism. The 'fifties completed this struggle: the criticism of parties and doctrines which made their appearance in the stormy 1848. In the 'sixties the struggle is shifted from the domain of general theory to that which is nearer to the immediate labour movement: the ejection of Bakunism from the International. In the beginning of the 'seventies the Proudhonist Mühlberger comes forward for a short time in Germany, and, at the end of the 'seventies, the positivist Dühring. But the influence of the one and the other on the proletariat was already quite insignificant. Marxism is already absolutely victorious over all the other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the nineties of last century this victory was, in its main features, completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism were kept up longest, the labour parties, in effect, built up their programmes and tactics on a Marxist basis. The renewed international organisation of the labour movement, in the form of periodical international congresses, at once and almost without struggle took up the standpoint of Marxism on all essential matters. But when Marxism had ousted all more or less consistent doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines set out to find other channels. The forms and occasions of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half century of the existence of Marxism (the nineties of last century) started with the struggle of a tendency within Marxism that was hostile to Marxism.

The formerly orthodox Marxist, Bernstein, provided the name to this current. He came forward with the greatest noise, and with the most comprehensive formulation of amendments to

Marx, revision of Marx, with revisionism. Even in Russia, where non-Marxian socialism maintained its position longest—and naturally so owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population crushed down by the remnants of serfdom—even in Russia, it is plainly growing into revisionism before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (municipalisation of all the land), as well as in general questions of programme and tactics, our social-*Narodniki* replace more and more with "amendments" to Marx the moribund and obsolescent remnants of their old system which was consistent in its own way and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxian socialism is smashed. It no longer continues the struggle on its own soil, but as revisionism on the general soil of Marxism. Let us, then, cast a glance on the ideological content of revisionism.

In the domain of philosophy, revisionism marched at the tail end of bourgeois professorial "science." The professors were going "back to Kant," so revisionism too trailed behind the Neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the age-old banalities of the priests against philosophic materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word according to the latest handbook) that materialism had long ago been "refuted." The professors slighted Hegel as a "dead dog," and while they themselves preached idealism of a sort a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, they contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and so the revisionists too floundered behind them in the mud of the philosophic vulgarisation of science, replacing "the twisted" (and revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and peaceful) "evolution." The professors earned their official wages by adjusting their idealistic as well as their "critical" systems to the dominant mediæval "philosophy" (*i.e.*, to theology), and the revisionists came closer to them, trying to maintain religion as a private matter not as far as the modern state was concerned, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

There is no need to speak of the real class significance of such

"amendments" to Marx—the thing is clear by itself. We will simply note that the only Marxist in the international social-democracy, who criticised those incredible banalities uttered by the revisionists, from the point of view of consistent dialectical materialism, was Plekhanov. It is all the more necessary decisively to emphasise this point since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made in our days to smuggle through the old and reactionary philosophic rubbish under the banner of criticism against the tactical opportunism of Plekhanov.[1]

Passing on to political economy, it must be noted, first of all, that the "amendments" of the revisionists in this domain were much more comprehensive and thorough. The attempt was made to influence the public by "new data of economic development." It was said that concentration and the squeezing out of petty production by large-scale production does not take place at all in agriculture, and proceeds extremely slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises have now become rarer and weaker and that the cartels and trusts will probably make it possible for capital to do away with crises altogether. It was said that the theory of "collapse," for which capitalism is heading, was insolvent, in view of tendencies that make for the blunting and diminishing of the class contradictions. Finally, it was said that it would do no harm to correct Marx's theory of value in conformity with Böhm-Bawerk.

The struggle with the revisionists on these questions was as fruitful in bringing about a revival of the theoretical thought of international socialism as the polemics of Engels with Dühring were twenty years previously. The arguments of the revisionists had been analysed with facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists had systematically touched up modern small-scale production. The technical and commercial

[1] See *Outline of the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss this book, so I must, in the meantime, limit myself to the statement that I will show, in the nearest future, in a series of articles or a special pamphlet, that *everything* that is said in the text about the Neo-Kantian revisionists substantially applies also to the "new" Neo-Humist and Neo-Berkeleyan revisionists. [Note by V. I. Lenin] (See Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIII.)—*Ed.*

advantage of big *production* over small, not only in industry but also in agriculture, is proved by irrefutable data. But commodity production in agriculture is much more weakly developed, and modern statisticians and economists usually understand but poorly how to distinguish the special branches (sometimes even the operations) of agriculture where one may observe the progressive process of agriculture being drawn into the *exchange* of world economy. Small-scale production maintains itself on the ruins of natural self-sufficing economy by an endless change for the worse in the matter of nourishment, by chronic starvation, prolongation of the working day, deterioration in the quality as well as in the treatment of cattle, in a word, by the same methods by which handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every step forward in the advance of science and technique undermines inevitably and relentlessly the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society. The task of socialist economics is to investigate this process in all its often complicated and intricate forms, and to prove to the small producer the impossibility of maintaining his position, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity for the peasant to pass over to the standpoint of the proletarian. The revisionists have sinned in this question from the point of view of science by their superficial generalisation of facts, onesidedly torn out of their context, and bearing no relation to the entire system of capitalism. They have also sinned from the point of view of politics by the fact that they have continually, willingly or unwillingly. called upon the peasant or driven him to adopt the standpoint of the master (*i.e.*, the standpoint of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt that of the revolutionary proletariat.

Matters with revisionism were still worse in regard to the theory of crises and the collapse theory. Only for the shortest space of time and only the most short-sighted people could think of remaking the bases of the teachings of Marx under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Life very soon demonstrated to the revisionists that crises have not outlived their time: a crisis set in after the period of prosperity.

The forms, the sequence and the aspect of particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component part of the capitalist system. Cartels and trusts, while unifying production, at the same time strengthened, in a way obvious to all, the anarchy of production, the insecurity of the proletariat and the pressure of capital and thus intensified to an unprecedented degree the class contradictions. That capitalism is going to its downfall, in the sense of individual, political and economic crises as well as in that of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system, has been made particularly obvious, and on a particularly large scale, by the latest gigantic trusts. The recent financial crisis in America, and the frightful extension of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the near approach of an industrial crisis which is indicated by many symptoms—all this has led to the result that the recent "theories" of the revisionists have been forgotten by all, and even, it seems, by many of the revisionists themselves. Only the lessons, which this instability of the intellectuals has afforded the working class, must not be forgotten.

In regard to the theory of value, it only remains to be said that with the exception of exceedingly vague hints about and a longing for Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have given absolutely nothing, and have not, therefore, left the slightest mark on the development of scientific thought.

In the domain of politics, revisionism did really try to revise the foundation of Marxism, namely: the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage destroy the basis of the class struggle—we were told—and make the old position of *The Communist Manifesto*, that the workers have no country, untrue. Since, they say, "the will of the majority" rules under a democracy, one can neither look upon the state as an organ of class domination, nor refuse alliances with the progressive social-reformist bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

These objections of the revisionists taken together undoubtedly represented a fairly harmonious system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal bourgeois views. The liberals

always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions since the right to vote and the right to participate in state affairs are possessed by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian Revolution in the beginning of the twentieth, clearly show the absurdity of such views. Economic differences are not weakened but strengthened and intensified under the liberty of "democratic" capitalism. Parliamentarism does not remove but lays bare the essence of the most democratic republics, as organs of class oppression. In helping to enlighten and to organise immeasurably broader masses of the population than those which previously participated actively in political events, parliamentarism thereby, far from making for the removal of crises and political revolutions, introduces, on the contrary, the greatest exacerbation in the civil war at the time of these revolutions. The Paris events of the spring of 1871 and the Russian events of the winter of 1905 showed as clearly as clear can be how inevitably this exacerbation comes about. The French bourgeoisie, without a moment's hesitation, made a deal with the common national enemy, with the foreign army who had ruined its fatherland, in order to crush the proletarian movement. He who does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, that leads to the dispute being decided by mass violence of an even sharper nature than that of former times—he, who does not understand this, will never be able, on the basis of this parliamentarism, to carry on a principled propaganda and agitation, and to really prepare the masses for a victorious participation in such "disputes." The experience of alliances, understandings and *blocs* with social-reformist liberalism in the West and with liberal reformism (the Constitutional-Democrats) in the Russian Revolution has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not strengthen but weaken the real significance of their struggles as they tie up the fighters with elements less capable of fighting and more wavering and treacherous. French Millerandism—the greatest experiment in the application of re-

visionist political tactics on a wide and really national scale—afforded a practical estimate of revisionism which the proletariat throughout the world will never forget.

The attitude of revisionism to the final aim of the socialist movement was a natural complement to its economic and political tendencies. "The final aim is nothing, the movement is everything"—this catch phrase of Bernstein expresses the substance of revisionism better than many a long argument. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the windings of political trivialities, to forget the basic interests of the proletariat and the main features of the entire capitalist system as well as the whole capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these basic interests for the sake of real or would-be advantages of the moment—such is the policy of revisionism. And it obviously follows from the very essence of such a policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms and will give rise to one or other variety of revisionism, each time when there is some "new" question, or when there is a more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though this turn changed the basic line of development to but an insignificant degree and for but the shortest period of time.

The inevitability of revisionism is conditioned by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. There cannot be the slightest doubt, for every more or less informed and thinking socialist, that the relations between the orthodox and the Bernsteinists in Germany, the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists (and now particularly the Broussists) in France, the Social-Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain, Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium, the integralists and reformists in Italy and the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia—that the relations between all these are everywhere substantially similar, notwithstanding the gigantic variety in the national conditions and historical moments of all these countries in their present state. The "division" within modern international socialism proceeds now, in reality, along *one* line in the various countries of the world, which is evidence of a tremendous step forward as compared

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with what was the case thirty or forty years ago, when different tendencies struggled with one another in the different countries inside a united international socialism. And the "revisionism from the Left," the outlines of which may now be observed in the Latin countries, under the title "Revolutionary Syndicalism," while "amending" Marxism, is also adapting itself to it: "Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France ever and anon appeal from Marx wrongly understood, to Marx rightly understood."

We cannot engage here in an analysis of the ideological substance of *this* revisionism, which has not yet, by far, developed to the extent reached by opportunist revisionism, has not yet assumed an international aspect, has not yet stood the test of one big practical battle with the socialist party even in one country. We, therefore, confine ourselves here to that "revisionism from the Right" which was described above.

What does the inevitability of revisionism in a capitalist society imply? Why is it more profound than the differences between the national peculiarities and the degrees of development of capitalism? Because, side by side with the proletariat in every capitalist country, there are broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, of small masters. Capitalism was born and is constantly being born out of small production. A whole number of "middle sections" are inevitably recreated by capitalism (appendages to factories, home work and small workshops scattered all over the country in view of the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and motor industries, etc.). These new petty producers are equally and just as inevitably thrown again into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that petty-bourgeois creeds again and again break through among the ranks of the broad labour parties. It is quite natural that this should be so and this always will be so right to the unfolding of the proletarian revolution, since it would be a foolish mistake to think that a "complete" proletarianisation of the majority of the population is necessary before such a revolution can be achieved. What we are frequently experiencing at present only in the domain of ideology, disputes about theoretical amendments to Marx, what at present leaks out in practice only

in individual particular issues of the labour movement such as tactical differences with revisionists and splits on this basis—all this the working class will without fail still have to go through, on an incomparably bigger scale, when the proletarian revolution will sharpen all questions at issue and concentrate all differences on points of immediate importance for determining the conduct of the masses, and in the heat of the fight will make it necessary to separate enemies from friends, to throw out the bad allies for the purpose of dealing decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle of revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat which marches forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the hesitations and weaknesses of philistinism.

Written in April 1908.

THE HISTORICAL DESTINY OF THE TEACHING OF KARL MARX

THE main thing in the teaching of Marx is the elucidation of the world-wide historical role of the proletariat as the builder of a socialist society. Has the progress of events in the world confirmed this teaching since it was expounded by Marx?

It was first put forward by Marx in 1844. Already *The Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, which appeared in 1848, gave a consistent, systematic exposition of this teaching, which exposition still remains the best even now. World history, since that time, is clearly divisible into three main periods: 1) From the 1848 Revolution to the Paris Commune (1871); 2) From the Paris Commune to the Russian Revolution (1905); 3) Since the Russian Revolution.

Let us cast a glance on the fate of the teaching of Marx in each of these periods.

I

In the beginning of the first period Marx's teaching does not by any means dominate. It is only one of very many fractions or streams in socialism. The forms of socialism which dominate are those which, in the main, are akin to our *Narodniki;* the lack of understanding of the materialist basis of the historical movement, the inability to assign the role and significance of each class in capitalist society, the masking of the bourgeois essence of democratic reorganisation by various, ostensibly socialist, phrases about "the people," "justice," "right," etc.

The 1848 Revolution struck a fatal blow at all these vociferous, multi-coloured, and noisy varieties of *pre*-Marxian social-

ism. In all countries the revolution showed the various classes of society *in action*. The shooting of the workers by the republican bourgeoisie in the June Days in Paris, in 1848, finally established that the proletariat *alone* was of a socialist nature. The liberal bourgeoisie feared the independence of this class a hundred times more than any kind of reaction. Cowardly liberalism grovels before the latter. The peasantry is satisfied with the abolition of the remnants of feudalism and passes over to the side of order and only from time to time wavers between *labour democracy and bourgeois liberalism*. All doctrines of class-*less* socialism and class-*less* politics turn out to be sheer nonsense.

The Commune of Paris (1871) completes this development of bourgeois reforms; it was only the heroism of the proletariat that brought about the consolidation of the republic, *i.e.*, the form of state organisation in which the class relations appear in their most naked form.

In all other European countries a more confused and less finished development leads to the same formation of a bourgeois society. By the end of the first period (1848-71)—a period of storm and revolution—pre-Marxian socialism *dies*. Independent *proletarian* parties are born: the First International (1864-72) and German Social-Democracy.

II

The second period (1872-1904) is distinguished from the first by its "peaceful" character, by the absence of revolutions. The West has finished with bourgeois revolutions. The East has not yet grown ripe for them.

The West enters into a phase of "peaceful" preparation for the epoch of future transformations. Socialist parties, proletarian in essence, are formed everywhere, parties which learn to use bourgeois parliamentarism, to establish their own daily press, their educational institutions, their trade unions and their co-operatives. The teaching of Marx gains a complete victory and *expands in breadth*. The process of selection and gathering of the forces of the proletariat and its preparation for the battles ahead proceed slowly but steadily.

The dialectics of history is such that the theoretical victory of Marxism forces its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists. Liberalism, rotten to the core, tries to revive itself in the form of socialist *opportunism*. The period of preparation of the forces for great battles is interpreted by them as the renunciation of these battles. Improvements in the position of the slaves enabling them to carry on a fight against wage slavery is explained by them in the sense that the slaves are selling their liberty rights for a penny. In a cowardly manner they preach "social peace" (*i.e.*, peace with slave-ownership), renunciation of the class struggle, etc. They have many adherents among socialist parliamentarians, the various officials in the labour movement, and the "sympathising" intellectuals.

III

The opportunists hardly had time to finish their hymns of praise to "social peace" and the needlessness of storms under "democracy," when a new source of the greatest of world storms opened in Asia. The Russian Revolution was followed by the Turkish, the Persian and the Chinese. We are now living in the very epoch of these storms and their "repercussion" on Europe. Whatever fate may befall the great Chinese republic against which various "civilised" hyenas are now sharpening their teeth, no power in the world will re-establish serfdom in Asia, or wipe out the heroic democracy of the masses of the people in Asiatic and semi-Asiatic countries.

Some people, inattentive to the conditions of preparation and development of mass struggle, were reduced to a state of despair and anarchism by the long postponements of the decisive fight against capitalism in Europe. We now see how short-sighted and pusillanimous is this anarchist despair.

The fact of Asia, with its eight hundred million people, being drawn into the struggle for the same European ideals must be a source of courage and not of despair.

The Asiatic revolutions have shown us the same lack of backbone and baseness of liberalism, the same exceptional importance of the independence of the democratic masses, and the

same sharp line dividing the proletariat from the bourgeoisie. Anyone who, after the experience of Europe and Asia, speaks of class-*less* politics and class-*less* socialism, simply deserves to be put in a cage, to be exhibited side by side with some Australian kangaroo.

After Asia, Europe has also begun to stir, but in no Asiatic way. The "peaceful" period of 1872-1904 has gone completely, never to return. High cost of living and the pressure of the trusts is causing an unprecedented intensification of the economic struggle, which has roused even the British workers who are most of all corrupted by liberalism. Before our eyes, a political crisis is maturing even in the "die-hard," bourgeois-*Junker* country, Germany. Owing to the feverish race for armaments, and the policy of imperialism, the "social peace" of modern Europe is more like a barrel of gunpowder. And the decay of *all* bourgeois parties together with the maturing of the proletariat is proceeding steadily apace.

Since the rise of Marxism, every one of the three great epochs in world history has provided it with fresh proof and has brought it new triumphs. But the coming historical epoch is holding in store for Marxism, as the teaching of the proletariat, a still greater triumph.

March 14, 1913.

FROM THE INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION IN RUSSIA [1]

Questions Put by the Delegation and Stalin's Replies

Question 1. What new principles have Lenin and the Communist Party added to Marxism in practice? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "constructive revolution" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of the development of economic forces?

Answer: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism nor did Lenin abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin was and remained a loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He developed these doctrines further. What does that mean? It means that he developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels in accordance with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism, with imperialism. This means that in developing further the doctrines of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle, Lenin contributed to the general treasury of Marxism something new as compared with what was created by Marx and Engels and with what they could create in the pre-imperialist period of capitalism. Moreover, Lenin's contribution to Marxism is based wholly and entirely on the principles laid down by Marx and

[1] In view of the fact that the English stenographic report of this interview was not available to the publishers, the report was translated from the Russian, which appeared in *Pravda* of September 15, 1927. Consequently, while the speeches of the American delegates as given in this report are correct in substance, they are not presented as a verbatim report. The interview took place on September 9, 1927.—*Ed.*

Engels. In that sense we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here are a number of questions in the sphere of which Lenin contributed something new in developing further the doctrines of Marx:

First: the question of monopolistic capitalism—of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. In *Capital*, Marx and Engels analysed the basis of capitalism. But Marx and Engels lived in the pre-monopolistic period of capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its "peaceful" expansion throughout the whole world. This old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when Marx and Engels had already passed away. Clearly Marx and Engels could only guess at the new conditions of the development of capitalism which arose out of the new phase of capitalism which succeeded the old phase. In the imperialistic, monopolistic phase of development the smooth evolution of capitalism gave way to spasmodic, cataclysmic development, the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism emerged with particular force; the struggle for markets and spheres for the investment of capital conducted amidst conditions of extreme unevenness of development made periodical imperialist wars for a periodical redistribution of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable. The service Lenin rendered, and, consequently, his new contribution, was that on the basis of the main postulates enunciated in *Capital* he made a fundamental Marxian analysis of imperialism as the final phase of capitalism, he exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. On the basis of this analysis arose Lenin's well-known postulate that the conditions of imperialism made possible the victory of socialism in separate capitalist countries.

Second: the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political domination of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the reign of capital by violence was created by Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was that a) utilising the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution, he discovered the Soviet form of government

as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; b) he deciphered the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of the problem of the allies of the proletariat, and defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, which is the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.) who are led; c) he particularly emphasised the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a higher type of democracy in class society, *i.e.*, *proletarian* democracy, which expresses the interests of the majority (the exploited) as against capitalist democracy which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Third: the question of the forms and methods of the successful building up of socialism in the period of dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism in a country encircled by capitalist states. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a more or less prolonged period replete with revolutionary conflicts and civil wars in the course of which the proletariat in power would take the economic, political, cultural and organisational measures necessary for the purpose of establishing a new socialist society, a society without classes and without a state, in place of the old capitalist society. Lenin wholly and entirely based himself on these fundamental postulates of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was: a) he proved that it was possible to construct complete socialist society in a land of the dictatorship of the proletariat encircled by imperialist states, provided the country is not crushed by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist states; b) he outlined the concrete path of economic policy (the "New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, being in command of the economic key positions (industry, land, transport, the banks, etc.), links up socialised industry with agriculture ("the bond between industry and peasant agriculture") and thus leads the whole of national economy towards socialism; c) he outlined the concrete channels by which the bulk of the peasantry is gradually brought into the line of socialist construction through the medium of the co-

operative societies, which, in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship, represent a powerful instrument for the transformation of petty peasant economy and for the re-education of the main masses of the peasantry in the spirit of socialism.

Fourth: the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution, in all popular revolutions—in the revolution against tsarism as well as in the revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels presented the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field was that he further developed and expanded these outlines into a symmetrical system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a symmetrical system of proletarian leadership of the masses of the toilers in town and country not only in the fight for the overthrow of tsarism and capitalism, but also in the work of building up socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is well known that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was skilfully applied in Russia. This, in passing, explains why the revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. In previous revolutions it usually happened that the workers did all the fighting at the barricades, shed their blood and overthrew the old order, but power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which oppressed and exploited the workers. That was the case in England and in France. That was the case in Germany. In Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia, the workers did not merely represent the shock troops of the revolution. While serving as the shock troops of the revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for hegemony, for the political leadership of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, detaching them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. Being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat all the time waged a fight to seize power in its own hands and utilise it in its own interests against the bourgeoisie and against capitalism. This explains why every powerful outbreak of the revolution in Russia, as in October 1905, and in February 1917, gave rise to Soviets of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power—the

function of which would be to crush the bourgeoisie—as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power—the function of which was to crush the proletariat. On two occasions the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the soviets: in August 1917, at the time of the "Preliminary Parliament" prior to the capture of power by the Bolsheviks, and in January 1918, at the time of the "Constituent Assembly" after power had been seized by the proletariat. On both occasions these efforts failed. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated. The vast masses of the toilers regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the revolution and the soviets had already been tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' government. For the proletariat to have substituted these soviets by a bourgeois parliament would have been tantamount to committing suicide. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the revolution in Russia led to the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. These were the results of the application of the Leninist system of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution.

Fifth: the national and colonial question. In analysing the events in Ireland, India, China and the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary, in their time, Marx and Engels developed the basic, initial ideas of the national and colonial question. In his works Lenin based himself on these ideas. Lenin's new contribution in this field was: a) that he gathered these ideas into one symmetrical system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the epoch of imperialism; b) that he connected the national and colonial question with the question of overthrowing imperialism, and c) that he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Finally: the question of the Party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave the main outlines of the idea of the Party as being the vanguard of the proletariat, without which (the Party), the proletariat could not achieve its emancipation, could not capture power or reconstruct capitalist society. Lenin's

new contribution to this theory was that he developed these outlines further and applied them to the new conditions of the proletarian struggle in the period of imperialism and showed: a) that the Party is a higher form of the class organisation of the proletariat as compared with the other forms of proletarian organisation (labour unions, co-operative societies, state organisation) and, moreover, its function is to generalise and direct the work of these organisations; b) that the dictatorship of the proletariat may be realised only through the Party as its directing force; c) that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete only if it is led by a single party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share leadership with any other party; and d) that without iron discipline in the Party, the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat to crush the exploiters and to transform class society into socialist society cannot be fulfilled.

This, in the main, is the new contribution which Lenin made in his works; he developed and made more concrete the doctrines of Marx in a manner applicable to the new conditions of the proletarian struggle in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

From this it is clear that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism, still less can it be contrasted with Marxism.

The question submitted by the delegation goes on to ask:

"Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'constructive revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to await the culmination of the development of economic forces?" I think it would be absolutely incorrect to say that. I think that every people's revolution, if it is really a people's revolution, is a constructive revolution; for it breaks up the old system and creates a new one. Of course, there is nothing constructive in such revolutions (if we can call them that) as take place, let us say, in Albania in the form of toy "rebellions" of one tribe against another. But Marxists never regarded such toy "rebellions" as revolutions. Apparently, it is not such "rebellions" that we are discussing, but mass popular

revolutions, the rising of oppressed classes against oppressing classes. Such a revolution cannot but be constructive. Marx and Lenin stood for such a revolution, and only for such a revolution. It must be added, of course, that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions; it can unfold itself only under certain favourable economic and political conditions.

PAUL LAFARGUE

REMINISCENCES OF MARX[1]

1

THE first time I ever saw Karl Marx was in February 1865. The International had been founded on September 28, 1864, at a meeting in St. Martin's Hall. I came from Paris to bring him news of the progress made there by the young organisation. Monsieur Tolain, now a senator of the bourgeois republic and one of its representatives at the Berlin Conference, had given me a letter of introduction.

I was twenty-four years old. Never in my life shall I forget the impression made on me by that first visit. Marx was in poor health at the time, and was hard at work upon the first volume of *Capital* (published two years later, in 1867). He was afraid he might be unable to finish it, and he gladly received young people, "for," he used to say, "I must train up men who will continue the communist propaganda after I am gone."

Karl Marx was one of those rare men who are fitted for the front rank both in science and in public life. So intimately did he combine these two fields that we shall never understand him unless we regard him simultaneously as man of science and as socialist fighter. While he was of opinion that every science must be cultivated for its own sake and that when we undertake scientific research we should not trouble ourselves about the possible consequences, nevertheless, he held that the man of learn-

[1] *Paul Lafargue* (1842-1911). Member of the First International, one of the founders of the French Labour Party and one of the most important leaders of the French Labour movement at the time of the Second International. His reminiscences were published in the *Neue Zeit* in September 1890.—*Ed.*

ing, if he does not wish to degrade himself, must never cease to participate in public affairs—must not be content to shut himself up in his study or his laboratory, like a maggot in a cheese, and to shun the life and the social and political struggles of his contemporaries.

"Science must not be a selfish pleasure. Those who are so lucky as to be able to devote themselves to scientific pursuits should be the first to put their knowledge at the service of mankind." One of his favourite sayings was, "Work for the world."

Though he deeply sympathised with the suffering of the working class, what had led him to the communist standpoint was not any sentimental consideration, but the study of history and political economy. He maintained that every unprejudiced person, uninfluenced by private interests and not blinded by class prejudices, must perforce come to the same conclusion. But if he studied the economic and political development of human society without any preconceived notions, he wrote only with the definite intention of spreading the results of his studies, and with the firm determination to provide a scientific foundation for the socialist movement, which down to his day had been lost in utopian mists. As far as public activity was concerned, he took part in this only in order to work on behalf of the triumph of the working class, whose historic mission it is to establish communism as soon as it has attained to the political and economic leadership of society. In like manner the mission of the bourgeoisie as soon as it rose to power was to break the feudal bonds which hampered the development of agriculture and industry; to inaugurate free intercourse for commodities and human beings, and free contract between employers and workers; to centralise the means of production and exchange; and to prepare the material and intellectual elements of communist society.

Marx did not restrict his activities to the land of his birth. "I am a citizen of the world," he would say, "and I work wherever I happen to be." In actual fact, he played a prominent part in the revolutionary movements that developed in the countries (France, Belgium, England) to which events and political persecutions drove him.

But at my first visit, when I saw him in his study in Maitland Park Road, he appeared before me, not as the indefatigable and unequalled socialist agitator, but as the man of learning. From all parts of the civilised world, party comrades flocked to his study in order to consult the master of socialist thought. This room has become historical. Anyone who wants to realise the intimate aspects of Marx's intellectual life must become acquainted with it. It was situated on the first floor, well lighted by a broad window overlooking the park. On both sides of the fireplace and opposite the window were crowded bookshelves, on the top of which packets of newspapers and manuscripts were piled up to the ceiling. On one side of the window stood two tables, likewise loaded with miscellaneous papers, newspapers, and books. In the middle of the room, where the light was best, was a small and plain writing table, three feet by two, and a wooden armchair. Between this chair and one of the bookshelves, facing the window, was a leather-covered sofa on which Marx would occasionally lie down to rest. On the mantelpiece were more books, interspersed with cigars, boxes of matches, tobacco jars, paperweights, and photographs of his daughters, his wife, Frederick Engels and Wilhelm Wolff. Marx was a heavy smoker. "*Capital* will not bring in enough money to pay for the cigars I smoked when I was writing it," he told me. But he was still more spendthrift in his use of matches. So often did he forget his pipe or his cigar that he had constantly to be relighting it, and would use up a box of matches in an incredibly short time.

He would never allow anyone to arrange (really, to disarrange) his books and papers. The prevailing disorder was only apparent. In actual fact, everything was in its proper place, and without searching he could put his hand on any book or manuscript he wanted. Even when conversing, he would often stop to show a relevant passage or figure in the book itself. He was at one with his study, where the books and papers were as obedient to his will as were his own limbs.

He took no account of external symmetry when arranging his books. Quarto and octavo volumes and pamphlets were placed

side by side; he arranged his books not according to size but according to content. To him books were intellectual tools, not luxuries. "They are my slaves," he would say, "and must serve my will." He had scant respect for their form, their binding, the beauty of paper or printing; he would turn down the corners of the pages, underline passages, and cover the margins with pencil marks. He did not make notes in his books, but could not refrain from a question mark or a note of exclamation when an author kicked over the traces. His system of underlining enabled him to re-find with great ease any desired passage. He had the habit, at intervals of some years, of re-reading his note-books and the marked passages in the books he had read, in order to refresh his memory—which was extraordinarily vigorous and accurate. From early youth he had trained it in accordance with Hegel's advice of memorising verses in an unfamiliar tongue.

He knew Heine and Goethe by heart, and would often quote them in conversation. He read the poets constantly, selecting authors from all the European languages. Year after year he would read Aeschylus again in the original Greek, regarding this author and Shakespeare as the two greatest dramatic geniuses the world has ever known. He had made an exhaustive study of Shakespeare, for whom he had an unbounded admiration, and whose most insignificant characters, even, were familiar to him. There was a veritable Shakespeare cult in the Marx family, and the three daughters knew much of Shakespeare by heart. Shortly after 1848, when Marx wished to perfect his knowledge of English (which he could already read well), he sought out and classified all Shakespeare's characteristic expressions; and he did the same with some of the polemical writings of William Cobbett, for whom he had a great esteem. Dante and Burns were among his favourite poets, and it was always a delight to him to hear his daughters recite Burns' satirical poems or sing Burns' love songs.

Cuvier, an indefatigable worker and one of the great masters of science, when director of the Paris Museum, had a number of workrooms installed for his personal use. Each of these rooms was devoted to a particular branch of study, and for this

purpose was equipped with the necessary books, instruments, anatomical accessories, etc. When wearied by some particular occupation, Cuvier would move on to the next room, finding that a change of mental work was just as good as a rest. Marx was just as untiring a worker as Cuvier, but he had not, like him, the means for the provision of several workrooms. He rested himself by pacing up and down the room, so that between door and window the carpet had been worn threadbare along a track as sharply defined as a footpath through a meadow. Sometimes he would lie down on the sofa and read a novel; he often had two or three novels going at the same time, reading them by turns—for, like Darwin, he was a great novel-reader. He had a preference for eighteenth-century novels, and was especially fond of Fielding's *Tom Jones*. The modern novelists who pleased him best were Paul de Kock, Charles Lever, the elder Dumas and Sir Walter Scott, whose *Old Mortality* he considered a masterpiece. He had a predilection for tales of adventure and humorous stories. The greatest masters of romance were for him Cervantes and Balzac. *Don Quixote* was for him the epic of the decay of chivalry, whose virtues in the newly rising bourgeois world became absurdities and follies. His admiration for Balzac was so profound that he had planned to write a criticism of *La Comédie Humaine* as soon as he should have finished his economic studies. Marx looked upon Balzac, not merely as the historian of the social life of his time, but as a prophetic creator of character types which still existed only in embryo during the reign of Louis Philippe, and which only reached full development under Napoleon III, after Balzac's death.

Marx could read all the leading European languages, and could write in three (German, French and English) in a way that aroused the admiration of all who were well acquainted with these tongues; he was fond of saying, "A foreign language is a weapon in the struggle of life." He had a great talent for languages, and this was inherited by his daughters. He was already fifty years old when he began to learn Russian. Although the dead and living languages already known to him had no close etymological relation to Russian, he had made

such progress in six months as to be able to enjoy reading in the original the works of the Russian poets and authors whom he especially prized: Pushkin, Gogol and Shchedrin. His reason for learning Russian was that he might be able to read certain official reports of investigations—which the government had suppressed because the revelations they contained were so appalling. Some devoted friends had managed to procure copies for Marx, who was certainly the only economist of Western Europe who had cognisance of them.

Besides the reading of poetry and novels, Marx had recourse to another and very remarkable means of mental relaxation, *viz.*, mathematics, of which he was exceedingly fond. Algebra even gave him moral consolation; and he would take refuge in it during the most painful moments of a storm-tossed life. In the days of his wife's last illness, he found it impossible to go on in the usual way with his scientific work, and his only escape from the thought of her sufferings was to immerse himself in mathematics. At this period of spiritual agony he wrote an essay upon the infinitesimal calculus, which, according to the reports of mathematicians who know it, is of the first importance, and is to be published in his collected works. In the higher mathematics he could trace the dialectical movement in its most logical and at the same time in its simplest form. According to his way of thinking, a science was only really developed when it had reached a form in which it could make use of mathematics.

Marx's library, comprising more than a thousand volumes laboriously collected in the course of a lifetime of research, was insufficient for his needs; and for many years he was a regular attendant at the British Museum Reading Room, whose catalogue he greatly prized. Even his opponents are compelled to admit that he was a man of profound and wide erudition; and this not merely in his own speciality of economics, but also in the history, philosophy and literature of all countries.

Although he invariably went to bed very late, he was always afoot between eight and nine in the morning. Having drunk a cup of black coffee and read his newspapers, he would go to his study and work there till two or three next morning—breaking

off only for meals, and (when the weather was fine) for a walk on Hampstead Heath. In the course of the day he slept for an hour or two on the sofa. As a young man, he had had the habit of spending whole nights at work. For Marx, work had become a passion, and one so absorbing that it was apt to make him forget his meals. Not infrequently he had to be summoned again and again before he would come down to the dining room; and hardly had he finished the last mouthful before he was on his way back to his desk. He was a poor eater, and even suffered from lack of appetite, which he tried to combat by the stimulus of highly seasoned food, such as ham, smoked fish, caviare and pickles. His stomach had to pay for the colossal activity of his brain, to which, indeed, all his body was sacrificed. Thinking was his supreme enjoyment. I have often heard him quote from Hegel, the master of the philosophy of his youthful days, the saying: "Even the criminal thought of a scoundrel is grander and more sublime than the wonders of the heavens."

He must undoubtedly have had a very strong constitution, for otherwise he could never have endured so unusual a way of living or such exhausting intellectual labours. He was, in fact, very powerfully built. A man above the average height, he had broad shoulders and a deep chest, and his limbs were well proportioned on the whole, though his legs were rather too short for his body (as is often the case among members of the Jewish race). If he had practised gymnastics, in his youth, he would have become an extremely powerful man. The only physical exercise he took was walking. He could walk for hours, and even climb hills, talking and smoking the whole time, without showing a sign of fatigue. It may be said that he did his work while walking in his study. Only for short intervals would he sit down at his desk in order to commit to paper what he had thought out while pacing the floor. He was fond, too, of conversing while thus engaged in walking, only pausing in his walk from time to time, when the discussion became lively or the conversation especially important.

For years it was my custom to join him in his evening strolls

on Hampstead Heath, and it was during these walks through the fields that I acquired through him my education in economics. Without noticing it himself, he developed in these talks with me the whole of the first volume of *Capital* as he was writing it at the time. As soon as I got home I would, to the best of my ability, jot down the substance of what I had heard; but at first I found it very difficult to follow Marx's profound and complicated thought-process. Unfortunately I lost these invaluable notes, for after the Commune my papers in Paris and Bordeaux were seized and burnt by the police. Especially do I regret the loss of the notes made one evening when Marx, with a characteristic abundance of proofs and reflections, had been expounding his brilliant theory of the development of human society. It was as if a veil had been lifted from my eyes. For the first time I clearly grasped the logic of universal history, and became able to refer to their material causes the phenomena of the evolution of society and ideas—phenomena which to outward seeming are so contradictory. I was dazzled by it, and this impression lasted for years. The theory had the same effect upon the Madrid socialists when I expounded it to the best of my poor abilities. It is the greatest of all Marx's theories, and unquestionably one of the greatest ever formulated by the human mind.

Marx's brain was armed with an incredible quantity of historical and scientific facts and philosophical theories, and he was amazingly skilled in making use of all this knowledge and observation which he had gathered during lengthy intellectual labour. At any time, and upon any conceivable topic, he could supply the most adequate answer anyone could possibly desire to any enquiry, an answer always accompanied by philosophical reflections of general significance. His brain resembled a warship which lies in harbour under full steam, being ready at a moment's notice to set forth into any of the seas of thought. Indubitably, *Capital* discloses to us a mind remarkable for its energy and rich in knowledge. But for me, as for all who have known Marx well, neither *Capital* nor any of his other writings exhibit the full extent of his knowledge or the full grandeur of his genius and knowledge. The man towered high above his writings.

I worked with Marx. I was nothing more than the writer to whom he dictated, but this gave me the opportunity of observing how he thought and wrote. For him, work was at once easy and difficult. It was easy because, whatever the theme, the apposite facts and reflections surged up in his mind in abundance at the first impulse; but this very abundance made the complete exposition of his ideas laborious and difficult.

Vico wrote: "Only for God, who knows all, is the thing a substance; for man, who knows externals merely, it is nothing more than a surface." Marx grasped things after the manner of the God of Vico; he did not see the surface only, but penetrated into the depths, examining all the constituent parts in their mutual interactions, isolating each of these parts and tracing the history of its development. Then he passed on from the thing to its environment, watching the effect of each upon the other. He went back to the origin of the object of study, considering the transformations, the evolutions and revolutions through which it had passed, and tracing finally even the remotest of its effects. He never saw a thing as a thing-by-itself, out of touch with its setting; but an extremely complicated world in continual movement. His aim was to expound all the life of this world, in its manifold and incessantly changing actions and reactions. The writers of the school of Flaubert and De Goncourt complain of the difficulty of giving an accurate account of what we see; and yet that which they wish to describe is nothing more than the surface of which Vico spoke, nothing more than the impression they receive. Their literary task was child's play compared with that undertaken by Marx. He needed quite exceptional powers of thought to comprehend the reality; and not less exceptional talent for exposition, if he was to make intelligible to others what he saw and wanted them to see. He was never content with what he wrote, altering it again and again, and he always felt that the presentation remained inadequate to the idea. One of Balzac's psychological studies, *Le chef d'oeuvre inconnu* [*The Unknown Masterpiece*] which has been pitifully plagiarised by Zola, made a deep impression on him because it was in part a description of his own feelings. A

talented painter is so tortured by the urge to reproduce exactly the picture which has formed itself in his brain that he touches and retouches his canvas incessantly, to produce at last nothing more than a shapeless mass of colours, which nevertheless to his prejudiced eye seems a perfect reproduction of reality.

Marx united both the qualities essential to a brilliant thinker. He was incomparable in his power of analysing an object into its constituent parts; and he was a master in the art of rebuilding this object, in all its details and in its various forms of development, and also in the art of discovering its inner connections. His method of demonstration does not consist in playing with abstractions as he has been accused of doing by economists who are incapable of thinking; he does not employ the device of the geometricians who, having isolated their definitions from the surrounding world, then go on to deduce conclusions in a realm quite out of touch with reality. We do not find in *Capital* a unique definition, or a unique formula; what we find is a series of highly subtle analyses which bring out the most fleeting *nuances* and the most inconspicuous differences of degree. He begins by noting the obvious fact that the wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails consists of an enormous accumulation of commodities; commodities, concrete objects and not mathematical abstractions, are the elements or cells out of which capitalist wealth is built up. Marx now takes firm hold of the commodity, twists it in every direction, turns it inside out, and extracts its secrets from it one after another—secrets of which the official economists have never had an inkling, and which are none the less more numerous and more profound than the mysteries of the Catholic faith. Having studied the commodity from every angle, he goes on to consider its relationships to other commodities, as shown in exchange; then he passes to its production, and to the historical prerequisites of its production. He contemplates the phenomenal forms of the commodity, and shows how it passes out of one form into another, how one form necessarily gives rise to another. The logical sequence of development of the phenomena is displayed with such consummate art that we might imagine Marx to have in-

vented it; and yet it issues from reality, and is a reproduction of the actual dialectic of the commodity.

Marx always worked with extreme conscientiousness. He never gave facts or figures which he could not substantiate from the best authorities. In this matter he was not content with second-hand sources, but went always to the fountain head, however much trouble it might entail. Even for the verification of some subsidiary item he would pay a special visit to the British Museum. That is why his critics have never been able to convict him of an error due to carelessness, or to show that any of his demonstrations were based on facts which could not stand severe examination. His habit of consulting original sources led him to read the least known authors, who were quoted only by him. *Capital* contains such a number of quotations from unknown writers that it might be supposed they were introduced to make a parade of learning. But Marx was moved by a very different impulse. He said: "I mete out historical justice, and render to each man his due." He considered it his duty to name the author, however insignificant and obscure, who had first expressed a thought, or had expressed it more precisely than any one else.

His literary conscience was no less strict than his scientific conscience. Not merely would he never rely on a fact about which he was not quite sure, but he would not speak on a topic at all unless he had made a thorough study of it. He would not publish anything until he had worked over it again and again, until what he had written obtained a satisfactory form. He could not bear to offer half-finished thoughts to the public. It would have been most distressing to him to show one of his manuscripts before it had been finally revised. This feeling was so strong in him that he said to me one day he would rather burn his manuscripts than leave them behind him unfinished. His method of work often involved him in tasks the magnitude of which is hardly to be conceived by the readers of his books. For instance, in order to write the twenty-odd pages of *Capital* dealing with English factory legislation he had worked through a whole library of blue-books containing the reports of special

commissions of enquiry and of the English and Scottish factory inspectors. As the pencil markings show, he read them from cover to cover. He regarded these reports as among the most important and significant of the documents available for the study of the capitalist mode of production; and he had so high an opinion of the men who had made them that he doubted whether it would be possible to find in any other nation "men as competent, as unbiased, and as free from respect of persons as are the English factory inspectors." This remarkable tribute will be found in the preface to the first volume of *Capital.*

Marx drew an abundance of facts out of these blue-books—which many of the members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords (to whom they were circulated) used only as targets in order to ascertain the power of their weapons by counting the number of pages the bullets would penetrate. Others sold them by weight as waste paper. That was the best use they could make of them, for it enabled Marx to get his copies cheap from a waste paper dealer in Long Acre. According to Professor Beasley, Marx was the man who most highly esteemed these English official enquiries, and was indeed the man who had made them known to the world. But Beasley did not know that as long ago as 1845 Engels had taken many extracts from the British blue-books for his treatise on *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844.*

2

Those who would know the man's heart and love it, that heart which beat so warmly beneath the outer wrappings of the scholar, had to see Marx when his books and manuscripts had been thrust aside—in the bosom of his family, and on Sunday evenings in the circle of his friends. At such times he was a most delightful companion, sparkling with wit and bubbling over with humour, one whose laugh came from the depths. His dark eyes would twinkle merrily beneath his bushy eyebrows when he listened to some bright sally or apt rejoinder.

He was a gentle, tender and considerate father. A favourite

phrase of his was: "Children must educate their parents." His daughters loved him ardently, and in the relationship between him and them there was never a trace of paternal authority. He never ordered them about, being content to ask them to do him a favour, or to beg them not to do something which he would rather they left undone. Yet seldom was a father's counsel more listened to than his. His daughters looked on him as their friend and behaved to him as to a playmate. They did not address him as "Father," but as "Moor"—a nickname which had been given him because of his dark complexion and his ebony locks and beard. On the other hand, as far back as 1848, when he was not yet thirty, to his fellow members of the Communist League he was "Father Marx."

He would spend hours playing with his children. They remember to this day the sea-fights and burning of whole fleets of paper boats, which he made for them and which he would then —amid jubilation—set fire to in a large bucket of water. On Sundays the girls would not allow him to work; he was theirs for the whole day. When the weather was fine, the whole family would go for a country walk, stopping at a wayside "pub" for a modest luncheon of bread and cheese with ginger beer. When the children were still quite small, he would shorten the miles for them by telling them stories without end, fantastic fairy tales invented as he went along and spun out to fit the length of the walk, so that his hearers forgot their fatigue. Marx had an incomparably rich poetic imagination, and his first literary efforts were poems. His wife treasured these youthful verses, but would not let anyone see them. Marx's parents had intended their son to become a man of letters or a university professor. In their view he degraded himself by devoting himself to socialist agitation and by occupying himself with the study of political economy (a subject then little esteemed in Germany).

Marx once promised his daughters that he would write them a play about the Gracchi. Unfortunately this scheme never ripened. It would have been interesting to see what "the knight of the class war," as he was called, would have made of the theme—a terrible and splendid episode in the class struggles of

the ancient world. This was but one of many plans that were never carried out. For instance, he intended to write a work on logic, and another on the history of philosophy, the latter having been one of his favourite studies in earlier days. He would have needed to live to a hundred to have a chance of writing all the books he had planned, and of presenting to the world a portion of the wealth with which his mind was stored.

Throughout his whole life, his wife was a companion in the truest, fullest sense of the word. They had known one another in childhood, and had grown up together. Marx was only seventeen when they were betrothed. They had to wait nine years before their marriage in 1843, but thenceforward they were never separated until Frau Marx died, not long before her husband. Although born and brought up in a noble German family, no one could have had a more lively sense of equality than she. For her, social differences and distinctions did not exist. In her house, at her table, workmen in their working clothes were welcomed with as much politeness and cordiality as dukes or princes would have been. Many workers from all lands enjoyed her hospitality, and I am sure that none of those whom she received with such simple and unfeigned kindliness ever dreamed that their hostess was descended in the female line from the Dukes of Argyll, or that her brother had been Minister of State to the king of Prussia. Nor were these things of any moment to her. She had left them all to follow her Karl; and she never regretted what she had done, not even in the days of their greatest want.

She had a serene and cheerful temperament. Her letters to her friends, effortless outpourings of her facile pen, were the masterly productions of a lively and original mind. Her correspondents regarded the days on which these letters arrived as days of rejoicing. Johann Philip Becker has published a number of them. Heine, the ruthless satirist, dreaded Marx's mockery, but he had a great admiration for the keen and sensitive intelligence of Frau Marx. When the pair stayed in Paris, he was a constant guest in their house. Marx had so much respect for his wife's intelligence and critical sense that (as he told me in

1866) he submitted all his manuscripts to her, and greatly valued her judgment. She copied his writings before they went to press.

Frau Marx had many children. Three of them died quite young during the phase of privation through which the family passed after the Revolution of 1848, when they were refugees in London living in two small rooms in Dean Street, Soho Square. I got to know only the three daughters of the family. When, in 1865, I was introduced to Marx, the youngest (now Mrs. Aveling) was a delightful child, more like a boy than a girl. Marx was wont to say that his wife had made a blunder about the sex when she gave Eleanor to the world. The two other daughters formed the most charming and harmonious contrast that can be conceived. The elder (now Madame Longuet) was of a swarthy complexion like her father, with dark eyes and raven locks; the younger (now Madame Lafargue) took after her mother, having a fair skin, rosy cheeks, and a wealth of curly hair, with a golden sheen, as if it concealed the setting sun.

In addition to those already named, there was another important member of the Marx family, Helene Demuth by name. Of peasant birth, she had become a servant in the Westphalen family when quite young, long before Jenny von Westphalen married Karl Marx. When the marriage took place, Helene would not part from Frau Marx, but followed the fortunes of the Marx family with the most self-sacrificing devotion. She accompanied Marx and his wife in all their wanderings through Europe, and shared in their various expulsions. The practical spirit of the household, she knew how to make the best of the most difficult situations. It was thanks to her orderliness, thrift and mother-wit that the family never had to endure the worst extremity of destitution. A mistress of all domestic arts, she acted as cook and housemaid, she dressed the children and also cut out the children's clothes, stitching them with Frau Marx's help. She was simultaneously housekeeper and major-domo. The children loved her like a mother; and she, returning their love, wielded a mother's influence over them. Both

Marx and his wife regarded her as a dear friend. Marx played chess with her, and frequently got the worst of the encounter. Helene's love for the Marx family was uncritical; everything they did was right, and could not be anything but good; anyone who criticised Marx had to reckon with her. All who were drawn into intimate relations with the family, she took under her motherly protection; she had, so to say, adopted the whole family. Having survived Marx and his wife, she has now transferred her attentive care to the Engels' household. She had made Engels' acquaintance in youth, and was as fond of him as of the Marx family.

Besides, Engels was, so to say, also a member of the Marx family. The girls spoke of him as their second father. He was Marx's *alter ego.* In Germany for many years their names were invariably coupled together, and history will always record their names together in its pages. In our modern age, Marx and Engels realised the ideal of friendship portrayed by the writers of classical antiquity. They had become acquainted in youth, had undergone a parallel development, had lived in the most intimate community of thoughts and feelings, had participated in the same revolutionary agitation, and had worked side by side as long as they could remain together. Presumably they would have done so throughout life, had not circumstances forced them apart for twenty years. After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848, Engels had to go to Manchester, while Marx was compelled to stay in London. None the less they continued to share their intellectual life by means of an exchange of letters. Almost daily they wrote to one another about political and scientific happenings, and about the work on which they were engaged. As soon as Engels could free himself from his work in Manchester, he hastened to set up house in London, only ten minutes' walk from his beloved Marx. From 1870 till Marx's death in 1883, hardly a day passed on which they did not see one another, either at the one house or the other.

There were always great rejoicings in the Marx household when Engels announced his intention of coming over from Manchester. The coming visit was a topic of conversation for days

in advance and on the day of his arrival, Marx was so impatient that he could not work. At length came the hour of reunion, and then the two friends would spend the whole night together, smoking and drinking, and talking of all that had happened since their last meeting.

Marx valued Engels' opinion more than that of anyone else. Engels was the man he deemed worthy to be his collaborator. In fact, Engels was for him a whole public. To convince Engels, to win Engels over to an idea, no labour seemed to Marx excessive. For instance, I have known him re-read entire volumes in search of facts required to change Engels' opinion concerning some minor detail (I cannot now recall what it was) in the political and religious war of the Albigenses. To win over Engels' opinion was a triumph for him.

Marx was proud of Engels. He recounted to me with pleasure all his friend's moral and intellectual merits; and he made a special journey to Manchester in order to show Engels to me. He admired the remarkable versatility of Engels' knowledge; and he was uneasy at the possibility of any accident that might befall him. "I am always terrified lest he should be thrown on one of his mad cross-country gallops," said Marx to me one day.

Marx was as good a friend as he was a loving husband and father. His wife, his daughters, Helene Demuth and Frederick Engels were beings worthy of the love of such a man as himself.

3

Marx, who had begun as one of the leaders of the radical bourgeoisie, found himself forsaken by his associates when his position became too sharply defined, and treated as an enemy as soon as he became a socialist. A hue and cry was raised against him, he was vilified and calumniated, and then he was driven out of Germany; thereafter a conspiracy of silence was organised against him and his works. His *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*—which showed that of all the historians and publicists of the year 1848 Marx was the only one who understood the true nature of the causes and effects of the *coup d'état*

of December 2, 1851, and the only one who elucidated them—was completely ignored. Not a single bourgeois journal made any mention of the work, despite its actuality. *The Poverty of Philosophy* (an answer to Proudhon's *The Philosophy of Poverty*) and *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* were likewise ignored. Only the foundation of the *International Working Men's Association* and the publication of the first volume of *Capital* broke this conspiracy of silence which had lasted some fifteen years. Marx could no longer be ignored; the International grew, and filled the world with the fame of its deeds. Although Marx kept himself in the background and let others appear as the chief actors, the identity of the manager was soon discovered. In Germany, the Social-Democratic Party was founded, and speedily became a power which Bismarck courted before he attacked it. Schweitzer, a follower of Lassalle, published a series of articles (Marx thought them worthy of note) which made *Capital* known to working class readers. The Congress of the International adopted a resolution moved by Johann Philipp Becker recommending the book to international socialists as the bible of the working class.

After the rising of March 18, 1871, in which there was a desire to trace the handiwork of the International, and after the defeat of the Commune (which the General Council of the International defended against the onslaughts of the bourgeois press of all lands), the name of Marx became world famous. He was now universally recognised as the invincible theoretician of scientific socialism, and as the organiser of the first international labour movement. *Capital* was now the textbook of socialists in every country; all socialist and labour journals popularised his theories; and during a great strike in New York extracts from his writings were published as leaflets in order to inspire the workers to hold firm and to prove to them the justice of their demands. *Capital* was translated from the German into the other most widely read European languages: into Russian, French and English. Extracts from the book appeared in German, Italian, French, Spanish and Dutch. Whenever, in Europe or America,

opponents have tried to refute Marx's theories, socialist economists have been able to find an effective answer. Today, in very truth, *Capital* is what the above-mentioned congress of the International declared it to be, the bible of the working class.

But Marx's active participation in the international socialist movement left him too little time for his scientific work; and further fatal blows were struck at this work by the death of his wife and that of his eldest daughter, Madame Longuet.

Marx and his wife were intimately associated by ties of mutual dependence. Her beauty had been his joy and his pride; her gentleness and her devotion had made it far easier for him to bear the poverty inseparable from his varied life as a revolutionary socialist. The suffering which brought Frau Marx to the grave was destined also to shorten the life of her husband. During her long and painful illness, Marx was worn out—mentally by distress, and physically by sleeplessness and by lack of fresh air and exercise. These were predisposing causes of the pulmonary inflammation which was to make an end of him.

On December 2, 1881, Frau Marx died as she had lived, a communist and materialist. Death had no terrors for her. When she felt that it was close at hand, she said: "Karl, my strength is broken." These were her last articulate words. On December 5, she was buried in unconsecrated ground in Highgate cemetery. In accordance with her lifelong sentiments and those of her husband, the funeral was kept as private as possible, and only a few intimate friends accompanied the body to its last resting-place. At the graveside Frederick Engels spoke as follows:

"My friends, the high-minded woman whom we are burying here was born at Salzwedel, in the year 1814. Soon afterwards her father, Baron von Westphalen, was transferred to Treves as Councillor of State, and there became an intimate friend of the Marx family. The children grew up together. The two highly-gifted natures found one another. When Marx entered the university, they had already made up their minds to join their lives.

"They were married in 1843, after the suppression of the first *Rheinische Zeitung*, which Marx had edited for a time. Ever

since, Jenny Marx has not merely shared the fortunes, the labours and the struggle of her husband, but has taken part in them with the fullest understanding and the most glowing enthusiasm.

"The young couple went to Paris, for an exile which was at first voluntary, but only too soon became a real one. The Prussian government extended its persecution of Marx even there. With regret I have to add that no less a man than Alexander von Humboldt lent himself to being active in the execution of the expulsion order against Marx. The family was driven to Brussels. Then came the February Revolution. During the ensuing disturbances that also broke out in Brussels, the Belgian government was not content with arresting Marx, but thought fit without any reason to throw his wife into prison as well.

"The revolutionary advance, begun in 1848, collapsed already in the following year. Further exile ensued, at first in Paris, and then, owing to a renewed intervention of the French government, in London. This time for Jenny Marx it was indeed exile with all its terrors. Nevertheless she bore up against the material difficulties, thanks to which she saw her two boys and her little girl sink into the grave. But it was a terrible blow to her that the government and the bourgeois opposition, from the vulgar-liberals to the democrats, made common cause in a great conspiracy against her husband; that they bespattered him with the most mean, detestable calumnies; that the whole press closed its columns against him, so that for a while he stood defenceless against the onslaught of foes whom he and his wife could not but despise. And this state of affairs lasted very long.

"But it did not last forever. The European proletariat once more secured conditions of existence in which a certain amount of independent mobility became possible. The International was founded. The class struggle of the workers spread from land to land, and Karl Marx, her husband, fought as the foremost of the foremost. Now began a period in which she received compensation for many of the grievous troubles of the past. She saw the calumnies which had been showered on Marx scattered like chaff before the wind; she saw his doctrines, which the reactionaries of all shades of opinion, from the feudalists to the

democrats, had so much exerted themselves to suppress, being preached from the housetops in all the languages of the civilised world. She saw the proletarian movement, which to her was bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh, shaking the foundations of the old world from Russia to America, and pressing forward ever more certain of victory despite the most strenuous opposition. One of her last joys was to note the striking proof of inexhaustible energy recently given by our German workers in the last elections to the Reichstag.

"What such a woman, with so keen and critical an understanding, with so much political tact, so much energy and passion, with so much devotion for her comrades-in-arms in the labour movement—what such a woman has done during the last forty years has not been made public, has not been recorded in the annals of the contemporary press. It is known only to those who have lived through it all. But this much I am sure, that the wives of the refugees from the Commune will often think of her, and that many of us will sadly miss her bold and clever advice—bold but never boastful, clever but never dishonourable.

"I need not speak of her personal qualities. Her friends know them, and will not forget them. If there was ever a woman whose supreme delight it was to make others happy, it was she."

After his wife's death, Marx's life was nothing more than a sequence of stoically endured physical and moral sufferings, which were intensified when a year later his eldest daughter, Madame Longuet, died suddenly. He was broken, and never recovered. The end came on March 14, 1883, in his sixty-seventh year, when he fell asleep, sitting at his work table.

FROM REMINISCENCES OF MARX [1]

1. First Meeting with Marx

The friendship—with Marx's two eldest daughters, one six and the other seven years old—began a few days after I had arrived in London in the summer of 1850 from Switzerland, and, in fact, from one of the prisons of "Free Switzerland," having been sent through France with a deportation passport. I met the Marx family at the summer outing of the *Kommunistische Arbeiterbildungsverein* [Communist Workers' Educational Union] somewhere near London, I don't remember whether in Greenwich or in Hampton Court. "*Père* Marx," whom I saw for the first time, immediately undertook a severe examination of me, looked me sharply in the eyes and examined my head fairly closely—an operation to which I was already accustomed from Gustav Struve who, because he obstinately persisted in doubting my "moral backbone," especially liked to make me the victim of his phrenological studies. However, the examination passed off successfully; I withstood the look of the lion's head with the coal-black lion's mane; the examination turned into lively cheerful conversation. Soon we were in the midst of unrestrained merry-making—Marx one of the most unrestrained of all—and I at once became acquainted with Frau Marx, with Lenchen, the faithful servant of the family from youth onwards, and with the children.

From that day I was at home in Marx's house and I never

[1] *Wilhelm Liebknecht* (1826-1900). One of the founders and leaders of German Social-Democracy. We reprint here excerpts from his reminiscences of Marx which were published in 1896. The titles of the excerpts here given have been added for the present edition.—*Ed.*

missed a day with the family, which at that time lived in Dean Street, one of the streets off Oxford Street, while I took up my quarters in nearby Church Street.

2. First Conversation

My first more lengthy conversation with Marx took place the day after our encounter at the above-mentioned country outing of the Communist Workers' Educational Union. Then there was naturally no opportunity for any detailed talk and Marx invited me to come the following day to the meeting place of the Union when Engels would probably also be present. I came a little before the appointed time, Marx was not yet there; but I found several old acquaintances and was in the midst of a lively conversation when Marx clapped his hand on my shoulder, greeting me in a very friendly way. Engels, he said, was in the private parlour, where we would be more alone. I did not know what a private parlour was, and it occurred to me that I was now about to face the "big" examination; however, I followed trustingly. Marx, who made the same sympathetic impression on me as the day before, had the property of inspiring confidence. He took me by the arm and led me into the private parlour, *i.e.*, the private room of the landlord—or was it a landlady? —where Engels, who had already provided himself with a pewter pot full of dark brown stout, immediately received me with merry joking. In a moment we had ordered from Amy (or "Emma" as she had been rechristened in German by the refugees, on account of the similarity of sound), the nimble waitress, "stuff" to eat and drink—among us refugees the stomach question played an important role. In a moment the beer arrived and we sat down, I on one side of the table, Marx and Engels opposite me. With the massive mahogany table, the shining pewter mugs, the foaming stout, the appearance of the genuine English beafsteak and trimmings, the long clay pipes which invited one to smoke them—it was all so comfortable that I was vividly reminded of a picture in the English illustrations to "Boz." But all the same it was an *examination*! But, why shouldn't it turn out all right? The conversation came more and

more into swing. I had not had any personal contact with them before my meeting with Engels in Geneva the year before. Of Marx, I knew only the articles in the Paris *Jahrbücher* and *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and of Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. I, who had been a Communist since 1846, had only been able to procure *The Communist Manifesto* shortly before my meeting with Engels after the campaign on the Constitution, although I had naturally heard of it before and knew the contents; the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* [*New Rhenish Gazette*] I very rarely got a sight of; during the eleven months of its appearance I was either abroad or in prison or in the chaotic life of storm and stress of the volunteers.

I was suspected by my two examiners of petty-bourgeois "democracy" and "South German exuberance of feeling" and many judgments which I pronounced on men and things met with very sharp criticism. On the whole, the examination passed off not unfavourably and the conversation gradually assumed a wider scope. Soon we were in the sphere of *natural science*, and Marx made fun of the victorious reaction which imagined that it had stifled the revolution and did not suspect that natural science was preparing a new revolution. King steam, who had revolutionised the world in the previous century, was coming to the end of his reign and another incomparably greater revolutionary would take his place, the *electric spark*. And then Marx related to me, full of fire and enthusiasm, that for the last few days there had been exhibited in Regent Street the model of an electrical machine which pulled a railway train. "Now the problem has been solved—the consequences are unpredictable. The economic revolution must be followed by a political one, for the latter is only the expression of the former." In the manner in which Marx discussed this progress of science and mechanics, his conception of the world, and especially what has been termed the *materialist conception of history*, was so clearly expressed that certain doubts which I had hitherto still maintained melted away like snow in the sunshine of spring. *That evening* I never came home at all—we spoke and joked and drank until late the next morning, and the sun was already high in the

heavens when I went to bed. But for a long time, I could not sleep. My head was too full of everything that I had heard. At length, my thoughts, roving hither and thither, drove me out again and I hurried to Regent Street in order to see the model, this modern Trojan horse, which bourgeois society in suicidal fascination had introduced with rejoicing into their Ilion, as once the Trojan men and women had done with theirs, and which would bring about their certain destruction: ἔσεται ἡμέρα —the day will come when holy Ilion will be destroyed.

A dense crowd indicated the show window behind which the model was exhibited. I pressed my way through and, correctly enough, there was the locomotive and the train—and both of them were running merrily round.

It was then the beginning of July 1850.

3. Marx as Teacher and Educator of Revolutionaries

"Moor" (Marx) with his advantage of five or six years over us "young fellows" was conscious of the whole superiority of his ripened manhood, and he took every opportunity of testing us, and especially me. With his colossal reading and marvellous memory he could easily give us a difficult time. How he rejoiced when he enticed a "young student" into difficult waters and proved to him *in corpore vili* [in his own person] the miserable character of our universities and of academic education.

But he *educated* also, in regular fashion. I can say of him in a double respect, in the wider and the narrower sense of the words, that *he was my teacher.* And one had to follow him in *every* sphere. I will say nothing of economics. In the Pope's palace one does not speak of the Pope. I will say something later about the lectures on economics in the Communist League. Marx was at home in both modern and ancient languages. I was a philologist and it gave him a childish pleasure when he could put before me some difficult passage from Aristotle or Aeschylus which I could not immediately understand. How he scolded me one day because I did not know—*Spanish*! In a moment he had pulled out Don Quixote from a heap of books and proceeded at once to give me a lesson. From Diez' compara-

tive grammar of the Latin languages I already knew the basic features of the grammar and word construction and so I got on quite well under Moor's excellent guidance and his careful assistance when I faltered or came to a standstill. And how patient he was in teaching, he who otherwise was so stormily impatient! Only the entrance of a visitor put an end to the lesson. Every day I was examined and had to translate from Don Quixote or some other Spanish book—until my ability appeared sufficiently proven.

Marx was an excellent philologist, it is true more of the modern than of the ancient languages. He had the closest knowledge of Grimm's German grammar, and he was more familiar with the German dictionary of the brothers Grimm, in so far as it had appeared, than I, the philologist, was. He wrote English and French like an Englishman or Frenchman, though it is true he was not quite fluent in speaking. His articles for the *New York Tribune* are in classical English, his *Poverty of Philosophy*, written in reply to Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty*, is in classical French—the French friend whom he got to read through the manuscript for the press found very little to correct.

Since Marx knew the *essence* of language, and had busied himself with its origin, development and structure, he did not find it hard to learn languages. In London, he also learned Russian and during the Crimean War he had even the intention of learning Arabic and Turkish, but this was not carried out. Like anyone who really desires to master a language, he laid chief stress on reading. One who has a good memory—and Marx had a rare memory which never let anything go—quickly acquires by much reading the vocabulary and phrases of a language. Practical use is then easily learned.

In the years 1850 and 1851, Marx gave a *Course of Lectures on Economics*. He only decided on it unwillingly; but after he had given a few private lessons to a small circle of friends, he allowed himself after all to be persuaded by us to give instruction to a larger circle. In this course, which was a great pleasure for all who had the good fortune to take part in it, Marx al-

ready unfolded completely the basic features of his system as it is to be found in *Capital.* In a crowded hall of the *Communist League*, or the Communist Workers' Educational Union, which was then situated in Great Windmill Street—in the same hall where two and a half years before *The Communist Manifesto* had been decided on—Marx demonstrated his remarkable talent for popularisation. Nobody hated vulgarisation more than he did, that is to say the falsification of science, making it shallow and uninspired. No one, however, possessed in a higher degree the capacity of expressing himself clearly. Clarity of speech is the fruit of clarity of thought; clear thinking necessarily determines a clear form of expression.

Marx proceeded methodically. He put forward a sentence, as short as possible, and then he explained it in a longer exposition, taking the greatest care to avoid using any expressions which would not be understood by the workers. Then he called upon the listeners to put questions to him. If he did not get any, he began to examine and did this with such pedagogical skill that not a single gap or misunderstanding escaped him. I learned, on expressing my admiration at his skill, that Marx had already delivered lectures on political economy in the Workers' Union at *Brussels.* In any case he had the makings of an excellent teacher. In teaching he also used a blackboard on which he wrote out the formulae—including those familiar to all of us from the early part of *Capital.*

It was a great pity that the course only lasted half a year, or even less. Elements came into the Communist League with whom Marx was not satisfied. After the waves of the flood of emigration had died away, the League shrank and took on a rather sectarian character—the old followers of Weitling and Cabet began to come to the fore again and Marx, for whom such a small sphere of activity was not sufficient and who had better things in view than to sweep away old cobwebs, kept away from the Communist League. . . .

He was a purist in speech almost to the point of pedantry. And my Upper Hessian dialect, which still obstinately stuck to me—or I to it—brought innumerable sermons on my head.

If I relate such small things, I do so in order to show how Marx felt himself as a *teacher* in relation to us "young fellows."

This of course also expressed itself in another way. He demanded *much*. As soon as he had discovered a gap in our knowledge, he insisted strongly that it must be filled—for which purpose he suggested the necessary measures. If one was alone with him, one went through a regular examination. And his examinations were no joke. Marx was not to be deceived into taking an X for a Y. And if he noticed that it all bore no fruit, then friendship also came to an end. It was an honour for us to have him as a "schoolmaster." I was never with him without learning. . . .

At that time it was only a tiny minority in the working class that had raised itself to socialism; and among the Socialists themselves those who were Socialists in the scientific sense of Marx—in the sense of *The Communist Manifesto*—were only a minority. The mass of the workers, in so far as they had at all awakened to political life, remained stuck in the fog of sentimental democratic wishes and phrases such as characterised the movement of '48 and its prelude and aftermath. The applause of the crowd, popularity, was for Marx the proof that one was on the wrong path and his favourite quotation was the proud verse of Dante: "*Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti.*" [Follow your path and let people say what they will.]

How often he quoted this verse to us, which also comes at the conclusion of the Preface to *Capital*. No one is entirely insensitive to thrusts, blows, gnat bites and bug bites, and Marx as he followed his path, attacked from all sides, worried by cares for his daily bread, misunderstood, indeed often rudely rebuffed by the mass of the working people for whose struggle for emancipation he was forging the weapons in the stillness of the night, while they were running after glib-tongued windbags, dissembling traitors, even open enemies, Marx must often have encouraged himself in the loneliness of his poor, genuinely proletarian study room with the words of the great Florentine and drawn fresh energy from them.

He did not allow himself to be led astray. Unlike the prince

of the *Thousand and One Nights*, who lost the victory and the reward of victory because he was enticed by the noise and the terrible pictures around him to look anxiously back, Marx strode forward, his eyes always looking ahead, fixed on the shining goal—he "let people say what they would" and even if "the earth had collapsed in ruins" he would not have been held back from his path. And the victory has been awarded to him. Though not indeed the reward of victory.

Before all-conquering death mowed him down, he lived to see that the seed which he had sown had sprung up in glorious fashion and was ripening for the sickle of the reaper. Yes, his was the victory—and we have the reward of victory.

If he hated popularity, he had a holy anger against popularity-seeking. Smooth-tongued speakers were an abomination to him and woe to those who gave way to phrases. Then he was inexorable. "*Phraseur*" [phrasemonger] was in his mouth the most severe blame possible, and if he had once recognised someone to be a *phraseur* then he was finished with him. Logical thinking and clear expression of thoughts—that is what he instilled into us "young fellows" on every occasion and compelled us to study.

At about that time the magnificent Reading Room of the British Museum, with its inexhaustible book treasures, had been built, and to this, where he used to spend every day, Marx also drove us. Learn! Learn! That was the categorical imperative which he often enough cried loudly to us, and which was also evident from his example, indeed from the mere sight of this ever powerfully working intellect.

While other refugees made plans for the overthrow of the world and day by day and evening after evening intoxicated themselves with the hashish draught of thinking that "tomorrow it will begin," we, the "incendiaries," the "bandits," the "scum of humanity" sat in the British Museum and endeavoured to educate ourselves and to prepare weapons and munitions for the future struggles.

Frequently one had had nothing to eat, but that did not prevent one from going into the Museum—there at any rate one

had comfortable chairs to sit on and a pleasant warmth in winter—which was lacking at home, if one had anything like a "home" at all.

Marx was a stern teacher; he not only forced one to learn but he also convinced himself whether one had learned. . . .

As a teacher, Marx had the rare quality of being stern without being discouraging.

And Marx had still another excellent qualification as a teacher; he compelled us to exercise *self-criticism* and did not tolerate that one should rest satisfied with what had been achieved. With the whip of his mockery he cruelly lashed the easy-going flesh of speculativeness.

4. Marx's Style

Marx is said to have had no "style," or a very bad one. That is said by those who do not know what style is—smooth-tongued speakers and phrase-mongers who have not understood Marx and were not capable of understanding him, incapable of following the flights of his intellect to the highest peaks of science and passion and to the profoundest depths of human suffering and human depravity. If Buffon's phrase holds good of anyone, it holds good of Marx: "the style is the man"—Marx's style is Marx himself. A man who was so thoroughly truthful as he was, who knew no other cult than that of truth, who at a moment's notice would throw aside propositions, however laboriously arrived at and dearly cherished, as soon as he was convinced that they were incorrect, could not but show himself in his writings as he was. Incapable of hypocrisy, incapable of pretence or posing, he always was *himself* in his writings as in his life. It is true that with such a many-sided, wide-embracing and varied nature, the style cannot be so uniform, unvaried or even monotonous as in the case of less complex, narrower natures. The Marx of *Capital*, the Marx of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and the Marx of *Herr Vogt* are three different persons, and yet in their diversity they are the same Marx—in their trinity still a unit—the unity of a great personality which expresses itself differently in different spheres and yet always re-

mains the same. Certainly, the style of *Capital* is hard to understand—but is indeed the subject dealt with easily comprehensible? The style is not merely the man, it is also the *matter*, it must adapt itself to the matter. There is no royal road to science, each must laboriously struggle and climb even when he has the best teacher. To complain of the heavy, difficult, incomprehensible or even clumsy style of *Capital* is merely to acknowledge one's own laziness of thought or incapacity for thinking.

Is *The Eighteenth Brumaire* incomprehensible? Is the arrow incomprehensible which flies straight to its goal and buries itself in the flesh? Is the spear incomprehensible which, flung with a sure hand, strikes the enemy right in the heart? The words of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* are arrows, are spears—it is a style which brands and kills. If hatred, if contempt, if glowing love of freedom have ever been expressed in burning, destroying and elevating words, it is in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, which combines the indignation and severity of a Tacitus with the deadly satire of a Juvenal and the holy anger of a Dante. The style is here what it originally was in the hands of the Romans, a *stilus*, a sharp steel implement for writing and for stabbing. The style is a dagger employed for striking with certainty to the heart.

And in *Herr Vogt*—this sparkling humour—this joy, reminiscent of Shakespeare, at having discovered a Falstaff and in him an inexhaustible mine for furnishing an arsenal of mockery!

However, I will not speak further here of Marx's style. Marx's style is indeed Marx. He has been reproached with having attempted to compress the greatest possible content in the smallest possible space, but that is precisely Marx.

Marx attached extraordinary value to pure correct expression and in Goethe, Lessing, Shakespeare, Dante and Cervantes, whom he read every day, he had chosen the greatest masters. He showed the most painstaking conscientiousness in regard to purity and correctness of speech.

Marx was a severe purist—he often searched long and laboriously for the correct expression. He hated superfluous foreign words and if, nevertheless, he frequently used foreign words him-

self—where the subject did not require it—his long stay abroad, especially in England, must be borne in mind. But what an infinite wealth of original, genuine German word formations and word constructions we find in Marx who, in spite of the fact that two-thirds of his life were passed abroad, performed very high services for our German language and belongs to the most eminent masters and creators of the German language.

5. Marx as Politician, Teacher and Man

Politics for Marx was a *study*. Empty political talk and talkers he hated like poison. And in fact can one imagine anything more stupid? *History* is the product of all the forces acting in mankind and in nature, the product of human thought, of human passions, of human needs. Politics, however, is *theoretically*—the *knowledge* of these millions and billions of factors working at the "loom of time," and *practically*—the action determined by this knowledge. Politics is therefore both a *theoretical and an applied science.*

How angry Marx could become when he spoke of the empty heads who settled matters with a few stereotyped phrases and who, taking their more or less confused desires and notions for facts, decide the fate of the world at the café table, in newspapers or popular meetings or parliaments. It is fortunate that the world does not take any notice of them. Among the "empty heads" were included very famous, much celebrated "great men."

In this matter Marx did not only criticise, he has also given a model example; especially in his writings on the recent development of France and on the *coup d'état* of Napoleon, and in his letters to the *New York Tribune,* he has provided classical examples of the political writing of history.

Here is a comparison which forces itself upon me. The *coup d'état* of Bonaparte, which Marx dealt with in his *Eighteenth Brumaire* was also made the subject of a famous piece of writing by *Victor Hugo,* the greatest of the French romantics and artists in phraseology. What a contrast between these two works and these two men! On the one hand, the monstrous phrase and the monster of phrases, on the other hand the facts, method-

ically arranged—the cool deliberate man of science and politics, angry, but whose judgment is never disturbed by his anger.

On one hand, fleeting, shimmering foam, outbreaks of pathetic rhetoric, grotesque caricatures, on the other hand, every word a well-directed arrow, the naked truth convincing by its nakedness—no indignation but the establishment and branding of what is. Victor Hugo's *Napoleon le Petit* [*Napoleon the Little*] passed rapidly through ten editions and is today *forgotten.* And Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* will still be read with admiration thousands of years hence. Victor Hugo's *Napoleon le Petit* was a firework, Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* is a work of history which for the future historian of culture—and the future will know no other world history than the history of culture—will be as indispensable as Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War.

Marx could only become what he has become, in England—as I have already explained on another occasion. In such an economically undeveloped country as Germany was until the middle of this century, Marx could not have arrived at his critique of bourgeois economy and at knowledge of capitalist production any more than this economically undeveloped Germany could have had the political institutions of economically developed England. Marx was as much dependent on his environment and the conditions in which he lived as any other human being and without this environment and without these conditions he would not have become what he is. No one has proved that better than he has himself.

To observe such an intellect while conditions operate upon it and while it penetrates deeper and deeper into nature and society—that is already in itself a deep intellectual enjoyment and I can never congratulate myself highly enough on my good fortune which led me as an inexperienced young fellow, thirsting for knowledge, to Marx and brought me under his influence and schooling.

And in view of the many-sidedness, indeed one could say all-sidedness of this universal mind—that is a mind embracing the universe, penetrating into all essential particulars, despising

nothing as unessential and insignificant—the schooling was necessarily also a many-sided one.

Marx was one of the first who grasped the significance of Darwin's investigations. Already prior to 1859, the year of the publication of the *Origin of the Species*—by a remarkable coincidence also the year Marx's *Critique of Political Economy* appeared—Marx had recognised the epoch-making significance of Darwin who, far removed from the noise and bustle of the big city, was preparing on his peaceful country estate a revolution similar to the one *Marx himself* was preparing in the stormswept centre of the world—only that the lever was applied at another point.

Particularly in the sphere of natural science—including physics and chemistry—and of history, Marx followed every new appearance, noted every progress: and Moleschott, Liebig, Huxley—whose "popular lectures" we conscientiously attended—were names as often occurring in our circle as Ricardo, Adam Smith, MacCulloch and the Scottish and Italian political economists. And when Darwin drew the conclusions of his investigations and made them public, for months we talked of nothing else but Darwin and the revolutionising power of his scientific achievements. I lay stress on this because "radical" enemies have spread the story that Marx out of jealousy only recognised the merits of Darwin very reluctantly and to a very limited extent.

Marx was the biggest-hearted and most just of men, where it was a question of appreciating the merits of others. He was too big for envy and jealousy, as for vanity. Only for false greatness, artificial renown in which incapacity and meanness spread themselves, had he a deadly hatred—as for everything false and falsified.

Marx was one of the few men among the big, little and mediocre personalities known to me who was not vain. He was too big for that, and too strong—and certainly also too proud. He never posed and was always himself. He was as incapable as any child of wearing a mask or disguising himself. Except where it was necessary on social or political grounds, he expressed his thoughts and feelings in full and without reservations

and they were to be seen in his face. And if it was necessary to keep anything back, he exhibited what I might almost call a childish awkwardness which often amused his friends.

There never was a more truthful person than Marx—he was the very embodiment of truth. On looking at him, one knew at once where one stood. In our "civilised" society with its permanent state of war one cannot of course always tell the truth—that would be to deliver oneself into the hands of the enemy or to become a social outlaw—but if one often cannot tell the truth one does not need for that reason to tell an untruth. I cannot always say in words what I am feeling and thinking, but that does not mean that I must or should say what I do *not* feel and think. The one is wisdom, the other is hypocrisy. And Marx was never hypocritical. He was simply incapable of it—exactly like an unspoiled child. Indeed, his wife often called him "my big child." And no one has understood him and known him better than she—not even Engels. It is a fact that when he came into "society"—in quotation marks—where great attention was paid to externals and one had to exercise restraint, then our "Moor" was in fact a big child and he could become embarrassed and red like a little child.

Persons who acted were an abomination to him. I remember still how he laughingly related to us his first encounter with *Louis Blanc*. It was when he was till in Dean street, in the little apartment which really consisted only of two rooms, of which the front room, the parlour, served as a room for visitors and for work, while the rear one served for everything else. *Louis Blanc* had announced himself to Lenchen, who led him into the front room while Marx hastily dressed himself in the other; the connecting door, however, was partly open and through the crack a farcical play was to be seen. The great historian and politician was a very little man, hardly taller than an eight year old boy, but nevertheless terribly vain. After a glance around in the proletarian drawing room, he discovered in one corner the extremely primitive mirror, before which he immediately took up his position. He threw himself into an attitude, drawing up his dwarf stature to the fullest possible extent—he wore shoes

with the highest heels that I have ever seen—and, regarding himself self-complacently, began to posture like a March hare in love and to cultivate as imposing an attitude as possible. Frau Marx, who was also a witness of the comic scene, could with difficulty keep from laughing aloud. When his toilet was finished, Marx announced his entry with a powerful cough, so that the fop of the people's tribune could take a step back from the mirror and meet the incomer with a stylish bow. Certainly with Marx nothing was to be gained by posing and acting. And so the "little Louis"—as he was called by the Paris workers in contrast to Louis Bonaparte—was soon behaving as naturally as he was capable of doing.

6. Marx at Work

"*Genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains*" as someone has said, and if this is perhaps not quite correct still it is certainly so at least to a very great extent.

There is no genius without extraordinary power of working and extraordinary performance of work. The so-called genius who knows nothing of either is only an irridescent soap bubble or a bill of exchange drawn on castles in the air. But where power of working and performance of work above the average is to be found, there is genius. I have met many who were considered by themselves and sometimes also by others to be geniuses who, however, had no power of working—they were only dilettantes with a gift of the gab and much talent for self-advertisement. All the really eminent men whom I have known were extremely diligent and worked very hard. This holds good of Marx to the fullest extent. He worked colossally, and since he was often prevented from working during the day—especially during his first period as a refugee—he had recourse to working at night. When we came home late in the evening from a session or meeting, he regularly sat down to work for a few hours. And the few hours lengthened themselves out more and more until at last he worked almost the whole night through and slept in the morning. His wife seriously remonstrated, but he declared laughingly that it was in accordance with his nature. I myself

even at school had been accustomed to carry out the more difficult work late in the evening or during the night, when I felt most active intellectually, and therefore I did not regard the matter in the same light as Frau Marx. But she was right. And in spite of his unusually powerful constitution, Marx already at the end of the 'fifties began to complain of all sorts of disturbances to his bodily functions. The advice of a doctor had to be taken. The consequence was a categorical *ban on night work*; also much physical exercise, walks and rides were prescribed. At that time I used to walk about with Marx a good deal in the neighbourhood of London, especially on the hills to the north. He recovered very quickly, for in fact he had a bodily constitution excellently adapted to great exertions and performance of work. However, hardly did he feel himself well again before he gradually slipped once more into the habit of working at night until another crisis took place forcing him to a more reasonable mode of life—but always only so long as necessity made compulsory. The crises became more violent—a liver complaint developed, malignant tumours made their appearance. Gradually the iron constitution was undermined. I am convinced, and this was also the verdict of the doctors who treated him at the end, that if Marx could have made up his mind to lead a natural life, that is, one corresponding to the requirements of his body, or, we may say, more in accordance with hygiene, he would still be living today. Only in his last years—when it was already too late—did he refrain from working at night. He worked so much the more during the day. He worked on every occasion when it was at all possible. Even when he went for a walk he had his notebook with him and made entries at every moment. And his work was never superficial. There is work and work. He always worked intensively, thoroughly. I have received from his daughter Eleanor a historical table which he had drawn up in order to get a survey for some subsidiary note. Certainly for Marx there was nothing that was subsidiary and this table for his own immediate practical use is drawn up with as much diligence and care as if it were intended for publication.

Marx worked with an endurance which often filled me with astonishment. He did not know what fatigue was. He had to collapse and even then he did not relax.

If the value of a man is to be reckoned according to the work performed by him—as the value of things is by the quantity of labour embodied in them—then, even from *this* standpoint, Marx is of so high a value that only a few among the giants of intellect could be put alongside of him.

And what has bourgeois society given as remuneration for this enormous total of work? On *Capital* he worked for forty years—and how he worked! He worked as only a Marx could work. And I do not exaggerate when I say that the worst-paid wage earner in Germany has received more in wages during forty years than Marx received as "honorarium"—literally, a payment of honour—for one of the two greatest scientific creations of this century, the other being the works of Darwin.

"Science" has not a market value. And could one expect bourgeois society to pay a respectable price for the elaboration of its *own death sentence*?

7. Marx and Children

Marx, like all persons of a strong and healthy nature, was extraordinarily fond of children. He was not merely the most tender father, who could be a child with his children for hours together—he also felt himself, as it were, magnetically drawn to strange children who came in his path, especially those who were poor and helpless. Hundreds of times, when wandering through poverty-stricken districts, he would suddenly tear himself away from us in order to stroke the hair and press a penny or halfpenny in the little hand of some child sitting in rags at a doorway. He had become suspicious of beggars, for in London begging has become a regular trade—and indeed one with a golden foundation although its income is only in copper. Accordingly he did not allow himself to be humbugged for long by beggars, men or women, to whom in the beginning he never refused a gift—as long as he had anything. He had even a furious anger against some of them who had levied toll on him

by artistic exhibition of artificial disease and poverty, because he regarded the exploitation of human sympathy as an especially gross meanness and a theft from poverty. But if a beggar approached Marx with a whimpering child, then he was irretrievably lost, were rascality depicted never so plainly on the beggar's countenance. He could not resist the beseeching eyes of the child.

Bodily weakness and helplessness always aroused his lively sympathy. A man who beat his wife—and wifebeating was then very much the fashion in London—he would gladly have had flogged to the point of death. Owing to his impulsive nature on such occasions he not infrequently involved both himself and us into trouble. One evening I was riding with him on the top of an omnibus towards Hampstead Road when in front of a gin palace at a halting place we noticed a crowd out of which came a piercing woman's voice shrieking, murder! murder! Quick as lightning, Marx sprang down and I after him. I wanted to hold him back—I might as well have tried to hold back a bullet from a gun with my bare hand. In a moment we were in the midst of the throng; and the wave of human beings closed behind us. "What is the matter?" What was the matter was only too soon visible. A drunken woman had had a quarrel with her husband, the latter wanted to get her home, she resisted and raised an outcry like one possessed. So far, so good. There was no reason for our intervention—that we saw. But that the quarrelling pair also saw, and they immediately made peace and then turned on us, while the crowd around us drew closer and closer and took up a threatening attitude against the "damned foreigners." The woman especially made a furious onslaught on Marx and aimed her attack at his magnificant, shining black beard. I tried to calm the storm—in vain. And if two powerful constables had not opportunely appeared on the battlefield, we would have had to pay dearly for our philanthropic attempts at intervention. We were glad to come out of it with a whole skin and to be seated once more on an omnibus going towards home. Afterwards Marx was somewhat more cautious in such attempts at intervention.

One had to have seen Marx with his children in order to get

a full idea of the depth of feeling and childishness of this hero of science. In his minutes of leisure or on walks, he carried them about, played the maddest, merriest games with them—in brief, was a child among children. On Hampstead Heath we often played "cavalry": I took one of the little daughters on my shoulders, Marx the other, and then we vied with one another in trotting and jumping—on occasion there was also a little fight between the mounted riders. For the girls were as unrestrained as boys and could also endure a bump without crying.

The society of children was a necessity for Marx—he recreated and refreshed himself by this means. And when his own children were grown up or dead, then the grandchildren took their place. Little Jenny, who in the beginning of the 'seventies married Longuet, one of the Commune refugees, brought Marx several children into the house—wild youngsters. The eldest especially, Jean or Johnny, now on the point of "serving" his year as an involuntary "volunteer" in France, was the grandfather's favourite. He could do what he liked with him and he knew it. One day, when I was on a visit in London, Johnny, whom the parents had sent over from Paris—as occurred several times every year—hit upon the brilliant idea of converting Moor into an *omnibus*, on the box of which, that is to say Marx's shoulders, he set himself, while Engels and I were appointed to be omnibus horses. And when we were properly harnessed, then there was a wild chase—I should have liked to say furious drive—in the little house garden behind Marx's cottage in Maitland Park Road. Perhaps it may have been in Engels' house at Regent's Park. The average London houses are all so much alike that they can be easily confused, and especially the house gardens. A few square metres of gravel and grass, both so closely covered with a layer of London "blacks" or "black snow" the soot particles flying around, that one cannot distinguish where *grass* and *gravel* begin and end—that is the London "garden."

And now they started off, gee up! With international cries in German, English and French—Go on! *Plus vite*! Hurrah! Moor had to trot so that the sweat ran down his face, and if Engels

or I tried to slacken the pace at all, the whip of the unrelenting driver immediately descended on our backs: you naughty horse! *en avant*! And so on, until Marx could not go on any more—and then negotiations began with Johnny and an armistice was concluded.

8. Lenchen

Ever since the time when Marx's household was established, Lenchen, in the words of one of the daughters, became the soul of the house and, in the highest, noblest sense of the words—the maid of all work. Was there anything which she did not have to do? Was there anything which she did not do joyfully? I will only recall the many journeys to the mysterious, much-berated and yet cultivated, benevolent relative. the "uncle" with the three gilt balls. And always she was cheerful, laughing, ready to help. But no! She could also be angry and "Moor's" enemies hated her with a fierce hatred.

If Frau Marx was not well, Lenchen acted as mother—and on other occasions, also, she was a second mother to the children. And she had a will of her own—a strong, firm will. What she thought necessary had to happen.

Lenchen exercised, as we have said, a sort of dictatorship—to formulate the relationship precisely, I might say: Lenchen was the dictator in the house, Frau Marx the ruler. And Marx submitted like a lamb to this dictatorship. It has been said that no one is a great man in the eyes of his valet. Marx was certainly not one in Lenchen's eyes. She would have sacrificed herself for him, she would have given up her life for him and Frau Marx and each of the children a hundred times over if it had been necessary or possible—she *did* indeed give her life—but Marx could not impress *her*. She knew him with all his moods and weaknesses and she twisted him round her little finger. However irritable his mood, however much he stormed and raged so that everyone else was glad to keep clear of him, Lenchen went into the lion's den, and if he growled she so forcibly read Leviticus to him that the lion became as tame as a lamb.

9. Walks With Marx

Our journeys to Hampstead Heath! Were I to live to be a thousand years old, I would never forget them. Hampstead "Heath" lies beyond Primrose Hill and like it is well known to the world outside London through Dickens' *Pickwick*. It is today still very largely heath, that is to say, hilly country, not built upon, with prickly gorse bushes and groups of trees growing on it. It has miniature mountains and valleys where everyone can roam and sport at will without fear of trespassing, *i.e.*, penetrating without authorisation into private property, where one may be stopped by a guardian of the holy property and subjected to fine. Hampstead Heath is still today a favourite place for the Londoner's excursions, and on a fine Sunday it is black with men's and gay with women's clothes. The ladies have a special predilection for putting the patience of the, in any case very patient, donkeys and hack horses to the test. Forty years ago, Hampstead Heath was very much larger and more primitive than it is today. A Sunday on Hampstead Heath was one of our greatest joys. The children talked of it the whole week beforehand and to us grown-ups, old and young, it was also a source of the greatest joy. The very journey thither was a festival. The girls were excellent walkers, lissom and untiring as cats. From Dean Street, where the Marxes lived—a few doors away from Church Street where I had my anchorage—it was a good hour and a quarter, and as a rule we started out by eleven clock in the morning. Frequently, it is true, we started later, for early rising is not the custom in London and it always took some time before everything was ready, the children looked after and the basket properly packed.

The basket! It stands, or rather hangs, before my "mental eye" as really, as vividly, as alluringly, as appetisingly as if I had seen it on Lenchen's arm only yesterday.

For the basket was our provision store, and when one has a strong and healthy stomach and very often not the necessary small change in one's pocket (large sums at that time were entirely out of the question), then the food question plays a very out-

standing role. And the good Lenchen, who kept a sympathetic heart in her breast for us starving and therefore ever-hungry guests knew this very well. A mighty roast of veal was the traditional *pièce de resistance* for a Sunday on Hampstead Heath. A basket of unusual dimensions for London, rescued by Lenchen from the old days at Treves, served as a receptacle, as a sort of tabernacle, for the holy of holies. Along with the roast was tea with sugar, and occasionally some fruit. Bread and cheese we would buy on the Heath, where, as in Berlin coffee gardens, crockery and hot water with milk could be obtained and everyone, according to desire and means, could—and can—buy bread, cheese, butter, beer, together with the shrimps, watercress and winkles characteristic of the place.

The march itself was usually accomplished in the following order. I went in front as vanguard accompanied by the two girls —sometimes relating stories, and sometimes doing free gymnastic exercises or hunting for wild flowers, which at that time were not so rare as they now are. Behind us came some friends. Then came the main body of the army: Marx with his wife and perhaps some Sunday visitors who claimed a certain amount of attention. And behind these came Lenchen with the hungriest of the guests, who helped her to carry the basket. If there was more company present it divided itself between the various columns of the army. I need hardly say that the order of march or battle array could be varied according to mood or needs.

Arrived on the Heath, we would first of all look out for a spot where we could set up our tent, taking into account the possibilities of obtaining tea and beer.

Autar epei posios kai edetios ex eron hento—

But after they had refreshed themselves with food and drink—then the excursionists sought out the most comfortable place for sitting and camping, and—provided a nap was not given the preference—the Sunday newspapers bought on the way were brought out from the pockets and we would begin to read and talk politics—while the children, who quickly found playmates, played hide-and-seek among the gorse bushes.

But we had to introduce some variety into our life of ease

and so races were held, and sometimes there was wrestling, aiming with stones or other sports. One Sunday we discovered in the neighbourhood a horse-chestnut tree with ripe fruits. "Let's see who can bring down the most," someone cried, and with shouts of "hurrah" we set to work. Moor was like a madman, and certainly bringing down chestnuts was not his strong point. But he was indefatigable—as we all were. The bombardment only ceased when the last chestnut had been secured amid wild cries of triumph. Marx could not use his right arm for eight days afterwards, and I was no better off.

The greatest "treat" of all was a ride on the donkeys. What uproarious laughter and merry-making there was! And what comical scenes! How Marx amused himself—and us! He amused *us* in two ways: both by his more than primitive equestrian skill and also by the fanaticism with which he asserted his virtuosity in this art. His virtuosity consisted in the fact that as a student he had once taken riding lessons—Engels asserted that he had never taken more than three—and that in the festival years when he visited Manchester he went out riding with Engels on a venerable Rosinante that was probably a great-grandchild of the gentle lamblike mare which old Fritz had once presented to the worthy Gellert.

Our return home from Hampstead Heath was always very jolly, although the pleasure in retrospect did not evoke such joyful thoughts as in anticipation. We were saved from melancholy—although we certainly had only too good grounds for it—by our sardonic humour. The woes of the refugee did not exist for us—if anyone began to complain he was reminded in most emphatic fashion of his social duties.

The order of march on the way back was different from that on the way out. The children had made themselves tired by running about, and formed the rearguard together with Lenchen who, being lighter of foot and load since the basket was emptied, was now able to take charge of them. Usually we struck up a song, only rarely political songs, mainly folk songs, especially sentimental songs and—this is no fáble—"patriotic" songs from the "Fatherland," such as *"O Strassburg, O Strassburg, du*

wunderschöne Stadt," which was a great favourite. Or the children would sing Negro songs to us, and even dance as well—if their legs had recovered somewhat from fatigue. During the march, it was as impermissible to speak of politics as of refugee sorrows. On the other hand, we spoke much of literature and art, and then Marx had an opportunity of showing his tremendous memory. He would recite long passages from the *Divine Comedy* of which he knew almost the whole by heart, and scenes from Shakespeare, in which case his wife, who had an excellent knowledge of Shakespeare, would often relieve him. . . .

From the end of the 'fifties we lived in the north of London, in Kentish Town and Haverstock Hill, and then our favourite walks were on the hills and fields between and behind Hampstead and Highgate. Here we could look for flowers and identify plants, which gives especial pleasure to town children in whom the cold, seething ocean of stones of the great city produces a passionate hunger for the green scenery of nature. What a joy it was for us when in the course of our wanderings we discovered a little pond overshadowed by trees and I was able to point out to the children the first living "wild" forget-me-not. And our joy was still greater when we came on a luxuriant, dark velvet green meadow, on to which we ventured after carefully reconnoitring the ground in defiance of warnings against "trespass," and discovered some wild hyacinths among other spring flowers in a wind-protected spot. . . .

10. Illness and Death [1]

On Moor's stay in Mustapha (Algiers) I cannot say much more than that the weather was awful, that Moor found there a very clever and friendly doctor and that every one in the hotel was attentive and friendly towards him.

During the autumn and winter of 1881-82, Moor was at first with Jenny in Argenteuil near Paris. There we met and remained together for a few weeks. Then he travelled to the south of France and to Algiers, but came back very ill. He passed the autumn

[1] A letter from Tussy (Marx's youngest daughter—Eleanor).—*Ed.*

and winter of 1882-83 in Ventnor (on the Isle of Wight) from where he returned in January 1883 after Jenny's death—January 8.

Now about *Karlsbad.* We visited it for the first time in 1874. Moor had been sent there on account of a liver complaint and sleeplessness. In the following year, 1875, his first stay having done him a great deal of good, he went there alone. The next year, *i.e.*, 1876, I accompanied him again because he said that he had missed me very much the year before. In Karlsbad he took his cure with great conscientiousness and carried out exactly what was prescribed for him. We made many friends there. As a travelling companion, Moor was delightful. Always in good spirits, he was always ready to enjoy everything whether it was beautiful scenery or a glass of beer. And with his extensive knowledge of history he could make every place that we came to even more vivid and living in the past than it actually was in the present.

I believe that various things have been written about Moor's stay in Karlsbad. Among other things I heard of a longish article, I cannot remember now in which paper it appeared; perhaps M.O. in D. could tell you something more about it. He spoke to me about a very good article.

In 1874-75 we saw each other in Leipzig, Then on our way home we made an excursion to Bingen, which Moor wanted to show me because he had been there on his honeymoon with my mother. Besides that we also went to Dresden, Berlin, Prague, Hamburg and Nuremberg during these two journeys.

In 1877, Moor should have gone back to Karlsbad. However, it was reported to us that the German and Austrian governments intended to expel him, and since the journey was too long and expensive to let it come to an expulsion, he did not go to Karlsbad any more—to his disadvantage for he always felt after the cure as if he had been rejuvenated.

We went to Berlin chiefly in order to visit the faithful friend of my father, my dear uncle Edgar von Westphalen. We remained only a few days. To Moor's joy we heard later that the

police had paid him a visit at our hotel on the third day—exactly an hour after we had left.

In the autumn of 1880—when our dear mother was already so ill that she could only rarely rise from her sickbed—Moor had a serious attack of pleurisy. It became so dangerous because he had been always neglecting his illness. The doctor (our excellent friend Donkin) regarded the case as almost hopeless. It was a terrible time. In the large front room lay our mother, in the little room behind was Moor. And the two of them, who were so used to one another, so close to one another, could not be together in the same room.

Our good old Lenchen (you know what she was to us) and I had to look after both of them. The doctor said that our care saved Moor's life. Be that as it may, I only know that neither Helene (Lenchen) nor I ever went to bed for three weeks. We were up and about day and night, and if we were at any time absolutely exhausted, we took turns in resting for an hour. Moor once more got the better of his illness. I shall never forget the morning when he felt himself strong enough to go into mother's room. They were young again together—she a loving maid and he a loving youth, who were entering life together—and not an old man devastated by illness and a dying old woman who were taking leave from one another for life.

Moor became better and if he was still not strong, still he appeared to be strong.

Then mother died—on December 2, 1881; her last words—remarkably enough in English—were addressed to her "Karl." When our dear General (Engels) came, he said—what at the time almost moved me to anger—"*Moor is also dead.*"

And it was actually so.

With mother's life went that of Moor also. He struggled hard in order to keep going, for he was a fighter to the last—but he was a broken man. His general state of health became worse and worse. If he had been more selfish, he would have let things take their course. However for him there was something which stood above everything else—that was his devotion to the cause. He

attempted to complete his great work and therefore he agreed to undertake another voyage of recovery.

In the spring of 1882 he went to Paris and Argenteuil,[1] where I met him, and we passed some really happy days together with Jenny and her children. Moor then travelled to the south of France and finally to Algiers.

During his whole stay in Algiers, Nice and Cannes he was dogged by bad weather. He wrote me long letters from Algiers. Many of them I have lost, because on his request I sent them also to Jenny—and she gave me very few of them back.

When Moor finally came home again, he was very ill; and now we began to fear the worst. On the advice of the doctor, he spent the autumn and winter at Ventnor in the isle of Wight. I must mention here that at that time, on Moor's wish, I spent three months in Italy with Jenny's youngest son, Jean (Johnny). In the spring of 1883 I went to Moor and took Johnny with me, who was his special favourite among his grandchildren. I had to go back because I had to give my lessons.

And now came the last dreadful blow: the news of Jenny's death. Jenny, the first born, Moor's favourite daughter, died suddenly (on January 8). We had received letters from "Moor"—I have them now before me—in which he writes that Jenny's health was better and we (Helene and I) did not need to be anxious. We received the telegram announcing her death an hour later than the letter in which Moor wrote the above. I travelled immediately to Ventnor.

I have gone through many sad hours in my life, but none was so sad as that. I felt that I was bringing my father his death sentence. On the long anxious journey, I tortured my brain thinking how to impart the news to him. I did not need to impart it, my face betrayed me—Moor said at once, "Our Jenny is dead!" and then he requested me to go to Paris at once and help with the children. I wanted to remain with *him*—he would not suffer any contradiction. I had hardly been half an hour in Ventnor

[1] This is the journey spoken of at the beginning of this letter. [*Note by W. Liebknecht*].

when I was already on my sad troubled way to London in order to set out immediately for Paris. I did what Moor wished on account of the children.

I will not speak of my journey there—I can only recall that time with a shudder—that mental agony, that torture—but no more of that. Sufficient—I came back and Moor returned home—*to die.*

And now a word about our mother. She lay dying during a whole month and suffered all the terrible tortures which cancer brings with it. Yet her good spirits, her inexhaustible wit, which you know very well, never deserted her for an instant. She inquired as impatiently as a child for the results of the elections then being held in Germany [1881], and how she rejoiced at our victories. Up to her death, she remained cheerful and tried by joking to relieve our anxiety about her. Yes, in spite of her frightful suffering, she joked—she *laughed*—she laughed at the doctor and all of us because we were so serious. She remained fully conscious until almost the last moment, and when she could not speak any more—her last words were addressed to "Karl"—she pressed our hands—and tried to smile.

As far as Moor is concerned, you know that he went from his bedroom into the study in Maitland Park, sat in the armchair and tranquilly went to sleep.

This armchair the "General" kept until his death and I have it now.

If you write about Moor, don't forget Lenchen. I know you will not forget mother—Helene was to a certain extent the axis around which everything in the house turned. The best, truest friend. Therefore be sure not to forget Helene, if you write about Moor.

Now, since you wish it, a little more about Moor's stay in the south. We—he and I—spent a few weeks at the beginning of 1882 with Jenny in Argenteuil. In March and April, Moor was in Algiers, in May in Monte Carlo, Nice, Cannes. Towards the end of June and during the whole of July he was again with Jenny, and Lenchen was also in Argenteuil at the time. From Argenteuil Moor went with Laura to Switzerland, Vevey, etc. Towards the end of September or at the beginning of October,

he returned to England and immediately went to Ventnor where Johnny and I visited him.

And now a few notes on your questions. Our little Edgar (Musch) was born in 1847—but I am not quite sure—and he died at the end of 1855. "Little Fawkes" [1] (Föxchen) Heinrich was born on November 5, 1849, and he died when about two years old. My little sister Francisca, born in 1851, died while still a baby, about eleven months old.

And now to your question about our good Helene or "Nymy" as we called her in the end, because Johnny Longuet called her that, I don't know why, when he was still a baby. Lenchen came to my grandmother from Westphalia as a little child of about eight or nine years old, and she grew up with Moor, mother and Edgar von Westphalen. Helene always remained very tenderly attached to the old Westphalen. And Moor also. He never tired of telling us of the old Baron von Westphalen, of his wonderful knowledge of Shakespeare and Homer. He could repeat word for word from beginning to end whole rhapsodies of Homer and he knew most of Shakespeare's plays by heart both in English and German. Moor's father, on the other hand—Moor had a great admiration for his father—was a real "Frenchman" of the eighteenth century. He knew his Voltaire and Rousseau by heart, as the old Westphalen knew his Homer and Shakespeare. And Moor undoubtedly owed his remarkable many-sidedness to a large extent to these "hereditary" influences.

But to return to Helene. Whether she came to my parents before or after they went to Paris—(which occurred very soon after their marriage) I cannot say. I only know that my grandmother sent the young girl to our mother "as the best that she could send her—faithful, dear Lenchen." And faithful, dear Lenchen remained with my parents, and her younger sister Marianne also came later on. You will hardly recall *her* because it was after your time.

[1] He got the name Fawkes from the hero of the "Gunpowder Plot," Guido (Guy) Fawkes, whose anniversary November 5 every year is still noisily celebrated or more correctly execrated. [*Note by W. Liebknecht.*]

11. Want and Privation

Innumerable lies have been spread about Marx—including that he lived in riotous luxury while the common herd of refugees around him went hungry and starved. I do not consider myself justified in entering here into details, but I can say this: what these diaries have once again brought freshly and vividly before my eyes was no isolated case of need such as could happen to anyone, especially in a foreign country where sources of assistance are lacking; Marx and his family experienced for years the misery of the life of a refugee. There can have been few refugees who suffered more than Marx and his family. And in the later period also, when the income was larger and more regular, the Marx family was not spared cares over daily food. During whole years—and the worst was then already over—the pound sterling which Marx was paid each week for his articles to the *New York Tribune* was the only certain source of income.

12. Marx's Grave

Marx's *family grave*, it should more correctly be called. It is situated in the *Highgate* cemetery in the north of London on a hill which overlooks the giant city.

Marx did not want a "memorial." To have desired to put up any other memorial to the creater of *The Communist Manifesto* and of *Capital* than that which he had built himself, would have been an insult to the great dead. In the heads and hearts of millions of workers, who have "united" at his call, he has not merely a memorial more lasting than bronze, but also the living soil in which what he taught and desired will become—and in part has already become—an act.

We Social-Democrats have no saints and no saints' burial places but millions think with thankfulness and veneration of the man who rests in this cemetery in the north of London. And a thousand years hence, in a period when the savagery and narrow-mindedness which the efforts for the emancipation of the working class today encounter have become a scarcely credible

*

tale of the past, free and noble men will still stand at this grave-side and with bared heads whisper to their children:

"Here lies Karl Marx!"

Here lies Karl Marx and *his family*. A simple marble slab, bordered with ivy, lies like a pillow at the head of the grave which is enclosed by marble blocks, and on the slab is the inscription:

Jenny von Westphalen
The beloved wife of ....
Karl Marx
Born 12 *February* 1814
Died 2 *December* 1881
And Karl Marx
Born May 5, 1818, *died March* 14, 1883
And Harry Longuet
Their grandson
Born July 4, 1878, *died March* 20, 1883
And Helene Demuth
Born January 1, 1823, *died November* 4, 1890

The family grave does *not* contain the whole family; that is in respect to the members no longer alive. The three children who died in London are buried in other London cemeteries—one of them, Edgar ("Musch"), *for certain*, the other two probably in the cemetery of Whitfield Chapel in Tottenham Court Road. And Jenny Marx, the favourite daughter, rests in *Argenteuil* near Paris, where death snatched her from her flourishing family.

But if not all of the dead children and grandchildren have found a place in the family grave, still there is one who belonged to the family, although not by blood relationship: "the faithful Lenchen," *Helene Demuth.*

That she should rest in the family grave had been decided already by Frau Marx, and after her by Marx. And Engels, the faithful Eckhart, like faithful Lenchen, carried out this duty together with the *surviving* children as he would have carried it out also on his own initiative.

What Marx's children thought of Lenchen, how tenderly they were attached to her, how deeply they revered her memory, can be seen from the letter of Marx's youngest daughter published in another place.[1]

And when on my way home *via* Paris, after my last visit to London, I was revelling in old London reminiscences with "Lörchen" in *Draveil*, where Lafargue and his wife *Laura* Marx had fashioned themselves an enviable country home, and I spoke of my intention of writing this memorial booklet, she also said to me, just as Tussy had done in the letter reproduced above and afterwards also by word of mouth: "Don't forget about Lenchen!"

Now—I have not forgotten Lenchen and shall not forget her. Was she not indeed a *friend* to me for forty years? Was she not indeed in the London refugee period often also my "providence"? How often she helped me out with sixpence when my pockets were empty and there was not too low a tide in Marx's house—for if the tide was low there, then there was nothing to be got from Lenchen. And how often, when *my* ability as a tailor did not suffice, did she artistically repair some indispensable article of clothing, which was—on financial grounds—not replaceable in any period of time that could be foreseen, so as to make it wearable again for some weeks.

When I saw Lenchen for the first time, she was twenty-seven years old and, while no beauty, she was pretty, well-grown and had very attractive features. She had no lack of admirers and she had repeated opportunities of making a good match. Nevertheless, without having made any vow, it was a matter of course for her faithful heart that she had to remain with "Moor" and Frau Marx and the children.

She remained—and the years of her youth passed away. She remained during want and privation, in good fortune and misfortune. Her first rest came when death had mowed down both the woman and the man to whom she had linked her fate. She found rest with Engels and with him she died—forgetful of self to the last. And now she rests in the family grave.

* * *

[1] See above, section 10, p. 125.—*Ed.*

Friend Motteler, the "Red postmaster," who lives now in Hampstead not far from Highgate, gives the following account of the grave:

"Marx's grave is set round with white marble; the small slab with names and dates in black type is of the same material. Spanish grass, wood ivy, which I brought back from Switzerland on one occasion, and a few small rose bushes form the simple adornment, mostly overgrown by wild grasses, as is usual here in bordered graves. My way usually takes me twice a week through Highgate Cemetery by Marx's grave; then I remove the grass if the overgrowth is excessive. A good deal gets withered during hot summers, as the two last have been (this year when it rained so much on the Continent, there was a drought in England the like of which no one remembers, and even in the parks the grass is completely withered). Even with Lessner's help, it was not possible for me to protect the grave from the effects of the burning sun and so we had after all, of course in agreement with the Avelings, who on account of the enormous distance can only seldom come here, to entrust it to the regular care of the cemetery gardener."

SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC

Preface to the First Edition

The following work is derived from three chapters of my book: *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, Leipzig, 1878.[1] I put it together for my friend Paul Lafargue for translation into French and added a few extra remarks. The French translation revised by me appeared first in the *Revue socialiste* [*Socialist Review*] and then independently under the title: *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique* [*Utopian Socialism and Scientific Socialism*], Paris, 1880. A rendering into Polish made from the French translation has just appeared in Geneva and bears the title: *Socyjalizm utopijny a naukowy* [*Socialism Utopian and Scientific*], Imprimerie de l'Aurore, Genève, 1882.

The surprising success of the Lafargue translation in the French-speaking countries and especially in France itself forced me to consider the question whether a separate German edition of these three chapters would not likewise be of value. Then the editors of the Zurich *Sozialdemokrat*[2] informed me that a de-

[1] This work of Engels, popularly known under the title of *Anti-Dühring*, ranks with *Capital* and the other chief works of Marx and Engels as one of the main sources of the study of Marxist theory. For the pamphlet entitled *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels took one chapter (the first) from the introduction to *Anti-Dühring* and two chapters (the first and second) from Part III (Socialism).

In his preface to the fourth edition (1891) of the pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels says: "The present edition has undergone various slight alterations; more important additions have only been made in two places, in the first chapter on Saint-Simon, who was dealt with too briefly in comparison with Fourier and Owen, and towards the end of the third chapter on the new form of production, the 'trusts,' which meanwhile had become important."—*Ed.*

[2] The *Sozialdemokrat*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, was published in Zurich, Switzerland, from 1879-88, since Social-Democratic newspapers and books were forbidden in Germany during the period of the Anti-Socialist Law (1878-90).—*Ed.*

mand was generally being raised within the German Social-Democratic Party for the publication of new propaganda pamphlets, and they asked me whether I would not apply those three chapters to this purpose. I was naturally in agreement with that and put my work at their disposal.

It was, however, not originally written for immediate popular propaganda. How could what was in the first place a purely scientific work be suitable for that? What changes in form and content were required?

So far as form is concerned, only the numerous foreign words could arouse doubts. But even Lassalle in his speeches and propaganda writings was not at all sparing of foreign words and to my knowledge there has been no complaint about it. Since that time our workers have read newspapers to a far greater extent and far more regularly and to that extent they have become thereby more familiar with foreign words. I have restricted myself to removing all unnecessary foreign words. In regard to those that were unavoidable I have refrained from adding so-called explanatory translations. The unavoidable foreign words, usually generally accepted scientific-technical expressions, would not have been unavoidable if they had been translatable. Translation, therefore, distorts the sense; it confuses instead of explaining. Oral information is of much more assistance.

The content on the other hand, I think I can assert, will cause German workers few difficulties. In general, only the third section is difficult, but far less so for workers, whose general conditions of life it concerns, than for the "educated" bourgeois. In the many explanatory additions that I have made here, I have had in mind not so much the workers as "educated" readers; persons of the type of the Deputy von Eynern, the *Geheimrat* Heinrich von Sybel and other Treitschkes,[1] being governed by the irresistible impulse to demonstrate again and again in black and white their frightful ignorance and their consequently comprehensible colossal misconception of socialism.

If Don Quixote tilts his lance at windmills, that is in accord-

[1] The names quoted by Engels (Sybel and Treitschke) are those of German bourgeois historians, well known at the time.—*Ed.*

ance with his duty, his role; but it would be impossible for us to permit Sancho Panza anything of the sort.

Such readers will also be surprised that in a sketch of the history of the development of socialism they should encounter the Kant-Laplace cosmogony,[1] modern natural science and Darwin, classical German philosophy and Hegel. But scientific socialism is indeed an essentially German product and could arise only in that nation whose classical philosophy had kept alive the tradition of conscious dialectics: in Germany.[2] The materialist conception of history and its special application to the modern class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie was only possible by means of dialectics. And if the schoolmasters of the German bourgeoisie have drowned the memory of the great German philosophers and of the dialectics pursued by them in a swamp of empty eclecticism, so much so that we are compelled to appeal to modern natural science as a witness for the preservation of dialectics in reality—we German Socialists are proud of the fact that we are derived not only from Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel.

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, September 21, 1882.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION OF 1892

The present little book is, originally, a part of a larger whole. About 1875, Dr. E. Dühring, *privatdocent* at Berlin University,

[1] The German philosopher Kant (1724-1804) enunciated the hypothesis of the origin of the solar system from a rotating nebular mass. This hypothesis was developed further by the French mathematician and astronomer Laplace (1749-1827).—*Ed.*

[2] "In Germany" is a slip of the pen. It should read "among Germans." For as indispensable, on the one hand, as German dialectics were for the genesis of scientific socialism, as equally indispensable for it were the developed economic and social conditions of England and France. The economic and political stage of development of Germany, which at the beginning of the 'forties was still more backward than today, could produce at the most caricatures of socialism (*cf. The Communist Manifesto, Section III*, l. c., *German or "True" Socialism)*. Only by the subjection of the conditions produced in England and France to German dialectical criticism could a real result be achieved. From this angle, therefore, scientific socialism is not an *exclusively* German, but just as much an international product. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

suddenly and rather clamorously announced his conversion to socialism, and presented the German public not only with an elaborate socialist theory, but also with a complete practical plan for the reorganisation of society. As a matter of course he fell foul of his predecessors; above all, he honoured Marx by pouring out upon him the full vials of his wrath.

This took place about the time when the two sections of the Socialist Party in Germany—Eisenachers and Lassalleans—had just effected their fusion, and thus obtained not only an immense increase of strength, but, what was more, the faculty of employing the whole of this strength against the common enemy. The Socialist Party in Germany was fast becoming a power. But to make it a power, the first condition was that the newly-conquered unity should not be imperilled. And Dr. Dühring openly proceeded to form around himself a sect, the nucleus of a future separate party. It thus became necessary to take up the gauntlet thrown down to us, and to fight out the struggle whether we liked it or not.

This, however, though it might not be an over-difficult, was evidently a long-winded business. As is well known, we Germans are of a terribly ponderous *Gründlichkeit*, radical profundity or profound radicality, whatever you may like to call it. Whenever anyone of us expounds what he considers a new doctrine, he has first to elaborate it into an all-comprising system. He has to prove that both the first principles of logic and the fundamental laws of the universe had existed from all eternity for no other purpose than to ultimately lead to this newly-discovered, crowning theory. And Dr. Dühring, in this respect, was quite up to the national mark. Nothing less than a complete *System of Philosophy*, mental, moral, natural, and historical; a complete *System of Political Economy and Socialism*; and, finally, a *Critical History of Political Economy*—three big volumes in octavo, heavy extrinsically and intrinsically, three army-corps of arguments mobilised against all previous philosophers and economists in general, and against Marx in particular—in fact, an attempt at a complete "revolution in science"—these were what I should have to tackle. I had to treat of all and every possible

subject from the concepts of time and space to Bimetallism; from the eternity of matter and motion to the perishable nature of moral ideas; from Darwin's natural selection to the education of youth in a future society. Anyhow, the systematic comprehensiveness of my opponent gave me the opportunity of developing, in opposition to him, and in a more connected form than had previously been done, the views held by Marx and myself on this great variety of subjects. And that was the principal reason which made me undertake this otherwise ungrateful task.

My reply was first published in a series of articles in the Leipzig *Vorwärts*, the chief organ of the Socialist Party, and later on as a book: *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (*Mr. E. Dühring's Revolution in Science*), a second edition of which appeared in Zürich, 1886.

At the request of my friend, Paul Lafargue, now representative of Lille in the French Chamber of Deputies, I arranged three chapters of this book as a pamphlet, which he translated and published in 1880, under the title, *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique.* From this French text a Polish and a Spanish edition were prepared. In 1883, our German friends brought out the pamphlet in the original language. Italian, Russian, Danish, Dutch and Rumanian translations, based upon the German text, have since been published. Thus, with the present English edition, this little book circulates in ten languages. I am not aware that any other socialist work, not even our *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 or Marx's *Capital*, has been so often translated. In Germany it has had four editions of about 20,000 copies in all.

The economic terms used in this work, as far as they are new, agree with those used in the English edition of Marx's *Capital.* We call "production of commodities" that economic phase where articles are produced not only for the use of the producers, but also for purposes of exchange; that is, as *commodities*, not as use values. This phase extends from the first beginnings of production for exchange down to our present time; it attains its full development under capitalist production only, that is, under conditions where the capitalist, the owner of the means of

production, employs, for wages, labourers, people deprived of all means of production except their own labour power, and pockets the excess of the selling price of the products over his outlay. We divide the history of industrial production since the Middle Ages into three periods:

1) handicraft, small master craftsmen with a few journeymen and apprentices, where each labourer produces the complete article;

2) manufacture, where greater numbers of workmen, grouped in one large establishment, produce the complete article on the principle of division of labour, each workman performing only one partial operation so that the product is complete only after having passed successively through the hands of all;

3) modern industry, where the product is produced by machinery driven by power, and where the work of the labourer is limited to superintending and correcting the performances of the mechanical agent.[1]

SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC

I

Modern socialism is, in its content, primarily the product of the perception on the one hand of the class antagonisms existing in modern society, between possessors and non-possessors, wage workers and capitalists; and on the other hand, of the anarchy ruling in production. In its theoretical form, however, it originally appears as a further and ostensibly more consistent extension of the principles established by the great French philosophers of the eighteenth century.[2] Like every new theory, it had at first

[1] The continuation of the English introduction to the pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* is reproduced in another place in the volume. Engels himself separated this portion which will be found on p. 388 *et seq.* He published it separately in German in the *Neue Zeit* under the title: *On Historical Materialism.* Under this title it is included also in this volume among the articles dealing with Marx's theory of history.—*Ed.*

[2] The reference is to the representatives of the French bourgeoisie in the spheres of philosophy and science during the preparatory period of the Great French Revolution (*i.e.*, the bourgeois revolution of 1789-94). The most important of the philosophers of the Enlightenment included Voltaire, Rousseau, the Encyclopædists headed by Diderot, etc—*Ed.*

to link itself on to the intellectual material which lay ready to its hand, however deep its roots lay in material-economic facts.

The great men who in France were clearing the minds of men for the coming revolution themselves acted in an extremely revolutionary fashion. They recognised no external authority of any kind. Religion, conceptions of nature, society, political systems, everything was subjected to the most merciless criticism; everything had to justify its existence at the bar of reason or renounce all claim to existence. The reasoning intellect was applied to everything as the sole measure. It was the time when, as Hegel says, the world was stood upon its head;[1] first, in the sense that the human head and the principles arrived at by its thought claimed to be the basis of all human action and association; and then later on also in the wider sense, that the reality which was in contradiction with these principles was in fact turned upside down from top to bottom. All previous forms of society and government, all the old ideas handed down by tradition were flung into the lumber-room as irrational; the world had hitherto allowed itself to be guided solely by prejudices; everything in the past deserved only pity and contempt. Now for the first time appeared the light of day, the kingdom of reason; henceforth, superstition, injustice, privilege and

[1] Hegel's passage concerning the French Revolution is as follows: "The thought, the idea of right, asserted itself *all at once*, and the old framework of wrong could not offer any resistance to it. In the thought of right, therefore, a constitution has now become established, and henceforth, everything is to be based on this foundation. Ever since the sun has been in the firmament and the planets have encircled it, it had never yet been witnessed that men should stand on their heads, that is on thought, and construct reality according to thought. It was Anaxagoras who first said that *nous*, reason, governs the world; now for the first time man arrived at recognising that thought ought to govern spiritual reality. This was then a *glorious sunrise. All thinking beings have joined in celebrating this epoch. A sublime emotion* prevailed at that time, *an enthusiasm of the intellect sent a thrill through the world*, as if the reconciliation of the divine with the mundane had only now been arrived at." (Hegel: *Philosophie der Geschichte* [*Philosophy of History*], 1840, p. 535.)

Is it not high time to put the Socialist Law into operation against such generally dangerous revolutionary doctrines as that of the whilom Professor Hegel? [*Note by F. Engels.*]

oppression were to be superseded by eternal truth, eternal justice, equality grounded in nature and the inalienable rights of man.

We know today that this kingdom of reason was nothing more than the idealised kingdom of the bourgeoisie; that eternal justice found its realisation in bourgeois justice; that equality reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law; that bourgeois property was proclaimed as one of the essential rights of man; and that the government of reason, the Social Contract of Rousseau,[1] came into existence and could only come into existence as a bourgeois-democratic republic. No more than their predecessors could the great thinkers of the eighteenth century pass beyond the limits imposed on them by their own epoch.

But side by side with the antagonism between the feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie, appearing on the scene as the representative of all the rest of society, was the general antagonism between the exploiters and the exploited, the rich idlers and the toiling poor. And it was precisely this circumstance that enabled the representatives of the bourgeoisie to put themselves forward as the representatives not of a special class but of the whole of suffering humanity. Still more: from its origin the bourgeoisie had been saddled with its antithesis: that capitalists cannot exist without wage workers, and in the same degree as the mediæval burgher of the guild developed into the modern bourgeois, so the guild journeyman and the day-labourer outside the guilds developed into the proletarian. And although, on the whole, the bourgeoisie *in their struggle with the nobility* could claim to represent at the same time the interests of the different sections of workers of that period, yet in every great bourgeois movement there were

[1] *Jean Jacques Rousseau* (1712-78). Representative of the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie during the preparatory period of the Great French Revolution, 1789-94. He taught that society and the state originally sprang from a free "social contract" between free, mutually independent persons, but that the social system established by such a "social contract" was subsequently distorted by social inequality appearing. Human beings, according to their nature, are free and equal and consequently should also possess equal political rights and be equal in all respects before the law. According to Rousseau's teaching, men can and must restore this equality among one another on the basis of a voluntary social contract.—*Ed.*

independent outbursts of that class which was the more or less developed forerunner of the modern proletariat. For example, the Thomas Münzer[1] tendency in the period of the Reformation and Peasant War in Germany; the Levellers, in the great English Revolution; in the great French Revolution, Babeuf.[2] Alongside of these revolutionary armed uprisings of a class which was as yet undeveloped, the corresponding theoretical manifestations made their appearance; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries[3] utopian portrayals of ideal social conditions; in the eighteenth century, actual communistic theories (Morelly and Mably). The demand for equality was no longer limited to political rights, but was extended also to the social conditions of individuals; it was not merely class privileges that were to be abolished, but class distinctions themselves. An ascetic communism, scorning all enjoyment of life and linked to Spartan conceptions, was the first form in which the new doctrine made its appearance. Then came the three great utopians: Saint-Simon, with whom bourgeois tendencies still had a certain influence, side by side with proletarian; Fourier; and Owen, who, in the country where capitalist production was the most developed, and under the influence of the antagonisms begotten of this, worked out his schemes for the removal of class distinctions systematically and in direct relation to French materialism.

It is common to all three of these that they do not come forward as representatives of the interests of the proletariat which in the meantime history has brought into being. Like the

[1] The Reformation and the peasant wars in Germany took place at the beginning of the sixteenth century. For the Reformation see Engels, *On Historical Materialism*, p. 395 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

[2] The communism of Babeuf was based on the idea of equality. Babeuf and his supporters wished to establish the communist system by means of conspiracies and an insurrection which should be carried out by a small group of communist conspirators. This peculiarity of Babeuf's communism reflected the undeveloped character of the class which was the forerunner of the present proletariat.—*Ed.*

[3] Engels refers here to "the description of the ideal state of society without private property" occurring in the works of the representatives of utopian socialism—Thomas More (sixteenth century) and Campanella (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).—*Ed.*

philosophers of the Enlightenment, they aim at the emancipation not first of all of a definite class, but of all humanity. Like them, they wish to establish the kingdom of reason and eternal justice; but their kingdom is spheres apart from that of the French philosophers. To them the bourgeois world based on the principles of these philosophers is also irrational and unjust, and therefore finds its way to the rubbish bin just as readily as feudalism and all earlier forms of society. If pure reason and justice have not hitherto ruled the world, this has been due only to the fact that until now men have not rightly understood them. What was lacking was just the individual man of genius, who has now arisen and has recognised the truth; the fact that he has now arisen, that the truth has been recognised precisely at this moment, is not an inevitable event, following of necessity in the chain of historical development, but a mere happy accident. He might just as well have been born five hundred years earlier, and would then have saved humanity five hundred years of error, strife and suffering.

We saw how the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, who paved the way for the revolution, appealed to reason as the sole judge of all that existed. A rational state, a rational society were to be established; everything that ran counter to eternal reason was to be relentlessly set aside. We saw also that in reality this eternal reason was no more than the idealised intellect of the middle class, just at that period developing into the bourgeoisie. When therefore the French Revolution had realised this rational society and this rational state, it became apparent that the new institutions, however rational in comparison with earlier conditions, were by no means absolutely rational. The rational state had suffered shipwreck. Rousseau's Social Contract had found its realisation in the Reign of Terror,[1] from which the bourgeoisie, who had lost faith in their own political capacity, had sought refuge first in the corruption of the Direc-

[1] During 1793-94, the revolutionary government of France, which was led by the Jacobins (representatives of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and the toiling poor strata of the population), employed terror as a weapon in the struggle against the counter-revolution.—*Ed.*

torate,[1] and ultimately in the protection of the Napoleonic despotism. The promised eternal peace had changed to an endless war of conquest. The rational society had fared no better. The antithesis between rich and poor, instead of being resolved in general well-being, had been sharpened by the abolition of the guild and other privileges, which had bridged it over, and of the benevolent institutions of the church, which had mitigated its effects; the "freedom of property" from feudal fetters, now become a reality, turned out to be for the small bourgeois and small peasants the freedom of selling this small property, which was being crushed by the overpowering competition of big property and big landed property, precisely to these great lords, and thus, for the small bourgeois and small peasants, became converted into freedom *from* property; the impetuous growth of industry on a capitalist basis raised the poverty and suffering of the working masses into a vital condition of society's existence. Cash payment became more and more, according to Carlyle's expression,[2] the sole nexus in society. The number of crimes increased from year to year. And if the feudal depravities, formerly shamelessly flaunting in the light of day, though not abolished, were yet temporarily forced into the background, on the other hand the bourgeois vices, until then cherished only in privacy, now bloomed all the more luxuriantly. Trade developed more and more into swindling. The "fraternity" of the revolutionary motto was realised in the chicanery and envy of the competitive struggle. Corruption took the place of violent oppression, and money replaced the sword as the chief lever of social power. The "right of the first night" passed from the feudal lords to the bourgeois manufacturers. Prostitution assumed proportions hitherto unknown. Marriage itself remained, as before,

[1] The Directorate was the name given to the French government set up in 1794 after the downfall of the Jacobin dictatorship. It remained in power from 1795 until 1799 when it, in its turn, was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte. The French wars of conquest of which Engels speaks were waged under the rule of Napoleon, who was proclaimed first "consul" and later emperor.—*Ed.*

[2] Thomas Carlyle was a representative of feudal socialism in England. See *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 230 in the present volume.—*Ed.*

the legally recognised form, the official cloak of prostitution, and was also supplemented by widespread adultery. In a word, compared with the glowing promises of the prophets of the Enlightenment, the social and political institutions established by the "victory of reason" proved to be bitterly disillusioning caricatures. The only thing still lacking was people to voice this disillusionment, and these came with the turn of the century. In 1802 Saint-Simon's *Geneva Letters* appeared; Fourier's first work was published in 1808, although the groundwork of his theory dated from 1799; on the first of January, 1800, Robert Owen took over the management of New Lanark.

At this period, however, the capitalist mode of production, and with it the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, was as yet very undeveloped. Large-scale industry, which had only just arisen in England, was still unknown in France. But it is large-scale industry that on the one hand first develops the conflicts which make a revolution in the mode of production, the abolition of its capitalist character, an urgent necessity—conflicts not only between the classes born of it, but also between the very productive forces and forms of exchange which it creates; and on the other hand it develops, precisely in these gigantic productive forces, also the means through which these conflicts can be resolved. If, therefore, about 1800, the conflicts arising from the new social order were only just beginning to develop, this is even more true of the means through which they were to be resolved. Though during the Reign of Terror the propertyless masses of Paris had been able to win the mastery for a moment, and thus, even *against* the bourgeoisie, to lead the bourgeois revolution to victory, by doing so they had only proved how impossible, in the long run, their rule was in the then existing conditions. The proletariat, only then just separating itself from these propertyless masses as the nucleus of a new class, as yet quite incapable of independent political action, appeared as an oppressed, suffering estate of society, to which, in its incapacity to help itself, help could at most be brought from outside, from above.

This historical situation also dominated the founders of social-

ism. To the immature stage of capitalist production and the immature class position, immature theories corresponded. The solution of social problems, a solution which still lay hidden in the undeveloped economic conditions, was to be produced out of their heads. Society presented nothing but abuses; it was the task of the thinking intellect to remove them. What was required was to discover a new and more perfect social order, and to impose this on society from without, by propaganda and, where possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were from the outset doomed to be utopias; the more their details were elaborated, the more they necessarily receded into pure phantasy.

This once established, we shall not dwell a moment longer on this aspect, now belonging wholly to the past. We can leave it to literary retailers to puzzle their brains solemnly over these phantasies, which today are only diverting, and to prove the superiority of their own insipid mode of thought over such "absurdity." We, on the contrary, delight in the inspired ideas and germs of ideas which everywhere emerge through their covering of phantasy, and to which those philistines are blind.

Saint-Simon was a son of the Great French Revolution, at the outbreak of which he was not yet thirty. The revolution was the victory of the third estate, *i.e.*, of the great masses of the nation, *working* in production and in trade, over the privileged *idle estates*, the nobles and the priests. But victory of the third estate soon revealed itself as exclusively the victory of a small part of this "estate," as the conquest of political power by the socially privileged section of it, the propertied bourgeoisie. And this bourgeoisie had certainly developed rapidly during the revolution, partly by speculation in the lands of the nobility and of the Church, confiscated and afterwards sold, and partly by frauds upon the nation by means of army contracts. It was the domination of these swindlers that, under the Directorate, brought France to the verge of ruin, and thus gave Napoleon the pretext for his *coup d'état.*

Hence, in Saint-Simon's mind the antagonism between the third estate and the privileged estates took the form of an an-

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tagonism between "workers" and "idlers." The idlers were not merely the old privileged classes, but also all who, without taking any part in production or distribution, lived on their unearned incomes. And the "workers" were not only the wage workers, but also the manufacturers, the merchants, the bankers. That the idlers had lost the capacity for intellectual leadership and political supremacy had been proved, and was finally settled by the revolution. That the non-possessing classes had not this capacity seemed to Saint-Simon proved by the experiences of the Reign of Terror. Then, who was to lead and command? According to Saint-Simon, science and industry, both united by a new religious bond, destined to restore that unity of religious ideas which had been lost since the time of the Reformation—a necessarily mystic and rigidly hierarchic "new Christianity." But science, that was the scholars; and industry, that was, in the first place, the working bourgeois, manufacturers, merchants, bankers. These bourgeois were, certainly, intended by Saint-Simon to transform themselves into a kind of public officials, of social trustees; but they were still to hold, compared with the workers, a commanding and economically privileged position. The bankers especially were to be called upon to direct the whole of social production by the regulation of credit. This conception was in exact keeping with a time in which modern industry in France and, with it, the chasm between bourgeoisie and proletariat was only just coming into existence. But what Saint-Simon especially lays stress upon is this: what interests him first, and above all other things, is the lot of the class that is the most numerous and the most poor ("*la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre*").

In his *Geneva Letters*, Saint-Simon already laid down the principle that "all men should work." When he wrote these letters he already knew that the Reign of Terror was the reign of the propertyless masses. "See," he tells them, "what happened in France when your comrades were masters there; they created famine." But to conceive the French Revolution as a class war, and, indeed, not merely one between nobility and bourgeoisie, but between nobility, bourgeoisie *and the propertyless masses* was, in-

deed, in the year 1802, a discovery of genius. In 1816 he declared that politics was the science of production, and predicted the complete absorption of politics in economics. And if the recognition that economic conditions are the basis of political institutions here shows itself only in embryo, nevertheless the transformation of political government over men into the administration of things and the direction of production processes—that is, the "abolition of the state" about which so much noise has recently been made everywhere—is already clearly stated.

With equal superiority over his contemporaries, in 1814, immediately after the entry of the Allies into Paris, and again in 1815, during the Hundred Days' War,[1] he proclaimed the alliance of France with England, and in the second line, of these two countries with Germany, as the sole guarantee of the prosperous development and the peace of Europe. To preach to the French in 1815 an alliance with the victors of Waterloo certainly required in equal measure courage and historical foresight.

If in Saint-Simon we find the breadth of view of a genius, thanks to which almost all the ideas of later socialists which are not strictly economic are contained in his works in embryo, in Fourier we find a critique of existing social conditions, which, typically French in its wit, is none the less penetrating. Fourier takes the bourgeoisie at their word—both their enthusiastic prophets before the revolution and their interested sycophants after it. He mercilessly lays bare the material poverty of the bourgeois world, contrasting it both with the glittering promises, made by the earlier philosophers of the Enlightenment, of a society only ruled by reason, of a civilisation which would yield universal happiness, of the illimitable perfectibility of man, and with the highly-coloured phraseology of his contemporary bourgeois ideologists, showing how everywhere the most pit-

[1] The wars of conquest waged by Napoleon I ended in defeat. An alliance of almost all the European powers, with bourgeois England and feudal Russia at its head, was formed against France. In 1814 the allied forces entered Paris and Napoleon was forced to abdicate. In 1815 he made an attempt to restore his power and wage a new war against the allies (the "Hundred Days' War") but was beaten at Waterloo and again deposed. He was banished to the island of St. Helena, where he died.—*Ed.*

iable reality corresponds to the most fine-sounding phrase, and overwhelming with his mordant satire this hopeless fiasco of phrases.

Fourier is not only a critic; his irrepressible gaiety makes him a satirist, and indeed one of the greatest satirists of all time. He depicts with the touch of a master, and at the same time in a most diverting way, the speculative swindles which flourished on the downfall of the revolution, and also the shopkeeping outlook which was characteristic of the French merchants of that period. His criticism of the bourgeois form of relations between the sexes, and of the position of woman in bourgeois society, is even more masterly. He was the first to declare that in a given society the degree of emancipation of women is the natural measure of the general emancipation. But it is in his conception of the history of society that Fourier appears at his greatest. He divides its whole past course into four stages of development: savagery, barbarism, the patriarchate, civilisation, the last of which coincides with what is now called bourgeois society and, therefore, with the social order introduced since the sixteenth century; and he shows "that the civilised stage raises every vice, practised by barbarism in a simple way, into a complex, ambiguous, hypocritical mode of existence"; that civilisation moves in a "vicious circle," in contradictions which it constantly reproduces but is never able to overcome, so that it constantly attains the opposite of what it wants or pretends that it wants to achieve. So that, for example, "in civilisation, *poverty springs from superabundance itself.*" Fourier, as we see, handles dialectics in the same masterly way as his contemporary, Hegel. With the same use of dialectics he brings out the fact, in opposition to the talk about the illimitable perfectibility of man, that each historical phase has its ascending, but also its descending curve, and applies this conception also to the future of the whole human race. As Kant introduced into natural science the ultimate destruction of the earth, so Fourier introduced into historical thought the ultimate extinction of humanity.

While in France the hurricane of the revolution swept through

the land, in England a quieter, but none the less mighty, revolutionising process was developing. Steam and the new tool-making machinery were transforming manufacture into modern large-scale industry, and thereby revolutionising the whole basis of bourgeois society. The sluggish march of development in the manufacturing period had changed to a real period of storm and stress in production. The division of society into big capitalists and propertyless proletarians was taking place with ever-increasing rapidity; and between these two classes, instead of the former stable middle class, there was now an unstable mass of artisans and small shopkeepers leading a precarious existence—the most fluctuating section of the population. The new mode of production was still only at the beginning of its ascending curve; it was still the normal, in existing conditions the sole possible mode of production. But even at that time it was producing crying social abuses: the crowding together of a homeless population in the worst quarters of great cities—the rupture of all traditional bonds based on descent, of patriarchal subordination, of the family—excessive labour, especially of women and children, on an appalling scale—widespread demoralisation of the working class, suddenly hurled into completely new conditions, from the countryside into the town, from agriculture into industry, from stable conditions of life into uncertain and daily varying conditions. Then a twenty-nine year old manufacturer came on the scene as a reformer, a man of almost sublimely childlike simplicity of character and at the same time a born leader of men such as is rarely seen. Robert Owen had adopted the teachings of the materialist philosophers of the Enlightenment, that man's character is the product on the one hand of his hereditary constitution, and on the other, of his environment during his lifetime, and particularly during the period of his development. In the industrial revolution most of his class saw only confusion and chaos, enabling them to fish in troubled waters and get rich quickly. He saw in it the opportunity to put his favourite theory into practice, and thereby to bring order out of chaos. He had already tried it out with success in Manchester, as manager of a factory with over five hundred work-

ers; from 1800 to 1829 he directed the great cotton-spinning mill of New Lanark in Scotland, as managing partner, along the same lines but with greater freedom of action and with a success which won him European fame. He transformed a population which rose gradually to 2,500 persons, and was originally composed of the most diverse and for the most part extremely demoralised elements, into an absolutely model colony, in which drunkenness, police, magistrates, lawsuits, poor law institutions and any need of charity were things unknown. And, in fact, he did so simply by placing the people in conditions more worthy of human beings, and especially by having the rising generation carefully brought up. He was the inventor of infant schools, and first introduced them here. From two years of age the children came to school, where they enjoyed themselves so much that they could hardly be got home again. While his competitors worked thirteen to fourteen hours a day, in New Lanark only ten and a half hours were worked. When a cotton crisis made a four months' stoppage necessary, full wages were paid to the idle workers. And with all this the concern had more than doubled its value and to the end brought in substantial profits to the proprietors.

In spite of it all, Owen was not content. The existence which he had contrived for his workers in his eyes fell far short of being worthy of human beings; "the people were my slaves"; the relatively favourable conditions in which he had set them were still far removed from allowing them an all-round and rational development of character and mind, and much less a free life. "And yet, the working part of this population of 2,500 persons was daily producing as much real wealth for society, as, less than half a century before, it would have required a population of 600,000 to create. I asked myself: what became of the difference between the wealth consumed by 2,500 persons and that which would have been consumed by 600,000?" The answer was clear. It had been used to pay the owners of the concern five per cent interest on their invested capital and in addition a profit of more than £300,000 sterling. And what was true of New Lanark held good in still greater measure of all

the factories in England. "Without this new wealth created by machinery, the wars for the overthrow of Napoleon, and for maintaining the aristocratic principles of society, could not have been carried through. And yet this new power was the creation of the working class."[1] To them, therefore, also belonged the fruits. To Owen, the new mighty productive forces, which until then had served only for the enrichment of individuals and the enslavement of the masses, offered the basis for a reconstruction of society, and were destined, as the common property of all, to work only for the common welfare of all.

The Owenite communism arose in this purely business way, as the result, so to speak, of commercial calculation. It retained this practical character throughout. Thus in 1823 Owen put forward a scheme to end the distress in Ireland by means of communist colonies; attached to the scheme were comprehensive estimates of the initial costs, the annual expenditure and the revenue which could be expected. Thus, too, in his definite plan for the future the technical elaboration of details, including ground plan, front elevation and bird's eye view, shows such practical knowledge that, once the Owenite method of social reform is accepted, from an expert's standpoint there is little to be said against the actual detailed arrangements.

His advance to communism was the turning point in Owen's life. As long as he merely played the part of a philanthropist he had reaped nothing but wealth, applause, honour and glory. He was the most popular man in Europe. Not only those of his own class, but statesmen and princes listened to him with approval. But when he came forward with his communist theories, the situation was entirely changed. There were three great obstacles which above all seemed to him to block the path to social reform: private property, religion and marriage in its present form. He knew what confronted him if he attacked them: complete outlawry from official society and the loss of

[1] From *The Revolution in Mind and Practice*, p. 21, a memorial addressed to all the "Red republicans, communists and socialists of Europe," and sent to the provisional government of France, 1848, and also "to Queen Victoria and her responsible advisers." [*Note by F. Engels.*]

his whole social position. But he didn't let anything hold him back from attacking them regardless of the consequences, and what he had foreseen came to pass. Banished from official society, banned by the press, impoverished by the failure of communist experiments in America in which he sacrificed his whole fortune, he turned directly to the working class and worked among them for another thirty years. All social movements, all real advances made in England in the interests of the working class were associated with Owen's name. Thus in 1819, after five years' effort, he was successful in securing the first law limiting the labour of women and children in the factories. He presided at the first Congress at which the trade unions of all England united in a single great trades association.[1] As transition measures to the complete communist organisation of society he introduced on the one hand the co-operative societies (both consumers' and producers,' which have since at least given practical proof that it is very well possible to dispense with both merchants and manufacturers; and on the other hand, the labour bazaars, institutions for the exchange of the products of labour by means of labour-notes with the labour-hour as unit. These institutions were necessarily bound to fail, but they completely anticipated the Proudhon[2] exchange bank of a much later period, and only differed from it in that they did not represent

[1] In October 1833 Owen presided over a delegate conference of trade unions which resolved on uniting them on a national scale. The *Great National Consolidated Trades Union*, founded in 1834, was the first attempt to create a united national organisation of English trade unions. The organisation was dissolved at the end of 1834.—*Ed.*

[2] Proudhon (1809-65), a French petty-bourgeois utopian, the father of anarchism, saw salvation from all the evils of developing capitalism, not in the advance towards socialism, not in the proletarian class struggle for the system of socialism, but in the return to a system of small peasants—independent producers, a system erected on the basis of small private property without the exploitation of wage labour. Proudhon's exchange bank was intended to serve the same purpose. According to his plan, the bank would secure the exchange of products of the small "producers" on the basis of the labour expended ("Equal labour for equal labour") and so save them from misery, impoverishment and the collapse of their small production and small private property. The same bank was expected to save the workers themselves from capitalist exploitation by converting them also into "small producers."—*Ed.*

the panacea for all social ills, but only the first step towards a far more radical transformation of society.

The mode of outlook of the utopians for a long time governed the socialist conceptions of the nineteenth century and in part still governs them. Until quite recently it received the homage of all French and English socialists, and the earlier German communism, including Weitling, also belongs to it. To all these, socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice and needs only to be discovered to conquer the world by virtue of its own power; as absolute truth is independent of time and space and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. At the same time absolute truth, reason and justice are different for the founder of each different school; and as each one's special kind of absolute truth, reason and justice is in turn conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and intellectual training, so the only solution possible in this conflict of absolute truths is that they should grind each other down. And from this nothing could emerge but a kind of eclectic, average socialism, such as in fact dominated the minds of most socialist workers in France and England up to the present time; a mixture, admitting of the most manifold shades, of such of the critical observations, economic doctrines and delineations of future society made by the various founders of sects as excite the least opposition; a mixture which is the more easily produced the more its individual constituents have the sharp edges of precision rubbed off in the stream of debate, as pebbles are rounded in a brook. In order to make socialism into a science it had first to be placed upon a real basis.

II

Meanwhile, along with and after the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, the newer German philosophy had arisen, culminating in Hegel. Its greatest merit was the re-adoption of dialectics as the highest form of thinking. The old Greek philosophers were all natural-born dialecticians, and Aristotle,

the most encyclopædic intellect of them, had even already analysed the most essential forms of dialectic thought. The newer philosophy, on the other hand, although it too included brilliant exponents of dialectics (*e.g.*, Descartes and Spinoza), had become, especially under English influence, more and more rigidly fixed in the so-called metaphysical mode of reasoning, by which also the French of the eighteenth century, at all events in their special philosophical works, were almost exclusively dominated. But outside philosophy in the restricted sense, the French were nevertheless able to produce masterpieces of dialectic; we need only recall Diderot's *Le Neveu de Rameau* [*Rameau's Nephew*] and Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men.* We give here, in brief, the essential character of these two modes of thought.

When we reflect on nature or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, the first picture presented to us is of an endless maze of relations and interactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes out of existence. We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, in which the details are still kept more or less in the background; we pay more attention to the movement, the transitions, the interconnections than to *what* it is that moves, changes, or is connected. This primitive, naive, yet intrinsically correct conception of the world was that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and also is not, for everything is in flux, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away. But this conception, correctly as it covers the general character of the picture of phenomena as a whole, is yet inadequate to explain the details of which this total picture is composed; and so long as we do not understand these, we also have no clear idea of the picture as a whole. In order to understand these details, we must detach them from their natural or historical connections, and examine each one separately, as to its nature, its special causes and effects, etc. This is primarily the task of natural science and historical research; branches of science which the Greeks of the classical

period, on very good grounds, relegated to a merely subordinate position, because they had first of all to collect materials for these sciences to work upon. A certain amount of natural and historical material must be collected before there can be any critical analysis, comparison or arrangement in classes, orders and species. The beginnings of the exact investigation of nature were first developed by the Greeks of the Alexandrian period,[1] and later on in the Middle Ages, were further developed by the Arabs. Real natural science, however, dates only from the second half of the fifteenth century, and from then on it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and natural objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies in their manifold forms—these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of nature which have been made during the last four hundred years. But this method of investigation has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and natural processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but as fixed constants; not in their life, but in their death. And when, as was the case with Bacon and Locke, this way of looking at things was transferred from natural science to philosophy, it produced the specific narrow-mindedness of last century, the metaphysical mode of thought.

To the metaphysician, things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other, apart from each other, rigid, fixed objects of investigation given once for all. He thinks in absolutely discontinuous antitheses. His

[1] The Alexandrian period of the development of science comprises the period from the third century before our era to the third century of our era. It gets its name from the town Alexandria (a port on the Mediterranean) in Egypt, which was one of the most important centres of international economic connections at that time. In the Alexandrian period, the exact sciences and natural sciences, such as mathematics (Euclid and Archimedes), geography, astronomy, anatomy, physiology, etc., attained considerable development.—*Ed.*

communication is: "Yea, Yea; Nay, Nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist; it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in an equally rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thought seems to us extremely plausible, because it is the mode of thought of so-called sound common sense. But sound common sense, respectable fellow as he is within the homely precincts of his own four walls, has most wonderful adventures as soon as he ventures out into the wide world of scientific research. Here the metaphysical mode of outlook, justifiable and even necessary as it is in domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the object under investigation, nevertheless sooner or later always reaches a limit beyond which it becomes onesided, limited, abstract, and loses its way in insoluble contradictions. And this is so because in considering individual things it loses sight of their connections; in contemplating their existence it forgets their coming into being and passing away; in looking at them at rest it leaves their motion out of account; because it cannot see the wood for the trees. For everyday purposes we know, for example, and can say with certainty whether an animal is alive or not; but when we look more closely we find that this is often an extremely complex question, as jurists know very well. They have cudgelled their brains in vain to discover some rational limit beyond which the killing of a child in its mother's womb is murder; and it is equally impossible to determine the moment of death, as physiology has established that death is not a sudden, instantaneous event, but a very protracted process. In the same way every organic being is at each moment the same and not the same; at each moment it is assimilating matter drawn from without, and excreting other matter; at each moment the cells of its body are dying and new ones are being formed; in fact, within a longer or shorter period the matter of its body is completely renewed and is replaced by other atoms of matter, so that every organic being is at all times itself and yet something other than

itself. Closer investigation also shows us that the two poles of an antithesis, like positive and negative, are just as inseparable from each other as they are opposed, and that despite *all* their opposition they mutually penetrate each other. It is just the same with cause and effect; these are conceptions which only have validity in their application to a particular case as such, but when we consider the particular case in its general connection with the world as a whole they merge and dissolve in the conception of universal action and interaction, in which causes and effects are constantly changing places, and what is now or here an effect becomes there or then a cause and *vice versa.*

None of these processes and methods of thought fit into the frame of metaphysical thinking. But for dialectics, which grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their interconnection, in their sequence, their movement, their birth and death, such processes as those mentioned above are so many corroborations of its own method of treatment. Nature is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually repeated cycle, but goes through a real historical evolution. Here, before all others, mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt the metaphysical conception of nature the heaviest blow by his proof that the whole of organic nature today, plants, animals and therefore also man, is the product of a process of evolution which has gone on through millions of years. But the scientists who have learnt to think dialectically are still few and far between, and hence the conflict between the discoveries made and the old traditional mode of thought is the explanation of the boundless confusion which now reigns in theoretical natural science and reduces both teachers and students, writers and readers to despair.

An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution and that of mankind, as well as of the reflection of this evolution in

the human mind, can therefore only be built up in a dialectical way, taking constantly into account the general actions and reactions of becoming and ceasing to be, of progressive of retrogressive changes. And the more recent German philosophy worked with this standpoint from the first. Kant began his career by resolving the stable solar system of Newton and its eternal permanence—after the famous initial impulse had once been given—into a historical process: the formation of the sun and of all the planets out of a rotating nebulous mass. Together with this he already drew the conclusion that given this origin of the solar system, its ultimate dissolution was also inevitable. Half a century later his views were given a mathematical basis by Laplace, and another fifty years later the spectroscope proved the existence in space of such incandescent masses of gas in various stages of condensation.

This newer German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system, in which for the first time—and this is its great merit—the whole natural, historical and spiritual world was presented as a process, that is, as in constant motion, change, transformation and development; and the attempt was made to show the internal interconnections in this motion and development. From this standpoint the history of mankind no longer appeared as a confused whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable before the judgment seat of the now matured philosophic reason, and best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as the process of development of humanity itself. It now became the task of thought to follow the gradual stages of this process through all its devious ways, and to trace out the inner regularities running through all its apparently fortuitous phenomena.

That Hegel did not succeed in this task is here immaterial. His epoch-making service was that he propounded it. It is indeed a task which no individual will ever be able to solve. Although Hegel—with Saint-Simon—was the most encyclopædic mind of his age, yet he was limited, in the first place, by the necessarily restricted compass of his own knowledge, and, secondly, by the similarly restricted scope and depth of the knowl-

edge and ideas of his age. But there was also a third factor. Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images of real things and processes, but on the contrary, things and their development were to him only the images made real of the "idea" [1] existing somewhere or other already before the world existed. This mode of thought placed everything on its head, and completely reversed the real connections of things in the world. And although Hegel grasped correctly and with insight many individual interconnections, yet, for the reasons just given, there is also much that in point of detail also is botched, artificial, laboured, in a word, wrong. The Hegelian system as such was a colossal miscarriage—but it was also the last of its kind. It suffered, in fact, from an internal and insoluble contradiction. On the one hand, its basic assumption was the historical outlook that human history is a process of evolution, which by its very nature cannot find intellectual finality in the discovery of any so-called absolute truth; but on the other hand, it laid claim to being the very sum total of precisely this absolute truth. A system of natural and historical knowledge which is all-embracing and final for all time is in contradiction to the fundamental laws of dialectical thinking; which, however, far from excluding, on the contrary includes, the idea that the systematic knowledge of the external universe can make giant strides from generation to generation.

The realisation of the entire incorrectness of previous German idealism led necessarily to materialism, but, it must be noted, not to the simple metaphysical and exclusively mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. Instead of the simple and naively revolutionary rejection of all previous history, modern materialism sees history as the process of the evolution of humanity, and its own problem as the discovery of the laws of motion of this process. The conception was prevalent among the French of the eighteenth century, as well as with Hegel, of

[1] The "idea" and the "absolute idea" in Hegelian philosophy served as a screen for the deity. Behind them lay concealed "the relics of faith in the creator."—*Ed.*

nature as a whole, moving in narrow circles and remaining immutable, with its eternal celestial bodies, as Newton taught, and unalterable species of organic beings, as Linnaeus taught. In opposition to this conception, modern materialism embraces the more recent advances of natural science, according to which nature also has its history in time, the celestial bodies, like the organic species which under favourable circumstances people them, coming into being and passing away, and the recurrent cycles, in so far as they are in any way admissible, assuming infinitely vaster dimensions. In both cases modern materialism is essentially dialectical, and no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences. As soon as each separate science is required to get clarity as to its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous. What still independently survives of all former philosophy is the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is merged in the positive science of nature and history.

While, however, the revolution in the conception of nature could only be carried through to the extent that research furnished the corresponding positive materials of knowledge, already much earlier certain historical facts had occurred which led to a decisive change in the conception of history. In 1831 the first working class rising had taken place in Lyons; [1] between 1838 and 1842 the first national workers' movement, that of the English Chartists, [2] reached its height. The class struggle

[1] The rising of the Lyons weavers in France, 1831, was the answer to the firing upon a workers' demonstration during a strike for the establishment of a minimum wage. The workers erected barricades in all parts of the town, occupied the town for some days and their resistance was only overcome when the regular troops came to the aid of the Lyons bourgeoisie.—*Ed.*

[2] The Chartist movement in England in the thirties and forties of the last century embraced the majority of the English working class and constituted the first independent *political* movement of the proletariat. Marx, Engels and Lenin have emphasised that it was in this that the historical significance of the movement consisted. It received its name from the "Charter," a petition which the workers laid before parliament in 1839, containing the following chief demands: 1) Universal suffrage for all males of 21 years and above. 2) Annual parliaments. 3) Salaried members of

between proletariat and bourgeoisie came to the front in the history of the most advanced European countries, in proportion to the development there, on the one hand, of large-scale industry, and on the other, of the newly-won political domination of the bourgeoisie. Facts more and more forcibly stamped as lies the teachings of bourgeois economics as to the identity of the interests of capital and labour, as to the universal harmony and universal prosperity that free competition brings. All these things could no longer be ignored, any more than the French and English socialism which was their theoretical, even though extremely imperfect, expression. But the old idealist conception of history, which was not yet displaced, knew nothing of class struggles based on material interests, in fact knew nothing at all of material interests; production and all economic relations appeared in it only as incidental, subordinate elements in the "history of civilisation."

The new facts made imperative a new examination of all past history, and then it was seen that *all* past history, with the exception of primitive conditions, was the history of class struggles, that these warring classes of society are always the products of the conditions of production and exchange, in a word, of the *economic* conditions of their time; that therefore the economic structure of society always forms the real basis from which, in the last analysis, is to be explained the whole superstructure of legal and political institutions, as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other conceptions of each historical period. Hegel had freed the conception of history from metaphysics, he had made it dialectical—but his conception of history was essentially idealistic. Now idealism was driven from its last refuge, the philosophy of history; now a materialist conception of history was propounded, and the way found to explain man's consciousness by his being, instead of, as heretofore, his being by his consciousness.

parliament. 4) Secret ballot. 5) Equal constituencies. 6) Abolition of the property qualification for parliamentary candidates. The struggle for these aims, which went on during a number of years, was conducted by means of strikes, demonstrations and armed risings.—*Ed.*

Henceforward socialism no longer appeared as the accidental discovery of this or that brilliant mind, but as the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task was no longer to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to investigate the historical, economic succession of events from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung and to discover in the economic position thus created the means for solving the conflict. But the socialism of earlier days was just as incompatible with this materialist conception of history as the French materialist conception of nature was with dialectics and modern natural science. It is true that the earlier socialism criticised the existing capitalist mode of production and its consequences, but it could not explain them, and so also could not get the mastery over them; it could only simply reject them as evil. The more violently it denounced the exploitation of the working class, which was inseparable from it, the less was it in a position to state clearly wherein this exploitation consists and how it arises. But what had to be done was to show this capitalist mode of production on the one hand in its historical sequence and in its inevitability for a definite historical period, and therefore also the inevitability of its downfall; and on the other hand also to lay bare its essential character, which was still hidden. This was done by the discovery of *surplus value*. It was shown that the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basic form of the capitalist mode of production and of the exploitation of the worker effected through it; that even if the capitalist buys the labour power of his labourer at its full value as a commodity on the market, he yet extracts more value from it than he paid for; and that in the ultimate analysis this surplus value forms those sums of value from which are heaped up the constantly increasing masses of capital in the hands of the possessing classes. The process both of capitalist production and of the production of capital was explained.

These two great discoveries, the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production by means of surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries

socialism became a science, which had in the first place to be developed in all its details and relations.

III

The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in every society which has appeared in history the distribution of the products, and with it the division of society into classes or estates, is determined by what is produced and how it is produced, and how the product is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics* of the epoch concerned. The growing realisation that existing social institutions are irrational and unjust, that reason has become nonsense and good deeds a scourge, is only a sign that changes have been taking place quietly in the methods of production and forms of exchange, with which the social order, adapted to previous economic conditions, is no longer in accord. This also involves that the means through which the abuses that have been revealed can be got rid of must likewise be present, in more or less developed form, in the altered conditions of production. These means are not to be *invented* by the mind, but *discovered* by means of the mind in the existing material facts of production.

Where then, on this basis, does modern socialism stand?

The existing social order, as is now fairly generally admitted, is the creation of the present ruling class, the bourgeoisie. The mode of production peculiar to the bourgeoisie—called, since Marx, the capitalist mode of production—was incompatible with the local privileges and the privileges of birth as well as with the reciprocal personal ties of the feudal system; the bourgeoisie shattered the feudal system, and on its ruins established the bourgeois social order, the realm of free competition, freedom of movement, equal rights for commodity owners, and all the other

bourgeois glories. The capitalist mode of production could now develop freely. From the time when steam and the new tool-making machinery had begun to transform the former manufacture into large-scale industry, the productive forces evolved under bourgeois direction developed at a pace that was previously unknown and to an unprecedented degree. But just as manufacture, and the handicraft industry which had been further developed under its influence, had previously come into conflict with the feudal fetters of the guilds, so large-scale industry, as it develops more fully, comes into conflict with the barriers within which the capitalist mode of production holds it confined. The new forces of production have already outgrown the bourgeois form of using them; and this conflict between productive forces and mode of production is not a conflict which has arisen in men's heads, as for example the conflict between original sin and divine justice; but it exists in the facts, objectively, outside of us, independently of the will or purpose even of the men who brought it about. Modern socialism is nothing but the reflex in thought of this actual conflict, its ideal reflection in the minds first of the class which is directly suffering under it—the working class.

In what, then, does this conflict consist?

Previous to capitalist production, that is to say, in the Middle Ages, small-scale production was general, on the basis of the private ownership by the workers of their means of production; the agricultural industry of the small peasant, freeman or serf, and the handicraft industry of the towns. The instruments of labour—land, agricultural implements, the workshop and tools—were the instruments of labour of individuals, intended only for individual use, and therefore necessarily puny, dwarfish, restricted. But just because of this they belonged, as a rule, to the producer himself. To concentrate and enlarge these scattered, limited means of production, to transform them into the mighty levers of production of the present day, was precisely the historic role of the capitalist mode of production and of its representative, the bourgeoisie. In Part IV of *Capital* [1] Marx gives a detailed account

[1] Engels refers here to Vol. I of *Capital*, which in Part IV (Chap. XI, XII, XIII) traces the history of the development of production from small

of how, since the fifteenth century, this process has developed historically through the three stages of simple co-operation, manufacture and large-scale industry. But, as Marx also points out, the bourgeoisie was unable to transform those limited means of production into mighty productive forces except by transforming them from individual means of production into *social* means of production, which could be used only *by a body of men as a whole*. The spinning-wheel, the land-loom and the blacksmith's hammer were replaced by the spinning machine, the mechanical loom and the steam-hammer; and the factory, making the co-operation of hundreds and thousands of workers necessary, took the place of the individual workroom. And, like the means of production, production itself changed from a series of individual operations into a series of social acts, and the products from the products of individuals into social products. The yarn, the cloth and the metal goods which now came from the factory were the common product of many workers through whose hands it had to pass successively before it was ready. No individual can say of such products: I made it, that is *my* product.

But where the natural spontaneous division of labour within society is the basic form of production, it imprints upon the products the form of *commodities*, the mutual exchange, purchase and sale of which enables the individual producers to satisfy their manifold needs. And this was the case during the Middle Ages. The peasant, for example, sold agricultural products to the artisan and purchased from him in exchange the products of his craft. Into this society of individual producers, producers of commodities, the new mode of production thrust itself, setting up, in the midst of the primitive *planless* division of labour which then existed throughout society, *the planned* division of labour organised in the individual factory; alongside of *individual* production *social* production made its appearance. The products of both were sold on the same market,

handicrafts to large-scale industry. Marx also deals briefly with this course of evolution in Chap. XXXII. A portion of this chapter is reproduced in the present volume. See p. 350.—*Ed.*

and consequently at prices which were at least approximately the same. But the planned organisation was stronger than the natural division of labour; the factories in which labour was socially organised produced their commodities more cheaply than the separate small producers. Individual production was vanquished on one field after another; social production revolutionised the whole former mode of production. But this, its revolutionary character, was so little understood that, on the contrary, it was introduced as a means of stimulating and accelerating the production of commodities. In its origin, it was directly linked with certain levers of commodity production and exchange which were already in existence: merchants' capital, handicraft, wage labour. Inasmuch as it itself came into being as a new form of commodity production, the forms of appropriation characteristic of commodity production remained in full force also for it.

In commodity production as it had developed in the Middle Ages, the question could never arise of who should be the owner of the product of labour. The individual producer had produced it, as a rule, from raw material which belonged to him and was often produced by himself, with his own instruments of labour, and by his own manual labour or that of his family. There was no need whatever for the product to be appropriated by him; it belonged to him as an absolute matter of course. His ownership of the product was therefore based *upon his own labour.* Even where outside help was used, it was as a rule subsidiary, and in many cases received other compensation in addition to wages; the guild apprentice and journeyman worked less for the sake of their board and wages than to train themselves to become master craftsmen. Then came the concentration of the means of production in large workshops and manufactories, their transformation into means of production that were in fact social. But the social means of production and the social products were treated as if they were still, as they had been before, the means of production and the products of individuals. Hitherto, the owner of the instruments of labour had appropriated the product because it was as a rule his own product, the auxiliary

labour of other persons being the exception; now, the owner of the instruments of labour continued to appropriate the product, although it was no longer *his* product, but exclusively the product of *others' labour*. Thus, therefore, the products, now socially produced, were not appropriated by those who had really set the means of production in motion and really produced the products, but by the *capitalists*. Means of production and production itself had in essence become social. But they were subjected to a form of appropriation which has as its presupposition private production by individuals, with each individual owning his own product and bringing it onto the market. The mode of production is subjected to this form of appropriation, although it removes the presuppositions on which the latter was based.[1] In this contradiction, which gives the new mode of production its capitalist character, *the whole conflict of today is already present in germ*. The more the new mode of production gained the ascendancy on all decisive fields of production and in all countries of decisive economic importance, supplanting individual production except for insignificant relics, *the more glaring necessarily became the incompatibility of social production with capitalist appropriation*.

The first capitalists found, as we have said, the form of wage labour already in existence; but wage labour as the exception, as an auxiliary occupation, as a supplementary, as a transitory phase. The agricultural labourer who occasionally went to work as a day labourer had a few acres of his own land, from which if necessary he could get his livelihood. The regulations of the guilds ensured that the journeyman of today became the master-

[1] There is no need here to explain that although the *form* of appropriation remains the same, the *character* of the appropriation is revolutionised by the process described above, to no less a degree than production. My appropriation of my own product and my appropriation of another person's product are certainly two very different forms of appropriation. It may be noted in passing that wage labour, in which the whole capitalist mode of production is already present in embryo form, is a very old institution; in isolated and scattered form it developed alongside slavery for centuries. But the germ could only develop into the capitalist mode of production when the necessary historical conditions had come into existence. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

craftsman of tomorrow. But as soon as the means of production had become social and were concentrated in the hands of capitalists, this situation changed. Both the means of production and the products of the small, individual producer lost more and more of their value; there was nothing left for him to do but to go to the capitalist and work for wages. Wage labour, hitherto an exception and subsidiary, became the rule and the basic form of all production; hitherto an auxiliary occupation, it now became the labourer's exclusive activity. The occasional wage worker became the wage worker for life. The number of lifelong wage workers was also increased to a colossal extent by the simultaneous disintegration of the feudal system, the dispersal of the retainers of the feudal lords, the eviction of peasants from their homesteads, etc. The separation between the means of production concentrated in the hands of the capitalists, on the one side, and the producers now possessing nothing but their labour power, on the other, was made complete. *The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation became manifest as the antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie.*

We saw that the capitalist mode of production thrust itself into a society of commodity producers, individual producers, whose social cohesion resulted from the exchange of their products. But every society based on commodity production has the peculiarity that in it the producers have lost control of their own social relationships. Each produces for himself, with the means of production which happen to be at his disposal and in order to satisfy his individual needs through the medium of exchange. No one knows how much of the article he produces is coming onto the market, or how much demand there is for it; no one knows whether his individual product will meet a real need, whether he will cover his costs or even be able to sell it at all. Anarchy reigns in social production. But commodity production, like all other forms of production, has its own laws, which are inherent in and inseparable from it; and these laws assert themselves in spite of anarchy, in and through anarchy. These laws are manifested in the sole form of social relationship which continues to exist, in

exchange, and enforce themselves on the individual producers as compulsory laws of competition. At first, therefore, they are unknown even to these producers, and have to be discovered by them gradually, only through long experience. They assert themselves, therefore, apart from the producers and against the producers, as the natural laws of their form of production, working blindly. The product dominates the producers.

In mediæval society, especially in the earlier centuries, production was essentially for the producer's own use; for the most part its aim was to satisfy only the needs of the producer and his family. Where, as in the countryside, personal relations of dependence existed, it also contributed towards satisfying the needs of the feudal lord. No exchange was involved, and consequently the products did not assume the character of commodities. The peasant family produced almost everything it required—utensils and clothing as well as food. It was only when it succeeded in producing a surplus beyond its own needs and the payments in kind due to the feudal lord—it was only at this stage that it also began to produce commodities; these surplus products, thrown into social exchange, offered for sale, became commodities. The town artisans, it is true, had to produce for exchange from the very beginning. But even they supplied the greatest part of their own needs themselves; they had gardens and small fields; they sent their cattle out into the communal woodland, which also provided them with timber and firewood; the women spun flax, wool, etc. Production for the purpose of exchange, the production of commodities, was only in its infancy. Hence, restricted exchange, restricted market, stable mode of production, local isolation from the outside world, and local unity within: the Mark in the countryside, the guild in the town.

With the extension of commodity production, however, and especially with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, the laws of commodity production, previously latent, also began to operate more openly and more potently. The old bonds were loosened, the old dividing barriers broken through, the producers more and more transformed into independent, isolated commodity producers. The anarchy of social production be-

came obvious, and was carried to further and further extremes. But the chief means through which the capitalist mode of production accentuated this anarchy in social production was the direct opposite of anarchy: the increasing organisation of production on a social basis in each individual productive establishment. This was the lever with which it put an end to the former peaceful stability. In whatever branch of industry it was introduced, it could suffer no older method of production to exist alongside it; where it laid hold of a handicraft, that handicraft was wiped out. The field of labour became a field of battle. The great geographical discoveries [1] and the colonisation which followed on them multiplied markets and hastened on the transformation of handicraft into manufacture. The struggle broke out not only between the individual local producers; the local struggles developed into national struggles, the trade wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. [2] Finally, large-scale industry and the creation of the world market have made the struggle universal, and at the same time given it an unparalleled intensity. Between individual capitalists, as between whole industries and whole countries, advantages in natural or artificial conditions of production decide life or death. The vanquished are relentlessly cast aside. It is the Darwinian [3]

[1] The great geographical discoveries fall in the second half of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century. The most important of them is the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in 1492 and the discovery of the sea route to India by Vasco da Gama in 1498.—*Ed.*

[2] The trade wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were waged between Portugal, Spain, Holland, France and England for control of the trade with India and America, and the exploitation of these two countries as colonies. England emerged from these wars as victor; by the end of the eighteenth century she dominated the entire trade of the world.—*Ed.*

[3] According to the Darwinian theory, the evolution of organisms has taken place owing to: 1) the occurrence of small hereditable variations among individuals of the same species; 2) the victory in the struggle for existence of those individuals possessing variations making them more adapted to their conditions of life, *i.e.*, the survival of the fittest; 3) the transmission by heredity of such favourable variations from one generation to another, thus the gradual accumulation of those variations of advantage in the struggle for existence. "Darwin did not know," says Engels, "what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind and especially on his

struggle for individual existence, transferred from nature to society with intensified fury. The standpoint of the animal in nature appears as the last word in human development. The contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation reproduces itself as *the antithesis between the organisation of production in the individual factory and the anarchy of production in society as a whole.*

The capitalist mode of production moves in these two formes of manifestation of the contradiction immanent in it from its very nature, without hope of escaping from that "vicious circle" which Fourier long ago discovered in it. But what Fourier in his day was as yet unable to see is that this circle is gradually narrowing; that the motion is rather in the form of a spiral and must meet its end, like the motion of the planets, by collision with the centre. It is the driving force of the social anarchy of production which transforms the immense majority of men more and more into proletarians, and it is in turn the proletarian masses who will ultimately put an end to the anarchy of production. It is the driving force of the social anarchy of production which transforms the infinite perfectibility of the machine in large-scale industry into a compulsory commandment for each individual industrial capitalist to make his machinery more and more perfect, under penalty of ruin. But the perfecting of machinery means rendering human labour superfluous. If the introduction and increase of machinery meant the displacement of millions of hand workers by a few machine workers, the improvement of machinery means the displacement of larger and larger numbers of machine workers themselves, and ultimately the creation of a mass of available wage workers exceeding the average requirements of capital for labour—a complete industrial reserve army, as I called it as long ago as 1845 [1]—a reserve that would be available at periods when industry was working at high pressure,

fellow countrymen when he proved that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists prize as the greatest historical achievement, is the normal state of the *animal kingdom.*" (F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature.*)—*Ed.*

[1] *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 109 (German edition). [*Note by F. Engels.*]

but would be thrown out onto the streets by the crash inevitably following the boom; a reserve that would at all times be like a leaden weight on the feet of the working class in their fight for existence against capital, a regulator to keep wages down to the low level which suits the needs of capital. Thus it comes about that machinery, to use Marx's phrase, becomes the most powerful weapon in the war of capital against the working class, that the instruments of labour constantly tear the means of subsistence out of the hands of the labourer, that the very product of the labourer is turned into an instrument for his subjection. Thus it comes about that the economising of the instruments of labour becomes from the outset a simultaneous and absolutely reckless waste of labour power and robbery of the normal conditions necessary for the labour function; that machinery, "the most powerful instrument for shortening labour time, becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment of the labourer's time and that of his family at the disposal of the capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital." [1]

Thus it comes about that the excessive labour of some becomes the necessary condition for the lack of employment of others, and that large-scale industry, which hunts all over the world for new consumers, restricts the consumption of the masses at home to a starvation minimum and thereby undermines its own internal market. "The law that always equilibrates the relative surplus population, or industrial reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, *i.e.*, on the side of the class that *produces its own products in the form of capital.*" [2] And to expect any other distribution of the products from the capital-

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 445. Kerr edition.—*Ed.*
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 709.—*Ed.*

ist mode of production is like expecting the electrodes of a battery, while they are in contact with the battery, not to decompose water, not to develop oxygen at the positive pole and hydrogen at the negative.

We have seen how the perfectibility of modern machinery, pushed to an extreme point, through the medium of the anarchy of production in society is transformed into a compulsory commandment for the individual industrial capitalist constantly to improve his machinery, constantly to increase its productive power. The mere possibility of extending his field of production is transformed for him into a similar compulsory commandment. The enormous expanding power of large-scale industry, compared with which the expanding power of gases is mere child's play, now appears to us as a *necessity* for both qualitative and quantitative expansion that laughs at all counteracting pressure. Such counteracting pressure comes from consumption, sale, markets for the products of large-scale industry. But the capacity of the market to expand, both extensively and intensively, is controlled directly by quite other and far less effective laws. The expansion of the market cannot keep pace with the expansion of production. The collision becomes inevitable, and as it can yield no solution so long as it does not burst the capitalist mode of production itself, it becomes periodic. Capitalist production brings into being a new "vicious circle."

And in fact, since 1825, when the first general crisis broke out, the whole industrial and commercial world, the production and exchange of all civilised peoples and of their more or less barbarian dependent people, have been dislocated practically once in every ten years. Trade comes to a standstill, the markets are glutted, the products lie in great masses, unsaleable, ready money disappears, credit vanishes, the factories are idle, the working masses go short of the means of subsistence because they have produced too much of them, bankruptcy follows upon bankruptcy, forced sale upon forced sale. The stagnation lasts for years, both productive forces and products are squandered and destroyed on a large scale, until the accumulated masses of commodities are at last disposed of at a more or less consid-

erable depreciation, until production and exchange gradually begin to move again. By degrees the pace quickens; it becomes a trot; the industrial trot passes into a gallop, and the gallop in turn passes into the mad onrush of a complete industrial, commercial, credit and speculative steeplechase, only to land again in the end, after the most breakneck jumps—in the ditch of a crash. And so on again and again. We have now experienced it five times since 1825, and at this moment (1877) we are experiencing it for the sixth time. And the character of these crises is so clearly marked that Fourier hit them all off when he described the first as a *crise pléthorique*, a crisis of superabundance.

In these crises, the contradiction between social production and capitalist appropriation comes to a violent explosion. The circulation of commodities is for the moment reduced to nothing; the means of circulation, money, becomes an obstacle to circulation; all the laws of commodity production and commodity circulation are turned upside down. The economic collision has reached its culminating point: *the mode of production rebels against the mode of exchange.*

The fact that the social organisation of production within the factory has developed to the point at which it has become incompatible with the anarchy of production in society which exists alongside it and above it—this fact is made palpable to the capitalists themselves by the violent concentration of capitals which takes place during crises through the ruin of many big and even more small capitalists. The whole mechanism of the capitalist mode of production breaks down under the pressure of the productive forces which it itself created. It is no longer able to transform the whole of this mass of means of production into capital; they lie idle, and for this very reason the industrial reserve army must also lie idle. Means of production, means of subsistence, available labourers, all the elements of production and of general wealth are there in abundance. But "abundance becomes the source of distress and want" (Fourier), because it is precisely abundance that prevents the conversion of the means of production and subsistence into capital. For

in capitalist society the means of production cannot begin to function unless they have first been converted into capital, into means for the exploitation of human labour power. The necessity for the means of production and subsistence to take on the form of capital stands like a ghost between them and the workers. It alone prevents the coming together of the material and personal levers of production; it alone forbids the means of production to function, the workers to work and to live. Thus on the one hand the capitalist mode of production stands convicted of its own incapacity any longer to control these productive forces. And on the other hand these productive forces themselves press forward with increasing force to put an end to the contradiction, to rid themselves of their character as capital, *to the actual recognition of their character as social productive forces.*

It is this pressure of the productive forces, in their mighty upgrowth, against their character as capital, increasingly compelling the recognition of their social character, which forces the capitalist class itself more and more to treat them as social productive forces, in so far as this is at all possible within the framework of capitalist relations. Both the period of industrial boom, with its unlimited credit inflation, and the crisis itself, through the collapse of great capitalist establishments, urge forward towards that form of the socialisation of huge masses of means of production which we find in the various kinds of joint-stock companies. Many of these means of production and communication are from the outset so colossal that, like the railways, they exclude all other forms of capitalist exploitation. At a certain stage of development even this form no longer suffices; the large-scale producers in one and the same branch of industry in a country unite in a "trust," a union for the purpose of regulating production. They determine the total amount to be produced, parcel it out among themselves and thus enforce the selling price fixed beforehand. But since such trusts as soon as business becomes bad usually go to pieces, for this very reason they compel a still greater concentration of association. The whole branch of industry is converted into one great joint stock

company; internal competition gives place to the internal monopoly of this one company, as happened as early as 1890 with the English alkali production, which is now, after the fusion of all the forty-eight large works, carried on by a single company, under uniform control, with a capital of £6,000,000.

In the trusts, freedom of competition changes into its opposite—into monopoly,[1] the planless production of capitalist society capitulates before the planned production of the invading socialist society. Certainly this is still at first to the benefit and advantage of the capitalists. But in this case the exploitation is so palpable that it must break down. No nation would put up with production conducted by trusts, with such a barefaced exploitation of the community by a small band of coupon-clippers.

In one way or another, with trusts or without, the official representative of capitalist society, the state, is finally con-

[1] In *Capital*, Marx only indicated *the tendency* towards monopoly, and the intensification of all contradictions, including competition. After Marx's death, Engels already had occasion to observe the development of this tendency. Since that time monopoly has developed to a very high degree and has become the characteristic feature of present-day capitalism, of imperialism.

"Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental attributes began to be transformed into their opposites, when the features of the period of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system began to take shape and reveal themselves all along the line. The fundamental economic factor in this process is the substitution of capitalist monopolies for capitalist free competition. Free competition is the fundamental attribute of capitalism and of commodity production generally. Monopoly is exactly the opposite of free competition; but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our very eyes, creating large-scale industry and eliminating small industry, replacing large-scale industry by still larger-scale industry, finally leading to such a concentration of production and capital that monopoly has been and is the result: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and, merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands of millions. At the same time monopoly, which has grown out of free competition, does not abolish the latter, but exists alongside it and hovers over it, as it were, and, as a result, gives rise to a number of very acute antagonisms, friction and conflicts." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. V, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," p. 80.)—*Ed.*

strained to take over the management of production.[1] This necessity of conversion into state property makes itself evident first in the big institutions for communication: the postal service, telegraphs and railways.

If the crises revealed the incapacity of the bourgeoisie any longer to control the modern productive forces, the conversion of the great organisations for production and communication into joint stock companies, trusts and state property shows that for this purpose the bourgeoisie can be dispensed with. All the social functions of the capitalist are now carried out by salaried employees. The capitalist has no longer any social activity save the pocketing of revenues, the clipping of coupons and gambling on the Stock Exchange, where the different capitalists fleece each other of their capital. Just as at first the capitalist mode of production displaced the workers, so now it displaces the capitalists, relegating them, just as it did the workers, to the superfluous population, even if in the first instance not to the industrial reserve army.

But neither conversion into joint-stock companies and trusts,

[1] I say *is constrained to.* For it is only when the means of production or communication have *actually* outgrown management by share companies, and therefore their transfer to the state has become inevitable from an economic standpoint—it is only then that this transfer to the state, even when carried out by the state of today, represents an economic advance, the attainment of another preliminary step towards the taking over of all productive forces by society itself. Recently, however, since Bismarck adopted state ownership, a certain spurious socialism has made its appearance—here and there even degenerating into a kind of flunkeyism—which declares that *all* taking over by the state, even the Bismarckian kind, is in itself socialistic. If, however, the taking over of the tobacco trade by the state was socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of socialism. If the Belgian state, for quite ordinary political and financial reasons, constructed its own main railway lines; if Bismarck, without any economic compulsion, took over the main railway lines in Prussia, simply in order to be better able to organise and use them for war, to train the railway officials as the government's voting cattle, and especially to secure a new source of revenue independent of parliamentary votes; such actions were in no sense socialist measures, whether direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal Porcelain Manufacture, and even the regimental tailors in the army, would be socialist institutions, or even, as was seriously proposed by a sly dog in the reign of Frederick William III, the taking over by the state of the—brothels. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

nor conversion into state property deprives the productive forces of their character as capital. In the case of joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious. And the modern state, too, is only the organisation with which bourgeois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against encroachments either by the workers or by individual capitalists. The modern state, whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine; it is the state of the capitalists, the ideal collective body of all capitalists. The more productive forces it takes over, the more it becomes the real collective body of all the capitalists, the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage earners, proletarians. The capitalist relationship is not abolished; it is rather pushed to an extreme. But at this extreme it is transformed into its opposite. State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the conflict, but it contains within itself the formal means, the key to the solution.

This solution can only consist in the recognition in practice of the social nature of the modern productive forces, in bringing, therefore, the mode of production, appropriation and exchange into accord with the social character of the means of production. And this can only be brought about by society, openly and without deviation, taking possession of the productive forces, which have outgrown all control other than that of society itself. Thereby the social character of the means of production and of the products—which today operates against the producers themselves, periodically breaking through the mode of production and exchange and enforcing itself only as a blind law of nature, violently and destructively—is quite consciously asserted by the producers, and is transformed from a cause of disorder and periodic collapse into the most powerful lever of production itself.

The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. But when once we have recognised them and understood how they work, their direction and their effects, the gradual sub-

jection of them to our will and the use of them for the attainment of our aims depends entirely upon ourselves. And this is quite especially true of the mighty productive forces of the present day. So long as we obstinately refuse to understand their nature and their character—and the capitalist mode of production and its defenders set themselves against any such attempt—so long do these forces operate in spite of us, against us, and so long do they control us, as we have shown in detail. But once their nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniacal masters into willing servants. This is the difference between the destructive force of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm and the tamed electricity of the telegraph and the arc-light; the difference between a conflagration and fire in the service of man. Such treatment opens the way to the replacement of the anarchy of social production by a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual. The capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer, and then also the appropriator, will thereby be replaced by the mode of appropriation of the product based on the nature of the modern means of production themselves: on the one hand direct social appropriation as a means to the maintenance and extension of production, and on the other hand direct individual appropriation as a means to life and pleasure.

By more and more transforming the great majority of the population into proletarians, the capitalist mode of production brings into being the force which, under penalty of its own destruction, is compelled to carry out this revolution. By more and more driving towards the conversion of the vast socialised means of production into state property, it itself points the way for the carrying through of this revolution. *The proletariat seizes the state power and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property.* But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms; it puts an end also to the state as the state. Former society, moving in class antagon-

isms, had need of the state, that is, an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; that is, therefore, for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, villeinage or serfdom, wage labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its embodiment in a visible corporation; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole; in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection, as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not "abolished," *it withers away*. It is from this standpoint that we must appraise the phrase "free people's state"—both its justification at times for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy[1]—and also the demand of the so-called anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight.[2]

[1] On the "free people's state" see Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, in Vol. II of the present edition.—*Ed.*

[2] The anarchists Proudhon, Bakunin, etc., did not comprehend the nature of the state and denied the significance of revolutionary power, of the revolutionary role of the governmental power in the hands of the victorious proletariat. Their demand that the state should be abolished over-

Since the emergence in history of the capitalist mode of production, the taking over of all means of production by society has often been dreamed of, by individuals as well as by whole sects, more or less vaguely and as an ideal of the future. But it could only become possible, it could only become a historical necessity, when the material conditions for its realisation had come into existence. Like every other social progress, it becomes realisable not through the perception that the existence of classes is in contradiction with justice, equality, etc., not through the mere will to abolish these classes, but through certain new economic conditions. The division of society into an exploiting and an exploited class, a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary outcome of the low development of production hitherto. So long as the sum of social labour yielded a product which only slightly exceeded what was necessary for the bare existence of all; so long, therefore, as all or almost all the time of the great majority of the members of society was absorbed in labour, so long was society necessarily divided into classes. Alongside of this great majority exclusively absorbed in labour there developed a class, freed from direct productive labour, which managed the general business of society: the direction of labour, affairs of state, justice, science, art and so forth. It is therefore the law of the division of labour which lies at the root of the division into classes. But this does not mean that this division into classes was not established by violence and robbery, by deception and fraud, or that the ruling class, once in the saddle, has ever failed to strengthen its domination at the cost of the working class and to convert its social management into the exploitation of the masses.

But if, on these grounds, the division into classes has a certain historical justification, it has this only for a given period of time, for given social conditions. It was based on the insufficiency of production; it will be swept away by the full development of the modern productive forces. And in fact the abolition of social classes has as its presupposition a stage of

night necessarily led them to "theoretical" struggle (and their followers to practical struggle) against the dictatorship of the proletariat.—*Ed.*

historical development at which the existence not merely of some particular ruling class or other but of any ruling class at all, that is to say, of class difference itself, has become an anachronism, is out of date.[1] It therefore presupposes that the development of production has reached a level at which the appropriation of means of production and of products, and with these, of political supremacy, the monopoly of education and intellectual leadership by a special class of society, has become not only superfluous but also economically, politically and intellectually a hindrance to development.

This point has now been reached. Their political and intellectual bankruptcy is hardly still a secret to the bourgeoisie themselves, and their economic bankruptcy recurs regularly every ten years. In each crisis society is smothered under the weight of its own productive forces and products of which it can make no use, and stands helpless in face of the absurd contradiction that the producers have nothing to consume because there are no consumers. The expanding force of the means of production bursts asunder the bonds imposed upon them by the capitalist mode of production. Their release from these bonds is the sole condition necessary for an unbroken and constantly more rapidly progressing development of the pro-

[1] The abolition of classes is being realised in the U.S.S.R. through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Seventeenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union laid down the final abolition of the remnants of the parasitic classes, and the establishment of classless socialist society as the goal of the Second Five-Year Plan. This task can only be carried out by means of an intense class struggle, it requires not only the retention but even the further consolidation and development of the state, of the proletarian dictatorship. It is precisely along the path of the consolidation and higher development of the proletarian state that the withering away of the state takes place.

"We are in favour of the state withering away and at the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents the most powerful and mighty authority of all forms of state which have existed up to the present day. The highest possible development of the power of the state, with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of the state: that is the Marxist formula. Is it 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction is a living thing, and completely reflects Marxist dialectics." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," p. 342.)—*Ed.*

ductive forces, and therewith of a practically limitless growth of production itself. Nor is this all. The appropriation by society of the means of production will put an end not only to the artificial restraints on production which exist today, but also to the positive waste and destruction of productive forces and products which is now the inevitable accompaniment of production and reaches its zenith in crises. Further, it sets free for society as a whole a mass of means of production and products by putting an end to the senseless luxury and extravagance of the present ruling class and its political representatives. The possibility of securing for every member of society, through social production, an existence which is not only fully sufficient from a material standpoint and becoming richer from day to day, but also guarantees to them the completely unrestricted development and exercise of their physical and mental faculties—this possibility now exists for the first time, but it does exist.[1]

The seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production, and therewith to the domination of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by conscious organisation on a planned basis. The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. And at this point, in a certain sense, man finally cuts himself off from the animal world, leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. The conditions of existence forming man's environment, which up to now

[1] A few figures may give an approximate idea of the enormous expansive power of modern means of production, even under the weight of capitalism. According to Giffen's latest estimates, the total wealth of Great Britain and Ireland was, as under, in round figures:

1814	£2,200,000,000	
1865	£6,100,000,000	, , ,,
1875	£8,500,000,000	

An indication of the waste of means of production and products resulting from crises is the estimate given at the Second German Industrial Congress (Berlin, February 21, 1878) that the total loss to the *German iron industry* alone in the last crisis amounted to 445,000,000 marks [£22,750,000.] [*Note by F. Engels.*]

On the further development of the productive forces under imperialism, the last and highest stage of capitalism, Lenin writes:

have dominated man, at this point pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of nature, because and in so far as he has become master of his own social organisation. The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of nature, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man. Men's own social organisation, which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by nature and history, will then become the voluntary act of men themselves. The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history, will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.

In conclusion, let us briefly sum up our sketch of the course of development:

I. *Mediæval Society*—Individual production on a small scale. Means of production adapted for individual use, hence primitively clumsy, petty, dwarfed in action. Production for

"Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by an extremely small group of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive features of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "bondholding" (*rentier*) state, the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons." It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the possibility of the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or less degree, one or other of these tendencies. On the whole capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before, but it is not only that this growth is becoming more and more uneven; this unevenness manifests itself also, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (such as England)." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. V. "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," pp. 115-16.)—*Ed.*

immediate consumption, either of the producer himself or of his feudal lord. Only where an excess of production over this consumption occurs is such excess offered for sale and enters into exchange. Production of commodities, therefore, only in its infancy; but it already contains within itself, in embryo, *anarchy in social production.*

II. *Capitalist Revolution*—Transformation of industry, at first by means of simple co-operation and manufacture. Concentration of the means of production, hitherto scattered, into large workshops. As a consequence, their transformation from individual into social means of production—a transformation which on the whole does not affect the form of exchange. The old forms of appropriation remain in force. The *capitalist* appears: in his quality of owner of the means of production he also appropriates the products and turns them into commodities. Production has become a social act, exchange and with it appropriation remain individual acts, the acts of separate individuals. *The social product is appropriated by the individual capitalist.* Fundamental contradiction, from which arise all the contradictions in which present-day society moves and which modern industry brings to light.

a) Severance of the producer from the means of production. Condemnation of the worker to wage labour for life. *Antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie.*

b) Growing emphasis and increasing effectiveness of the laws governing commodity production. Unbridled competitive struggle. *Contradiction between social organisation in the individual factory and social anarchy in production as a whole.*

c) On the one hand, perfecting of machinery, owing to competition, made a compulsory commandment for each individual manufacturer, and equivalent to a continually increasing displacement of workers: *industrial reserve army*—on the other hand, unlimited extension of production, likewise a compulsory law of competition for every manufacturer—on both sides, unheard of development of productive forces, excess of supply over demand, overproduction, glutting of the markets, crises every ten years, vicious circle: excess here of means of production and prod-

ucts, excess there of workers without employment and means of existence. But these two levers of production and of social well-being are unable to work together, because the capitalist form of production prevents the productive forces from working and the products from circulating, unless they are first turned into capital: which their very superabundance prevents. The contradiction has become heightened into an absurdity. *The mode of production rebels against the form of exchange.* The bourgeoisie is convicted of incapacity further to manage their own social productive forces.

d) Partial recognition of the social character of the productive forces forced upon the capitalists themselves. Taking over of the great institutions for production and communication, first by *joint stock companies*, later by *trusts*, then by the *state*. The bourgeoisie shows itself to be a superfluous class; all its social functions are now performed by hired employees.

III. *Proletarian Revolution*—Solution of the contradictions. The proletariat seizes the public power and by means of this power transforms the socialised means of production, slipping from the hands of the bourgeoisie, into public property. By this act, the proletariat frees the means of production from the character of capital hitherto borne by them, and gives their social character complete freedom to assert itself. A social production upon a predetermined plan now becomes possible. The development of production makes the further existence of different classes of society an anachronism. In proportion as anarchy in social production vanishes, the political authority of the state also dies away. Man, at last the master of his own form of social organisation, becomes at the same time the lord over nature, master of himself—free.

To carry through this world-emancipating act is the historical mission of the modern proletariat. And it is the task of scientific socialism, the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, to establish the historical conditions and, with these, the nature of this act, and thus to bring to the consciousness of the now oppressed class the conditions and nature of the act which it is its destiny to accomplish.

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

1. Preface to the German Edition of 1872

The Communist League,[1] an international association of workers, which could of course be only a secret one, under the conditions obtaining at the time, commissioned us, the undersigned, at the Congress held in London in November 1847, to write for publication a detailed theoretical and practical programme of the Party. Such was the origin of the following *Manifesto*, the manuscript of which travelled to London to be printed a few weeks before the February Revolution.[2] First published in German, it has been republished in that language in at least twelve different editions in Germany, England and America. It was published in English for the first time in 1850 in the *Red Republican*, London, translated by Miss Helen Macfarlane, and in 1871 in at least three different translations in America. The French version first appeared in Paris shortly before the June insurrection of 1848,[3] and recently in *Le Socialiste* of New York. A new translation is in the course of preparation. A Polish version appeared in London shortly after it was first published in German. A Russian translation was published in Geneva in the 'sixties. Into Danish, too, it was translated shortly after its first appearance.

However much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this *Manifesto* are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application

[1] For further details see Engels, *The History of the Communist League*, Volume II of the present edition.—*Ed.*

[2] The February Revolution in France, 1848—*Ed.*

[3] The insurrection of the Paris workers. See *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50*, Volume II of the present edition—*Ed.*

of the principles will depend, as the *Manifesto* itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of modern industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organisation of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." (See *The Civil War in France*; *Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association*, 1871, where this point is further developed.[1]) Further, it is self-evident, that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that, the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

But then, the *Manifesto* has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter. A subsequent edition may perhaps appear with an introduction bridging the gap from 1847 to the present day; but this reprint was too unexpected to leave us time for that.

KARL MARX. FREDERICK ENGELS

London, June 24, 1872.

[1] See Volume II of the present edition. Lenin in *The State and Revolution* (1917) says: "Thus Marx and Engels regarded one of the principal and fundamental lessons of the Paris Commune as being of such enormous importance that they introduced it as a vital correction in

2. Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882

The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, translated by Bakunin, was published early in the 'sixties by the printing office of the *Kolokol*. Then the West could see in it (the Russian edition of the *Manifesto*) only a literary curiosity. Such a view would be impossible today.

What a limited field the proletarian movement occupied at that time (December 1847) is most clearly shown by the last section: the position of the Communists in relation of the various opposition parties in the various countries. Precisely Russia and the United States are missing here. It was the time when Russia constituted the last great reserve of all European reaction, when the United States absorbed the surplus proletarian forces of Europe through immigration. Both countries provided Europe with raw materials and were at the same time markets for the sale of its industrial products. Both were therefore, in one way or another, pillars of the existing European system.

How very different today! Precisely European immigration fitted North America for a gigantic agricultural production, whose competition is shaking the very foundations of European landed property—large and small. At the same time it enabled the United States to exploit its tremendous industrial resources with an energy and on a scale that must shortly break the industrial monopoly of Western Europe, and especially of England, existing up to now. Both circumstances react in a revolutionary manner upon America itself. Step by step the small and middle land ownership of the farmers, the basis of the whole political constitution, is succumbing to the competition of giant farms; at the same time a mass industrial proletariat and a fabulous concentration of capital funds are developing for the first time in the industrial regions.

And now Russia! During the Revolution of 1848-49 not only the European princes, but the European bourgeois as well, found

The Communist Manifesto. . . . And it is precisely this lesson that has been not only forgotten, but positively distorted, in the prevailing Kautskyan 'interpretation' of Marxism." (Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, chap. III, pp. 41-42, 1935 edition.)—*Ed.*

their only salvation from the proletariat just beginning to awaken in Russian intervention. The tsar was proclaimed the chief of European reaction. Today he is prisoner of war of the revolution in Gatchina, and Russia forms the vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe.

The Communist Manifesto had as its object the proclamation of the inevitable impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face to face with the rapidly flowering capitalist swindle and bourgeois property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian *obshchina*[1], though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primæval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.

KARL MARX. FREDERICK ENGELS

London, January 21, 1882.

3. PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1883

The preface to the present edition I must, alas, sign alone. Marx, the man to whom the whole working class of Europe and America owes more than to any one else—rests at Highgate cemetery and over his grave the first grass is already growing. Since his death, there can be even less thought of revising or supplementing the *Manifesto*. But I consider it all the more necessary again to state the following expressly:

The basic thought running through the *Manifesto*—that economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the

[1] The Russian peasant community.—*Ed.*

political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primæval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social evolution; that this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles—this basic thought belongs solely and exclusively to Marx.[1]

I have already stated this many times; but precisely now is it necessary that it also stand in front of the *Manifesto* itself.

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, June 28, 1883.

3. PREFACE TO THE GERMAN EDITION OF 1890

Since the above was written, a new German edition of the *Manifesto* has again become necessary, and much has also happened to the *Manifesto* which should be recorded here.

A second Russian translation—by Vera Zasulich[2]—appeared at Geneva in 1882; the preface to that edition was written by Marx and myself. Unfortunately, the original German manuscript has gone astray; I must therefore re-translate from the Russian which will in no way improve the text. It reads:

"The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in Bakunin's translation, was published early in the 'sixties by the printing offices of the *Kolokol*. At that date a

[1] "This proposition," I wrote in the preface to the English translation, "which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it is best shown by my *Condition of the Working Class in England*. But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here." [*Note by F. Engels.*]

[2] As a matter of fact the translation was done by G. V. Plekhanov, as stated by himself in the Russian edition of the *Manifesto* in 1900.—*Ed.*

Russian edition of the *Manifesto* had for the West the significance, at most, of a literary curiosity. Today such a view is no longer possible. How limited the area of the spread of the proletarian movement was at the time the *Manifesto* was first published (January 1848) is best shown by the last section, *The Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Opposition Parties.* Russia and the United States above all are missing. It was the time when Russia constituted the last great reserve of European reaction and when emigration to the United States absorbed the surplus forces of the European proletariat. Both countries provided Europe with raw materials, and served at the same time as markets for the sale of its industrial products. Both appeared therefore, in one way or another, as pillars of the European social order.

"What a change has taken place since then! Precisely European emigration has made possible the gigantic growth of agriculture in North America, which through its competition is shaking the very foundations of great and small landed property in Europe. At the same time it enabled the United States to begin the exploitation of its abundant industrial resources, and with such energy and on such a scale that in a short time it must put an end to the industrial monopoly of Western Europe. These two circumstances react in turn upon America in a revolutionary sense. More and more the small and middle land ownership of the independent farmers, the basis of the whole political system of America, is succumbing to the competition of giant farms, while simultaneously a numerous proletariat is emerging for the first time in the industrial regions alongside a fabulous concentration of capital.

"Let us now turn to Russia. At the time of the Revolution of 1848-49, not only the European monarchs, but the European bourgeois as well, looked upon Russian intervention as the only salvation from the proletariat, then for the first time becoming aware of its own strength. The tsar was acclaimed the leader of European reaction. Today he sits in Gatchina, a prisoner of war of the revolution, and Russia forms the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in Europe.

"The object of *The Communist Manifesto* was to proclaim the inevitable impending downfall of present-day bourgeois property. But in Russia we find—side by side with the feverishly growing capitalist system and the bourgeois land ownership just beginning to take shape—more than half the land owned in common by the peasant.

"Now the question is: can the Russian peasant community, this form of primæval common ownership of land, although already very much disintegrated, pass directly to a higher communist form of land ownership, or must it first pass through the same process of dissolution represented in the historical evolution of the West?

"The only answer to this question possible today is the following. If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a workers' revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may then serve as the starting point for a communist development."

"London, January 21, 1882."

At about the same date, a new Polish version appeared in Geneva: *Manifest Komunistyczny.*

Furthermore, a new Danish translation has appeared in the *Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek,* Copenhagen, 1885. Unfortunately it is not quite complete; certain essential passages, which seem to have presented difficulties to the translator, have been omitted and in addition there are signs of carelessness here and there, which are all the more unpleasantly conspicuous since the translation indicates that had the translator taken a little more pains he would have done an excellent piece of work.

A new French version appeared in 1886 in *Le Socialiste* of Paris; it is the best published to date.

From this latter a Spanish version was published the same year in *El Socialista* of Madrid, and then reissued in pamphlet form: *Manifesto del Partido Communista* por Carlos Marx y F. Engels, Madrid, Administracion de El Socialista, Hernan Cortes 8.

As a matter of curiosity I may mention that in 1887 the manuscript of an Armenian translation was offered to a publisher in Constantinople. But the good man did not have the courage to publish something bearing the name of Marx and suggested that

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the translator set down his own name as author, which the latter however declined.

After one and then another of the more or less inaccurate American translations had been repeatedly reprinted in England, an authentic version at last appeared in 1888. This was by my friend Samuel Moore and we went through it together once more before it was sent to press. It is entitled: *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Authorised English translation, edited and annotated by Frederick Engels, 1888, London, William Reeves, 185 Fleet Street, E. C. I have added some of the notes of that edition to the present one.

The *Manifesto* has had a history of its own. Greeted with enthusiasm, at the time of its appearance, by the not at all numerous vanguard of scientific socialism (as is proved by the translations mentioned in the first preface), it was soon forced into the background by the reaction that began with the defeat of the Paris workers in June 1848, and was finally excommunicated "by law" in the conviction of the Cologne Communists in November 1852.[1] With the disappearance from the public scene of the worker's movement that had begun with the February Revolution, the *Manifesto* too passed into the background.

When the European workers had again gathered sufficient strength for a new onslaught upon the power of the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association came into being. Its aim was to weld together into *one* huge army the whole militant working class of Europe and America. Therefore it could not *set out* from the principles laid down in the *Manifesto*. It was bound to have a programme which would not shut the door on the English trade unions, the French, Belgian, Italian and Spanish Proudhonists and the German Lassalleans. This programme—the considerations underlying the Statutes of the International[2]—was drawn up by Marx with a master hand acknowledged even by Bakunin and the anarchists. For the ultimate final

[1] This refers to the trial of the members of the Communist League in Cologne. *Cf. The History of the Communist League* and *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* in Volume II of the present edition.—*Ed.*

[2] *Cf. Inaugural Address* and Statutes of the International Working Men's Association in Volume II of the present edition.—*Ed.*

triumph of the ideas set forth in the *Manifesto,* Marx relied solely upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion. The events and vicissitudes in the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the successes, could not but demonstrate to the fighters the inadequacy of their former universal panaceas and make their minds more receptive to a thorough understanding of the true conditions for working class emancipation. And Marx was right. The working class of 1874, at the dissolution of the International, was altogether different from that of 1864, at its foundation. Proudhonism in the Latin countries and the specific Lassalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the then arch-conservative English trade unions were gradually approaching the point where in 1887 the chairman of their Swansea Congress could say in their name: "Continental socialism has lost its terrors for us." Yet by 1887 continental socialism was almost exclusively the theory heralded in the *Manifesto.* Thus, to a certain extent, the history of the *Manifesto* reflects the history of the modern working class movement since 1848. At present it is doubtless the most widely circulated, the most international product of all socialist literature, the common programme of many millions of workers of all countries from Siberia to California.

Nevertheless, when it appeared we could not have called it a *socialist* manifesto. In 1847 two kinds of people were considered socialists. On one hand were the adherents of the various utopian systems, notably the Owenites in England and the Fourierists in France, both of whom at that date had already dwindled to mere sects gradually dying out. On the other, the manifold types of social quacks who wanted to eliminate social abuses through their various universal panaceas and all kinds of patch-work, without hurting capital and profit in the least. In both cases, people who stood outside the labour movement and who looked for support rather to the "educated" classes. The section of the working class, however, which demanded a radical reconstruction of society, convinced that mere political revolutions were not enough, then called itself *Communist.* It was still a rough-hewn, only instinctive and frequently somewhat crude communism. Yet it was

powerful enough to bring into being two systems of utopian communism—in France the "Icarian" communism of Cabet, and in Germany that of Weitling. Socialism in 1847 signified a bourgeois movement, communism a working class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, quite respectable, whereas communism was the very opposite. And since we were very decidedly of the opinion as early as then that "the emancipation of the workers must be the task of the working class itself," we could have no hesitation as to which of the two names we should choose. Nor has it ever occurred to us to repudiate it.

"Workingmen of all coutries, unite!" But few voices responded when we proclaimed these words to the world forty-two years ago, on the eve of the first Paris Revolution in which the proletariat came out with demands of its own. On September 28, 1864, however, the proletarians of most of the Western European countries joined hands in the International Working Men's Association of glorious memory. True, the International itself lived only nine years. But that the eternal union of the proletarians of all countries created by it is still alive and lives stronger than ever, there is no better witness than this day. Because today, as I write these lines, the European and American proletariat is reviewing its fighting forces, mobilised for the first time, mobilised as *one* army, under *one* flag, for *one* immediate aim: the standard eight-hour working day to be established by legal enactment, as proclaimed by the Geneva Congress of the International in 1866, and again by the Paris Workers' Congress in 1889.[1] And today's spectacle will open the eyes of the capitalists and landlords of all countries to the fact that today the proletarians of all countries are united indeed.

If only Marx were still by my side to see this with his own eyes!

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, May 1, 1890.

5. PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION OF 1888

The *Manifesto* was published as the platform of the Communist League, a workingmen's association, first exclusively German,

[1] The Foundation Congress of the Second International.—*Ed.*

later on international, and, under the political conditions of the Continent before 1848, unavoidably a secret society. At a Congress of the League, held in London in November 1847, Marx and Engels were commissioned to prepare for publication a complete theoretical and practical party programme. Drawn up in German, in January 1848 the manuscript was sent to the printer in London a few weeks before the French revolution of February 24. A French translation was brought out in Paris, shortly before the insurrection of June 1848. The first English translation, by Miss Helen Macfarlane, appeared in George Julian Harney's *Red Republican*, London, 1850. A Danish and a Polish edition had also been published.

The defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June 1848—the first great battle between proletariat and bourgeoisie—drove again into the background, for a time, the social and political aspirations of the European working class. Thenceforth, the struggle for supremacy was again, as it had been before the Revolution of February, solely between different sections of the propertied class; the working class was reduced to a fight for political elbow-room, and to the position of extreme wing of the middle-class Radicals. Wherever independent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down. Thus the Prussian police hunted out the Central Board of the Communist League then located in Cologne. The members were arrested, and, after eighteen months' imprisonment, they were tried in October 1852. This celebrated "Cologne Communist Trial" lasted from October 4 till November 12; seven of the prisoners were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in a fortress, varying from three to six years. Immediately after the sentence, the League was formally dissolved by the remaining members. As to the *Manifesto*, it seemed thenceforth to be doomed to oblivion.

When the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association sprang up. But this association, formed with the express aim of welding into one body the whole militant proletariat of Europe and America, could not at once

proclaim the principles laid down in the *Manifesto*. The International was bound to have a programme broad enough to be acceptable to the English trades unions, to the followers of Proudhon in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, and to the Lassalleans[1] in Germany. Marx, who drew up this programme[2] to the satisfaction of all parties, entirely trusted to the intellectual development of the working class, which was sure to result from combined action and mutual discussion. The very events and vicissitudes of the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the victories, could not help bringing home to men's minds the insufficiency of their various favourite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true conditions of working class emancipation. And Marx was right. The International, on its breaking up in 1874, left the workers quite different men from what it had found them in 1864. Proudhonism in France, Lassalleanism in Germany were dying out, and even the conservative English trades unions, though most of them had long since severed their connection with the International, were gradually advancing towards that point at which, last year at Swansea, their president could say in their name: "Continental socialism has lost its terrors for us." In fact, the principles of the *Manifesto* had made considerable headway among the workingmen of all countries.

The *Manifesto* itself thus came to the front again. Since 1850 the German text had been reprinted several times in Switzerland, England and America. In 1872, it was translated into English in New York, where the translation was published in *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*. From this English version, a French one was made in *Le Socialiste* of New York. Since then at least two more English translations, more or less mutilated, have been brought out in America, and one of them has been reprinted in England.

[1] Lassalle personally, to us, always acknowledged himself to be a disciple of Marx, and, as such, stood on the ground of the *Manifesto*. But in his public agitation, 1862-64, he did not go beyond demanding co-operative workshops supported by state credit. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

[2] For this programme see Volume II of the present edition, the *Inaugural Address* and Statutes of the International Working Men's Association.—*Ed.*

The first Russian translation, made by Bakunin, was published at Herzen's *Kolokol* office in Geneva, about 1863; a second one, by the heroic Vera Zasulich, also in Geneva, in 1882. A new Danish edition is to be found in *Socialdemokratisk Bibliothek*, Copenhagen, 1885; a fresh French translation in *Le Socialiste*, Paris, 1886. From this latter, a Spanish version was prepared and published in Madrid, in 1886. The German reprints are not to be counted, there have been twelve altogether at the least. An Armenian translation, which was to be published in Constantinople some months ago, did not see the light, I am told, because the publisher was afraid of bringing out a book with the name of Marx on it, while the translator declined to call it his own production. Of further translations into other languages I have heard, but have not seen. Thus the history of the *Manifesto* reflects, to great extent, the history of the modern working class movement; at present it is undoubtedly the most widespread, the most international production of all socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of workingmen from Siberia to California.

Yet, when it was written, we could not have called it a *socialist* manifesto. By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand the adherents of the various Utopian systems: Owenites in England, Fourierists in France, both of them already reduced to the position of mere sects, and gradually dying out; on the other hand, the most multifarious social quacks, who by all manner of tinkering, professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances, in both cases men outside the working class movement, and looking rather to the "educated" classes for support. Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, called itself Communist. It was a crude, rough-hewn, purely instinctive sort of communism; still it touched the cardinal point and was powerful enough amongst the working class to produce the Utopian communism of Cabet in France, and of Weitling in Germany. Thus, in 1847, socialism was a middle class movement, communism a working class movement. Socialism

was, on the Continent at least, "respectable"; communism was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself," there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it.

The *Manifesto* being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition which forms its nucleus belongs to Marx. That proposition is: That in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, nowadays, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without, at the same time, and once and for all emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

This proposition, which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. How far I had independently progressed towards it, is best shown by my *Condition of the Working Class in England.*[1] But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it already worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here.

From our joint preface to the German edition of 1872, I quote the following:

[1] *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844.* By Frederick Engels. Translated by Florence K. Wischnewetzky, New York. Lovell—London, W. Reeves, 1888. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

"However much the state of things may have altered during the last twenty-five years, the general principles laid down in this *Manifesto* are, on the whole, as correct today as ever. Here and there some detail might be improved. The practical application of the principles will depend, as the *Manifesto* itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of modern industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organisation of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, *viz.*, that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.' (See *The Civil War in France; Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association, 1871*, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident, that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also, that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.

"But then, the *Manifesto* has become a historical document which we have no longer any right to alter."

The present translation is by Mr. Samuel Moore, the translator of the greater portion of Marx's *Capital.* We have revised it in common, and I have added a few notes explanatory of historical allusions.

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, January 30, 1888.

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals[1] and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power? Where is the opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact:

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the spectre of communism with a manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I. Bourgeois and Proletarians[2]

The history of all hitherto existing society[3] is the history of class struggles.

[1] The bourgeois-republicans of the time. Prominent writers and politicians, who fought socialism and communism, such as Marrast, were among their adherents.—*Ed.*

[2] By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

[3] That is, all *written* history. In 1847 the pre-history of society, the social organisation existing previous to recorded history, was all but un-

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian,[1] lord and serf, guild-master[2] and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great

known. Since then Haxthausen [August von, 1792-1866] discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer [Georg Ludwig von] proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and, by and by, village communities were found to be, or to have been, the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organisation of this primitive communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's [Lewis Henry, 1818-81] crowning discovery of the true nature of the *gens* and its relation to the *tribe*. With the dissolution of these primæval communities, society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums und des Staats* [*The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*], second edition, Stuttgart, 1886. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

[1] Patricians and plebeians—classes in ancient Rome. The patricians were the ruling class of big landowners, who held the land as well as state power. Plebeians were the class of citizens who were free, but did not possess full civic rights. For details of the classes in Rome, see Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.—Ed.*

[2] Guild-master, that is a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, in which industrial production was monopolised by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed aside by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, modern industry, the place of the industrial middle class by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediæval commune[1]; here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France); afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy[2] as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general—the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of modern industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by re-

[1] This was the name given their urban communities by the townsmen of Italy and France, after they had purchased or conquered their initial rights of self-government from their feudal lords. [*Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

"Commune" was the name taken in France by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters local self-government and political rights as the "Third Estate." Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country, for its political development, France. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

[2] "Semi-feudal monarchy in the period of manufacture" signifies a monarchy with the estates (clergy, nobility, "Third Estate"—bourgeoisie) represented in the monarchy's organs.—*Ed.*

ligious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionaries so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former exoduses of nations[1] and crusades.[2]

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away,

[1] Exodus of nations—in Europe from the fourth to the sixth century. Mass migrations of various peoples occurred during this period, extending to the territory of the Roman empire. Engels gives a characterisation of this exodus of nations in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,* chap. VII and VIII.—*Ed.*

[2] Crusades—big military and looting expeditions to the Near East under the leadership of the Catholic church, during the period from the eleventh century to the thirteenth, allegedly to "free" the Holy Land (Palestine). These expeditions arose on the basis of the increasing contradictions of European feudal society (especially the growing power of the big feudal lords, the rise of impoverished knights-errant, the increasing stratum of poor landless peasants), its motive-power was merchant capital, aiming to conquer the trade routes to the East.—*Ed.*

all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what

it calls civilisation into their midst, *i.e.*, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeois has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with

the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put the existence of the entire bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed. And why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises?

*

On the one hand, by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed—a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour,[1] is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also

[1] Marx made a correction subsequently, when he developed the theory of surplus value; he substituted "the value of labour power" for "the value of labour." See the explanation in Engels' Introduction to Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital*, p. 242 *et seq.* of the present volume.—*Ed.*

increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work exacted in a given time, or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen[1] generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which modern industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

[1] *Rentier* in the German original. This signifies a property owner (in this case a small property owner), living on the income of his capital invested in securities, such as domestic and foreign government bonds, or industrial shares.—*Ed.*

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the work people of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. There-

upon the workers begin to form combinations (trades unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hours' bill in England was carried.

Altogether, collisions between the classes of the old society further in many ways the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the rul-

ing classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer

anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under

the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

II. Proletarians and Communists

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the other proletarian parties: Formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.[1]

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.[2]

The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most

[1] See page 227 for what Marx meant by conquest of political power.—*Ed.*

[2] This refers to the Great French Revolution (1789-94) which overthrew the absolute monarchy and rule of the French nobility.—*Ed.*

complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, *i.e.*, that kind of property which exploits wage labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social, *status* in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.

Let us now take wage labour.

The average price of wage labour is the minimum wage, *i.e.*, that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer.

What, therefore, the wage labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the communist abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with

intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent,[1] into a social power capable of being monopolised, *i.e.*, from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.

It has been objected, that upon the abolition of private property all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything, do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: There can no longer be any wage labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

[1] That part of the surplus value created by the workers' labour (and hence of the exploiters' income as well) which goes to the landowner as land rent or in the form of additional income, if he is his own entrepreneur.—*Ed.*

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property,[1] what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds it complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the inter-

[1] Property in the ancient world (Greece, Rome), based on the exploitation of slave labour.—*Ed.*

vention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois claptrap about the family and education, about the hallowed correlation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives.

Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident, that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the aboli-

tion of the community of women springing from that system, *i.e.*, of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The workingmen have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements

of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the eighteenth century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change."

"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, *viz.*, the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by

the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organised as the ruling class;[1] and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.[2]

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.

[1] Lenin makes the following comment on this passage of *The Communist Manifesto*: "*The state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class*, is precisely the dictatorship of the proletariat." When Marx spoke of "winning the battle of democracy" he meant "proletarian democracy"—the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the basis of the experiences of the 1848 Revolution, Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* developed his doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here he says that the proletariat cannot simply take possession of the bourgeois state machinery, but must "smash," must "destroy" it. On the basis of the experiences of the Paris Commune (see *The Civil War in France*), Marx gives a characterisation of the machinery of state (the state of the Commune type), with which the proletariat, during its dictatorship, will replace the oppressive bourgeois state machinery destroyed by it. (See Lenin, *The State and Revolution.*)—*Ed.*

[2] In the *Grundsätze des Kommunismus* [*Principles of Communism*], the draft of the Manifesto, Engels set forth his programme in twelve demands. Stalin, at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U. in 1926, compared these demands with the achievements of the October Revolution, pointing out that "nine-tenths of this programme has already been realised by our revolution."—*Ed.*

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2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.

4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.

5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.

6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.

7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.

8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.

9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

III. Socialist and Communist Literature[1]

1. Reactionary Socialism

a. Feudal Socialism

Owing to their historical position, it became the vocation of the aristocracies of France and England to write pamphlets against modern bourgeois society. In the French Revolution of July 1830, and in the English reform agitation, these aristocracies again succumbed to the hateful upstart.[2] Thenceforth, a serious political struggle was altogether out of the question. A literary battle alone remained possible. But even in the domain of literature the old cries of the restoration period[3] had become impossible.

In order to arouse sympathy, the aristocracy was obliged to lose sight, apparently, of its own interests, and to formulate its indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master, and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.

In this way arose feudal socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie

[1] This chapter of *The Communist Manifesto* contains a critique, still applicable today, of the socialist tendencies of that time, behind most of which there were concealed either the interests of classes directly hostile to the proletariat (such as the big landowners—feudal socialism; capitalists—bourgeois socialism) or the interests of the impoverished small peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie (petty-bourgeois socialism). A characterisation of the "socialist" tendencies and parties in the present era of imperialism is given in chapter VI of the *Programme of the Communist International*, adopted at its Sixth Congress. (*Cf. Programme of the Communist International*, p. 70.)—*Ed.*

[2] The July Revolution in France overthrew the power of the big landowners—the aristocrats (headed by the Bourbon king, Charles X)—and placed it in the hands of the big finance bourgeoisie (the July monarchy headed by Louis Philippe of the Orleans dynasty.) In England the Reform Bill of 1832 gave the bourgeoisie dominating trade and industry a recognised and powerful place in parliament.—*Ed.*

[3] Not the English Restoration, 1660 to 1689, but the French Restoration, 1814 to 1830. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

to the very heart's core, but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history.

The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to them, waved the proletarian alms-bag in front for a banner. But the people, so often as it joined them, saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coats of arms, and deserted with loud and irreverent laughter.

One section of the French Legitimists[1] and "Young England,"[2] exhibited this spectacle.

In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different, and that are now antiquated. In showing that, under their rule, the modern proletariat never existed, they forget that the modern bourgeoisie is the necessary offspring of their own form of society.

For the rest, so little do they conceal the reactionary character of their criticism, that their chief accusation against the bourgeoisie amounts to this, that under the bourgeois regime a class is being developed, which is destined to cut up root and branch the old order of society.

What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a proletariat, as that is creates a *revolutionary* proletariat.

In political practice, therefore, they join in all coercive measures against the working class; and in ordinary life, despite their high falutin' phrases, they stoop to pick up the golden apples dropped from the tree of industry, and to barter truth, love, and honour for traffic in wool, beetroot-sugar, and potato spirits.[3]

[1] The Legitimists (adherents of the "legitimate" Bourbon monarchy) were the party of the noble landowners. Montalambert was a prominent advocate of the policy under discussion.—*Ed.*

[2] "Young England"—a section of the English Conservative Party which appeared in public around 1842. The representatives of "Young England" included Disraeli and Thomas Carlyle.—*Ed.*

[3] This applies chiefly to Germany where the landed aristocracy and squirearchy have large portions of their estates cultivated for their own account by stewards, and are, moreover, extensive beetroot-sugar manufac-

As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has clerical socialism with feudal socialism.

Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the state? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.

b. Petty-Bourgeois Socialism

The feudal aristocracy was not the only class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie, not the only class whose conditions of existence pined and perished in the atmosphere of modern bourgeois society. The mediæval burgesses and the small peasant proprietors were the precursors of the modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed, industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side with the rising bourgeoisie.

In countries where modern civilisation has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

In countries, like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of the population, it was natural that writers who sided with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, should

turers and distillers of potato spirits. The wealthier British aristocracy are, as yet, rather above that; but they, too, know how to make up for declining rents by lending their names to floaters of more or less shady joint-stock companies. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

use, in their criticism of the bourgeois regime, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the cudgels for the working class. Thus arose petty-bourgeois socialism. Sismondi was the head of this school, not only in France but also in England.

This school of socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labour; the concentration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.

In its positive aims, however, this form of socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and utopian.

Its last words are: Corporate guilds for manufacture; patriarchal relations in agriculture.

Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dispersed all intoxicating effect of self-deception, this form of socialism ended in a miserable fit of the blues.

c. German or "True" Socialism[1]

The socialist and communist literature of France, a literature that originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the expression of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie,

[1] See Engels' article, *The History of the Communist League*, Volume II of the present edition, for the German or "True" Socialists.—*Ed.*

in that country, had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and men of letters eagerly seized on this literature, only forgetting that when these writings immigrated from France into Germany, French social conditions had not immigrated along with them. In contact with German social conditions, this French literature lost all its immediate practical significance, and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the eighteenth century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified in their eyes the laws of pure will, of will as it was bound to be, of true human will generally.

The work of the German *literati* consisted solely in bringing the new French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is appropriated, namely by translation.

It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic saints *over* the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German *literati* reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote "alienation of humanity," and beneath the French criticism of the bourgeois state, they wrote, "dethronement of the category of the general," and so forth.

The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of the French historical criticisms they dubbed "Philosophy of Action," "True Socialism," "German Science of Socialism," "Philosophical Foundation of Socialism," and so on.

The French socialist and communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome "French one-sidedness" and

of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of human nature, of man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical phantasy.

This German socialism, which took its school-boy task so seriously and solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such mountebank fashion, meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.

The fight of the German and especially of the Prussian bourgeoisie against feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchy, in other words, the liberal movement, became more earnest.

By this, the long-wished-for opportunity was offered to "True" Socialism of confronting the political movement with the socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement. German socialism forgot, in the nick of time, that the French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things whose attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.

To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.

It was a sweet finish after the bitter pills of floggings and bullets, with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working class risings.

While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of the German philistines. In Germany the petty-bourgeois class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then constantly crop-

ping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of the existing state of things.

To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with certain destruction—on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. "True" Socialism appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.

The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry "eternal truths," all skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a public.

And on its part, German socialism recognised, more and more, its own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty-bourgeois philistine.

It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German petty philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this model man it gave a hidden, higher, socialistic interpretation, the exact contrary of its real character. It went to the extreme length of directly opposing the "brutally destructive" tendency of communism, and of proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With very few exceptions, all the so-called socialist and communist publications that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.[1]

2. Conservative or Bourgeois Socialism

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society.

[1] The revolutionary storm of 1848 swept away this whole shabby tendency and cured its protagonists of the desire to dabble in socialism. The chief representative and classical type of this tendency is Mr. Karl Grün. [*Note by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.*]

To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This form of socialism has, moreover, been worked out into complete systems.

We may cite Proudhon's *Philosophie de la Misère* [*Philosophy of Poverty*] as an example of this form.

The socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best; and bourgeois socialism develops this comfortable conception into various more or less complete systems. In requiring the proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby to march straightway into the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in reality, that the proletariat should remain within the bounds of existing society, but should cast away all its hateful ideas concerning the bourgeoisie.

A second and more practical, but less systematic, form of this socialism sought to depreciate every revolutionary movement in the eyes of the working class, by showing that no mere political reform, but only a change in the material conditions of existence, in economical relations, could be of any advantage to them. By changes in the material conditions of existence, this form of socialism, however, by no means understands abolition of the bourgeois relations of production, an abolition that can be effected only by a revolution, but administrative reforms, based on the continued existence of these relations; reforms therefore, that in no respect affect the relations between capital and labour, but, at the best, lessen the cost, and simplify the administrative work of bourgeois government.

Bourgeois socialism attains adequate expression, when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech.

Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective

duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison reform: for the benefit of the working class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois socialism.

It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class.

3. Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism

We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat, such as the writings of Babeuf and others.

The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends, made in times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown, these attempts necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling in its crudest form.

The socialist and communist systems, properly so called, those of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen and others, spring into existence in the early undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie (see Section 1. Bourgeois and Proletarians).

The founders of these systems, see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing elements in the prevailing form of society. But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement.

Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions.

Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action;

historically created conditions of emancipation to phantastic ones; and the gradual, spontaneous class organisation of the proletariat to an organisation of society especially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.

In the formation of their plans they are conscious of caring chiefly for the interests of the working class, as being the most suffering class. Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them.

The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society?

Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social gospel.

Such phantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a phantastic conception of its own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.

But these socialist and communist publications contain also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them—such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the func-

tions of the state into a mere superintendence of production—all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognised in their earliest, indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals, therefore, are of a purely utopian character.

The significance of critical-utopian socialism and communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this phantastic standing apart from the contest, these phantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realisation of their social utopias, of founding isolated *phalanstères*, of establishing "Home Colonies," or setting up a "Little Icaria" [1]—pocket editions of the New Jerusalem—and to realise all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary conservative socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind unbelief in the new gospel.

The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively, oppose the Chartists and the *Réformistes*.

[1] "Home colonies" were what Owen called his communist model societies. [*Added by F. Engels to the German edition of 1890.*] *Phalanstères* were socialist colonies on the plan of Charles Fourier; Icaria was the name given by Cabet to his utopia and, later on, to his American communist colony. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the Social-Democrats,[1] against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and illusions traditionally handed down from the Great Revolution.

In Switzerland they support the Radicals,[2] without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.[3]

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty-bourgeoisie.[4]

[1] The party then represented in Parliament by Ledru-Rollin, in literature by Louis Blanc (1811-82), in the daily press by the *Réforme*. The name of Social-Democracy signifies, with these its inventors, a section of the Democratic or Republican Party more or less tinged with socialism. [*Note by F. Engels to the English edition of 1888.*]

[2] Petty-bourgeois Swiss democratic (republican) party headed by James Fazy.—*Ed.*

[3] The Cracow insurrection in January 1846 had been planned by the "Polish Democratic Society" (founded in 1832), an organisation of the minor Polish landed nobility, which carried on a struggle against the partition and suppression of Poland by Russia, Austria and Prussia. Its programme included the demand for liberating the peasants from the yoke of serfdom, in addition to republican and democratic demands.—*Ed.*

[4] *Kleinbürgerei* in the German original. Marx and Engels used this term to describe the reactionary elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie who supported the rule of the feudal nobility and the absolute monarchy. The

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.

In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Workingmen of all countries, unite!

ideal of these elements was the guild system of the Middle Ages. In Germany this section of the population was very numerous in most of the cities and towns.—*Ed.*

WAGE LABOUR AND CAPITAL

Introduction *by* Frederick Engels

The following work appeared as a series of leading articles in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* [*New Rhenish Gazette*] from April 4, 1842, onwards. It is based on the lectures delivered by *Marx* in 1847 at the German Workers' Club in Brussels. The work as printed remained a fragment; the words at the end of No. 269: "To be continued," remained unfulfilled in consequence of the events which just then came crowding after one another[1]; the invasion of Hungary by the Russians, the insurrections in Dresden, Iserlohn, Elberfeld, the Palatinate and Baden, which led to the suppression of the newspaper itself (May 19, 1849). The manuscript of the continuation was not found among Marx's papers after his death.

Wage-Labour and Capital has appeared in a number of editions as a separate publication in pamphlet form, the last being in 1884, by the Swiss Co-operative Press, Hottingen-Zurich.[2] The editions hitherto published retained the exact wording of the original. The present new edition, however, is to be circulated in not less than 10,000 copies as a propaganda pamphlet, and

[1] In his article, "Marx and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*" (in Volume II of the present edition), published by Engels in the Zurich *Sozialdemokrat* in 1884, he describes the situation at the time in the following words:

"The insurrection was suppressed in Dresden and Elberfeld, in Iserlohn it was encircled, the Rhine Province and Westphalia bristled with bayonets which, after completing the rape of the Prussian Rhineland, were intended to be marched against the Palatinate and Baden. Then at last the government ventured to make an attack on us."—*Ed.*

[2] At the time of the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany, the Social-Democratic Party, as an illegal party, was compelled to have its party literature printed abroad and smuggled into Germany by illegal means.—*Ed.*

so the question could not but force itself upon me, whether under these circumstances Marx himself would have approved of an unaltered reproduction of the original.

In the 'forties, Marx had not yet published his critique of political economy. This took place only towards the end of the 'fifties. Consequently, his works which appeared before the first part of the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) differ in some points from those written after 1859, and contain expressions and whole sentences which, from the point of view of the later works, appear awkward and even incorrect. Now, it is self-evident that in ordinary editions intended for the general public this earlier point of view, as a part of the intellectual development of the author, also has its place, and that both author and public have an indisputable right to the unaltered reproduction of these older works. And I should not have dreamed of altering a word of them.

It is another thing when the new edition is intended practically exclusively for propaganda among workers. In such a case Marx would certainly have brought the old presentation dating from 1849 into harmony with his new point of view. I felt certain of acting as he would have done in undertaking *for this edition* the few alterations and additions which are required in order to attain this object in all essential respects. I therefore tell the reader beforehand: this is not the pamphlet as Marx wrote it in 1849 but approximately as he would have written it in 1891. The actual text, moreover, is circulated in so many copies that this will suffice until I am able to reprint it again, unaltered, in a later complete edition of Marx's works.

My alterations all turn on one point. According to the original, the worker sells his *labour* to the capitalist for wages; according to the present text he sells his labour *power*. And for this alteration I owe an explanation. I owe it to the workers in order that they may see it is not a case here of mere juggling with words, but rather of one of the most important points in the whole of political economy. I owe it to the bourgeois, so that they can convince themselves how greatly superior the uneducated workers, for whom one can easily make com-

prehensible the most difficult economic analyses, are to our conceited "educated people" to whom such intricate questions remain insoluble their whole life long.

Classical political economy[1] took over from industrial practice the current conception of the manufacturer, that he buys and pays for the *labour* of his workers. This conception had been quite adequate for the business needs, the bookkeeping and price calculations of the manufacturer. But, naively transferred to political economy, it produced there really wondrous errors and confusions.

Economics observes the fact that the prices of all commodities, among them also the price of the commodity that it calls "labour," are continually changing; that they rise and fall as the result of the most varied circumstances, which often bear no relation to the production of the commodities themselves, so that prices seem, as a rule, to be determined by pure chance. As soon, then, as political economy made its appearance as a science,[2] one of its first tasks was to seek for the law which was concealed behind this chance which apparently governs the prices of commodities, and which, in reality, itself governed this very chance. Within the prices of commodities, continually fluctuating and oscillating, now upwards and now downwards, they sought for the firm central point around which these fluctuations and oscillations turned. In a word, they started from the *prices* of commodities in order to look for the *value* of the commodities as the law controlling prices, by which all fluctuations in price are to be explained and to which finally they are all to be ascribed.

[1] Marx says in *Capital*, Vol. I, (Swan and Sonnenschein edition, p. 53): "... By classical political economy, I understand that economy which, since the time of W. Petty, has investigated the real relations of production in bourgeois society, in contradistinction to vulgar economy, which deals with appearances only."

The last representative of classical economics in England was Ricardo (1772-1823).—*Ed.*

[2] "Although it first took shape in the minds of a few men of genius towards the end of the seventeenth century, political economy in the narrow sense, in its positive formulation by the physiocrats and Adam Smith, is nevertheless essentially a child of the eighteenth century." (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring.*)—*Ed.*

Classical economics found then that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour contained in it requisite for its production. With this explanation it contented itself. And we also can pause here for the time being. I will only remind the reader, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that this explanation has nowadays become totally inadequate. Marx first of all thoroughly investigated the value-creating quality of labour and he discovered in so doing that not all labour apparently, or even really, necessary for the production of a commodity gives it under all circumstances a magnitude of value which corresponds to the quantity of labour expended. If therefore today we say, in short, with economists like Ricardo, that the value of a commodity is determined by the labour necessary for its production, we always in so doing imply the reservations made by Marx. This suffices here; more is to be found in Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, 1859, and the first volume of *Capital*.[1]

But as soon as the economists applied this determination of value by labour to the commodity "labour," they fell into one contradiction after another. How is the value of "labour" determined? By the necessary labour contained in it. But how much labour is contained in the labour of a worker for a day, a week, a month, a year? The labour of a day, a week, a month, a year. If labour is the measure of all values, then indeed we can express the "value of labour" only in labour. But we know absolutely nothing about the value of an hour of labour, if we only know that it is equal to an hour of labour. Thus, we are not a hair's breadth nearer the goal thereby; we keep on moving in a circle.

Classical economics, therefore, tried another tack. It said: The value of a commodity is equal to its cost of production. But what is the cost of production of labour? In order to answer this question, the economists have to tamper a little with logic. Instead of investigating the cost of production of labour itself, which unfortunately cannot be ascertained, they proceed to investigate the cost of production of the worker. And this can be

[1] A popular explanation of this question was given by Marx himself in 1865 in his lecture *Value, Price and Profit*. See page 282 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

ascertained. It varies according to time and circumstance, but for a given state of society, a given locality and a given branch of production, it too is given, at least within fairly narrow limits. We live today under the domination of capitalist production, in which a large, ever-increasing class of the population can live only if it works for the owners of the means of production—the tools, machines, raw materials and means of subsistence—in return for wages. On the basis of this mode of production, the cost of production of the worker consists of that quantity of the means of subsistence—or their price in money—which, on the average, is necessary to make him capable of working, keep him capable of working, and to replace him, after his departure by reason of old age, sickness or death, with a new worker—that is to say, to reproduce the working class in the necessary numbers. Let us assume that the money price of these means of subsistence averages three marks a day.

Our worker, therefore, receives a wage of three marks a day from the capitalist who employs him. For this, the capitalist makes him work, say, twelve hours a day. The capitalist calculates, roughly, as follows:

Let us assume that our worker—a machinist—has to make a part of a machine which he can complete in one day. The raw material—iron and brass in the necessary previously prepared form—costs twenty marks. The consumption of coal by the steam-engine, the wear and tear of this same engine, of the lathe and other tools which our worker uses, represent for one day, and reckoned by his share of their use, a value of one mark. The wage for one day, according to our assumption, is three marks. This makes twenty-four marks in all for our machine part. But the capitalist calculates that he will obtain, on an average, twenty-seven marks from his customers in return, or three marks more than his outlay.

Whence came the three marks pocketed by the capitalist? According to the assertion of classical economics, commodities are, on the average, sold at their values, that is, at prices corresponding to the amount of necessary labour contained in them.

The average price of our machine part—twenty-seven marks—would thus be equal to its value, that is equal to the labour embodied in it. But of these twenty-seven marks, twenty-one marks were values already present before our machinist began work. Twenty marks were contained in the raw materials, one mark in the coal consumed during the work, or in the machines and tools which were used in the process and which were diminished in their efficiency to the value of this sum. There remain six marks which have been added to the value of the raw material. But according to the assumption of our economists themselves, these six marks can only arise from the labour added to the raw material by our worker. His twelve hours' labour has thus created a new value of six marks. The value of his twelve hours' labour would, therefore, be equal to six marks. And thereby we would at last have discovered what the "value of labour" is.

"Hold on there!" cries our machinist. "Six marks? But I have only received three marks! My capitalist swears by all that is holy that the value of my twelve hours' labour is only three marks, and if I demand six, he laughs at me. How does that fit?"

If previously we got into a circle without an exit with our value of labour, we are now properly caught in an insoluble contradiction. We looked for the value of labour and we have found more than we can use. For the worker, the value of the twelve hours' labour is three marks, for the capitalist it is six marks, of which he pays three to the worker as wages and pockets three for himself. Thus labour would have not one but two different values and very different values into the bargain!

The contradiction becomes still more ridiculous, as soon as we reduce to labour time the values expressed in money. During the twelve hours' labour a new value of six marks is created. Hence, in six hours three marks—the sum which the worker receives for twelve hours' labour. For twelve hours' labour the worker receives as an equivalent value the product of six hours' labour. Either, therefore, labour has two values, of which one is double the size of the other, or twelve equals six! In both cases we get pure nonsense.

Turn and twist as we will, we cannot get out of this contradiction, as long as we speak of the purchase and sale of labour and of the value of labour. And this also happened to the economists. The last off-shoot of classical economics, the Ricardian school, was wrecked mainly by the insolubility of this contradiction. Classical economics had got into a blind alley. The man who found the way out of this blind alley was Karl Marx.

What the economists had regarded as the cost of production of "labour" was the cost of production not of labour but of the living worker himself. And what this worker sold to the capitalist was not his labour. "As soon as his labour really begins" says Marx, "it has already ceased to belong to him, and can, therefore, no longer be sold by him." At the most, he might sell his *future* labour, *i.e.*, undertake to perform a certain amount of work at a definite time. In so doing, however, he does not sell labour (which would first have to be performed) but puts his labour power at the disposal of the capitalist for a definite time (in the case of time wages) or for the purpose of a definite output (in the case of piece wages) in return for a definite payment: he hires out or sells his *labour power*. But this labour power is amalgamated with his person and inseparable from it. Its cost of production, therefore, coincides with his cost of production; what the economists called the cost of production of labour is really the cost of production of the worker and therewith of his labour power. And so we can also go back from the cost of production of labour power to the *value* of labour power and determine the amount of socially necessary labour requisite for the production of labour power of a particular quality, as Marx has done in the chapter on the buying and selling of labour power. (*Capital*, Vol. I, chapter VI, Moore and Aveling translation.)

Now what happens after the worker has sold his labour power to the capitalist, *i.e.*, placed it at the disposal of the latter in return for a wage—day wage or piece wage—agreed upon beforehand? The capitalist takes the worker into his workshop or factory, where all the things necessary for work—raw materials, auxiliary materials (coal, dyes, etc.), tools, machines are already

to be found. Here the worker begins to toil. His daily wage may be, as above, three marks—and in this connection it does not make any difference whether he earns it as day wage or piece wage. Here also we again assume that in twelve hours the worker by his labour adds a new value of six marks to the raw materials used, which new value the capitalist realises on the sale of the finished piece of work. Out of this he pays the worker his three marks; the other three marks he keeps for himself. If, now, the worker creates a value of six marks in twelve hours, then in six hours he creates a value of three marks. He has, therefore, already repaid the capitalist the counter-value of the three marks contained in the wages when he has worked six hours for him. After six hours' labour they are both quits, neither owes the other a pfennig.

"Hold on there!" the capitalist now cries. "I have hired the worker for a whole day, for twelve hours. Six hours, however, are only half a day. So go on working steadily until the other six hours are up—only then shall we be quits!" And, in fact, the worker has to comply with his contract "voluntarily" entered into, according to which he has pledged himself to work twelve hours for a labour product which costs six hours of labour.

It is just the same with piece wages. Let us assume that our worker makes twelve items of a commodity in twelve hours. Each of these costs two marks in raw materials and depreciation and is sold at two and a half marks. Then the capitalist, on the same assumptions as before, will give the worker twenty-five pfennigs per item; that makes three marks for twelve items, to earn which the worker needs twelve hours. The capitalist receives thirty marks for the twelve items; deduct twenty-four marks for raw materials and depreciation and there remain six marks, of which he pays three marks to the worker and pockets three marks. It is just as above. Here, too, the worker works six hours for himself, *i.e.*, for replacement of his wages (half an hour in each of the twelve hours) and six hours for the capitalist.

The difficulty on which the best economists came to grief, so long as they started out from the value of "labour," vanishes as soon as we start out from the value of labour *power* instead. In

our present-day capitalist society, labour power is a commodity, a commodity like any other, and yet quite a peculiar commodity. It has, namely, the peculiar property of being a value-creating power, a source of value, and, indeed, with suitable treatment a source of more value than it itself possesses. With the present state of production, human labour power not only produces in one day a greater value than it itself possesses or costs; with every new scientific discovery, with every new technical invention, this surplus of its daily product over its daily cost increases, and therefore that portion of the labour day in which the worker works to produce the replacement of his day's wage decreases, consequently on the other hand that portion of the labour day in which he has to *make a present* of his labour to the capitalist without being paid for it increases.

And this is the economic constitution of the whole of our present-day society: it is the working class alone which produces all values. For value is only another expression for labour, that expression whereby in our present-day capitalist society is designated the amount of socially necessary labour contained in a particular commodity. These values produced by the workers do not, however, belong to the workers. They belong to the owners of the raw materials, machines, tools and the reserve funds which allow these owners to buy the labour power of the working class. From the whole mass of products produced by it, the working class, therefore, only receives a part for itself. And, as we have just seen, the other part, which the capitalist class keeps for itself and at most has to divide with the class of landowners, becomes larger with every new discovery and invention, while the part falling to the working class (reckoned per head) either increases only very slowly and inconsiderably or not at all, and under certain circumstances may even fall.

But these discoveries and inventions which supersede each other at an ever-increasing rate, this productivity of human labour which rises day by day to an extent previously unheard of, finally gives rise to a conflict in which the present-day capitalist economy must perish. On the one hand are immeasurable riches and a superfluity of products which the purchasers cannot

cope with; on the other hand, the great mass of society proletarianised, turned into wage workers, and precisely for that reason made incapable of appropriating for themselves this superfluity of products. The division of society into a small, excessively rich class and a large, propertyless class of wage workers results in the society suffocating from its own superfluity, while the great majority of its members is scarcely, or even not at all, protected from extreme want. This state of affairs becomes daily more absurd and—unnecessary. It *must* be put an end to, it *can* be put an end to. A new social order is possible in which the present class differences will have disappeared and in which—perhaps after a short transitional period of privation, but of great value morally—through the planned utilisation and extension of the already existing enormous productive forces of all members of society, and with uniform obligation to work, the means for existence, for enjoying life, for the development and employment of all bodily and mental faculties will also be available for all in an equal measure in ever-increasing fullness. And that the workers are becoming more and more determined to *win* this new social order will be demonstrated on both sides of the ocean by May the First, tomorrow, and by Sunday May 3.

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, April 30, 1891.

WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL

From various quarters we have been reproached with not having presented the *economic relationships* which constitute the material foundation of the present class struggles and national struggles. We have designedly touched upon these relationships only where they directly forced themselves to the front in political conflicts.

The point was, above all, to trace the class struggle in contemporary history, and to prove empirically, by means of the historical material already to hand and which is being newly created daily, that, with the subjugation of the working class that had carried through February and March,[1] its opponents were simultaneously conquered—the bourgeois republicans in France and the bourgeois and peasant classes who were fighting feudal absolutism throughout the whole continent of Europe; that the victory of the "honest republic" in France was at the same time the downfall of the nations that had responded to the February Revolution by heroic wars of independence; finally, that Europe, with the defeat of the revolutionary workers, had relapsed into its old double slavery, the *Anglo-Russian* slavery. The June struggle in Paris, the fall of Vienna, the tragi-comedy of Berlin's November 1848, the desperate exertions of Poland, Italy and Hungary, the starvation of Ireland—these were the chief elements in which the European class struggle between bourgeoisie and working class came to a head and by means of which we proved

[1] This refers to the Revolution of February 23 and 24, 1848, in Paris on March 13 in Vienna and March 18 in Berlin. For further details in regard to these and the subsequent events see Volume II of the present edition: *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50, The Eighteenth Brumaire* and *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution.—Ed.*

that every revolutionary upheaval, however remote from the class struggle its goal may appear to be, must fail until the revolutionary working class is victorious, that every social reform remains a utopia until the proletarian revolution and the feudalist counter-revolution take arms against one another in a *world war*. In our presentation, as in reality, *Belgium* and *Switzerland* were tragi-comic genre-pictures akin to caricature in the great historical tableau, the one being the model state of the bourgeois monarchy, the other the model state of the bourgeois republic, both of them states which imagine themselves to be as independent of the class struggle as of the European revolution.

Now after our readers have seen the class struggle develop in colossal political forms in 1848, the time has come to deal more closely with the economic relationships themselves on which the existence of the bourgeoisie and its class rule, as well as the slavery of the workers, are founded.

We shall present in three large sections: 1) the relation of *wage labour to capital*, the slavery of the workers, the domination of the capitalist, 2) *the inevitable downfall of the middle bourgeois classes and of the so-called peasant class*[1] *under the present system*, 3) *the commercial subjugation and exploitation of the bourgeois classes of the various European nations* by the despot of the world market—*England*.

We shall try to make our presentation as simple and popular as possible and shall not presuppose even the most elementary notions of political economy. We wish to be comprehensible to the workers. Moreover, the most remarkable ignorance and confusion of ideas prevails in Germany in regard to the simplest economic relationships, from the accredited defenders of the existing state of things down to the *socialist miracle-workers* and the *unrecognised political geniuses* in which divided Germany is even richer than in sovereign princes.

Now, therefore, for the first question.

[1] *Bauernstand* or estate of peasants. The German edition, 1891, has *Bürgerstand* (estate of burghers) which has been corrected according to the original text in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

What are wages? How are they determined?

If workers were asked: "How much are your wages?" one would reply: "I get a mark a day from my bourgeois," another "I get two marks," and so on. According to the different trades to which they belong, they would mention different sums of money which they receive from their respective bourgeois for a particular period of labour or for the completion of a particular piece of work, *e.g.*, weaving a yard of linen or type-setting a printed sheet. In spite of the variety of their statements, they would all agree on one point: wages are the sum of money paid by the capitalist for a particular period of labour or for a particular output of labour.

The capitalist, it appears, therefore *buys* their labour with money. They *sell* him their labour for money. But this is merely the appearance. In reality what they sell to the capitalist is their labour *power*. The capitalist buys this labour power for a day, a week, a month, etc. And after he has bought it, he uses it by having the workers work for the stipulated time. For the same sum with which the capitalist has bought their labour power, *e.g.*, two marks, he could have bought two pounds of sugar or a definite amount of any other commodity. The two marks, with which he bought two pounds of sugar, are the *price* of the two pounds of sugar. The two marks, with which he bought twelve hours' use of labour power, are the price of twelve hours' labour. Labour power, therefore, is a commodity, neither more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by the scales.

The workers exchange their commodity, labour power, for the commodity of the capitalist, for money, and this exchange takes place in a definite ratio. So much money for so long a use of labour power. For twelve hours' weaving, two marks. And do not the two marks represent all the other commodities which I can buy for two marks? In fact, therefore, the worker has exchanged his commodity, labour power, for other commodities of all kinds and that in a definite ratio. By giving him two marks, the capitalist has given him so much meat, so much

clothing, so much fuel, light, etc., in exchange for his day's labour. Accordingly, the two marks express the ratio in which labour power is exchanged for other commodities, the *exchange value* of his labour power. The exchange value of a commodity, reckoned in *money*, is what is called its *price*. *Wages* are only a particular name for the price of labour power, commonly called the *price of labour*, for the price of this peculiar commodity which has no other repository than human flesh and blood.

Let us take any worker, *e.g.*, a weaver. The capitalist supplies him with the loom and yarn. The weaver sets to work and the yarn is converted into linen. The capitalist takes possession of the linen and sells it, say, for twenty marks. Now are the wages of the weaver a *share* in the linen, in the twenty marks, in the product of his labour? By no means. Long before the linen is sold, perhaps long before its weaving is finished, the weaver has received his wages. The capitalist, therefore, does not pay these wages with the money which he will obtain from the linen, but with money already in hand. Just as the loom and the yarn are not the product of the weaver to whom they are supplied by the bourgeois, so likewise with the commodities which the weaver receives in exchange for his commodity, labour power. It was possible that the bourgeois found no purchaser at all for his linen. It was possible that he did not get even the amount of the wages by its sale. It is possible that he sells it very profitably in comparison with the weaver's wages. That has nothing to do with the weaver. The capitalist buys the labour power of the weaver with a part of his available wealth, of his capital, just as he has bought the raw material—the yarn—and the instrument of labour—the loom—with another part of his wealth. After he has made these purchases, and these purchases include the labour power necessary for the production of linen, he produces only with the *raw materials and instruments of labour belonging to him.* For the latter include now, it is true, our good weaver as well, who has as little share in the product or the price of the product as the loom has.

Wages are, therefore, not the worker's share in the commodity

produced by him. Wages are the part of the already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power.

Labour power is, therefore, a commodity which its possessor, the wage worker, sells to capital. Why does he sell it? In order to live.

But the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker's own life-activity, his own expression of life. And this *life-activity* he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary *means of subsistence.* Thus his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence, also, the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself are *wages*: and silk, gold, palace, resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket, copper coins and a basement dwelling. And the worker who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries, etc.—does he consider this twelve hours' weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone-breaking as an expression of his life, as life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. The twelve hours' labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as *earning*, which brings him to the table, to the public house, into bed. If the silk worm were to spin, in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage worker. Labour power was not always a *commodity.* Labour was not always wage labour, *i.e.*, free labour. The *slave* did not sell his labour power to the slave-owner, any more than the ox sells its services to the peasant. The slave, together with his labour power, is sold once for all to his owner. He is a commodity which can pass from the hand of one owner to that of another. He is *himself* a commodity, but the labour

power is not *his* commodity. The *serf* sells only a part of his labour power. It is not he who receives a wage from the owner of the land; rather the owner of the land receives a tribute from him.

The serf belongs to the land and turns over to the owner of the land the fruits thereof. The *free labourer,* on the other hand, sells himself and, indeed, sells himself piecemeal. He sells at auction eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his life, day after day, to the highest bidder, to the owner of the raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence, *i.e.,* to the capitalist. The worker belongs neither to an owner nor to the land, but eight, ten, twelve, fifteen hours of his daily life belong to him who buys them. The worker leaves the capitalist to whom he hires himself, as often as he likes, and the capitalist dismisses him as often as he thinks fit, as soon as he no longer gets any profit from him, or not the anticipated profit. But the worker, whose sole source of livelihood is the sale of labour power, cannot leave the *whole class of purchasers, i.e., the capitalist class* without renouncing his existence. He belongs not to this or that capitalist but to the *capitalist class,* and it is his business to dispose of himself, *i.e.,* to find a purchaser within the capitalist class.

Now, before going more closely into the relation between capital and wage labour, we shall present summarily the most general relations which come into consideration in the determination of wages.

Wages, as we have seen, are the *price* of a definite commodity, of labour power. Wages are, therefore, determined by the same laws that determine the price of every other commodity. The question, therefore, is, *how is the price of a commodity determined?*

By What Means is the Price of a Commodity Determined?

By competition between buyers and sellers, by the relation of inquiry to delivery, of demand to supply. Competition, through which the price of a commodity is determined, is *three-sided.*

The same commodity is offered by various sellers. With goods of the same quality, the one who sells most cheaply is certain of driving the others out of the field and securing the greatest sale for himself. Thus, the sellers mutually contend among themselves for sale, for the market. Each of them desires to sell, to sell as much as possible and, if possible, to sell to the exclusion of the other sellers. Hence one sells cheaper than another. Consequently, *competition* takes place *among the sellers,* which *depresses* the price of the *commodities offered by them.*

But *competition* also takes place *among the buyers,* which in its turn *causes* the commodities offered to *rise in price.*

Finally, *competition* occurs *between buyers and sellers*; the former desire to buy as cheaply as possible, the latter desire to sell as dearly as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon how the two beforementioned sides of the competition are related, that is whether the competition is stronger in the army of buyers or in the army of sellers. Industry leads two armies into the field against each other, each of which again carries on a battle within its own ranks among its own troops. The army among whose troops the least fighting takes place gains the victory over the opposing army.

Let us suppose there are 100 bales of cotton on the market and at the same time buyers for 1,000 bales of cotton. In this case, therefore, the demand is ten times as great as the supply. Competition will be very strong among the buyers, each of whom desires to get one, and if possible all, of the hundred bales for himself. This example is no arbitrary assumption. We have experienced periods of cotton crop failure in the history of the trade, when a few capitalists in alliance have tried to buy not one hundred bales but all the cotton stocks of the world. Hence, in the example mentioned, one buyer will seek to drive the other from the field by offering a relatively higher price for the bales of cotton. The cotton sellers, who perceive that the troops of the enemy army are engaged in the most violent struggle amongst themselves and that the sale of all their hundred bales is absolutely certain, will be careful not

to fall out amongst themselves and depress the price of cotton at the moment when their adversaries are competing with one another to force it up. Thus, peace suddenly descends on the army of the sellers. They stand facing the buyers as *one* man, fold their arms philosophically, and there would be no bounds to their demands were it not that the offers of even the most persistent and eager buyers have very definite limits.

If, therefore, the supply of a commodity is weaker than the demand for it, then only slight competition, or none at all, takes place among the sellers. In the same proportion as this competition decreases, competition increases among the buyers. The result is a more or less considerable rise in commodity prices.

It is well known that the reverse case with a reverse result occurs more frequently. Considerable surplus of supply over demand; desperate competition among the sellers; lack of buyers; goods disposed of at ridiculously low prices.

But what is the meaning of a rise, a fall in prices, what is the meaning of high price, low price? A grain of sand is high when examined through a microscope, and a tower is low when compared with a mountain. And if price is determined by the relation of supply and demand, what determines the relation of supply and demand?

Let us turn to the first citizen we meet. He will not reflect for an instant but, like another Alexander the Great, will cut this metaphysical knot with the multiplication table. "If the production of the goods which I sell has cost 100 marks," he will tell us, "and if I get 110 marks from the sale of these goods, after a year of course—then that is an ordinary, honest, legitimate profit. But if I get in exchange 120 or 130 marks, that is a high profit; and if I get 200 marks, that would be an extraordinary, an enormous profit." What, therefore, serves the citizen as the *measure* of profit? The *cost of production* of his commodity. If he receives in exchange for this commodity an amount of other commodities which has cost less to produce, then he has lost. If he receives in exchange for his commodity an amount of other commodities, the production of which has cost more, then he has gained. And he calculates

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the rise or fall of the profit according to the degree in which the exchange value of his commodity stands above or below zero—the *cost of production.*

We have seen then how the changing relation of demand and supply causes now a rise and now a fall of prices, now high, now low prices. If the price of a commodity rises considerably through inadequate supply or disproportionate increase of the demand, the price of any other commodity must have fallen proportionately, for the price of a commodity only expresses in money the ratio in which third commodities are given in exchange for it. If, for example, the price of a yard of silk material rises from five marks to six marks, the price of silver in relation to silk has fallen and equally the prices of all other commodities that have remained at their old prices have fallen in relation to the silk. One has to give a larger amount of them in exchange to get the same amount of silk. What will be the consequence of the rising price of a commodity? A mass of capital will be thrown into that flourishing branch of industry and this influx of capital into the domain of the favoured industry will continue until it yields no more than the ordinary profits or, rather, until the price of its products, through overproduction, sinks below the cost of production.

Conversely, if the price of a commodity falls below its cost of production, capital will be withdrawn from the production of this commodity. Except in the case of a branch of industry which has become obsolete and must, therefore, perish, the production of such a commodity, *i.e.*, its supply, will go on decreasing owing to this flight of capital until it corresponds to the demand, and consequently its price is again on a level with the cost of production or, rather, until the supply has sunk below the demand, *i.e.*, until its prices rise again above the cost of production, *for the current price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production.*

We see how capital continually migrates in and out, out of the domain of one industry into that of another. High prices bring too great an immigration and low prices too great an emigration.

We could show from another point of view how not only supply but also demand is determined by the cost of production. But this would take us too far away from our subject.

We have just seen how the fluctuations of supply and demand continually bring the price of a commodity back to the cost of production. *The real price of a commodity, it is true, is always above or below the cost of production; but rise and fall reciprocally balance each other,* so that within a certain period of time, taking the ebb and flow of the industry together, commodities are exchanged for one another in accordance with their cost of production, their price, therefore, being determined by the cost of production.

This determination of price by the cost of production is not to be understood in the sense of the economists. The economists say that the *average price* of commodities is equal to the cost of production; that this is the *law.* The anarchical movement, in which rise is compensated by fall and fall by rise, is regarded by them as chance. With just as much right one could regard the fluctuations as the law and the determination by the cost of production as chance, as has also been done by other economists. But it is solely these fluctuations, which, looked at more closely, bring with them the most fearful devastations and like earthquakes cause bourgeois society to tremble to its foundations—it is solely these fluctuations that in their course determine price through the cost of production. In the total movement of this disorder is its order. In the course of this industrial anarchy, in this movement in a circle, competition compensates so to speak for one extravagance by means of another.

We see, therefore, that the price of a commodity is determined by its cost of production, in such manner that the periods in which the price of this commodity rises above the cost of production are compensated by the periods in which it sinks below the cost of production, and *vice versa.* This does not hold, of course, for a particular isolated industrial product but only for the whole branch of industry. Consequently, it also

does not hold for the individual industrialists but only for the whole class of industrialists.

The determination of price by the cost of production is equivalent to the determination of price by the labour time necessary for the production of a commodity, for the cost of production consists of 1) raw materials and depreciation of instruments, *i.e.*, of industrial products the production of which has cost a certain amount of labour days and which therefore, represent a certain amount of labour time, and 2) of direct labour, the measure of which is precisely time.

Now, the same general laws that regulate the price of commodities in general of course also regulate *wages, the price of labour.*

Wages will rise and fall according to the relation of supply and demand, according to the turn taken by the competition between the buyers of labour power, the capitalists, and the sellers of labour power, the workers. The variations in wages correspond in general to the variations in prices of commodities. *Within these variations, however, the price of labour will be determined by the cost of production, by the labour time necessary to produce this commodity—labour power.*

What then is the cost of production of labour power?

It is the cost required for maintaining the worker as a worker and of developing him into a worker.

The less the period of training, therefore, that any work requires, the smaller is the cost of production of the worker and the lower is the price of his labour, his wages. In those branches of industry, in which hardly any period of apprenticeship is required and where the mere bodily existence of the worker suffices, the cost necessary for his production is almost confined to the commodities necessary for keeping him alive and capable of working. The *price of his labour* will, therefore, be determined by the *price of the necessary means of subsistence.*

Another consideration, however, also comes in. The manufacturer in calculating his cost of production and thereby the price of the products takes into account the wear and tear of

the instruments of labour. If, for example, a machine costs him 1,000 marks and wears out in ten years, he adds 100 marks annually to the price of the commodities so as to be able to replace the worn-out machine by a new one at the end of ten years. In the same way, in calculating the cost of production of simple labour power, there must be included the cost of reproduction, whereby the race of workers is enabled to increase and to replace worn-out workers by new ones. Thus the depreciation of the worker is taken into account in the same way as the depreciation of the machine.

The cost of production of simple labour power, therefore, amounts to the *cost of the existence and reproduction of the worker.* The price of this cost of existence and reproduction constitutes wages. Wages so determined are called the *wage minimum.* This wage minimum, like the determination of the price of commodities by the cost of production in general, does not hold good for the *single individual* but for the *species.* Individual workers, millions of workers, do not get enough to be able to exist and reproduce themselves; *but the wages of the whole working class* level themselves out within their variations to this minimum.

Now that we have arrived at an understanding of the most general laws which regulate wages like the price of any other commodity, we can go into our subject more specifically.

Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilised in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labour and new means of subsistence. All these component parts are creations of labour, products of labour, *accumulated labour.* Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital.

So say the economists.

What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other.

A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a *slave* in certain relationships. A cotton-spinning machine is a machine for spinning cotton. Only in certain relationships does it become *capital.*

Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is *money* or sugar the *price* of sugar.

In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.

These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the conditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the invention of a new instrument of warfare, firearms, the whole internal organisation of the army necessarily changed; the relationships, within which individuals can constitute an army and act as an army, were transformed and the relations of different armies to one another also changed.

Thus the social relations, within which individuals produce, the *social relations of production, change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the forces of production. The production relations in their totality constitute what is called the social relations, society, and indeed a society at a definite stage of historical development,* a society with a special distinctive character. *Ancient* society, *feudal* society, *bourgeois* society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same time denotes a special stage of development in the history of mankind.

Capital, also, is a social production relation. *It is a bourgeois production relation,* a production relation of bourgeois society. Are not the means of subsistence, the instruments of labour, the raw materials, of which capital consists, produced and accumulated under given social conditions in definite social relations? Are they not utilised for new production under given social conditions, in definite social relations? And is it not just this definite social character which makes the products serving for new production into *capital*?

Capital consists not only of means of subsistence, instruments of labour and raw materials, not only of material products; it consists just as much of *exchange values*. All the products of which it consists are *commodities*. Capital is, therefore, not only a sum of material products, it is a sum of commodities, of exchange values, *of social magnitudes*.

Capital remains the same, whether we put cotton in place of wool, rice in place of wheat or steamships in place of railways, provided only that the cotton, the rice, the steamships—the body of capital—have the same exchange value, the same price as the wool, the wheat, the railways in which it was previously incorporated. The body of capital can change continually without the capital suffering the slightest alteration.

But while all capital is a sum of commodities, *i.e.*, of exchange values, every sum of commodities, of exchange values, is not yet capital.

Every sum of exchange values is an exchange value. Every separate exchange value is a sum of exchange values. For instance, a house that is worth 1,000 marks is an exchange value of 1,000 marks. A piece of paper worth a pfennig is a sum of exchange values of one hundred-hundredths of a pfennig. Products which are exchangeable for others are *commodities*. The particular proportion in which they are exchangeable constitutes their *exchange value* or, expressed in money, their *price*. The quantity of these products can make no difference to their being *commodities* or representing an *exchange value* or having a definite *price*. Whether a tree is large or small it remains a tree. Whether we exchange iron for other products in ounces or in hundredweights, does this make any difference to its character as commodity, as exchange value? According to the quantity it is a commodity of greater or lower value, of higher or lower price.

How then does a sum of commodities, of exchange values, become capital?

In that, as an independent social *power*, *i.e.*, as the power of a *part of society*, it maintains itself and increases by *ex-*

change for direct, living labour power. The existence of a class which possesses nothing but its capacity for labour is a necessary prerequisite of capital.

It is only the domination of accumulated, past, materialised labour over direct, living labour, which turns accumulated labour into capital.

Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means for maintaining and increasing the exchange value of the latter.

What takes place in the exchange between capitalist and wage worker?

The worker receives means of subsistence in exchange for his labour power, but the capitalist receives in exchange for his means of subsistence labour, the productive activity of the worker, the creative power whereby the worker not only replaces what he consumes but *gives to the accumulated labour a greater value than it previously possessed.* The worker receives a part of the available means of subsistence from the capitalist. For what do these means of subsistence serve him? For immediate consumption. As soon, however, as I consume the means of subsistence, they are irretrievably lost to me unless I use the time during which I am kept alive by them in order to produce new means of subsistence, in order during consumption to create by my labour new values in place of the values which perish in being consumed. But it is indeed just this noble reproductive power which the worker surrenders to the capitalist in exchange for the means of subsistence received. He has, therefore, lost them for himself.

Let us take an example: a tenant farmer gives his day labourer five silver groschen a day. For five silver groschen the labourer works all day on the farmer's field and thus secures him a receipt of ten silver groschen. The farmer not only gets the value replaced that he has to give the day labourer; he doubles it. He has therefore employed, consumed, the five silver groschen that he gave to the labourer in a fruitful, productive

manner. He has bought with the five silver groschen just that labour and power of the labourer which produces agricultural products of double value and makes ten silver groschen out of one. The day labourer, on the other hand, receives in place of his productive power, the results of which he has surrendered to the farmer, five silver groschen which he exchanges for means of subsistence and these he more or less rapidly consumes. The five silver groschen have, therefore, been consumed in a double way, *reproductively* for capital, for they have been exchanged for labour power which produced ten silver groschen. *unproductively* for the worker, for they have been exchanged for means of subsistence which have disappeared forever and the value of which he can only recover by repeating the same exchange with the farmer. *Thus capital pre-supposes wage labour; wage labour pre-supposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally evoke each other.*

Does a worker in a cotton factory produce only cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his labour and by means of it to create new values.

Capital can only increase itself by exchanging itself for labour power, by calling wage labour to life. The labour power of the wage worker can only exchange itself for capital by increasing capital, by strengthening the power whose slave it is. *Hence, increase of capital is increase of the proletariat, i.e., of the working class.*

The interest of the capitalist and that of the worker are, therefore, *one and the same,* so assert the bourgeois and their economists. They are, indeed! The worker perishes if capital does not employ him. Capital perishes if it does not exploit labour power and in order to exploit it, it must buy it. The faster capital intended for production, productive capital, increases, the more, therefore, industry prospers, the more the bourgeoisie enriches itself and the better business is, the more workers does the capitalist need, the more dearly does the worker sell himself.

The indispensable condition for a tolerable situation of the worker *is, therefore, the fastest possible growth of productive capital.*

But what is the growth of productive capital? Growth of the power of accumulated labour over living labour. Growth of the domination of the bourgeoisie over the working class. If wage labour produces the wealth of others that rules over it, the power that is hostile to it, capital, then the means of employment, *i.e.*, the means of subsistence, flow back to it from this hostile power, on condition that it makes itself afresh into a part of capital, into the lever which hurls capital anew into an accelerated movement of growth.

To say that the interests of capital and those of the workers are one and the same is only to say that capital and wage labour are two sides of one and the same relationship. The one determines the other, as usurer and squanderer reciprocally condition the existence of each other.

As long as the wage worker is a wage worker his lot depends upon capital. That is the much vaunted community of interests between worker and capitalist.

If capital grows, the mass of wage labour grows, the number of wage workers grows; in a word, the domination of capital extends over a greater number of individuals. And if we assume the most favourable case: if productive capital grows, the demand for labour grows. Consequently, the price of labour, wages, goes up.

A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilisation, if the neighbouring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the dweller in the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.

A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth

of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social needs, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalists, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our needs and enjoyments spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects of their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.

Wages are by no means determined only by the amount of commodities for which I can exchange them. They embody various relations.

What the workers receive for their wages, in the first place, is a definite sum of money. Are wages determined only by this money price?

In the sixteenth century, the gold and silver circulating in Europe increased as a result of the discovery of richer and more easily worked mines in America. Hence, the value of gold and silver fell in relation to other commodities. The workers received the same amount of coined silver for their labour power as before. The money price of their labour remained the same, and yet their wages had fallen, for in exchange for the same quantity of silver they received a smaller amount of other commodities in return. This was one of the circumstances which furthered the growth of capital and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the sixteenth century.

Let us take another case. In the winter of 1847, as a result of a crop failure, the most indispensable means of subsistence, corn, meat, butter, cheese, etc., rose considerably in price. Assume that the workers received the same sum of money for their labour power as before. Had not their wages fallen? Of course. For the same money they received less bread, meat, etc., in exchange. Their wages had fallen not because the value of silver had diminished but because the value of the means of subsistence had increased.

Assume, finally, that the money price of labour remains the

same while all agricultural and manufactured goods have fallen in price owing to the employment of new machinery, a favourable season, etc. For the same money the workers can now buy more commodities of all kinds. Their wages, therefore, have risen, just because the money value of their wages has not altered.

Thus, the money price of labour, nominal wages, do not coincide with real wages, *i.e.*, with the sum of commodities which is actually given in exchange for the wages. If, therefore, we speak of a rise or fall of wages, we must not only keep in mind the money price of labour, the nominal wages.

But neither nominal wages, *i.e.*, the sum of money for which the worker sells himself to the capitalist, nor real wages, *i.e.*, the sum of commodities which he can buy for his money, exhaust the relations contained in wages.

Wages are, above all, also determined by their relation to the gain, to the profit of the capitalist—comparative, relative wages.

Real wages express the price of labour in relation to the price of other commodities; relative wages, on the other hand, express the share of direct labour in the new value it has created in relation to the share which falls to accumulated labour, to capital.

We said above, pages 255-56, "Wages are . . . not the worker's share in the commodity produced by him. Wages are the part of the already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a definite amount of productive labour power." But the capitalist must replace these wages out of the price at which he sells the product produced by the worker, he must replace it in such a way that there remains to him, as a rule, a surplus over the cost of production expended by him, a profit. For the capitalist, the sale price of the commodities produced by the worker is divided into three parts: *firstly*, replacement of the price of the raw materials advanced by him together with replacement of the depreciation of the tools, machinery, and other means of labour also advanced by him; *secondly*, the replacement of the wages advanced by him, and *thirdly*, the

surplus left over, the capitalist's profit. While the first part only replaces *previously existing values*, it is clear that both the replacement of the wages and also the surplus profit of the capitalist are, as a whole, taken from the *new value created by the worker's labour* and added to the raw materials. And *in this sense*, in order to compare them with one another, we can regard both wages and profit as shares in the product of the worker.

Real wages may remain the same, they may even rise, and yet relative wages fall. Let us suppose, for example, that all means of subsistence have gone down in price by two-thirds while wages per day have only fallen by one-third, that is to say, for example, from three marks to two marks. Although the worker can command a greater amount of commodities with these two marks than he previously could with three marks, yet his wages have gone down in relation to the profit of the capitalist. The profit of the capitalist (*e.g.*, the manufacturer) has increased by one mark, that is, for a smaller sum of exchange values which he pays to the worker, the latter must produce a greater amount of exchange values than before. The share of capital relative to the share of labour has risen. The division of social wealth between capital and labour has become still more unequal. With the same capital, the capitalist commands a greater quantity of labour. The power of the capitalist class over the working class has grown, the social position of the worker has deteriorated, has been depressed one stage further below that of the capitalist.

What then is the general law which determines the rise and fall of wages and profits in their reciprocal relation?

They stand in inverse ratio to each other. Capital's share, profit, rises in the same proportion as labour's share, wages, falls and vice versa. Profit rises to the extent that wages fall; it falls to the extent that wages rise.

The objection, will, perhaps, be made that the capitalist can profit by a favourable exchange of his products with other capitalists, by increase of the demand for his commodities, whether as a result of the opening of new markets, or as a result of a

momentarily increased demand in the old markets, etc.; that the capitalist's profit can, therefore, increase by over-reaching other capitalists, independently of the rise and fall of wages, of the exchange value of labour power; or that the capitalist's profit may also rise owing to improvement of the instruments of labour, a new application of natural forces, etc.

First of all, it will have to be admitted that the result remains the same, although it is brought about in reverse fashion. It is true the profit has not risen because wages have fallen, but wages have fallen because the profit has risen. With the same amount of other people's labour, the capitalist has bought a greater amount of exchange values, without having paid more for the labour on that account; that is, therefore, labour is paid less in proportion to the net profit which it yields the capitalist.

In addition, we recall that, in spite of variations in prices of commodities, the average price of every commodity, the ratio in which it is exchanged for other commodities, is determined by its *cost of production.* Hence the over-reachings within the capitalist class necessarily balance one another. The improvement of machinery, new application of natural forces in the service of production enable a larger amount of products to be created in a given period of time with the same amount of labour and capital, but not by any means a larger amount of exchange values. If, by the use of the spinning machine, I can turn out twice as much yarn in an hour as before its invention, *e.g.*, one hundred pounds instead of fifty, then in the long run I will receive for these hundred pounds no more commodities in exchange than formerly for the fifty pounds, because the cost of production has fallen by one-half, or because I can deliver double the product at the same cost.

Finally, in whatever proportion the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, whether of one country or of the whole world market, shares the net profit of production within itself, the total amount of this net profit always consists only of the amount by which, on the whole, accumulated labour has been increased by direct labour. This total amount grows, therefore, in the proportion in

which labour augments capital, *i.e.*, in the proportion in which profit rises in contrast to wages.

We see, therefore, that even if we remain *within the relationship of capital and wage labour, the interests of capital and the interests of wage labour are diametrically opposed.*

A rapid increase of capital is equivalent to a rapid increase of profit. Profit can only increase rapidly if the price of labour, if relative wages, decrease just as rapidly. Relative wages can fall although real wages rise simultaneously with nominal wages, with the money value of labour, if only they do not rise, however, in the same proportion as profit. If, for instance, in times when business is good, wages rise by five per cent, profit on the other hand by thirty per cent, then the comparative, the relative wages have not *increased* but *decreased.*

If, therefore, the income of the worker increases with the rapid growth of capital, the social gulf that separates the worker from the capitalist increases at the same time, the power of capital over labour, the dependence of labour on capital, increases at the same time.

To say that the worker has an interest in the rapid growth of capital is only to say that the more rapidly the worker increases the wealth of others, the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him, the greater is the number of workers that can be employed and called into existence, the more can the mass of slaves dependent on capital be increased.

We have, therefore, seen:

Even the *most favourable* situation for the working class, the *most rapid possible growth of capital,* however much it may improve the material existence of the worker, does not remove the antagonism between his interests and the bourgeois interests, those of the capitalist. *Profit* and *wages* remain as before in *inverse proportion.*

If capital is growing rapidly, wages may rise; the profit of capital rises incomparably more rapidly. The material position of the worker has improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social gulf that divides him from the capitalist has widened.

Finally:

To say that the most favourable condition for wage labour is the most rapid possible growth of productive capital, is only to say that the more rapidly the working class increases and enlarges the power that is hostile to it, the wealth that does not belong to it and that controls it, the more favourable will be the conditions under which it is allowed to labour anew at increasing bourgeois wealth, at enlarging the power of capital, content with forging for itself the golden fetters by which the bourgeoisie drags it in its train.

Growth of productive capital and rise of wages, are these really so inseparably connected as the bourgeois economists maintain? We must not take their word for it. We must not even believe them when they say that the fatter capital is, the better will its slave be fed. The bourgeoisie is too enlightened, it calculates too well, to share the prejudices of the feudal lord who makes a display by the brilliance of his retinue. The conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie compel it to calculate.

We must, therefore, examine more closely:

How does the growth of productive capital affect wages?

If, on the whole, the productive capital of bourgeois society grows, a *more varied* accumulation of labour takes place. The capitals[1] increase in number and extent. The increase of the capitals increases the *competition between the capitalists. The increasing extent* of the capitals provides the means for *bringing more powerful labour armies with more gigantic instruments of warfare into the industrial battlefield.*

One capitalist can only drive another from the field and capture his capital by selling more cheaply. In order to be able to sell more cheaply without ruining himself, he must produce more cheaply, *i.e.*, raise the productive power of labour as much as possible. But the productive power of labour is raised, above all, by a *greater division of labour*, by a more universal introduction and continual improvement of *machinery*. The greater the labour army among whom labour is divided, the more gigantic

[1] *Capitalists* in the edition of 1891; corrected according to the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung.—Ed.*

the scale on which machinery is introduced, the more does the cost of production proportionately decrease, the more fruitful is labour. Hence, a general rivalry arises among the capitalists to increase machinery and the division of labour, and to exploit them on the greatest possible scale.

If, now, by a greater division of labour, by the utilisation and improvement of new machines, by more profitable and extensive exploitation of natural forces, one capitalist has found the means of producing with the same amount of labour or of accumulated labour, a greater amount of products, of commodities, than his competitors, if he can for example produce a whole yard of linen in the same labour time in which his competitors weave half a yard, how will this capitalist operate?

He could continue to sell half a yard of linen at the old market price; this would, however, be no means of driving his opponents from the field and of enlarging his own sales. But in the same measure in which his production has expanded, his need to sell has also increased. The more powerful and costly means of production that he has called into life *enable* him, indeed, to sell his commodities more cheaply, they *compel* him, however, at the same time *to sell more commodities*, to conquer a much *larger* market for his commodities; consequently our capitalist will sell his half yard of linen more cheaply than his competitors.

The capitalist will not, however, sell a whole yard as cheaply as his competitors sell half a yard, although the production of the whole yard does not cost him more than the half yard costs the others. Otherwise he would not gain anything, but only get back the cost of production by the exchange. His possibly greater income would be derived, therefore, from having set a larger capital into motion, but not from having made more of his capital than the others. Moreover, he attains the object he wishes to attain, if he puts the price of his goods only a small percentage lower than that of his competitors. He drives them from the field, he wrests from them at least a part of their sales, by *underselling* them. And, finally, it will be remembered that the current price always stands *above or below the cost of production*,

according to whether the sale of the commodity occurs in a favourable or unfavourable industrial season. According as the market price of the yard of linen stands below or above its hitherto customary cost of production the percentage will vary at which the capitalist who has employed new and more fruitful means of production sells above his real cost of production.

However, the *privilege* of our capitalist is not of long duration; other competing capitalists introduce the same machines, the same division of labour, introduce them on the same, or on a larger, scale, and this introduction will become so general that the price of linen *is reduced* not only *below its old* but *below its new cost of production.*

The capitalists find themselves, therefore, in the same position relative to one another as *before* the introduction of the new means of production, and if they are able to supply by these means double the production at the same price, they are *now* forced to supply the double product *below* the old price. From the standpoint of this new cost of production, the same game begins again. More division of labour, more machinery, enlarged scale of exploitation of machinery and division of labour. And again competition brings the same counter-action against this result.

We see how in this way the mode of production and the means of production are continually transformed, revolutionised, *how the division of labour is necessarily followed by greater division of labour, the application of machinery by still greater application of machinery, work on a large scale by work on a still larger scale.*

That is the law which again and again throws bourgeois production out of its old course and which compels capital to intensify the productive forces of labour, *because* it has intensified it, the law which gives capital no rest and continually whispers to it: "March on! March on!"

This law is none other than that which, within the fluctuations of trade periods, necessarily *levels out* the price of a commodity to its *cost of production.*

However powerful the means of production which a capital-

ist brings into the field, competition will make these means of production universal and from the moment when it has made them universal, the only result of the greater fruitfulness of his capital is that he must now supply for the *same* price ten, twenty, a hundred times as much as before. But, as he must sell perhaps a thousand times as much as before in order to outweigh the lower sale price by the greater amount of the products sold, because a more extensive sale is now necessary, not only in order to make more profit but in order to replace the cost of production—the instrument of production itself, as we have seen, becomes more and more expensive and because this extensive sale becomes a question of life or death not only for him but also for his rivals, the old struggle begins again *all the more violently the more fruitful the already discovered means of production are. The division of labour and the application of machinery, therefore, will go on anew on an incomparably greater scale.*

Whatever the power of the means of production employed may be, competition seeks to rob capital of the golden fruits of this power, by bringing the price of the commodities back to the cost of production and therefore by making the cheaper production and the supply of ever greater amounts of the product for the same sum into an imperative law to the same extent as production is cheapened, *i.e.,* as more is produced with the same amount of labour. Thus the capitalist will have won nothing by his own exertions but the obligation to supply more in the same period of labour, in a word, *more difficult conditions for profitable use of his capital.* While, therefore, competition continually pursues him with its law of the cost of production and every weapon that he forges against his rivals recoils against himself, the capitalist continually tries to get the better of competition by incessantly introducing new machines, more expensive, it is true, but producing more cheaply, and new division of labour in place of the old, and by not waiting until competition has rendered the new ones obsolete.

If now we picture to ourselves this feverish agitation on the *whole world market,* it will be comprehensible how the growth,

accumulation and concentration of capital results in an uninterrupted sub-division of labour, and application of new and perfecting of old machinery, proceeding feverishly and carried out on an ever more gigantic scale.

But how do these circumstances, which are inseparable from the growth of productive capital, affect the determination of wages?

The greater *division of labour* enables *one* worker to do the work of five, ten or twenty; it multiplies competition, therefore, among the workers fivefold, tenfold and twentyfold. The workers do not only compete by one selling himself cheaper than another; they compete by *one* doing the work of five, ten, twenty; and the *division of labour*, introduced by capital and continually increased, compels the workers to compete among themselves in this way. Further, in the same measure as the *division of labour* increases, the labour itself *is simplified.* The special skill of the worker becomes worthless. He becomes transformed into a simple, monotonous, productive force that does not have to use either bodily or intellectual faculties. His labour becomes a labour accessible to all. Hence, competitors crowd upon him on all sides, and in addition we may recall that the more simple and easily learned the labour is, the lower the cost of production needed to master it, the lower do wages sink, for, like the price of every other commodity, they are determined by the cost of production.

In the same measure, therefore, in which labour becomes more unsatisfying, more repulsive, competition increases and wages decrease. The worker tries to keep up the amount of his wages by working more, whether by working longer hours or by producing more in the same time. Impelled by want, therefore, he still further increases the evil effects of the division of labour. The result is that *the more he works the less wage he receives*, and for the simple reason that he competes to that extent against his fellow workers, hence makes them into so many competitors who offer themselves on just the same bad terms as he does himself, and that, therefore, in the last resort he *competes against himself, against himself as a member of the working class.*

Machinery brings about the same results on a much greater scale, by replacing skilled workers by unskilled, men by women, adults by children. It brings about the same results, where it is newly introduced, by throwing the hand workers on to the streets in masses, and, where it is developed, improved and replaced by more productive machinery, by dismissing workers in smaller numbers. We have portrayed above, in a hasty sketch, the industrial war of the capitalists among themselves; *this war has the peculiarity that its battles are won less by recruiting than by discharging the army of labour. The generals, the capitalists, compete with one another as to who can dismiss most soldiers of industry.*

The economists tell us, it is true, that the workers rendered superfluous by machinery find *new* branches of employment.

They dare not assert directly that the same workers who are discharged find places in the new branches of labour. The facts cry out too loudly against this lie. They really only assert that new means of employment will open up for *other component sections of the working class, e.g.,* for the portion of the young generation of workers that was already standing ready to enter the branch of industry which has died out. That is, of course, a great consolation for the dismissed workers. Messrs. the capitalists will never want for fresh, exploitable flesh and blood, the dead will be left to bury their dead. This is rather a consolation which the capitalists give themselves than one which they give the workers. If the whole class of wage workers were to be abolished owing to machinery, how dreadful that would be for capital which, without wage labour, ceases to be capital!

Let us suppose, however, that those directly driven out of work by machinery, and the entire section of the new generation that was already on the watch for this employment, *find a new occupation.* Does one believe that it will be as highly paid as that which has been lost? *That would contradict all the laws of economics.* We have seen how modern industry always brings with it the substitution of a more simple, subordinate occupation for the more complex and higher one.

How, then, could a mass of workers, who have been thrown

out of one branch of industry owing to machinery, find refuge in another, unless the latter *is lower and worse paid?*

The workers who work on the manufacture of machinery itself have been cited as an exception. As soon as more machinery is demanded and used in industry, there must necessarily be an increase of machines, consequently of the manufacture of machines, and consequently of the employment of workers in the manufacture of machines; and the workers engaged in this branch of industry are skilled, even educated workers.

Since the year 1840 this assertion, which even before was only half true, has lost all semblance of truth because ever more versatile machines have been employed in the manufacture of machinery, no more and no less than in the manufacture of cotton yarn, and the workers employed in the machine factories, confronted by highly elaborate machines, can only play the part of highly unelaborate machines.

But in place of the man who has been dismissed owing to the machine, the factory employs maybe *three* children and *one* woman! And did not the man's wages have to suffice for the three children and one woman? Did not the minimum of wages have to suffice to maintain and to propagate the race? What, then, does this favourite bourgeois phrase prove? Nothing more than that now four times as many workers' lives are used up in order to gain a livelihood for *one* worker's family.

Let us sum up: *The more the growth of productive capital, the greater is the expansion of division of labour and application of machinery. The greater the expansion of division of labour and application of machinery, the greater is the expansion of competition among the workers, the greater is the contraction of their wages.*

In addition, the working class gains recruits from the *higher strata of society* also; a mass of petty industrialists and small *rentiers* are hurled down into its ranks and have nothing more urgent to do than to stretch out their arms alongside those of the workers. Thus the forest of uplifted arms demanding work becomes ever thicker, while the arms themselves become ever thinner.

That the small industrialist cannot survive the struggle in which one of the first conditions is to produce on an ever greater scale, *i.e.*, precisely to be a large and not a small industrialist, is self-evident.

That the interest on capital decreases in the same measure as the mass and figure of the capital increases, as capital grows, that, therefore, the small *rentier* can no longer live on his interest but must throw himself into industry, and, consequently, help to increase the ranks of the small industrialists and therefore of candidates for the proletariat, all this surely requires no further exposition.

Finally, in the measure that the capitalists are compelled, by the movement described above, to exploit the already existing gigantic means of production on a larger scale and to set in motion all the mainsprings of credit to this end, in the same measure do the industrial earthquakes increase, in which the trading world can only maintain itself by sacrificing a part of wealth, products and even of productive forces, to the gods of the underworld—in a word, *crises* increase. They become more frequent and more violent, if only because in the same measure in which the mass of production, and, consequently, the need for extended markets, grows, the world market becomes more and more contracted, fewer and fewer new markets remain available for exploitation, since every preceding crisis has subjected to world trade a market hitherto unconquered or only superficially exploited. But capital *lives* not only on labour. A lord, at once aristocratic and barbarous, it drags with it into the grave the corpses of its slaves, whole hecatombs of workers who perish in the crises. Thus we see: *if capital grows rapidly, competition among the workers grows incomparably more rapidly, i.e., the means of employment, the means of subsistence, of the working class decrease proportionately so much the more, and, nevertheless, the rapid growth of capital is the most favourable condition for wage labour.*

VALUE, PRICE AND PROFIT [1]

Preliminary

Citizens, Before entering into the subject matter, allow me to make a few preliminary remarks.

There reigns now on the Continent a real epidemic of strikes, and a general clamour for a rise of wages. The question will turn up at our Congress. You, as the head of the International Association, ought to have settled convictions upon this paramount question. For my own part, I considered it, therefore, my duty to enter fully into the matter, even at the peril of putting your patience to a severe test.

Another preliminary remark I have to make in regard to Citizen Weston. He has not only proposed to you, but has publicly defended, in the interest of the working class, as he thinks, opin-

[1] The present work is an address delivered by K. Marx at two sessions of the General Council of the First International on June 20 and 27, 1865. The circumstances which led to this report are briefly as follows:

At the session of the General Council on April 4, 1865, John Weston, an influential member of the General Council and English workers' representative, proposed that the General Council should discuss the following questions:

"1) Can the social and material prospects of the working class be in general improved by wage increases?"

"2) Do not the efforts of the trade unions to secure increases have a harmful effect on other branches of industry?"

Weston declared that he would uphold a negative answer to the first question and a positive answer to the second one.

Weston's report was delivered and discussed at the session of the Council of May 2 and 20. In a letter to Engels of May 20, 1865, Marx refers to this as follows:

"This evening," wrote Marx, "there was a special session of the International. A good old card, an old Owenite, Weston (a carpenter) has

ions he knows to be most unpopular with the working class. Such an exhibition of moral courage all of us must highly honour. I hope that, despite the unvarnished style of my paper, at its conclusion he will find me to agree with what appears to me the just idea lying at the bottom of his theses, which, however, in their present form, I cannot but consider theoretically false and practically dangerous.

I shall now at once proceed to the business before us.

I. Production and Wages

Citizen Weston's argument rested, in fact, upon two premises: firstly, that the *amount of national production* is a *fixed thing*, a *constant* quantity or magnitude, as the mathematicians would say; secondly, that the *amount of real wages*, that is to say, of wages as measured by the quantity of the commodities they can buy, is a *fixed* amount, a *constant* magnitude.

Now, his first assertion is evidently erroneous. Year after year, you will find that the value and mass of production increase, that the productive powers of the national labour increase, and that the amount of money necessary to circulate this increasing production continuously changes. What is true at the end of the year, and for different years compared with each other, is true

put forward two propositions which he is continually defending in the *Beehive:* 1) that a general rise in the rate of wages cannot bring any advantage to the workers; 2) that consequently, etc., trade unions are harmful. If these two propositions, in which he alone in our society believes, were accepted, we would be put in a ridiculous position, both in regard to the trade unions here and in regard to the epidemic of strikes now prevailing on the Continent. . . . I am, of course, expected to provide a rejoinder. I ought really therefore to have prepared my reply for this evening, but I thought it more important to continue writing at my book [*Capital*] and so shall have to rely on improvisation.

"Of course, I know in advance what the two chief points are: 1) that the wages of labour determine the value of commodities; 2) that if the capitalists pay five instead of four shillings today, then tomorrow they will sell their commodities for five instead of four shillings (being enabled to do so by the increased demand).

"Stupid as this is, since it only attaches itself to the most superficial external appearance, all the same it is not easy to explain everything connected with these questions to persons who know nothing about them.

for every average day of the year. The amount or magnitude of national production changes continuously. It is not a *constant* but a *variable* magnitude, and apart from changes in population it must be so, because of the continuous change in the *accumulation of capital* and the *productive powers of labour*. It is perfectly true that if a *rise in the general rate of wages* should take place today, that rise, whatever its ulterior effects might be, would, *by itself, not immediately* change the amount of production. It would, in the first instance, proceed from the existing state of things. But if *before* the rise of wages the national production was *variable*, and not *fixed*, it will continue to be variable and not fixed *after* the rise of wages.

But suppose the amount of national production to be *constant* instead of *variable*. Even then, what our friend Weston considers a logical conclusion would still remain a gratuitous assertion. If I have a given number, say eight, the absolute limits of this number do not prevent its parts from changing their *relative* limits. If profits were six and wages two, wages might increase to six and profits decrease to two, and still the total amount remain eight. Thus the fixed amount of production would by no means prove the fixed amount of wages. How then does our friend Weston prove this fixity? By asserting it.

But even conceding him his assertion, it would cut both ways,

You can't compress a course of political economy into one hour. But we shall do our best."

At the session of May 20, Weston's views were subjected to a smashing criticism by Marx, and Wheeler, a representative of the English trade unions on the General Council, also spoke against Weston. Marx did not confine himself to "improvisation," but proceeded to deliver a counter-report. Proposals were made at the sessions of the Central Council to publish the reports of Marx and Weston. In connection with this Marx wrote as follows to Engels on June 24:

"I have read a paper in the Central Council (it would make two printed sheets perhaps) on the question brought up by Mr. Weston as to the effect of a general rise of wages, etc. The first part of it was an answer to Weston's nonsense; the second, a theoretical explanation, in so far as the occasion was suited to this.

"Now the people want to have this printed."

The work, however, was not published either by Marx or Engels. It was found among Marx's papers after Engels' death and published by Marx's daughter, Eleanor Aveling.—*Ed.*

while he presses it only in one direction. If the amount of wages is a constant magnitude, then it can be neither increased nor diminished. If then, in enforcing a temporary rise of wages, the workingmen act foolishly, the capitalists, in enforcing a temporary fall of wages, would act not less foolishly. Our friend Weston does not deny that, under certain circumstances, the workingmen *can* enforce a rise of wages, but their amount being naturally fixed, there must follow a reaction. On the other hand, he knows also that the capitalists *can* enforce a fall of wages, and, indeed, continuously try to enforce it. According to the principle of the constancy of wages, a reaction ought to follow in this case not less than in the former. The workingmen, therefore, reacting against the attempt at, or the act of, lowering wages, would act rightly. They would, therefore, act rightly in enforcing *a rise of wages, because every reaction* against the lowering of wages is an *action* for raising wages. According to Citizen Weston's own principle of the *constancy of wages*, the workingmen ought, therefore, under certain circumstances, to combine and struggle for a rise of wages.

If he denies this conclusion, he must give up the premise from which it flows. He must not say that the amount of wages is a *constant quantity*, but that, although it cannot and must not *rise*, it can and must *fall*, whenever capital pleases to lower it. If the capitalist pleases to feed you upon potatoes instead of upon meat, and upon oats instead of upon wheat, you must accept his will as a law of political economy and submit to it. If in one country the rate of wages is higher than in another, in the United States, for example, than in England, you must explain this difference in the rate of wages by a difference between the will of the American capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a method which would certainly very much simplify, not only the study of economic phenomena, but of all other phenomena.

But even then, we might ask, *why* the will of the American capitalist differs from the will of the English capitalist? And to answer the question you must go beyond the domain of *will*. A parson may tell me that God wills one thing in France, and another thing in England. If I summon him to explain to me this

duality of will, he might have the brass to answer me that God wills to have one will in France and another will in England. But our friend Weston is certainly the last man to make an argument of such a complete negation of all reasoning.

The *will* of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we have to do is not to talk about his *will*, but to enquire into his *power*, the *limits of that power*, and the *character of those limits*.

II. Production, Wages, Profits

The address Citizen Weston read to us might have been compressed into a nutshell.

All his reasoning amounted to this: If the working class forces the capitalist class to pay five shillings instead of four shillings in the shape of money wages, the capitalist will return in the shape of commodities four shillings' worth instead of five shillings' worth. The working class would have to pay five shillings for what, before the rise of wages, they bought with four shillings. But why is this the case? Why does the capitalist only return four shillings' worth for five shillings? Because the amount of wages is fixed. But why is it fixed at four shillings' worth of commodities? Why not at three, or two, or any other sum? If the limit of the amount of wages is settled by an economic law, independent alike of the will of the capitalists and the will of the working man, the first thing Citizen Weston had to do was to state that law and prove it. He ought then, moreover, to have proved that the amount of wages actually paid at every given moment always corresponds exactly to the necessary amount of wages, and never deviates from it. If, on the other hand, the given limit of the amount of wages is founded on the *mere will* of the capitalist, or the limits of his avarice, it is an arbitrary limit. There is nothing necessary in it. It may be changed *by* the will of the capitalist, and may, therefore, be changed *against* his will.

Citizen Weston illustrated his theory by telling you that when a bowl contains a certain quantity of soup, to be eaten by a

certain number of persons, an increase in the broadness of the spoons would produce no increase in the amount of soup. He must allow me to find this illustration rather spoony. It reminded me somewhat of the simile employed by Menenius Agrippa. When the Roman plebeians struck against the Roman patricians, the patrician Agrippa told them that the patrician belly fed the plebeian members of the body politic. Agrippa failed to show that you feed the members of one man by filling the belly of another. Citizen Weston, on his part, has forgotten that the bowl from which the workmen eat is filled with the whole produce of the national labour, and that what prevents them fetching more out of it is neither the narrowness of the bowl nor the scantiness of its contents, but only the smallness of their spoons.

By what contrivance is the capitalist enabled to return four shillings' work for five shillings? By raising the price of the commodity he sells. Now, does a rise and, more generally, a change in the prices of commodities, do the prices of commodities themselves, depend on the mere will of the capitalist? Or are, on the contrary, certain circumstances wanted to give effect to that will? If not, the ups and downs, the incessant fluctuations of market prices, would become an insoluble riddle.

As we suppose that no change whatever has taken place either in the productive powers of labour, or in the amount of capital and labour employed, or in the value of the money wherein the values of products are estimated, but *only a change in the rate of wages*, how could that *rise of wages* affect the *prices of commodities?* Only by affecting the actual proportion between the demand for, and the supply of, these commodities.

It is perfectly true that, considered as a whole, the working class spends, and must spend, its income upon *necessaries*. A general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, produce a rise in the demand for, and consequently in the *market prices of, necessaries*. The capitalists who produce these necessaries would be compensated for the risen wages by the rising market prices of their commodities. But how with the other capitalists who do *not* produce necessaries? And you must not fancy them a small body. If you consider that two-thirds

of the national produce are consumed by one-fifth of the population—a member of the House of Commons stated it recently to be but one-seventh of the population—you will understand what an immense proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries, or be *exchanged* for luxuries, and what an immense amount of the necessaries themselves must be wasted upon flunkeys, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of necessaries.

Well, what would be the position of those capitalists who do *not* produce necessaries? For the *fall in the rate of profit*, consequent upon the general rise of wages, they could not compensate themselves by a *rise in the price of their commodities*, because the demand for those commodities would not have increased. Their income would have decreased; and from this decreased income they would have to pay more for the same amount of higher-priced necessaries. But this would not be all. As their income had diminished they would have less to spend upon luxuries, and therefore their mutual demand for their respective commodities would diminish. Consequent upon this diminished demand the prices of their commodities would fall. In these branches of industry, therefore, *the rate of profit would fall*, not only in simple proportion to the general rise in the rate of wages, but in the compound ratio of the general rise of wages, the rise in the prices of necessaries, and the fall in the prices of luxuries.

What would be the consequence of *this difference in the rates of profit* for capitals employed in the different branches of industry? Why, the consequence that generally obtains whenever, from whatever reason, the *average rate of profit* comes to differ in the different spheres of production. Capital and labour would be transferred from the less remunerative to the more remunerative branches; and this process of transfer would go on until the supply in the one department of industry would have risen proportionately to the increased demand, and would have sunk in the other departments according to the decreased demand. *This change effected*, the *general rate of profit* would again be

equalised in the different branches. As the whole derangement originally arose from a mere change in the proportion of the demand for, and the supply of, different commodities, the cause ceasing, the effect would cease, and *prices* would return to their former level and equilibrium. Instead of being limited to some branches of industry, *the fall in the rate of profit* consequent upon the rise of wages would have become *general*. According to our supposition, there would have taken place no change in the productive powers of labour, nor in the aggregate amount of production, but *that given amount of production would have changed its form*. A greater part of the produce would exist in the shape of necessaries, a lesser part in the shape of luxuries, or what comes to the same, a lesser part would be exchanged for foreign luxuries, and be consumed in its original form, or, what again comes to the same, a greater part of the native produce would be exchanged for foreign necessaries instead of for luxuries. The general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, after a temporary disturbance of market prices, only result in a general fall of the rate of profit without any permanent change in the prices of commodities.

If I am told that in the previous argument I assume the whole surplus wages to be spent upon necessaries, I shall answer that I have made the supposition most advantageous to the opinion of Citizen Weston. If the surplus wages were spent upon articles formerly not entering into the consumption of the working men, the real increase of their purchasing power would need no proof. Being, however, only derived from an advance of wages, that increase of their purchasing power must exactly correspond to the decrease of the purchasing power of the capitalists. The *aggregate demand* for commodities would, therefore, not *increase*, but the constituent parts of that demand would *change*. The increasing demand on the one side would be counter-balanced by the decreasing demand on the other side. Thus the aggregate demand remaining stationary, no change whatever could take place in the market prices of commodities.

You arrive, therefore, at this dilemma: Either the surplus wages are equally spent upon all articles of consumption—then

the expansion of demand on the part of the working class must be compensated by the contraction of demand on the part of the capitalist class—or the surplus wages are only spent upon some articles whose market prices will temporarily rise. Then the consequent rise in the rate of profit in some, and the consequent fall in the rate of profit in other branches of industry will produce a change in the distribution of capital and labour, going on until the supply is brought up to the increased demand in the one department of industry, and brought down to the diminished demand in the other. On the one supposition there will occur no change in the prices of commodities. On the other supposition, after some fluctuations of market prices, the exchangeable values of commodities will subside to the former level. On both suppositions the general rise in the rate of wages will ultimately result in nothing else but a general fall in the rate of profit.

To stir up your powers of imagination, Citizen Weston requested you to think of the difficulties which a general rise of English agricultural wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would produce. Think, he exclaimed, of the immense rise in the demand for necessaries, and the consequent fearful rise in their prices! Now, all of you know that the average wages of the American agricultural labourer amount to more than double that of the English agricultural labourer, although the prices of agricultural produce are lower in the United States than in the United Kingdom, although the general relations of capital and labour obtain in the United States the same as in England, and although the annual amount of production is much smaller in the United States than in England. Why, then, does our friend ring this alarm bell? Simply to shift the real question before us. A sudden rise of wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would be a sudden rise to the amount of 100 per cent. Now, we are not at all discussing the question whether the general rate of wages in England could suddenly be increased by 100 per cent. We have nothing at all to do with the *magnitude* of the rise, which in every practical instance must depend on, and be suited to, given circumstances. We have only to inquire how a general

rise in the rate of wages, even if restricted to one per cent, will act.

Dismissing friend Weston's fancy rise of 100 per cent, I propose calling your attention to the real rise of wages that took place in Great Britain from 1849 to 1859.

You are all aware of the Ten Hours Bill, or rather Ten and a Half Hours Bill, introduced since 1848. This was one of the greatest economic changes we have witnessed. It was a sudden and compulsory rise of wages, not in some local trades, but in the leading industrial branches by which England sways the markets of the world. It was a rise of wages under circumstances singularly unpropitious. Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and all the other official economic mouthpieces of the middle class, *proved*, and I must say upon much stronger grounds than those of our friend Weston, that it would sound the death knell of English industry. They proved that it not only amounted to a simple rise of wages, but to a rise of wages initiated by, and based upon, a diminution of the quantity of labour employed. They asserted that the twelfth hour you wanted to take from the capitalist was exactly the only hour from which he derived his profit. They threatened a decrease of accumulation, rise of prices, loss of markets, stinting of production, consequent reaction upon wages, ultimate ruin. In fact, they declared Maximilian Robespierre's Maximum Laws[1] to be a small affair compared to it; and they were right in a certain sense. Well, what was the result? A rise in the money wages of the factory operatives, despite the curtailing of the working day, a great increase in the number of factory hands employed, a continuous fall in the prices of their products, a marvellous development in the productive powers of their labour, an unheard-of progressive expansion of the markets for their commodities. In Manchester, at the meeting in 1860 of the

[1] The Maximum Law was introduced during the Great French Revolution in 1792, fixing definite price limits for commodities and standard rates of wages. The chief supporters of the Maximum Law were the so-called "madmen" who represented the interests of the urban and village poor. Robespierre, the leader of the Jacobin Party, introduced this law at a time when the Jacobins as a result of tactical considerations had formed a *bloc* with the "madmen."—*Ed.*

Society for the Advancement of Science, I myself heard Mr. Newman confess that he, Dr. Ure, Senior, and all other official propounders of economic science had been wrong, while the instinct of the people had been right. I mention Mr. W. Newman,[1] not Professor Francis Newman, because he occupies an eminent position in economic science, as the contributor to, and editor of, Mr. Thomes Tooke's *History of Prices*, that magnificent work which traces the history of prices from 1793 to 1856. If our friend Weston's fixed idea of a fixed amount of wages, a fixed amount of production, a fixed degree of the productive power of labour, a fixed and permanent will of the capitalists, and all his other fixedness and finality were correct, Professor Senior's woeful forebodings would have been right, and Robert Owen,[2] who already in 1816 proclaimed a general limitation of the working day the first preparatory step to the emancipation of the working class and actually in the teeth of the general prejudice inaugurated it on his own hook in his cotton factory at New Lanark, would have been wrong.

In the very same period during which the introduction of the Ten Hours Bill, and the rise of wages consequent upon it, occurred, there took place in Great Britain, for reasons which it would be out of place to enumerate here, *a general rise in agricultural wages.*

Although it is not required for my immediate purpose, in order not to mislead you, I shall make some preliminary remarks.

If a man got two shillings weekly wages, and if his wages rose to four shillings, the *rate of wages* would have risen by 100 per cent. This would seem a very magnificent thing if expressed as a rise in the *rate of wages*, although the *actual amount of wages*, four shillings weekly, would still remain a wretchedly small, a starvation, pittance. You must not, therefore, allow yourselves to be carried away by the high-sounding per cents in the *rate* of wages. You must always ask: What was the *original* amount?

[1] Marx means the economist W. Newmarch (1820-82) who wrote two volumes in continuation of Tooke's *History of Prices.—Ed.*

[2] Robert Owen (1771-1858) was a British manufacturer who became a utopian socialist. He introduced in his factory the ten-hour day, and also organised sickness insurance, consumers' co-operative societies, etc.—*Ed.*

Moreover, you will understand, that if there were ten men receiving each 2*s.* per week, five men receiving each 5*s.*, and five men receiving 11*s.* weekly, the twenty men together would receive 100*s.*, or £5, weekly. If then a rise, say by 20 per cent, upon the *aggregate* sum of their weekly wages took place, there would be an advance from £5 to £6. Taking the average, we might say that the *general rate of wages* had risen by 20 per cent, although, in fact, the wages of the ten men had remained stationary, the wages of the one lot of five men had risen from 5*s.* to 6*s.* only, and the wages of the other lot of five men from 55*s.* to 70*s.*[1] One-half of the men would not have improved their position at all, one-quarter would have improved it in an imperceptible degree, and only one quarter would have bettered it really. Still, reckoning by the *average*, the total amount of the wages of those twenty men would have increased by 20 per cent, and as far as the aggregate capital that employs them, and the prices of the commodities they produce, are concerned, it would be exactly the same as if all of them had equally shared in the average rise of wages. In the case of agricultural labour, the standard of wages being very different in the different countries of England and Scotland, the rise affected them very unequally.

Lastly, during the period when that rise of wages took place counteracting influences were at work, such as the new taxes consequent upon the Russian war,[2] the extensive demolition of the dwelling houses of the agricultural labourers, and so forth.

Having premised so much, I proceed to state that from 1849 to 1859 there took place a *rise of about 40 per cent* in the average rate of the agricultural wages of Great Britain. I could give you ample details in proof of my assertion, but for the present purpose think it sufficient to refer you to the conscientious and critical paper read in 1860 by the late Mr. John C. Morton at the London Society of Arts on *The Forces Used in Agriculture.* Mr. Morton gives the returns, from bills and other authentic docu-

[1] These figures, 55*s.*-70*s.*, refer to the total wages of the group of five men. The wage of each man in the group would increase from 11*s.* to 14*s.* —*Ed.*

[2] Marx refers to the Crimean War, 1854-55.—*Ed.*

ments, which he had collected from about one hundred farmers, residing in twelve Scotch and thirty-five English counties.

According to our friend Weston's opinion, and taken together with the simultaneous rise in the wages of the factory operatives, there ought to have occurred a tremendous rise in the prices of agricultural produce during the period 1849 to 1859. But what is the fact? Despite the Russian war, and the consecutive unfavourable harvests from 1854 to 1856, the average price of wheat, which is the leading agricultural produce of England, fell from about £3 per quarter for the years 1838 to 1848 to about £2 10*s*. per quarter for the years 1849 to 1859. This constitutes a fall in the price of wheat of more than 16 per cent simultaneously with an average rise of agricultural wages of 40 per cent. During the same period, if we compare its end with its beginning, 1859 with 1849, there was a decrease of official pauperism from 934,419 to 860,470, the difference being 73,949; a very small decrease, I grant, and which in the following years was again lost, but still a decrease.

It might be said that, consequent upon the abolition of the Corn Laws, the import of foreign corn was more than doubled during the period from 1849 to 1859, as compared with the period from 1838 to 1848. And what of that? From Citizen Weston's standpoint one would have expected that this sudden, immense, and continuously increasing demand upon foreign markets must have sent up the prices of agricultural produce there to a frightful height, the effect of increased demand remaining the same, whether it comes from without or from within. What was the fact? Apart from some years of failing harvests, during all that period the ruinous fall in the price of corn formed a standing theme of declamation in France; the Americans were again and again compelled to burn their surplus produce; and Russia, if we are to believe Mr. Urquhart, prompted the Civil War in the United States because her agricultural exports were crippled by the Yankee competition in the markets of Europe.

Reduced to its abstract form, Citizen Weston's argument would come to this: Every rise in demand occurs always on the basis of a given amount of production. It can, therefore, *never increase*

the supply of the articles demanded, but *only enhance their money prices.* Now the most common observation shows that an increased demand will, in some instances, leave the market prices of commodities altogether unchanged, and will, in other instances, cause a temporary rise of market prices followed by an increased supply, followed by a reduction of the prices *to* their original level, and in many cases *below* their original level. Whether the rise of demand springs from surplus wages, or from any other cause, does not at all change the conditions of the problem. From Citizen Weston's standpoint the general phenomenon was as difficult to explain as the phenomenon occurring under the exceptional circumstances of a rise of wages. His argument had, therefore, no peculiar bearing whatever upon the subject we treat. It only expressed his perplexity at accounting for the laws by which an increase of demand produces an increase of supply, instead of an ultimate rise of market prices.

III. Wages and Currency

On the second day of the debate our friend Weston clothed his old assertions in new forms. He said: Consequent upon a general rise in money wages, more currency will be wanted to pay the same wages. The currency being *fixed,* how can you pay with this fixed currency increased money wages? First the difficulty arose from the fixed amount of commodities accruing to the working man despite his increase of money wages; now it arises from the increased money wages, despite the fixed amount of commodities. Of course, if you reject his original dogma, his secondary grievance will disappear.

However, I shall show that this currency question has nothing at all to do with the subject before us.

In your country the mechanism of payments is much more perfected than in any other country of Europe. Thanks to the extent and concentration of the banking system, much less currency is wanted to circulate the same amount of values, and to transact the same or a greater amount of business. For example, as far as wages are concerned, the English factory oper-

tive pays his wages weekly to the shopkeeper, who sends them weekly to the banker, who returns them weekly to the manufacturer, who again pays them away to his workingmen, and so forth. By this contrivance the yearly wages of an operative, say of £52, may be paid by one single sovereign turning round every week in the same circle. Even in England the mechanism is less perfect than in Scotland, and is not everywhere equally perfect; and therefore we find, for example, that in some agricultural districts, as compared to the manufacturing districts, much more currency is wanted to circulate a much smaller amount of values.

If you cross the Channel you will find that the *money wages* are much lower than in England, but that they are circulated in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France by a *much larger amount of currency*. The same sovereign will not be so quickly intercepted by the banker or returned to the industrial capitalist; and, therefore, instead of one sovereign circulating £52 yearly, you want, perhaps, three sovereigns to circulate yearly wages to the amount of £25. Thus, by comparing Continental countries with England, you will see at once that low money wages may require a much larger currency for their circulation than high money wages, and that this is, in fact, a merely technical point, quite foreign to our subject.

According to the best calculations I know, the yearly income of the working class of this country may be estimated at £250,000,000. This immense sum is circulated by about £3,000,000. Suppose a rise of wages of 50 per cent to take place. Then instead of £3,000,000 of currency, £4,500,000 would be wanted. As a very considerable part of the workingman's daily expenses is laid out in silver and copper, that is to say, in mere tokens, whose relative value to gold is arbitrarily fixed by law, like that of inconvertible money paper, a rise of money wages by 50 per cent would, in the extreme case, require an additional circulation of sovereigns say to the amount of one million. One million, now dormant, in the shape of bullion or coin, in the cellars of the Bank of England, or of private bankers, would circulate. But even the trifling expense resulting

from the additional minting or the additional wear and tear of that million might be spared, and would actually be spared, if any friction should arise from the want of the additional currency. All of you know that the currency of this country is divided into two great departments. One sort, supplied by bank-notes of different descriptions, is used in the transactions between dealers and dealers, and the larger payments from consumers to dealers, while another sort of currency, metallic coin, circulates in the retail trade. Although distinct, these two sorts of currency intermix with each other. Thus gold coin, to a very great extent, circulates even in larger payments for all the odd sums under £5. If tomorrow £4 notes, or £3 notes, or £2 notes were issued, the gold coin filling these channels of circulation would at once be driven out of them, and flow into those channels where they would be needed from the increase of money wages. Thus the additional million required by an advance of wages by 50 per cent would be supplied without the addition of one single sovereign. The same effect might be produced, without one additional bank-note, by an additional bill circulation, as was the case in Lancashire for a very considerable time.

If a general rise in the rate of wages, for example, of 100 per cent, as Citizen Weston supposed it to take place in agricultural wages, would produce a great rise in the prices of necessaries, and, according to his views, require an additional amount of currency not to be procured, a *general fall in wages* must produce the same effect, on the same scale, in an opposite direction. Well! All of you know that the years 1858 to 1860 were the most prosperous years for the cotton industry, and that peculiarly the year 1860 stands in that respect unrivalled in the annals of commerce, while at the same time all other branches of industry were most flourishing. The wages of the cotton operatives and of all the other workingmen connected with their trade stood, in 1860, higher than ever before. The American crisis came, and those aggregate wages were suddenly reduced to about one-fourth of their former amount. This would have been in the opposite direction a rise of 400 per cent. If wages rise from five to twenty, we say that they rise by 300

per cent; if they fall from twenty to five, we say that they fall by 75 per cent but the amount of rise in the one and the amount of fall in the other case would be the same, namely, fifteen shillings. This, then, was a sudden change in the rate of wages unprecedented, and at the same time extending over a number of operatives which, if we count all the operatives not only directly engaged in but indirectly dependent upon the cotton trade, was larger by one-half than the number of agricultural labourers. Did the price of wheat fall? It *rose* from the annual average of 47*s.* 8*d.* per quarter during the three years of 1858-60 to the annual average of 55*s.* 10*d.* per quarter during the three years 1861-63. As to the currency, there were coined in the mint in 1861 £8,673,232, against £3,378,102 in 1860. That is to say, there were coined £5,295,130 more in 1861 than in 1860. It is true the bank-note circulation was in 1861 less by £1,319,000 than in 1860. Take this off. There remains still an overplus of currency for the year 1861, as compared with the prosperity year, 1860, to the amount of £3,976,130, or about £4,000,000; but the bullion reserve in the Bank of England had simultaneously decreased, not quite in the same, but in an approximating proportion.

Compare the year 1862 with 1842. Apart from the immense increase in the value and amount of commodities circulated, in 1862 the capital paid in regular transactions for shares, loans. etc., for the railways in England and Wales amounted alone to £320,000,000, a sum that would have appeared fabulous in 1842. Still, the aggregate amounts of currency in 1862 and 1842 were pretty nearly equal, and generally you will find a tendency to a progressive diminution of currency in the face of an enormously increasing value, not only of commodities, but of monetary transactions generally. From our friend Weston's standpoint this is an unsolvable riddle.

Looking somewhat deeper into this matter, he would have found that, quite apart from wages, and supposing them to be fixed, the value and mass of the commodities to be circulated, and generally the amount of monetary transactions to be settled, vary daily; that the amount of bank-notes issued varies daily;

that the amount of payments realised without the intervention of any money, by the instrumentality of bills, cheques, book-credits, clearing houses, varies daily; that, as far as actual metallic currency is required, the proportion between the coin in circulation and the coin and bullion in reserve or sleeping in the cellars of banks varies daily; that the amount of bullion absorbed by the national circulation and the amount being sent abroad for international circulation vary daily. He would have found that his dogma of a fixed currency is a monstrous error, incompatible with the everyday movement. He would have inquired into the laws which enable a currency to adapt itself to circumstances so continually changing, instead of turning his misconception of the laws of currency into an argument against a rise of wages.

IV. Supply and Demand

Our friend Weston accepts the Latin proverb that *repetitio est mater studiorum*, that is to say, that repetition is the mother of study, and consequently he repeated his original dogma again under the new form, that the contraction of currency, resulting from an enhancement of wages, would produce a diminution of capital, and so forth. Having already discarded his currency crotchet, I consider it quite useless to enter upon the imaginary consequences he fancies to flow from his imaginary currency mishap. I shall proceed at once to reduce his *one and the same dogma*, repeated in so many different shapes, *to its simplest theoretical expression.*

The uncritical way in which he has treated his subject will become evident from one single remark. He pleads against a rise of wages or against high wages as the result of such a rise. Now, I ask him: What are high wages and what are low wages? Why constitute, for example, five shillings weekly low, and twenty shillings weekly high wages? If five is low as compared with twenty, twenty is still lower as compared with two hundred. If a man was to lecture on the thermometer, and commenced by declaiming on high and low degrees, he would impart no knowledge whatever. He must first tell me how the

freezing-point is found out, and how the boiling-point, and how these standard points are settled by natural laws, not by the fancy of the sellers or makers of thermometers. Now, in regard to wages and profits, Citizen Weston has not only failed to deduce such standard points from economic laws, but he has not even felt the necessity to look after them. He satisfied himself with the acceptance of the popular slang terms of low and high as something having a fixed meaning, although it is self-evident that wages can only be said to be high or low as compared with a standard by which to measure their magnitudes.

He will be unable to tell me why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour. If he should answer me, "This was settled by the law of supply and demand," I should ask him, in the first instance, by what law supply and demand are themselves regulated. Aye, such an answer would at once put him out of court. The relations between the supply and demand of labour undergo perpetual changes, and with them the market prices of labour. If the demand overshoots the supply wages rise; if the supply overshoots the demand wages sink, although it might in such circumstances be necessary to *test* the real state of demand and supply by a strike, for example, or any other method. But if you accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, it would be as childish as useless to declaim against a rise of wages, because, according to the supreme law you appeal to, a periodical rise of wages is quite as necessary and legitimate as a periodical fall of wages. If you do *not* accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, I again repeat the question, why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour?

But to consider matters more broadly: You would be altogether mistaken in fancying that the value of labour or any other commodity whatever is ultimately fixed by supply and demand. Supply and demand regulate nothing but the temporary *fluctuations* of market prices. They will explain to you why the market price of a commodity rises above or sinks below its *value*, but they can never account for that *value* itself. Suppose supply and demand to equilibrate, or, as the economists

call it, to cover each other. Why, the very moment these opposite forces become equal they paralyse each other, and cease to work in the one or the other direction. At the moment when supply and demand equilibrate each other, and therefore cease to act, the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *real value*, with the standard price round which its market prices oscillate. In inquiring into the nature of that *value*, we have therefore nothing at all to do with the temporary effects on market prices of supply and demand. The same holds true of wages as of the prices of all other commodities.

V. Wages and Prices

Reduced to their simplest theoretical expression, all our friend's arguments resolve themselves into this one single dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*"

I might appeal to practical observation to bear witness against this antiquated and exploded fallacy. I might tell you that the English factory operatives, miners, shipbuilders, and so forth, whose labour is relatively high-priced, undersell by the cheapness of their produce all other nations; while the English agricultural labourer, for example, whose labour is relatively low-priced, is undersold by almost every other nation because of the dearness of his produce. By comparing article with article in the same country, and the commodities of different countries, I might show, apart from some exceptions more apparent than real, that on an average the high-priced labour produces the low-priced, and the low-priced labour produces the high-priced commodities. This, of course, would not prove that the high price of labour in the one, and its low price in the other instance, are the respective causes of those diametrically opposed effects, but at all events it would prove that the prices of commodities are not ruled by the prices of labour. However, it is quite superfluous for us to employ this empirical method.

It might, perhaps, be denied that Citizen Weston has put forward the dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined*

or regulated by wages." In point of fact, he has never formulated it. He said, on the contrary, that profit and rent form also constituent parts of the prices of commodities, because it is out of the prices of commodities that not only the workingman's wages, but also the capitalist's profits and the landlord's rents must be paid. But how in his idea are prices formed? First by wages. Then an additional percentage is joined to the price on behalf of the capitalist, and another additional percentage on behalf of the landlord. Suppose the wages of the labour employed in the production of a commodity to be ten. If the rate of profit was 100 per cent, to the wages advanced the capitalist would add ten, and if the rate of rent was also 100 per cent upon the wages, there would be added ten more, and the aggregate price of the commodity would amount to thirty. But such a determination of prices would be simply their determination by wages. If wages in the above case rose to twenty, the price of the commodity would rise to sixty, and so forth. Consequently all the superannuated writers on political economy who propounded the dogma that wages regulate prices, have tried to prove it by treating profit and rent *as mere additional percentages upon wages.* None of them was, of course, able to reduce the limits of those percentages to any economic law. They seem, on the contrary, to think profits settled by tradition, custom, the will of the capitalist, or by some other equally arbitrary and inexplicable method. If they assert that they are settled by the competition between the capitalists, they say nothing. That competition is sure to equalise the different rates of profit in different trades, or reduce them to one average level, but it can never determine the level itself, or the general rate of profit.

What do we mean by saying that the prices of the commodities are determined by wages? Wages being but a name for the price of labour, we mean that the prices of commodities are regulated by the price of labour. As "*price*" is exchangeable value—and in speaking of value I speak always of exchangeable value—is exchangeable *value expressed in money,* the propo-

sition comes to this, that "the *value of commodities is determined by the value of labour*," or that "the *value of labour is the general measure of value.*"

But how, then, is the "*value of labour*" itself determined? Here we come to a standstill. Of course, to a standstill if we try reasoning logically. Yet the propounders of that doctrine make short work of logical scruples. Take our friend Weston, for example. First he told us that wages regulate the price of commodities and that consequently when wages rise prices must rise. Then he turned round to show us that a rise of wages will be no good because the prices of commodities had risen, and because wages were indeed measured by the prices of the commodities upon which they are spent. Thus we begin by saying that the value of labour determines the value of commodities, and we wind up by saying that the value of commodities determines the value of labour. Thus we move to and fro in the most vicious circle, and arrive at no conclusion at all.

On the whole, it is evident that by making the value of one commodity, say labour, corn, or any other commodity, the general measure and regulator of value, we only shift the difficulty, since we determine one value by another value, which on its side wants to be determined.

The dogma that "wages determine the price of commodities," expressed in its most abstract terms, comes to this, that "value is determined by value," and this tautology means that, in fact, we know nothing at all about value. Accepting this premise, all reasoning about the general laws of political economy turns into mere twaddle. It was, therefore, the great merit of Ricardo that in his work *On The Principles of Political Economy*, published in 1817, he fundamentally destroyed the old, popular, and worn-out fallacy that "wages determine prices," a fallacy which Adam Smith and his French predecessors had spurned in the really scientific parts of their researches, but which, nevertheless, they reproduced in their more exoterical and vulgarising chapters.

VI. Value and Labour

Citizens, I have now arrived at a point where I must enter upon the real development of the question. I cannot promise to do this in a very satisfactory way, because to do so I should be obliged to go over the whole field of political economy. I can, as the French would say, but *effleurer la question*, touch upon the main points.

The first question we have to put is: What is the *value* of a commodity? How is it determined?

At first sight it would seem that the value of a commodity is a thing quite *relative*, and not to be settled without considering one commodity in its relations to all other commodities. In fact, in speaking of the value, the value in exchange of a commodity, we mean the proportional quantities in which it exchanges with all other commodities. But then arises the question: How are the proportions in which commodities exchange with each other regulated?

We know from experience that these proportions vary infinitely. Taking one single commodity, wheat, for instance, we shall find that a quarter of wheat exchanges in almost countless variations of proportion with different commodities. Yet, *its value remaining always the same*, whether expressed in silk, gold, or any other commodity, it must be something distinct from, and independent of, these *different rates of exchange* with different articles. It must be possible to express, in a very different form, these various equations with various commodities.

Besides, if I say a quarter of wheat exchanges with iron in a certain proportion, or the value of a quarter of wheat is expressed in a certain amount of iron, I say that the value of wheat and its equivalent in iron are equal *to some third thing*, which is neither wheat nor iron, because I suppose them to express the same magnitude in two different shapes. Either of them, the wheat or the iron, must, therefore, independently of the other, be reducible to this third thing which is their common measure.

To elucidate this point I shall recur to a very simple geometrical illustration. In comparing the areas of triangles of all possible forms and magnitudes, or comparing triangles with rectangles, or any other rectilinear figure, how do we proceed? We reduce the area of any triangle whatever to an expression quite different from its visible form. Having found from the nature of the triangle that its area is equal to half the product of its base by its height, we can then compare the different values of all sorts of triangles, and of all rectilinear figures whatever, because all of them may be resolved into a certain number of triangles.

The same mode of procedure must obtain with the values of commodities. We must be able to reduce all of them to an expression common to all, and distinguishing them only by the proportions in which they contain that same and identical measure.

As the *exchangeable values* of commodities are only *social functions* of those things, and have nothing at all to do with the *natural* qualities, we must first ask: What is the common *social substance* of all commodities? It is *labour*. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, or worked up in it. And I say not only *labour*, but *social labour*. A man who produces an article for his own immediate use, to consume it himself, creates a *product*, but not a *commodity*. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to do with society. But to produce a *commodity*, a man must not only produce an article satisfying some *social* want, but his labour itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of labour expended by society. It must be subordinate to the *division of labour within society*. It is nothing without the other division of labour, and on its part is required to *integrate* them.

If we consider *commodities as values*, we consider them exclusively under the single aspect of *realised, fixed*, or, if you like, *crystallised social labour*. In this respect they can *differ* only by representing greater or smaller quantities of labour, as, for example, a greater amount of labour may be worked up in a silken handkerchief than in a brick. But how does one measure *quantities of labour?* By the *time the labour lasts*, in

measuring the labour by the hour, the day, etc. Of course, to apply this measure, all sorts of labour are reduced to average or simple labour as their unit.

We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has *a value*, because it is a *crystallisation of social labour.* The *greatness* of its value, or its *relative* value, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labour necessary for its production. The *relative values of commodities* are, therefore, determined by the *respective quantities or amounts of labour, worked up, realised, fixed in them.* The *correlative* quantities of commodities which can be produced in the *same time of labour* are *equal.* Or the value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labour fixed in the one is to the quantity of labour fixed in the other.

I suspect that many of you will ask: Does then, indeed, there exist such a vast, or any difference whatever, between determining the values of commodities by *wages*, and determining them by the *relative quantities of labour* necessary for their production? You must, however, be aware that the *reward* for labour, and *quantity* of labour, are quite disparate things. Suppose, for example, *equal quantities of labour* to be fixed in one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold. I resort to the example because it was used by Benjamin Franklin in his first essay published in 1721, and entitled: *A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency*, where he, one of the first, hit upon the true nature of value. Well. We suppose, then, that one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold are *equal values* or *equivalents*, because they are *crystallisations of equal amounts of average labour*, of so many days' or so many weeks' labour respectively fixed in them. In thus determining the relative values of gold and corn, do we refer in any way whatever to the *wages* of the agricultural labourer and the miner? Not a bit. We leave it quite *indeterminate how* their day's or week's labour was paid, or even whether wages labour was employed at all. If it was, wages may have been very unequal. The labourer whose labour is realised in the quarter of wheat may

receive two bushels only, and the labourer employed in mining may receive one-half of the ounce of gold. Or, supposing their wages to be equal, they may deviate in all possible proportions from the values of the commodities produced by them. They may amount to one-half, one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, or any other proportional part of the one quarter of corn or the one ounce of gold. Their *wages* can, of course, not *exceed*, not be more than the values of the commodities they produced, but they can be *less* in every possible degree. Their *wages* will be *limited* by the *values* of the products, but the *values of their products* will not be limited by the wages. And above all, the values, the relative values of corn and gold, for example, will have been settled without any regard whatever to the value of the labour employed, that is to say, to *wages*. To determine the values of commodities, by the *relative quantities of labour fixed in them*, is, therefore, a thing quite different from the tautological method of determining the values of commodities by the value of labour, or by *wages*. This point, however, will be further elucidated in the progress of our inquiry.

In calculating the exchangeable value of a commodity we must add to the quantity of labour *last* employed the quantity of labour *previously* worked up in the raw material of the commodity, and the labour bestowed on the implements, tools, machinery, and buildings, with which such labour is assisted. For example, the value of a certain amount of cotton yarn is the crystallisation of the quantity of labour added to the cotton during the spinning process, the quantity of labour previously realised in the cotton itself, the quantity of labour realised in the coal, oil, and other auxiliary matter used, the quantity of labour fixed in the steam-engine, the spindles, the factory building, and so forth. Instruments of production, properly so-called, such as tools, machinery, buildings, serve again and again for a longer or shorter period during repeated processes of production. If they were used up at once, like the raw material, their whole value would at once be transferred to the commodities they assist in producing. But as a spindle, for example, is but gradually used up, an average calculation is made, based upon the average time it lasts, and its

average waste of wear and tear during a certain period, say a day. In this way we calculate how much of the value of the spindle is transferred to the yarn daily spun, and how much, therefore, of the total amount of labour realised in a pound of yarn, for example, is due to the quantity of labour previously realised in the spindle. For our present purpose it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon this point.

It might seem that if the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour bestowed upon its production*, the lazier a man, or the clumsier a man, the more valuable his commodity, because the greater the time of labour required for finishing the commodity. This, however, would be a sad mistake. You will recollect that I used the word "*social* labour," and many points are involved in this qualification of "*social*." In saying that the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour* worked up or crystallised in it, we mean *the quantity of labour necessary* for its production in a given state of society, under certain social average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labour employed. When, in England, the power-loom came to compete with the hand-loom, only one-half the former time of labour was wanted to convert a given amount of yarn into a yard of cotton or cloth. The poor hand-loom weaver now worked seventeen and eighteen hours daily, instead of the nine or ten hours he had worked before. Still the product of twenty hours of his labour represented now only ten social hours of labour or ten hours of labour socially necessary for the conversion of a certain amount of yarn into textile stuffs. His product of twenty hours had, therefore, no more value than his former product of ten hours.

If then the quantity of socially necessary labour realised in commodities regulates their exchangeable values, every increase in the quantity of labour wanted for the production of a commodity must augment its value, as every diminution must lower it.

If the respective quantities of labour necessary for the production of the respective commodities remained constant, their relative values also would be constant. But such is not the case. The quantity of labour necessary for the production of a com-

modity changes continuously with the changes in the productive powers of the labour employed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the more produce is finished in a given time of labour; and the smaller the productive powers of labour, the less produce is finished in the same time. If, for example, in the progress of population it should become necessary to cultivate less fertile soils, the same amount of produce would be only attainable by a greater amount of labour spent, and the value of agricultural produce would consequently rise. On the other hand, if with the modern means of production, a single spinner converts into yarn, during one working day, many thousand times the amount of cotton which he could have spun during the same time with the spinning wheel, it is evident that every single pound of cotton will absorb many thousand times less of spinning labour than it did before, and, consequently, the value added by spinning to every single pound of cotton will be a thousand times less than before. The value of yarn will sink accordingly.

Apart from the different natural energies and acquired working abilities of different peoples, the productive powers of labour must principally depend:

Firstly. Upon the *natural* conditions of labour, such as fertility of soil, mines, and so forth.

Secondly. Upon the progressive improvement of the *social powers of labour*, such as are derived from production on a grand scale, concentration of capital and combination of labour, subdivision of labour, machinery, improved methods, appliance of chemical and other natural agencies, shortening of time and space by means of communication and transport, and every other contrivance by which science presses natural agencies into the service of labour, and by which the social or co-operative character of labour is developed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the less labour is bestowed upon a given amount of produce; hence the smaller the value of this produce. The smaller the productive powers of labour, the more labour is bestowed upon the same amount of produce; hence the greater its value. As a general law we may, therefore, set it down that:

The values of commodities are directly as the times of labour

employed in their production, and are inversely as the productive powers of the labour employed.

Having till now only spoken of *value*, I shall add a few words about *price*, which is a peculiar form assumed by value.

Price, taken by itself, is nothing but the *monetary expression of value*. The values of all commodities of this country, for example, are expressed in gold prices, while on the Continent they are mainly expressed in silver prices. The value of gold or silver, like that of all other commodities, is regulated by the quantity of labour necessary for getting them. You exchange a certain amount of your national products, in which a certain amount of your national labour is crystallised, for the produce of the gold and silver producing countries, in which a certain quantity of *their* labour is crystallised. It is in this way, in fact by barter, that you learn to express in gold and silver the values of all commodities, that is the respective quantities of labour bestowed upon them. Looking somewhat closer into *the monetary expression of value*, or what comes to the same, *the conversion of value into price*, you will find that it is a process by which you give to the *values* of all commodities an *independent* and *homogeneous form*, or by which you express them as quantities of *equal* social labour. So far as it is but the monetary expression of value, price has been called *natural price* by Adam Smith, *prix nécessaire* by the French physiocrats.

What then is the relation between *value* and *market prices*, or between *natural prices* and *market prices*? You all know that the *market price* is the *same* for all commodities of the same kind, however the conditions of production may differ for the individual producers. The market price expresses only the *average amount of social labour* necessary, under the average conditions of production, to supply the market with a certain mass of a certain article. It is calculated upon the whole lot of a commodity of a certain description.

So far the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *value*. On the other hand, the oscillations of market prices, rising now over, sinking now under the value or natural price, depend upon the fluctuations of supply and demand. The deviations

of market prices from values are continual, but as Adam Smith says: "The natural price is the central price to which the prices of commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it."

I cannot now sift this matter. It suffices to say that *if* supply and demand equilibrate each other, the market prices of commodities will correspond with their natural prices, that is to say with their values, as determined by the respective quantities of labour required for their production. But supply and demand *must* constantly tend to equilibrate each other, although they do so only by compensating one fluctuation by another, a rise by a fall, and *vice versa.* If instead of considering only the daily fluctuations you analyse the movement of market prices for longer periods, as Mr. Tooke, for example, has done in his *History of Prices*, you will find that the fluctuations of market prices, their deviations from values, their ups and downs, paralyse and compensate each other; so that apart from the effect of monopolies and some other modifications I must now pass by, all descriptions of commodities are, on the average, sold at their respective *values* or natural prices. The average periods during which the fluctuations of market prices compensate each other are different for different kinds of commodities, because with one kind it is easier to adapt supply to demand than with the other.

If then, speaking broadly, and embracing somewhat longer periods, all descriptions of commodities sell at their respective values, it is nonsense to suppose that profit, not in individual cases, but that the constant and usual profits of different trades spring from surcharging the prices of commodities, or selling them at a price over and above their *value.* The absurdity of this notion becomes evident if it is generalised. What a man would constantly win as a seller he would as constantly lose as a purchaser. It would not do to say that there are men who are buyers without being sellers, or consumers without being producers. What

these people pay to the producers, they must first get from them for nothing. If a man first takes your money and afterwards returns that money in buying your commodities, you will never enrich yourselves by selling your commodities too dear to that same man. This sort of transaction might diminish a loss, but would never help in realising a profit.

To explain, therefore, the *general nature of profits*, you must start from the theorem that, on an average, commodities are *sold at their real values*, and *that profits are derived from selling them at their values*, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labour realised in them. If you cannot explain profit upon this supposition, you cannot explain it at all. This seems paradox and contrary to everyday observation. It is also paradox that the earth moves round the sun, and that water consists of two highly inflammable gases. Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things.

VII. Labouring Power [1]

Having now, as far as it could be done in such a cursory manner, analysed the nature of *value*, of the *value of any commodity whatever*, we must turn our attention to the specific *value of labour*. And here, again, I must startle you by a seeming paradox. All of you feel sure that what they daily sell is their labour; that, therefore, labour has a price, and that, the price of a commodity being only the monetary expression of its value, there must certainly exist such a thing as the *value of labour*. However, there exists no such thing as the *value of labour* in the common acceptance of the word. We have seen that the amount of necessary labour crystallised in a commodity constitutes its value. Now, applying this notion of value, how could we define, say, the value of a ten hours' working day? How much labour is contained in that day? Ten hours' labour. To say that the value of a ten hours' working day is equal to ten hours' labour, or the quantity of labour contained in it, would be a tautological and, moreover, a nonsensical expression.

[1] "Labour Power" in the English translation of *Das Kapital*.—*Ed.*

Of course, having once found out the true but hidden sense of the expression "*value of labour*," we shall be able to interpret this irrational, and seemingly impossible application of value, in the same way that, having once made sure of the real movement of the celestial bodies, we shall be able to explain their apparent or merely phenomenal movements.

What the working man sells is not directly his *labour*, but his *labouring power*, the temporary disposal of which he makes over to the capitalist. This is so much the case that I do not know whether by the English laws, but certainly by some Continental laws, the *maximum time* is fixed for which a man is allowed to sell his labouring power. If allowed to do so for any indefinite period whatever, slavery would be immediately restored. Such a sale, if it comprised his lifetime, for example, would make him at once the lifelong slave of his employer.

One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England—Thomas Hobbes—has already, in his *Leviathan*, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says: "*The value or worth of a man* is, as in all other things, his *price*: that is so much as would be given for the *use of his power*."

Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the *value of labour* as that of all other commodities.

But before doing so, we might ask, how does this strange phenomenon arise, that we find on the market a set of buyers, possessed of land, machinery, raw material, and the means of life, all of them, save land in its crude state, the *products of labour*, and on the other hand, a set of sellers who have nothing to sell except their labouring power, their working arms and brains? That the one set buys continually in order to make a profit and enrich themselves, while the other set continually sells in order to earn their livelihood? The inquiry into this question would be an inquiry into what the economists call "*Previous, or Original Accumulation*," but which ought to be called *original expropriation*. We should find that this so-called *original accumulation* means nothing but a series of historical processes, resulting in a *decomposition of the original union* existing be-

tween the labouring man and his means of labour. Such an inquiry, however, lies beyond the pale of my present subject. The *separation* between the man of labour and the means of labour once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a constantly increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again overturn it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.

What, then, is the *value of labouring power*?

Like that of every other commodity, its value is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to produce it. The labouring power of a man exists only in his living individuality. A certain mass of necessaries must be consumed by a man to grow up and maintain his life. But the man, like the machine, will wear out, and must be replaced by another man. Beside the mass of necessaries required for *his own* maintenance, he wants another amount of necessaries to bring up a certain quota of children that are to replace him on the labour market and to perpetuate the race of labourers. Moreover, to develop his labouring power, and acquire a given skill, another amount of values must be spent. For our purpose it suffices to consider only average labour, the costs of whose education and development are vanishing magnitudes. Still I must seize upon this occasion to state that, as the costs of producing labouring powers of different quality do differ, so must differ the values of the labouring powers employed in different trades. The cry for an *equality of wages* rests, therefore, upon a mistake, is an inane wish never to be fulfilled. It is an offspring of that false and superficial radicalism that accepts premises and tries to evade conclusions. Upon the basis of the wages system the value of labouring power is settled like that of every other commodity; and as different kinds of labouring power have different values, or require different quantities of labour for their production, they *must* fetch different prices in the labour market. To clamour for *equal or even equitable retribution* on the basis of the wages system is the same as to clamour for *freedom* on the basis of the slavery system. What you think just or equitable is

out of the question. The question is: what is necessary and unavoidable with a given system of production?

After what has been said, the *value of labouring power* is determined by the *value of the necessaries* required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the labouring power.

VIII. Production of Surplus Value

Now suppose that the average amount of the daily necessaries of a labouring man require *six hours of average labour* for their production. Suppose, moreover, six hours of average labour to be also realised in a quantity of gold equal to 3*s*. Then 3*s*. would be the *price*, or the monetary expression of the *daily value* of that man's *labouring power*. If he worked daily six hours he would daily produce a value sufficient to buy the average amount of his daily necessaries, or to maintain himself as a labouring man.

But our man is a wages labourer. He must, therefore, sell his labouring power to a capitalist. If he sells it at 3*s*. daily, or 18*s*. weekly, he sells it at its value. Suppose him to be a spinner. If he works six hours daily he will add to the cotton a value of 3*s*. daily. This value, daily added by him, would be an exact equivalent for the wages, or the price of his labouring power, received daily. But in that case no *surplus value* or *surplus produce* whatever would go to the capitalist. Here, then, we come to the rub.

In buying the labouring power of the workman, and paying its value, the capitalist, like every other purchaser, has acquired the right to consume or use the commodity bought. You consume or use the labouring power of a man by making him work, as you consume or use a machine by making it run. By paying the daily or weekly value of the labouring power of the workman, the capitalist has, therefore, acquired the right to use or make that labouring power work during the *whole day or week*. The working day or the working week has, of course, certain limits, but those we shall afterwards look more closely at.

For the present I want to turn your attention to one decisive point.

The *value* of the labouring power is determined by the quan-

tity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it, but the *use* of that labouring power is only limited by the active energies and physical strength of the labourer. The daily or weekly *value* of the labouring power is quite distinct from the daily or weekly exercise of that power, the same as the food a horse wants and the time it can carry the horseman are quite distinct. The quantity of labour by which the *value* of the workman's labouring power is limited forms by no means a limit to the quantity of labour which his labouring power is apt to perform. Take the example of our spinner. We have seen that, to daily reproduce his labouring power, he must daily reproduce a value of three shillings, which he will do by working six hours daily. But this does not disable him from working ten or twelve or more hours a day. But by paying the daily or weekly *value* of the spinner's labouring power the capitalist has acquired the right of using that labouring power during *the whole day or week.* He will, therefore, make him work daily, say, *twelve* hours. *Over and above* the six hours required to replace his wages, or the value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work *six other hours*, which I shall call hours of *surplus labour*, which surplus labour will realise itself in a *surplus value* and a *surplus produce.* If our spinner, for example, by his daily labour of six hours, added three shillings' value to the cotton, a value forming an exact equivalent to his wages, he will, in twelve hours, add six shillings' worth to the cotton, and produce *a proportional surplus of yarn.* As he has sold his labouring power to the capitalist, the whole value or produce created by him belongs to the capitalist, the owner *pro tem.* of his labouring power. By advancing three shillings, the capitalist will, therefore, realise a value of six shillings, because, advancing a value in which six hours of labour are crystallised, he will receive in return a value in which twelve hours of labour are crystallised. By repeating this same process daily, the capitalist will daily advance three shillings and daily pocket six shillings, one-half of which will go to pay wages anew, and the other half of which will form the *surplus value*, for which the capitalist pays no equivalent. It is this *sort of exchange be-*

tween capital and labour upon which capitalistic production, or the wages system, is founded, and which must constantly result in reproducing the workingman as a workingman, and the capitalist as a capitalist.

The rate of surplus value, all other circumstances remaining the same, will depend on the proportion between that part of the working day necessary to reproduce the value of the labouring power and the *surplus time* or *surplus labour* performed for the capitalist. It will, therefore, depend on the *ratio in which the working day is prolonged over and above that extent*, by working which the workingman would only reproduce the value of his labouring power, or replace his wages.

IX. Value of Labour

We must now return to the expression, "*value, or price of labour.*"

We have seen that, in fact, it is only the value of the labouring power, measured by the values of commodities necessary for its maintenance. But since the workman receives his wages *after* his labour is performed, and knows, moreover, that what he actually gives to the capitalist is his labour, the value or price of his labouring power necessarily appears to him as the *price* or *value of his labour itself.* If the price of his labouring power is three shillings, in which six hours of labour are realised, and if he works twelve hours, he necessarily considers these three shillings as the value or price of twelve hours of labour, although these twelve hours of labour realise themselves in a value of six shillings. A double consequence flows from this.

Firstly. *The value or price of the labouring power* takes the semblance of the *price or value of labour itself*, although, strictly speaking, value and price of labour are senseless terms.

Secondly. Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is *paid*, while the other part is *unpaid*, and while that unpaid or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which *surplus value* or *profit* is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour.

This false appearance distinguishes *wages labour* from other *historical* forms of labour. On the basis of the wages system even the *unpaid* labour seems to be *paid* labour. With the *slave,* on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is paid appears to be unpaid. Of course, in order to work the slave must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the value of his own maintenance. But since no bargain is struck between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to be given away for nothing.

Take, on the other hand, the peasant serf, such as he, I might say, until yesterday existed in the whole east of Europe. This peasant worked, for example, three days for himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratuitous labour on the estate of his lord. Here, then, the paid and unpaid parts of labour were visibly separated, separated in time and space; and our Liberals overflowed with moral indignation at the preposterous notion of making a man work for nothing.

In point of fact, however, whether a man works three days of the week for himself on his own field and three days for nothing on the estate of his lord, or whether he works in the factory or the workshop six hours daily for himself and six for his employer, comes to the same, although in the latter case the paid and unpaid portions of labour are inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by the *intervention of a contract* and the *pay* received at the end of the week. The gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one instance, and to be compulsory in the other. That makes all the difference.

In using the word "*value of labour,*" I shall only use it as a popular slang term for "*value of labouring power.*"

X. Profit is Made by Selling a Commodity at its Value

Suppose an average hour of labour to be realised in a value equal to sixpence, or twelve average hours of labour to be real-

ised in six shillings. Suppose, further, the value of labour to be three shillings or the produce of six hours' labour. If, then, in the raw material, machinery, and so forth, used up in a commodity, twenty-four average hours of labour were realised, its value would amount to twelve shillings. If, moreover, the workman employed by the capitalist added twelve hours of labour to those means of production, these twelve hours would be realised in an additional value of six shillings. The *total value of the product* would, therefore, amount to thirty-six hours of realised labour, and be equal to eighteen shillings. But as the value of labour, or the wages paid to the workman, would be three shillings only, no equivalent would have been paid by the capitalists for the six hours of surplus labour worked by the workman, and realised in the value of the commodity. By selling this commodity at its value for eighteen shillings, the capitalist would, therefore, realise a value of three shillings, for which he had paid no equivalent. These three shillings would constitute the surplus value or profit pocketed by him. The capitalist would consequently realise the profit of three shillings, not by selling his commodity at a price *over and above* its value, but by selling it *at its real value.*

The value of a commodity is determined by the *total quantity of labour* contained in it. But part of that quantity of labour is realised in a value, for which an equivalent has been paid in the form of wages; part of it is realised in a value for which *no* equivalent has been paid. Part of the labour contained in the commodity is *paid* labour; part is *unpaid* labour. By selling, therefore, the commodity *at its value*, that is, as the crystallisation of the *total quantity of labour* bestowed upon it, the capitalist must necessarily sell it at a profit. He sells not only what has cost him an equivalent, but he sells also what has cost him nothing, although it has cost the labour of his workman. The cost of the commodity to the capitalist and its real cost are different things. I repeat, therefore, that normal and average profits are made by selling commodities not *above*, but *at their real values*.

XI. The Different Parts into Which Surplus Value is Decomposed

The *surplus value*, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the *surplus labour* or *unpaid labour* of the workingman is realised, I call *profit*. The whole of that profit is not pocketed by the employing capitalist. The monopoly of land enables the landlord to take one part of that *surplus value*, under the name of *rent*, whether the land is used for agriculture or buildings or railways, or for any other productive purpose. On the other hand, the very fact that the possession of *the means of labour* enables the employing capitalist to produce a *surplus value*, or, what comes to the same, to *appropriate to himself* a *certain amount of unpaid labour*, enables the owner of the means of labour, which he lends wholly or partly to the employing capitalist—enables, in one word, the *money-lending capitalist* to claim for himself under the name of *interest* another part of that surplus value, so that there remains to the employing capitalist *as such* only what is called *industrial* or *commercial profit*.

By what laws this division of the total amount of surplus value amongst the three categories of people is regulated is a question quite foreign to our subject. This much, however, results from what has been stated.

Rent, interest, and industrial profit are only *different names for different parts* of the *surplus value* of the commodity, or the *unpaid labour realised in it*, and they are *equally derived from this source, and from this source alone*. They are not derived from *land* as such nor from *capital* as such, but land and capital enable their owners to get their respective shares out of the surplus value extracted by the employing capitalist from the labourer. For the labourer himself it is a matter of subordinate importance whether that surplus value, the result of his surplus labour, or unpaid labour, is altogether pocketed by the employing capitalist, or whether the latter is obliged to pay portions of it, under the names of rent and interest, away to third parties. Suppose the employing capitalist to use only his own capital

and to be his own landlord, then the whole surplus value would go into his pocket.

It is the employing capitalist who immediately extracts from the labourer this surplus value, whatever part of it he may ultimately be able to keep for himself. Upon this relation, therefore, between the employing capitalist and the wages labourer the whole wages system and the whole present system of production hinge. Some of the citizens who took part in our debate were, therefore, wrong in trying to mince matters, and to treat this fundamental relation between the employing capitalist and the workingman as a secondary question, although they were right in stating that, under given circumstances, a rise of prices might affect in very unequal degrees the employing capitalist, the landlord, the moneyed capitalist, and, if you please, the tax-gatherer.

Another consequence follows from what has been stated.

That part of the value of the commodity which represents only the value of the raw materials, the machinery, in one word, the value of the means of production used up, forms *no revenue* at all, but replaces *only capital.* But, apart from this, it is false that the other part of the value of the commodity *which forms revenue*, or may be spent in the form of wages, profits, rent, interest, is *constituted* by the value of wages, the value of rent, the value of profit, and so forth. We shall, in the first instance, discard wages, and only treat industrial profits, interest, and rent. We have just seen that the *surplus value* contained in the commodity, or that part of its value in which *unpaid labour* is realised, resolves itself into different fractions, bearing three different names. But it would be quite the reverse of the truth to say that its value is *composed* of, or *formed* by, the *addition* of the *independent values of these three constituents.*

If one hour of labour realises itself in a value of sixpence, if the working day of the labourer comprises twelve hours, if half of this time is unpaid labour, that surplus labour will add to the commodity a *surplus value* of three shillings, that is of value for which no equivalent has been paid. This surplus value of three shillings constitutes the *whole fund* which the employing capital-

ist may divide, in whatever proportions, with the landlord and the money-lender. The value of these three shillings constitutes the limit of the value they have to divide amongst them. But it is not the employing capitalist who adds to the value of the commodity an arbitrary value for his profit, to which another value is added for the landlord, and so forth, so that the addition of these arbitrarily fixed values would constitute the total value. You see, therefore, the fallacy of the popular notion, which confounds the *decomposition* of a *given value* into three parts, with the *formation* of that value by the addition of three *independent* values, thus converting the aggregate value, from which rent, profit, and interest are derived, into an arbitrary magnitude.

If the total profit realised by a capitalist be equal to £100, we call this sum, considered as absolute magnitude, the *amount of profit.* But if we calculate the ratio which those £100 bear to the capital advanced we call this *relative* magnitude, the *rate of profit.* It is evident that this rate of profit may be expressed in a double way.

Suppose £100 to be the capital *advanced in wages.* If the surplus value created is also £100—and this would show us that half the working day of the labourer consists of *unpaid* labour—and if we measured this profit by the value of the capital advanced in wages, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted to one hundred per cent, because the value advanced would be one hundred and the value realised would be two hundred.

If, on the other hand, we should not only consider the *capital advanced in wages,* but the *total capital* advanced, say, for example, £500, of which £400 represented the value of raw materials, machinery, and so forth, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted only to twenty per cent, because the profit of one hundred would be but the fifth part of the *total* capital advanced.

The first mode of expressing the rate of profit is the only one which shows you the real ratio between paid and unpaid labour, the real degree of the *exploitation* (you must allow me

this French word) *of labour.* The other mode of expression is that in common use, and is, indeed, appropriate for certain purposes. At all events, it is very useful for concealing the degree in which the capitalist extracts gratuitous labour from the workman.

In the remarks I have still to make I shall use the word *profit* for the whole amount of the surplus value extracted by the capitalist without any regard to the division of that surplus value between different parties, and in using the words *rate of profit*, I shall always measure profits by the value of the capital advanced in wages.

XII. General Relation of Profits, Wages and Prices

Deduct from the value of a commodity the value replacing the value of the raw materials and other means of production used upon it, that is to say, deduct the value representing the *past* labour contained in it, and the remainder of its value will resolve into the quantity of labour added by the workingman *last* employed. If that workingman works twelve hours daily, if twelve hours of average labour crystallise themselves in an amount of gold equal to six shillings, this additional value of six shillings is the *only* value his labour will have created. This given value, determined by the time of his labour, is the only fund from which both he and the capitalist have to draw their respective shares or dividends, the only value to be divided into wages and profits. It is evident that this value itself will not be altered by the variable proportions in which it may be divided amongst the two parties. There will also be nothing changed if in the place of one workingman you put the whole working population, twelve million working days, for example, instead of one.

Since the capitalist and workman have only to divide this limited value, that is, the value measured by the total labour of the workingman, the more the one gets the less will the other get, and *vice versa.* Whenever a quantity is given, one part of it will increase inversely as the other decreases. If the wages change, profits will change in an opposite direction. If

wages fall, profits will rise; and if wages rise, profits will fall. If the workingman, on our former supposition gets three shillings, equal to one half of the value he has created, or if his whole working day consists half of paid, half of unpaid labour, the *rate of profit* will be 100 per cent because the capitalist would also get three shillings. If the workingman receives only two shillings or works only one-third of the whole day for himself, the capitalist will get four shillings, and the rate of profit will be 200 per cent. If the workingman receives four shillings, the capitalist will only receive two, and the rate of profit would sink to 50 per cent, but all these variations will not affect the value of the commodity. A general rise of wages would, therefore, result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but not affect values. But although the values of commodities, which must ultimately regulate their market prices, are exclusively determined by the total quantities of labour fixed in them, and not by the division of that quantity into paid and unpaid labour, it by no means follows that the values of the single commodities, or lots of commodities, produced during twelve hours, for example, will remain constant. The *number* or mass of commodities produced in a given time of labour, or by a given quantity of labour, depends upon the *productive power* of the labour employed, and not upon its *extent* or length. With one degree of the productive power of spinning labour, for example, a working day of twelve hours may produce twelve pounds of yarn, with a lesser degree of productive power only two pounds. If then twelve hours' average labour were realised in the value of six shillings in the one case, the twelve pounds of yarn would cost six shillings, in the other case the two pounds of yarn would also cost six shillings. One pound of yarn would, therefore, cost sixpence in the one case, and three shillings in the other. This difference of price would result from the difference in the productive powers of labour employed. One hour of labour would be realised in one pound of yarn with the greater productive power, while with the smaller productive power, six hours of labour would be realised in one pound of yarn. The price of a pound of yarn would.

in the one instance, be only sixpence, although wages were relatively high and the rate of profit low; it would be three shillings in the other instance, although wages were low and the rate of profit high. This would be so because the price of the pound of yarn is regulated by the *total amount of labour worked up in it*, and not by the *proportional division of that total amount into paid and unpaid labour*. The fact I have before mentioned that high-priced labour may produce cheap, and low-priced labour may produce dear commodities, loses, therefore, its paradoxical appearance. It is only the expression of the general law that the value of a commodity is regulated by the quantity of labour worked up in it, but that the quantity ol labour worked up in it depends altogether upon the productive powers of the labour employed, and will, therefore, vary with every variation in the productivity of labour.

XIII. Main Cases of Attempts at Raising Wages or Resisting Their Fall

Let us now seriously consider the main cases in which a rise of wages is attempted or a reduction of wages resisted.

1. We have seen that the *value of the labouring power*, or in more popular parlance, the *value of labour*, is determined by the value of necessaries, or the quantity of labour required to produce them. If, then, in a given country the value of the daily average necessaries of the labourer represented six hours of labour expressed in three shillings, the labourer would have to work six hours daily to produce an equivalent for his daily maintenance. If the whole working day was twelve hours, the capitalist would pay him the value of his labour by paying him three shillings. Half the working day would be unpaid labour, and the rate of profit would amount to 100 per cent. But now suppose that, consequent upon a decrease of productivity, more labour should be wanted to produce, say, the same amount of agricultural produce, so that the price of the average daily necessaries should rise from three to four shillings. In that case the *value* of labour would rise by one-third.

or 33 1/3 per cent. Eight hours of the working day would be required to produce an equivalent for the daily maintenance of the labourer, according to his old standard of living. The surplus labour would therefore sink from six hours to four, and the rate of profit from 100 to 50 per cent. But in insisting upon a rise of wages, the labourer would only insist upon getting the *increased value of his labour,* like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of his commodities having increased, tries to get its increased value paid. If wages did not rise, or not sufficiently rise, to compensate for the increased values of necessaries, the *price* of labour would sink *below the value of labour,* and the labourer's standard of life would deteriorate.

But a change might also take place in an opposite direction. By virtue of the increased productivity of labour, the same amount of the average daily necessaries might sink from three to two shillings, or only four hours out of the working day, instead of six, be wanted to reproduce an equivalent for the value of the daily necessaries. The workingman would now be able to buy with two shillings as many necessaries as he did before with three shillings. Indeed, the *value of labour* would have sunk, but that diminished value would command the same amount of commodities as before. Then profits would rise from three to four shillings, and the rate of profit from 100 to 200 per cent. Although the labourer's absolute standard of life would have remained the same, his *relative* wages, and therewith his *relative social position,* as compared with that of the capitalist. would have been lowered. If the workingman should resist that reduction of relative wages, he would only try to get some share in the increased productive powers of his own labour. and to maintain his former relative position in the social scale. Thus, after the abolition of the Corn Laws, and in flagrant violation of the most solemm pledges given during the anti-Corn Law agitation, the English factory lords generally reduced wages ten per cent. The resistance of the workmen was at first baffled, but, consequent upon circumstances I cannot now enter upon, the ten per cent lost were afterwards regained.

2. The *values* of necessaries, and consequently the *value of labour*, might remain the same, but a change might occur in their *money prices*, consequent upon a previous *change* in the *value of money*.

By the discovery of more fertile mines and so forth, two ounces of gold might, for example, cost no more labour to produce than one ounce did before. The *value* of gold would then be depreciated by one-half, or fifty per cent. As the *values* of all other commodities would then be expressed in twice their former *money prices*, so also the same with the *value of labour*. Twelve hours of labour, formerly expressed in six shillings, would now be expressed in twelve shillings. If the workingman's wages should remain three shillings, instead of rising to six shillings, the *money price of his labour* would only be equal to *half the value of his labour*, and his standard of life would fearfully deteriorate. This would also happen in a greater or lesser degree if his wages should rise, but not proportionately to the fall in the value of gold. In such a case nothing would have been changed, either in the productive powers of labour, or in supply and demand, or in values. Nothing would have been changed except the money *names* of those values. To say that in such a case the workman ought not to insist upon a proportionate rise of wages, is to say that he must be content to be paid with names, instead of with things. All past history proves that whenever such a depreciation of money occurs, the capitalists are on the alert to seize this opportunity for defrauding the workman. A very large school of political economists assert that, consequent upon the new discoveries of gold lands, the better working of silver mines, and the cheaper supply of quicksilver, the value of precious metals has been again depreciated. This would explain the general and simultaneous attempts on the Continent at a rise of wages.

3. We have till now supposed that the *working day* has given limits. The working day, however, has, by itself, no constant limits. It is the constant tendency of capital to stretch it to its utmost physically possible length, because in the same

degree surplus labour, and consequently the profit resulting therefrom, will be increased. The more capital succeeds in prolonging the working day, the greater the amount of other people's labour it will appropriate. During the seventeenth and even the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century a ten hours' working day was the normal working day all over England. During the anti-Jacobin war, which was in fact a war waged by the British barons against the British working masses, capital celebrated its bacchanalia, and prolonged the working day from ten to twelve, fourteen, eighteen hours. Malthus, by no means a man whom you would suspect of a maudlin sentimentalism, declared in a pamphlet, published about 1815, that if this sort of thing was to go on the life of the nation would be attacked at its very source. A few years before the general introduction of the newly-invented machinery, about 1765, a pamphlet appeared in England under the title: *An Essay on Trade.* The anonymous author, an avowed enemy of the working classes, declaims on the necessity of expanding the limits of the working day. Amongst other means to this end, he proposes *working houses,* which, he says, ought to be "*Houses of Terror.*" And what is the length of the working day he prescribes for these "Houses of Terror"? *Twelve hours,* the very same time which in 1832 was declared by capitalists, political economists, and ministers to be not only the existing but the necessary time of labour for a child under twelve years.

By selling his labouring power, and he must do so under the present system, the workingman makes over to the capitalist the consumption of that power, but within certain rational limits. He sells his labouring power in order to maintain it, apart from its natural wear and tear, but not to destroy it. In selling his labouring power at its daily or weekly value, it is understood that in one day or one week that labouring power shall not be submitted to two days' or two weeks' waste or wear and tear. Take a machine worth £1,000. If it is used up in ten years it will add to the value of the commodities in whose production it assists £100 yearly. If it be used up in five years it would add £200 yearly, or the value of its annual

wear and tear is in inverse ratio to the quickness with which it is consumed. But this distinguishes the workingman from the machine. Machinery does not wear out exactly in the same ratio in which it is used. Man, on the contrary, decays in a greater ratio than would be visible from the mere numerical addition of work.

In their attempts at reducing the working day to its former rational dimensions, or, where they cannot enforce a legal fixation of a normal working day, at checking overwork by a rise of wages, a rise not only in proportion to the surplus time exacted, but in a greater proportion, workingmen fulfil only a duty to themselves and their race. They only set limits to the tyrannical usurpations of capital. Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime, apart from the mere physical interruptions by sleep, meals, and so forth, is absorbed by his labour for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a mere machine for producing foreign wealth, broken in body and brutalised in mind. Yet the whole history of modern industry shows that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class to this utmost state of degradation.

In prolonging the working day the capitalist may pay *higher wages* and still lower the *value of labour*, if the rise of wages does not correspond to the greater amount of labour extracted, and the quicker decay of the labouring power thus caused. This may be done in another way. Your middle-class statisticians will tell you, for instance, that the average wages of factory families in Lancashire have risen. They forget that instead of the labour of the man, the head of the family, his wife and perhaps three or four children are now thrown under the Juggernaut wheels of capital, and that the rise of the aggregate wages does not correspond to the aggregate surplus labour extracted from the family.

Even with given limits of the working day, such as they now exist in all branches of industry subjected to the factory laws, a rise of wages may become necessary, if only to keep up the

old standard *value of labour*. By increasing the *intensity* of labour, a man may be made to expend as much vital force in one hour as he formerly did in two. This has, to a certain degree, been effected in the trades, placed under the Factory Acts, by the acceleration of machinery, and the greater number of working machines which a single individual has now to superintend. If the increase in the intensity of labour or the mass of labour spent in an hour keeps some fair proportion to the decrease in the extent of the working day, the workingman will still be the winner. If this limit is overshot, he loses in one form what he has gained in another, and ten hours of labour may then become as ruinous as twelve hours were before. In checking this tendency of capital, by struggling for a rise of wages corresponding to the rising intensity of labour, the workingman only resists the depreciation of his labour and the deterioration of his race.

4. All of you know that, from reasons I have not now to explain, capitalistic production moves through certain periodical cycles. It moves through a state of quiescence, growing animation, prosperity, overtrade, crisis, and stagnation. The market prices of commodities, and the market rates of profit, follow these phases, now sinking below their averages, now rising above them. Considering the whole cycle, you will find that one deviation of the market price is being compensated by the other, and that, taking the average of the cycle, the market prices of commodities are regulated by their values. Well! During the phase of sinking market prices and the phases of crisis and stagnation, the workingman, if not thrown out of employment altogether, is sure to have his wages lowered. Not to be defrauded, he must, even with such a fall of market prices, debate with the capitalist in what proportional degree a fall of wages has become necessary. If, during the phases of prosperity, when extra profits are made, he did not battle for a rise of wages, he would, taking the average of one industrial cycle, not even receive his *average wages*, or the *value* of his labour. It is the utmost height of folly to demand, that while his wages are necessarily affected by the adverse phases of the cycle, he

should exclude himself from compensation during the prosperous phases of the cycle. Generally, the *values* of all commodities are only realised by the compensation of the continuously changing market prices, springing from the continuous fluctuations of demand and supply. On the basis of the present system labour is only a commodity like others. It must, therefore, pass through the same fluctuations to fetch an average price corresponding to its value. It would be absurd to treat it on the one hand as a commodity, and to want on the other hand to exempt it from the laws which regulate the prices of commodities. The slave receives a permanent and fixed amount of maintenance; the wages labourer does not. He must try to get a rise of wages in the one instance, if only to compensate for a fall of wages in the other. If he resigned himself to accept the will, the dictates of the capitalist as a permanent economic law, he would share in all the miseries of the slave, without the security of the slave.

5. In all the cases I have considered, and they form ninety-nine out of a hundred, you have seen that a struggle for a rise of wages follows only in the track of *previous* changes, and is the necessary offspring of previous changes in the amount of production, the productive powers of labour, the value of labour, the value of money, the extent or the intensity of labour extracted, the fluctuations of market prices, dependent upon the fluctuations of demand and supply, and coexistent with the different phases of the industrial cycle; in one word, as reactions of labour against the previous action of capital. By treating the struggle for a rise of wages independently of all these circumstances, by looking only upon the change of wages, and overlooking all the other changes from which they emanate, you proceed from a false premise in order to arrive at false conclusions.

XIV. The Struggle Between Capital and Labour and its Results

1. Having shown that the periodical resistance on the part of the workingmen against a reduction of wages, and their periodical attempts at getting a rise of wages, are inseparable from the wages system, and dictated by the very fact of labour being as-

similated to commodities, and therefore subject to the laws regulating the general movement of prices; having, furthermore, shown that a general rise of wages would result in a fall in the general rate of profit, but not affect the average prices of commodities, or their values, the question now ultimately arises, how far, in this incessant struggle between capital and labour, the latter is likely to prove successful.

I might answer by a generalisation, and say that, as with all other commodities, so with labour, its *market price* will, in the long run, adapt itself to its *value*; that, therefore, despite all the ups and downs, and do what he may, the workingman will, on an average, only receive the value of his labour, which resolves into the value of his labouring power, which is determined by the value of the necessaries required for its maintenance and reproduction, which value of necessaries finally is regulated by the quantity of labour wanted to produce them.

But there are some peculiar features which distinguish the *value of the labouring power, or the value of labour,* from the values of all other commodities. The value of the labouring power is formed by two elements—the one merely physical, the other historical or social. Its *ultimate limit* is determined by the *physical* element, that is to say, to maintain and reproduce itself, to perpetuate its physical existence, the working class must receive the necessaries absolutely indispensable for living and multiplying. The *value* of those indispensable necessaries forms, therefore, the ultimate limit of the *value of labour.* On the other hand, the length of the working day is also limited by ultimate, although very elastic boundaries. Its ultimate limit is given by the physical force of the labouring man. If the daily exhaustion of his vital forces exceeds a certain degree, it cannot be exerted anew, day by day. However, as I said, this limit is very elastic. A quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations will keep the labour market as well supplied as a series of vigorous and long-lived generations.

Besides this mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a *traditional standard of life.* It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants

springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up. The English standard of life may be reduced to the *Irish* standard; the standard of life of a German peasant to that of a Livonian peasant. The important part which historical tradition and social habitude play in this respect, you may learn from Mr. Thornton's work on *Overpopulation*, where he shows that the average wages in different agricultural districts of England still nowadays differ more or less according to the more or less favourable circumstances under which the districts have emerged from the state of serfdom.

This historical or social element, entering into the value of labour, may be expanded, or contracted, or altogether extinguished, so that nothing remains but the *physical limit*. During the time of the *anti-Jacobin war*, undertaken, as the incorrigible tax-eater and sinecurist, old George Rose, used to say, to save the comforts of our holy religion from the inroads of the French infidels, the honest English farmers, so tenderly handled in a former session of ours, depressed the wages of the agricultural labourers even beneath that *mere physical minimum*, but made up by *Poor Laws* the remainder necessary for the physical perpetuation of the race. This was a glorious way to convert the wages labourer into a slave, and Shakespeare's proud yeoman into a pauper.

By comparing the standard wages or values of labour in different countries, and by comparing them in different historical epochs of the same country, you will find that the *value of labour* itself is not a fixed but a variable magnitude, even supposing the values of all other commodities to remain constant.

A similar comparison would prove that not only the *market rates of profit* change, but its *average* rates.

But as *profits*, there exists no law which determines their *minimum*. We cannot say what is the ultimate limit of their decrease. And why cannot we fix that limit? Because, although we can fix the *minimum* of wages, we cannot fix their *maximum*. We can only say that, the limits of the working day being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to the *physical minimum of wages;* and that wages being given, the *maximum*

of profit corresponds to such a prolongation of the working day as is compatible with the physical forces of the labourer. The maximum of profit is therefore limited by the physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum of the working day. It is evident that between the two limits of this *maximum rate of profit* an immense scale of variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the workingman constantly presses in the opposite direction.

The question resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants.

2. As to the *limitation of the working day*, in England, as in all other countries, it has never been settled except by *legislative interference*. Without the workingmen's continuous pressure from without that interference would never have taken place. But at all events, the result was not to be attained by private settlement between the workingmen and the capitalists. This very necessity of *general political action* affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side.

As to the *limits* of the *value of labour*, its actual settlement always depends upon supply and demand, I mean the demand for labour on the part of capital, and the supply of labour by the workingmen. In colonial countries[1] the law of supply and demand favours the workingman. Hence the relatively high standard of wages in the United States. Capital may there try its utmost. It cannot prevent the labour market from being continuously emptied by the continuous conversion of wages labourers into independent, self-sustaining peasants. The function of a wages labourer is for a very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to leave within a longer or shorter term. To mend this colonial state of things, the paternal British government accepted for some

[1] Marx is speaking of colonial countries in which there was much free land; hence the workers constantly flocked into agriculture and became independent farmers. Such colonial countries included the United States and Australia.—*Ed.*

time what is called the modern colonisation theory, which consists in putting an artificial high price upon colonial land, in order to prevent the too quick conversion of the wages labourer into the independent peasant.

But let us now come to old civilised countries, in which capital domineers over the whole process of production. Take, for example, the rise in England of agricultural wages from 1849 to 1859. What was its consequence? The farmers could not, as our friend Weston would have advised them, raise the value of wheat, nor even its market prices. They had, on the contrary, to submit to their fall. But during these eleven years they introduced machinery of all sorts, adopted more scientific methods, converted part of the arable land into pasture, increased the size of farms, and with this the scale of production, and by these and other processes diminishing the demand for labour by increasing its productive power, made the agricultural population again relatively redundant. This is the general method in which a reaction, quicker or slower, of capital against a rise of wages takes place in old, settled countries. Ricardo has justly remarked that machinery is in constant competition with labour, and can often be only introduced when the price of labour has reached a certain height, but the appliance of machinery is but one of the many methods for increasing the productive powers of labour. This very same development which makes common labour relatively redundant simplifies on the other hand skilled labour, and thus depreciates it.

The same law obtains in another form. With the development of the productive powers of labour the accumulation of capital will be accelerated, even despite a relatively high rate of wages. Hence, one might infer, as Adam Smith, in whose days modern industry was still in its infancy, did infer, that this accelerated accumulation of capital must turn this balance in favour of the workingman, by securing a growing demand for his labour. From this same standpoint many contemporary writers have wondered that English capital having grown in the last twenty years so much quicker than English population, wages should not have been more enhanced. But simultaneously with the

progress of accumulation there takes place a *progressive change in the composition of capital.* That part of the aggregate capital which consists of fixed capital, machinery, raw materials, means of production in all possible forms, progressively increases as compared with the other part of capital, which is laid out in wages or in the purchase of labour. This law has been stated in a more or less accurate manner by Mr. Barton, Ricardo, Sismondi, Professor Richard Jones, Professor Ramsay, Cherbuliez, and others.

If the proportion of these two elements of capital was originally one to one, it will, in the progress of industry, become five to one, and so forth. If of a total capital of 600, 300 is laid out in instruments, raw materials, and so forth, and 300 in wages, the total capital wants only to be doubled to create a demand for 600 workingmen instead of for 300. But if of a capital of 600, 500 is laid out in machinery, materials, and so forth, and 100 only in wages, the same capital must increase from 600 to 3,600 in order to create a demand for 600 workmen instead of for 300. In the progress of industry the demand for labour keeps, therefore, no pace with the accumulation of capital. It will still increase, but increase in a constantly diminishing ratio as compared with the increase of capital.

These few hints will suffice to show that the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the workingman, and that consequently the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the *value of labour* more or less to its *minimum limit.* Such being the tendency of *things* in this system, is this to say that the working class ought to renounce their resistance against the encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken-down wretches past salvation. I think I have shown that their struggles for the standard of wages are incidents inseparable from the whole wages system, that in 99 cases out of 100 their efforts at raising wages are only efforts at maintaining the given value of labour and that the necessity of debating their price with the capitalist

is inherent to their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities. By cowardly giving way in their everyday conflict with capital, they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement.

At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude involved in the wages system, the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these everyday struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights incessantly springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market. They ought to understand that, with all the miseries it imposes upon them, the present system simultaneously engenders the *material conditions* and the *social forms* necessary for an economic reconstruction of society. Instead of the *conservative* motto: "*A fair day's wages for a fair day's work!*" they ought to inscribe on their banner the *revolutionary* watchword: "*Abolition of the wages system!*"

After this very long and, I fear, tedious exposition, which I was obliged to enter into to do some justice to the subject matter, I shall conclude by proposing the following resolutions:

Firstly. A general rise in the rate of wages would result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but, broadly speaking, not affect the prices of commodities.

Secondly. The general tendency of capitalist production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages.

Thirdly. Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system.

MARX'S *CAPITAL*[1]

I

As long as there have been capitalists and workers on earth no book has appeared which is of as much importance for the workers as the one before us. The relation between capital and labour, the axis on which our entire present system of society turns, is here treated scientifically for the first time and with a thoroughness and acuity such as was possible only for a German. Valuable as the writings of an Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, are and will remain—it was reserved for a German to climb to the height from which the whole field of modern social relations can be seen clearly and in full view just as the lower mountain scenery is seen by an observer standing on the topmost peak.

Political economy up to now has taught us that labour is the source of all wealth and the measure of all values, so that two objects, whose production has cost the same labour time, also possess the same value and must also be exchanged for each other, since on the average only equal values are exchangeable for one another. At the same time, however, it teaches that there exists a kind of stored up labour, which it calls capital;

[1] The two articles reprinted here were written by Engels in the beginning of March, 1868. They were intended to acquaint German workers with the contents of the first volume of *Capital* which had been published a short time before. In a popular form they expound the theory of surplus value, reveal the meaning of the struggle of the working class and prove the inevitability of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in consequence of the effect of the general law of capitalist accumulation. The articles were published in the Leipzig *Demokratisches Wochenblatt*, Nos. 12, 13, May 21 and 28, 1868. The editor of the paper was Wilhelm Liebknecht.—*Ed.*

that this capital owing to the auxiliary sources contained in it, raises the productivity of living labour a hundred and a thousand-fold, and in return claims a certain compensation which is termed profit or gain. As we all know, this occurs in reality in such a way that the profits of stored up, dead labour become ever more massive, the capital of the capitalists becomes ever more colossal, while the wages of living labour become constantly less and the mass of the workers living solely on wages becomes ever more numerous and poverty-stricken. How is this contradiction to be solved? How can there remain a profit for the capitalists, if the worker gets back in another form the full value of the labour he adds to his product? And this should be the case, nevertheless, since only equal values are exchanged. On the other hand, how can equal values be exchanged, how can the worker receive the full value of his product, if, as is admitted by many economists, this product is divided between him and the capitalists? Economics up to now, has been helpless in the face of the contradiction, and writes or stutters embarrassed phrases which say nothing. Even the previous socialist critics of economics have not been able to do more than to emphasise the contradiction; no one has solved it, until now at last Marx has traced the process by which this profit arises right to its birthplace and has thereby made everything clear.

In tracing the development of capital, Marx starts out from the simple, notoriously obvious fact that the capitalists turn their capital to account by exchange: they buy commodities for their money and afterwards sell them for more money than they cost. For example, a capitalist buys cotton for 1,000 talers[1] and resells it for 1,100, thus "earning" 100 talers. This excess of 100 talers over the original capital, Marx calls *surplus value*. What is the origin of this surplus value? According to the economists' assumption, only equal values are exchanged and in the sphere of abstract theory this is correct. Hence the purchase of cotton

[1] Taler—a silver coin worth approximately three shillings, which was in circulation in Germany and Western Europe until the end of the nineteenth century.—*Ed.*

and its subsequent sale can just as little yield surplus value as the exchange of a silver taler for thirty silver groschen[1] and the re-exchange of the small coins for a silver taler, a process by which one becomes neither richer nor poorer. But surplus value can just as little arise from sellers selling commodities above their value, or purchasers buying them below their value, because each one is in turn buyer and seller and this would therefore again balance. Just as little can it arise from buyers and sellers reciprocally overreaching each other, for this would create no new or surplus value, but only divide the existing capital differently between the capitalists. In spite of the fact that the capitalist buys the commodities at their value and sells them at their value, he gets more value out than he puts in. How does this happen?

The capitalist finds on the market under present social conditions *one commodity* which has the peculiar property that *its use is a source of new value, is a creation of new value.* This commodity is *labour power.*

What is the value of labour power? The value of every commodity is measured by the labour required for its production. Labour power exists in the form of the living worker who requires a definite amount of means of subsistence for his existence as well as for the maintenance of his family, which ensures the continuance of labour power even after his death. Hence the labour time necessary for producing these means of subsistence represents therefore the value of labour time. The capitalist pays him weekly and purchases for that the use of one week's labour of the worker. So far Messieurs the economists will be pretty well in agreement with us as to the value of labour power.

The capitalist now sets his worker to work. In a certain period of time the worker will have delivered as much labour as was represented by his weekly wages. Supposing that the weekly wage of a worker represents three labour days, then if the worker begins on Monday, he has by Wednesday evening *replaced for the capitalist the full value of the wage paid.* But does he then stop working? Not at all. The capitalist has bought his *week's*

[1] Silver groschen—a small silver coin, 1-30 of a taler, in circulation in Prussia until the seventies of the last century.—*Ed.*

labour and the worker must also go on working during the last three days of the week. This *surplus labour* of the worker, over and above the time necessary to replace his wages, is the *source of surplus value*, of profit, of the continually growing accumulation of capital.

Do not say it is an arbitrary assumption that the worker reproduces in three days the wages he has received and works the remaining three days for the capitalist. Whether he takes exactly three days to replace his wages, or two or four, is to be sure quite immaterial here and varies according to circumstances; the main point is that the capitalist, besides the labour he pays for, also extracts labour that he *does not pay for*, and this is no arbitrary assumption, for the day the capitalist only extracts from the worker as much labour in the long run as he paid him in wages, on that day he would shut down his workshops, since indeed his whole profit would come to nought.

Here we have the solution of all those contradictions. The origin of surplus value (of which the capitalist's profit forms an important part) is now quite clear and natural. The value of the labour power is paid for, but this value is far less than that which the capitalist can extract from the labour power, and it is precisely the difference, the *unpaid labour*, which constitutes the share of the capitalist, or more accurately, of the capitalist class. For even the profit that the cotton dealer made on his cotton in the above example must consist of unpaid labour, if cotton prices have not risen. The trader must have sold to a cotton manufacturer, who is able to extract a profit for himself from his product besides the 100 talers, and therefore divides with him the unpaid labour he has pocketed. In general it is this unpaid labour which maintains all the non-working members of society. The state and municipal taxes, as far as they affect the capitalist class, are paid from it, as also the rent of the landowners, etc. On it rests the whole existing social system.

It would however be absurd to assume that unpaid labour arose only under present conditions where production is carried on by capitalists on the one hand and wage workers on the other. On the contrary, the oppressed class at all times has

had to perform unpaid labour. During the whole long period when slavery was the prevailing form of the organisation of labour, the slaves had to perform much more labour than was returned to them in the form of means of subsistence. The same was the case under the rule of serfdom and right up to the abolition of peasant corvée labour; here in fact the difference stands out palpably between the time during which the peasant works for his own maintenance and the surplus labour for the feudal lord, precisely because the latter is carried out separately from the former. The form has now been changed, but the substance remains and as long as "a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production."[1]

II

In the previous article we saw that every worker employed by the capitalist performs two kinds of labour: during one part of his working time he replaces the wages advanced to him by the capitalist, and this part of his labour Marx terms the *necessary labour*. But afterwards he has to go on working and during that time he produces *surplus value* for the capitalist, a significant portion of which constitutes profit. That part of the labour is called surplus labour.

Let us assume that the worker works three days of the week to replace his wages and three days to produce surplus value for the capitalist. Putting it otherwise, it means that, with a twelve-hour working day, he works six hours daily for his wages and six hours for the production of surplus value. One can only get six days out of the week, or at most seven even by including Sunday, but one can extract six, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen or even more hours of labour out of every working day. The worker sells the capitalist a working day for his day's wages. But, *what is a working day*? Eight hours or eighteen?

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 259, Kerr edition.—*Ed.*

It is to the capitalist's interest to make the working day as long as possible. The longer it is, the more surplus value he obtains. The worker correctly feels that every hour of labour which he performs over and above the replacement of the wage is unjustly extorted from him; he experiences in his own person what it means to work excessive hours. The capitalist fights for his profit, the worker for his health, for a few hours of daily rest, to be able to occupy himself as a human being as well, in other ways besides working, sleeping and eating. It may be remarked in passing that it does not depend at all upon the good will of the individual capitalists whether they desire to embark on this struggle or not, since competition compels even the most philanthropic among them to join with his colleagues and to make a working time as long as theirs the rule.

The struggle for the fixing of the working day has lasted from the first historical appearance of free workers on the scene up to the present day. In various trades, different traditional working days prevail; but in reality they are seldom adhered to. Only where the law fixes the working day and supervises its observance can one really say that there exists a normal working day. And up to now this is the case almost solely in the factory districts of England. Here the ten-hour working day (ten and a half hours on five days, seven and a half hours on Saturday) has been fixed for all women and for youths of thirteen to eighteen, and since the men cannot work without them, they also come under the ten-hour working day. This law has been won by English factory workers by years of endurance, through the most persistent, stubborn struggle with the factory owners, through freedom of the press, the right of association and assembly, as well as through adroit utilisation of the divisions in the ruling class itself. It has become the palladium of the English workers, it has gradually become extended to all branches of large-scale industry and last year to almost all *trades*, at least to all those employing women and children. The present work contains most exhaustive material on the history of this legislative regulation of the working day in England. The next "North German Reich-

stag"[1] will also have factory regulations to discuss and therefore the regulation of factory labour. We expect that none of the deputies elected by German workers will proceed to discuss this bill without previously making themselves thoroughly conversant with Marx's book. *There is much to be achieved there.* The divisions within the ruling classes are more favourable to the workers than they ever were in England, because *universal suffrage compels the ruling classes to court the favour of the workers.* Under these circumstances, four or five representatives of the proletariat are a *power*, if they know how to use their position, if above all they know what is at issue, which the bourgeois do not know. And for this purpose, Marx's book gives them all the material in ready form.

We will pass over a number of other very fine investigations of more theoretical interest and will halt only at the final chapter which deals with the accumulation of capital. Here it is first shown that the capitalist mode of production, *i.e.*, that effected by capitalists on the one hand and by wage workers on the other, not only continually reproduces the capital of the capitalist, but also continually reproduces the poverty of the workers at the same time. Thereby it is ensured that there always exist anew, on the one hand, capitalists who are the owners of all means of subsistence, raw materials and instruments of labour, and, on the other hand, the great mass of workers who are compelled to sell their labour power to these capitalists for an amount of the means of subsistence which at best just suffices to maintain them in a condition capable of working and to bring up a new generation of able-bodied proletarians. But capital does not merely reproduce itself: it is continually increased and multiplied —hence its power over the propertyless class of workers. And just as it itself is reproduced on an ever greater scale, so the modern capitalist mode of production reproduces the class of propertyless workers also on an ever greater scale and in ever

[1] A representative body of the "North German Confederation," composed of 22 German states, which came into existence after the victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866.—*Ed.*

greater numbers. "... accumulation [of capital] reproduces the capital relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage workers at that.... *Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat.*" [1] Since, however, owing to the progress of machinery, owing to improved agriculture, etc., fewer and fewer workers are necessary in order to produce the same quantity of products, since this perfecting, *i.e.*, this making the workers superfluous grows more rapidly than the growing capital itself, what becomes of this ever increasing number of workers? They form an industrial reserve army, which is paid *below* the value of its labour and is irregularly employed or comes under the care of public Poor Law institutions during times of bad or moderate business, but which is indispensable to the capitalist class at times when business is especially lively, as is palpably evident in England—but which *under all circumstances* serves to break the power of resistance of the regularly employed workers and to keep their wages down. "The greater the social wealth . . . the greater is the [relative surplus population or] [2] industrial reserve army. . . . But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population [or strata of workers],[2] whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the Lazarus-layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. *This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.*" [3]

These, strictly scientifically proved—and the official economists take great care not to make even an attempt at a refutation—are some of the chief laws of the modern, capitalist social system. But with this is everything said? By no means. Just as sharply as he stresses the bad sides of capitalist production, does Marx also clearly prove that this social form was necessary to develop the productive forces of society to a level which will

[1] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 673, Kerr edition.—*Ed.*
[2] Insertions in brackets by Engels.—*Ed.*
[3] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 707, Kerr edition.—*Ed.*

make possible an equal development worthy of human beings for *all* members of society. All earlier forms of society were too poor for this. Capitalist production for the first time creates the wealth and the productive forces necessary for this, but at the same time it also creates in the mass of oppressed workers the social class which is more and more compelled to claim the utilisation of this wealth and these productive forces for the whole of society—instead of as today for a monopolist class.

FROM THE PREFACE TO *CAPITAL*, VOLUME II

But what did Marx say about surplus value that is new? How is it that Marx's theory of surplus value struck home like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, and that in all modern countries too, while the theories of all his socialist predecessors, including Rodbertus, vanished without effect?

The history of chemistry offers an illustration which explains this:

Until late in the eighteenth century, the phlogistic theory prevailed as we know. It assumed that the essence of all combustion consisted in the separation from the burning substance of another hypothetical substance, an absolute combustible, named phlogiston. This theory sufficed for the explanation of most of the chemical phenomena then known, although not without considerable forcing in many cases. But in 1774, Priestley discovered a kind of air "which he found to be so pure, or so free from phlogiston, that common air seemed adulterated in comparison with it." He called it "dephlogisticated air." Shortly after him, Scheele obtained the same kind of air in Sweden, and demonstrated its presence in the atmosphere. He also found that this air disappeared, whenever a substance was burned in it or in ordinary air, and therefore he called it "fire-air." "From these facts he drew the conclusion that the compound arising from the union of phlogiston with one of the components of the air" (that is to say by combustion) "was nothing but fire or heat which escaped through the glass." [1]

Priestley and Scheele had produced oxygen, but did not know what they had discovered. They remained "entangled in" the phlogistic "categories as they found them." The element, which

[1] Roscoe-Schorlemmer, *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Chemie.* Braunschweig 1877, I, p. 13, 18. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

was to abolish the whole phlogistic concept and to revolutionise chemistry, remained barren in their hands. But Priestley had immediately communicated his discovery to Lavoisier in Paris, and Lavoisier, by means of this new fact, now examined all phlogistic chemistry. He first discovered that the new kind of air is a new chemical element, and that in combustion the mysterious phogiston does not *depart* from the burning substance, but this new element combines with the substance. Thus he placed chemistry, which in its phlogistic form had so long stood on its head, on its feet for the first time. And although he did not produce oxygen independently of the others and at the same time as they, as he claimed later on, he nevertheless is the real *discoverer* of oxygen as compared to the others, who had merely *produced* it without any suspicion of *what* it was they had found.

Marx stands in the same relation to his predecessors in the theory of surplus value as Lavoisier to Priestley and Scheele. The *existence* of that part of a product's value, which we now call surplus value, had been ascertained long before Marx. What it consists of had also been stated, more or less distinctly, *viz.*, of the product of labour for which its appropriator has not paid any equivalent. But they got no further. Some of them—the classical bourgeois economists—investigated at most the proportion in which the product of labour is divided between the labourer and the owner of the means of production. Others—the socialists—found this division unjust and looked for utopian means of abolishing this injustice. Both remain in thrall to the economic categories as they had found them.

Then Marx came forward. And he did so in direct opposition to all his predecessors. Where they had seen a *solution*, he saw only a *problem*. He saw that here there was neither dephlogisticated air, nor fire-air, but oxygen, that it was not simply a matter of recording an economic fact, or of pointing out the conflict of this fact with eternal justice and true morals, but of a fact destined to revolutionise the whole of political economy and offering a key to the understanding of all capitalist production—to the one who knew how to use it. With this fact as a starting point Marx examined all the categories he found at hand, just as Lavoisier

had examined the categories of phlogistic chemistry he had found at hand. In order to know what surplus value was, he had to find out what value was. Ricardo's theory of value itself had to be subjected to criticism first of all. Thus Marx investigated labour in regard to its value-creating quality, and for the first time established *what* labour produces value, and why and how it does this, and that value is nothing but coagulated labour of *this* kind—a point which Rodbertus never grasped to the very end. Marx then examined the relation of commodities to money, demonstrating how and why, thanks to their imminent property of value, commodities and commodity exchange must produce the antagonism of commodities and money. His theory of money, founded on this basis, is the first exhaustive, and now tacitly generally accepted one. He investigated the transformation of money into capital, demonstrating that this transformation is based on the purchase and sale of labour power. By substituting labour power, the value-producing property, for labour, he solved with one stroke one of the difficulties upon which the Ricardian school was wrecked, *viz.*, the impossibility of harmonising the mutual exchange of capital and labour with the Ricardian law of value determination by labour. By establishing the distinction between constant and variable capital, he was first enabled to trace the real course of the process of surplus value formation in the utmost detail, and thus to explain it, which none of his predecessors had accomplished. Thus he established a distinction within capital itself with which neither Rodbertus nor the capitalist economists had been able to do anything, but which, nevertheless, furnished a key for the solution of the most complicated economic problems, as is most strikingly proved once again by this Volume II, and still more by Volume III as will be shown. He analysed surplus value itself further, finding its two forms, absolute and relative surplus value. And he showed the different but in each case decisive role, that they had played in the historical development of capitalist production. On the basis of surplus value he developed the first rational theory we have of wages, and gave for the first time the basic features of the history of capitalist accumulation and a portrayal of its historical trend.

THE HISTORICAL TENDENCY OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION[1]

WHAT does the *primitive accumulation of capital, i.e.*, its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage labourers, and therefore a *mere change of form*, it only means the *expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner.* Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the instruments of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or not labourers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades that it at first sight presents reflect only the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the free private owner of his own conditions of labour manipulated by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan

[1] The present book contains only a small portion of chapter XXXII of the first volume of Marx's chief work, *Capital.* In summary form and in very broad outline, Marx expounds the origin of capitalist relations and the direction of their development. He draws here general conclusions as a result of his study of the capitalist system.—*Ed.*

of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso. This mode of production pre-supposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the *concentration* of the means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the social mastery and control over nature, and the free development of the *social* productive forces. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, "to decree universal mediocrity." At a certain level of development it brings into being the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, *the transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones*, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, *the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the instruments of labour*, this fearful and painful *expropriation of the mass of the people* forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalist private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, *i.e.*, on wage labour.

As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands

on its own feet, then the further socialisation of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalist regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this, too, grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist produc-

tion begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: *i.e.*, on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production produced by labour itself.

The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult than the transformation of capitalist private property, already in fact resting on socialised production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.

KARL MARX

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY [1]

Preface

I EXAMINE the system of bourgeois political economy in the following order: *capital, landed property, wage labour; the state, foreign trade, world market.* Under the first three headings, I investigate the economic conditions of life of the three great classes into which modern bourgeois society is divided; the interconnection of the three other headings is obvious at a glance. The first section of the first book, which deals with capital, consists of the following chapters: 1. Commodities; 2. Money or simple circulation; 3. Capital in general. The two first chapters form the content of the present part. The total material lies before me in the form of monographs, which were written at periods widely separated from one another, for self-clarification not for publication, and their elaboration in connected form according to the above plan will be dependent on external circumstances.

I am omitting a general introduction which I had projected because on closer reflection any anticipation of results yet to be proved appears to me to be disturbing, and the reader who desires to follow me must be resolved to ascend from the particular to the general. A few indications of the course of my own politico-economic studies may, on the other hand, appear not out of place.

[1] This is a complete translation of Marx's preface to his work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* which appeared in 1859. Marx here relates in his own words the course of his scientific studies and the shaping of his theory. At the same time, he expounds in an extremely finished and concise form the essence of his theory of history.—*Ed.*

My speciality was that of law, which, however, I only pursued as a subordinate subject along with philosophy and history. In the year 1842-43, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, for the first time I experienced the embarrassment of having to take part in speaking on so-called material interests. The proceedings of the Rhenish Landtag on thefts of wood and parcelling of landed property, the official polemic which Herr von Schaper, then *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, opened against the *Rheinische Zeitung* on the conditions of the Moselle peasantry, and finally debates on free trade and protective tariffs gave the first incentive to my occupation with economic questions. On the other hand, at that time when the good will "to go further" frequently outweighed specialised knowledge, a weak, philosophically tinged echo of French socialism and communism made itself audible in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I declared myself against this bungling, but frankly confessed at the same time in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* that my previous studies did not permit me to venture for myself any judgment on the content of the French tendencies. Instead, I eagerly seized on the illusion of the managers of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, who thought that by a weaker attitude on the part of the paper they could secure a remission of the death sentence passed upon it, in order to withdraw from the public stage into the study.

The first work which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of law, a work the introduction to which appeared in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, published in Paris. My investigation led to the result that legal relations such as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, in accordance with the procedure of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of "civil society," but that the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. The investigation of the latter, which I began in Paris,

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I continued in Brussels, whither I had emigrated in consequence of an expulsion order of M. Guizot. The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, æsthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the

productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society.

Frederick Engels, with whom, since the appearance of his brilliant sketches on the criticism of the economic categories (in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*), I maintained a constant exchange of ideas by correspondence, had by another road (compare his *The Condition of the Working Class in England*) arrived with me at the same result, and when in the spring of 1845 he also settled in Brussels, we resolved to work out together the opposition of our view to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our previous philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes, had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly since we had achieved our main purpose—to clear our own minds. Of the scattered works in which we placed our views before the public, now from one aspect and

now from another, I will mention only the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, jointly written by Engels and myself, and *Discours sur le libre échange* [*Discourse on Free Trade*] published by me. The decisive points of our view were first scientifically, although only polemically, indicated in my work published in 1847 and directed against Proudhon: *Misère de la Philosophie* [*The Poverty of Philosophy*], *etc.* A dissertation written in German on *Wage Labour*, in which I put together my lectures on this subject delivered in the Brussels *Deutscher Arbeiterverein* [German Labour Union], was interrupted while being printed by the February Revolution and my consequent forced removal from Belgium.

The editing of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848 and 1849, and the subsequent events, interrupted my economic studies which could only be resumed in the year 1850 in London. The enormous material for the history of political economy which is accumulated in the British Museum, the favourable vantage point afforded by London for the observation of bourgeois society, and finally the new stage of development into which the latter appeared to have entered with the discovery of gold in Australia and California, determined me to begin afresh from the very beginning and to work through the new material critically. These studies led partly of themselves into apparently quite remote subjects on which I had to dwell for a shorter or longer period. Especially, however, was the time at my disposal limited by the imperative necessity of earning my living. My contributions, during eight years now, to the first English-American newspaper, the *New York Tribune*, compelled an extraordinary scattering of my studies, since I only occupied myself with newspaper correspondence proper in exceptional cases. However, articles on striking economic events in England and on the Continent constituted so considerable a part of my contributions that I was compelled to make myself familiar with practical details which lie outside the sphere of the actual science of political economy.

This sketch of the course of my studies in the sphere of political economy is intended only to show that my views, how-

ever they may be judged and however little they may coincide with the interested prejudices of the ruling classes, are the result of conscientious investigation lasting many years. But at the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be posted:

Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto
Ogni viltà convien che qui sia morta[1]

KARL MARX

London, January 1859.

[1] Here all mistrust must be abandoned
And here must perish every craven thought.

ON KARL MARX'S *CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY* [1]

In all scientific spheres, the Germans have long since demonstrated their equality with, and in most of them their superiority over, the remaining civilised nations. Only one science was not able to count on a single German name among its adepts, *viz.*, political economy. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore pre-supposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which in Germany, after the wars of the Reformation and the peasant wars, particularly after the Thirty Years' War,[2] could not arise for centuries. The separation of Holland from the Empire forced Germany to the rear in world trade and from the outset reduced its industrial development to the scantiest proportions. While the Germans were slowly and laboriously recovering from the devastation of the civil wars, while they were using up all their bourgeois energy, which had never been very great, in fruitless struggle against the customs barriers and idiotic trade regulations which every petty princeling

[1] This review by Engels of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) appeared in London in 1895 in the German periodical *Das Volk*. A concluding article did not appear owing to the cessation of the journal. In the present edition the text is reproduced completely and corresponds with the original of the London periodical which is now in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (Moscow).—*Ed.*

[2] The *Thirty Years' War* was waged on German soil under religious slogans (Catholicism against Protestantism) in the first half of the seventeenth century between various changing groupings of German principalities, kingdoms and the imperial power (Catholic). Non-German armies also participated in the war, chiefly Swedish on the Protestant side and French and Spanish on the Catholic side. The war wrought terrible ravages throughout the country, intensified still further its political dismemberment and held back its economic development for a long time.—*Ed.*

and imperial baron imposed on the industry of his subjects, while the imperial towns with their guild ceremonials and patrician cliques were falling into decay—Holland, England and France conquered the leading positions in world trade, amassed colony after colony and developed the manufacturing industry to the highest pitch, until finally England, owing to steam power which first imparted value to its coal and iron deposits, attained the foremost position in modern bourgeois development. So long, however, as a struggle had still to be waged against such ludicrously antiquated relics of the Middle Ages as up to 1830 laid fetters on the material bourgeois development of Germany, no German political economy was possible. Only with the establishment of the Customs Union[1] did the Germans arrive at a position in which they could at all even *understand* political economy. From this time, in fact, began the importation of English and French political economy for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. Presently the intelligentsia and bureaucracy seized hold of the imported material and worked it up in a fashion not very creditable to the "German spirit." From the medley of industrial barons, traders, schoolmasters and bureaucrats engaged in authorship there arose a German economic literature which in its insipidity, shallowness, lack of thought, verbosity and plagiarism was paralleled only by the German novel. Among the people with practical aims, the protectionist school of the industrialists was the first to establish itself; and its authority, List, is still the best that German bourgeois-economic literature has produced, although the whole of his glorious work is copied from the Frenchman, Ferrier, the theoretical originator of the Continental System.[2] In opposition to this tendency there arose in the 'forties the free school of the traders in the Baltic provinces, who, with childish but self-interested faith, echoed the arguments of the English free traders. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats who had to deal with

[1] The German *Customs and Trade Union* was established on January 1, 1834, between Prussia and the other German states with the exception of Austria.—*Ed.*

[2] The Continental System was the policy pursued by Napoleon I of prohibiting the import of English goods on the Continent.—*Ed.*

the theoretical side of the subject, there were to be found dried-up, uncritical herbarium collectors like Herr Rau, speculating wiseacres like Herr Stein, who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, or literary gleaners in the "cultural-historical" field, like Herr Riehl. The final outcome of this was cameralism,[1] a mush consisting of all sorts of extraneous matter, with a spattering of eclectic-economic sauce, such as would be useful knowledge for a young law school graduate in the employ of the state preparing for his final state board examination.

While then the bourgeoisie, schoolmasters and bureaucracy were still labouring to learn the first elements of English-French economics by heart as unassailable dogmas and to attain some degree of clarity about them, the German proletarian party appeared on the scene. Its whole theoretical existence proceeded from the study of political economy; and scientific, independent *German economics* dates from the moment of its appearance. This German economics is based essentially upon the materialist conception of history, the basic features of which are presented briefly in the preface to the above-named work. The main points of this preface have already been printed in *Volk*, for which reason we referred to it. Not only for economics, but for all historical sciences (and all sciences which are not natural sciences are historical) a revolutionising discovery is made with this proposition: "that the mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life processes in general"; that all the social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all the theoretical outlooks which emerge in the course of history, are to be comprehended only when the material conditions of life of the respectively corresponding epochs are understood and the former are derived from these material conditions. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being; but their social being that determines their consciousness." The proposition is so simple that it must be self-evident to anyone who is not bemused by idealist delusions.

[1] The word is derived from the chambers that administered state property in Germany.—*Ed.*

But it involves highly revolutionary consequences, not only for theory but also for practice.

"At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of *social revolution.* With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. . . .

"The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of this antagonism."

As we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present, the perspective of a tremendous revolution, indeed the most tremendous revolution of all time, therefore immediately unfolds itself before us.

On closer consideration, it is, however, also immediately evident that this apparently simple proposition, that the consciousness of men depends on their being and not *vice versa,* at once, and as its first consequences, runs directly counter to all idealism, even the most concealed. All traditional and customary outlooks on everything historical are negated by it. The whole traditional mode of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic noble-mindedness fights indignantly against such an unprincipled conception. The new mode of outlook, therefore, necessarily came into conflict, not only with the representatives of the bourgeoisie, but also with the mass of French socialists who would fain shake the world by means of the magic formula, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*! But above all it aroused great wrath among the German vulgar-democratic screamers. All the same they have by preference attempted to exploit the new ideas in plagiaristic fashion, but with rare misunderstanding.

The development of the materialist conception even in regard to a single historical example was a scientific work which would have demanded years of tranquil study, for it is obvious that nothing can be done here with mere phrases, that

only a mass of critically sifted, completely mastered historical material can enable one to solve such a task. The February Revolution thrust our party on the political stage and thereby made it impossible for it to pursue purely scientific aims. Nevertheless, this basic outlook runs like a red thread through all the literary productions of the party. In all of them in each particular case it is demonstrated how every time the action originated from direct material impulses, not from the phrases that accompanied the action, and how, on the contrary, the political and juristic phrases were derived from the material impulses just as much as the political actions and their results.

When, after the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, a period began in which it became more and more impossible to influence Germany from without, our party surrendered the field of emigrational quarrels—for that remained the only possible activity—to vulgar democracy. While the latter indulged in intrigues to its heart's content, and squabbled today in order to make up the day after, and the day after that again washed all its dirty linen in view of everyone—while vulgar democracy went begging through the whole of America in order immediately afterwards to stage new scandals over the division of the few pence secured—our party was glad once again to have some leisure for study. It had the great advantage of having a new scientific outlook as its theoretical basis, the working out of which kept it fully occupied; for this reason alone it could never degenerate to such an extent as the "great men" among the emigrants.

The first fruit of these studies is the book under review.

II

In a publication like the one before us there can be no question of a merely desultory criticism of separate chapters taken from political economy, of the isolated treatment of this or that disputed economic question. Rather it is from the outset constructed so as to be a systematic summing up of the whole

complex of economic science, interconnected development of the laws of bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. Since the economists are nothing but the interpreters of and apologists for these laws, this development is at the same time a criticism of the whole of economic literature.

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop a science in its own inner interconnection. The official Hegelian school had appropriated from the dialectic of the master only the manipulation of the simplest tricks, which it applied to anything and everything, often with ludicrous clumsiness. For it the whole inheritance of Hegel was limited to a mere pattern by the help of which every theme could be correctly devised, and to a compilation of words and turns of speech which had no other purpose than to be inserted at the right time when thought and positive knowledge failed them. Thus it came about that, as a Bonn professor said, these Hegelians understood nothing about anything, but could write about everything. This was certainly the case. Meanwhile, these gentlemen were, in spite of their self-complacency, so conscious of their weakness that they avoided big problems as much as possible. The old pedantic science held the field by its superiority in positive knowledge. And when Feuerbach also gave notice that he was quitting the field of speculative conceptions, Hegelianism quietly fell asleep; and it seemed as if the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun to reign anew in science.

The thing had its natural cause. After the regime of the Hegelian Diadochi,[1] which had wound up with pure phrases, there naturally followed an epoch in which the positive content of science outweighed its formal side. Germany, too, immersed itself in natural science with a quite extraordinary energy which corresponded with the powerful bourgeois development after 1848. And while these sciences in which the speculative tendency never assumed any kind of importance were in fashion, there was a recrudescence of the old metaphysical

[1] The successors of Hegel—philosophers and Hegelians—who were unable to overcome Hegelian idealism. See Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 419 *et seq.* in the present volume.—*Ed.*

manner of thinking up to and including the most extreme insipidities of Wolff.[1]

Hegel fell into oblivion; and there developed the new natural-scientific materialism which was almost indistinguishable theoretically from that of the eighteenth century, and for the most part only enjoyed the advantage of having a richer, natural-scientific material at its disposal, particularly in chemistry and physiology. The narrow, philistine mode of thought of pre-Kantian times one finds reproduced even to the most extreme triviality in Büchner and Vogt; and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, continually runs amuck in the most diverting fashion among the simplest of categories. The lumbering cart-horse of everyday bourgeois understanding naturally stopped dead in confusion before the ditch which separates essence from appearance, cause from effect. But if one goes gaily hunting over such badly broken ground as that of abstract thinking, one must not ride cart-horses.

Here, therefore, was another problem to be solved, one which had nothing to do with political economy as such. How was science to be treated? On the one hand there was the Hegelian dialectics in the wholly abstract, "speculative" form in which Hegel had bequeathed it; on the other hand there was the ordinary, essentially metaphysical Wolffian method which had again become fashionable and in which the bourgeois economists had written their fat, disjointed tomes. This latter method had been so annihilated theoretically by Kant and particularly by Hegel that only lassitude and the lack of any *simple* alternative method could make possible its continued existence in practice. On the other hand the Hegelian method was absolutely unusable in its *available* form. It was essentially idealistic, and the problem here was that of developing a world contemplation more materialistic than any previously advanced. This method started with pure thinking and here one was to start from stubborn facts.

[1] *C. Wolff* (1679-1754). German philosopher of the Enlightenment. As an example of his insipidities, Engels cites in the old introduction to *Naturdialektik* [*Dialectics of Nature*] Wolff's statement that "cats were created in order to eat mice and mice to be eaten by cats, and the whole of nature in order to demonstrate the wisdom of the creator."—*Ed.*

A method which, according to its own admission, "came from nothing, through nothing, to nothing," was in this form completely out of place here.

Nevertheless, of all the available logical material, it was the only thing which could be used, at least as a starting point. It had never been criticised, never overcome. Not one of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud structure; it fell into oblivion, because the Hegelian school had not the slightest notion what to do with it. It was, therefore, above all necessary to subject the Hegelian method to thorough-going criticism.

What distinguished Hegel's mode of thought from that of all other philosophers was the enormous historical sense upon which it was based. Abstract and idealist though it was in form, yet the development of his thoughts always proceeded in line with the development of world history and the latter was really meant to be only the test of the former. If, thereby, the real relation was inverted and stood on its head, nevertheless, the real content entered everywhere into the philosophy: all the more so since Hegel—in contrast to his disciples—did not parade ignorance, but was one of the finest intellects of all time. He was the first who attempted to show an evolution, an inner coherence, in history; and while today much in his *Philosophy of History* may seem peculiar to us, yet the grandeur of his fundamental outlook is admirable even today, whether one makes comparison with his predecessors, or with anyone who, since his time, has taken the liberty of reflecting in general concerning history. Everywhere, in his *Phenomenology, Æsthetics, History of Philosophy*, this magnificent conception of history penetrates, and everywhere this material is treated historically, in a definite, even if abstractly distorted, interconnection with history.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical prerequisite for the new materialist contemplation, and thereby already provided a connecting point for the logical method. Since this forgotten dialectics had led to such results even from the standpoint of "pure thinking," and had, in addition, so easily settled accounts with all preceding logic and

metaphysics, there must of necessity have been something more to it than sophistry and hair-splitting. But the criticism of this method, which all officially recognised philosophy had fought shy of and still does, was no trifle.

Marx was, and is, the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel which comprised Hegel's real discoveries in this sphere, and to construct the dialectical method, divested of its identical [1] trappings, in the simple shape in which it becomes the only true form of development of thought. The working out of the method which forms the foundation of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* we consider a result of hardly less importance than the basic materialist outlook itself.[2]

The criticism of economics, even according to the method secured, could still be exercised in two ways: historically or logically. Since in history, as in its literary reflection, development as a whole proceeds from the most simple to the more complex relations, the historical development of the literature of political economy provided a natural guiding thread with which criticism could link up and the economic categories as a whole would thereby appear in the same sequence as in the logical development. This form apparently has the advantage of greater clearness, since indeed it is the *actual* development that is followed, but as a matter of fact it would thereby at most become more popular. History often proceeds by jumps and zig-zags and it would in this way have to be followed everywhere, whereby not only would much material of minor importance have to be incorporated, but there would be much interruption of the chain of thought; furthermore, the history of economics could not be written without that of bourgeois society and this would make the task endless, since all preliminary work is lacking. The logical method of treatment was, therefore, the only appropriate one. But this, as a matter of

[1] This word obviously should be "idealistic."—*Ed.*

[2] The working out of the method was also achieved by Lenin. His so-called "philosophical notebooks" provide most valuable material for the materialist use of Hegelian dialectics.—*Ed.*

fact, is nothing else than the historical method; only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities. The chain of thought must begin with the same thing with which this history begins and its further course will be nothing else than the mirror-image of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form; a corrected mirror-image but corrected according to laws furnished by the real course of history itself, in that each factor can be considered at its ripest point of development, in its classic form.

In this method we proceed from the first and simplest relation that historically and in fact confronts us; here, therefore, from the first economic relation to be found. We analyse this relation. Being a *relation* already implies that it has two sides, *related to each other.* Each of these sides is considered by itself; which brings us to the way they behave to each other, their reciprocal interaction. Contradictions will result which demand a solution. But as we are not considering an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real happening which has actually taken place at some particular time, or is still taking place, these contradictions too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution, and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we shall now have to develop, and so on.

Political economy begins with *commodities*, begins from the moment when products are exchanged for one another—whether by individuals or by primitive communities. The product that appears in exchange is a commodity. It is, however, a commodity solely because a *relation* between two persons or communities, attaches to the *thing*, the product, the relation between producer and consumer who are here no longer united in the same person. Here at once we have an example of a peculiar fact, which runs through the whole of economics and which has caused utter confusion in the minds of the bourgeois economists: economics deals not with things but with relations between persons, and, in the last resort, between classes; these relations are, however, always *attached to things* and *appear as things.*

This interconnection, which in isolated cases it is true has dawned upon individual economists, was first discovered by Marx as obtaining for all political economy, whereby he made the most difficult questions so simple and clear that now even the bourgeois economists will be able to grasp them.

If now we consider commodities from their various aspects, commodities in their complete development and not as they first laboriously developed in the primitive barter between two primitive communities, they present themselves to us from the two points of view of use value and exchange value, and here we at once enter the sphere of economic dispute. Anyone who would like to have a striking illustration of the fact that the German dialectical method in its present state of elaboration is at least as superior to the old, shallow, garrulous metaphysical method as the railway is to the means of transport of the Middle Ages, should read in Adam Smith or any other reputable official economist what a torment exchange value and use value were to these gentlemen, how difficult it was for them to keep them properly apart and to comprehend each in its peculiar distinctness, and should then compare the simple, clear treatment by Marx.

After use value and exchange value have been developed, commodities are presented as the immediate unity of both, in the form in which they enter *the process of exchange.* What contradictions result here can afterwards be read on pp. 20, 21.[1] We only notice that these contradictions are not merely of abstract theoretical interest, but at the same time reflect the difficulties which emerge from the nature of the immediate exchange relations, of simple barter, reflect the impossibilities in which this first crude form of exchange necessarily terminates. The solution of these impossibilities is to be found in the fact that the property of representing the exchange value of all other commodities is transferred to a special commodity—*money.* Money or simple circulation is now developed in the second chapter, *viz.*, 1) money as the *measure of value,* in which connection the value

[1] Engels refers here to the pages of Marx's book, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.—Ed.*

measured in money, the *price*, receives its closer determination; 2) as *means of circulation* and 3) as the unity of both determinations, as *real money*, as the representative of all material bourgeois wealth. This closes the development of the first booklet, reserving the passing of money into capital for the second.

It is seen that with this method the logical development is by no means compelled to keep to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, this method requires historical illustrations, continual contact with reality. Such proofs are accordingly introduced in great variety, namely references both to the actual course of history at different stages of social development and also to the economic literature in which the clear working out of the determinations of economic relations is pursued from the beginning. The criticism of individual more or less one-sided or confused modes of conception is then in essence already given in the logical development itself and can be briefly formulated.

In a third article we shall deal with the economic content of the book itself.

FROM LETTERS ON HISTORICAL MATERIALISM[1]

MARX TO P. V. ANNENKOV

Brussels, December 28, 1846

. . . WHAT is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action. Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a corresponding social order, a corresponding organisation of the family and of

[1] The short description of the essence of historical materialism, contained in the Preface to Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* is supplemented here by a series of explanations of the question occurring in the letters of Marx and Engels.

In the letter to Annenkov (extracts from this letter are here given first of all) Marx criticised the bourgeois thinker Proudhon—a typical representative of the idealist conception of history—who was firmly convinced that in the final analysis all human life and every social order is determined by human consciousness. Against this conception, which falsifies the true state of affairs, Marx put forward the materialist conception, the only correct one, and proved that the foundation of the historical evolution of mankind lies in its material production of society.

The explanations given in this letter of the basic concepts of historical materialism, such as productive forces, relations of production, etc., are supplemented by two extracts from the letters of Marx to Engels. In his letter to Joseph Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852, Marx points again to the decisive significance of material production, as also to the important role played in his theory of history by the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In Engels' letters to a number of persons who applied to him for explanations of various questions of historical materialism, a number of

the ranks and classes, in a word a corresponding civil society.[1] Presuppose a particular civil society and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society. M. Proudhon will never understand this because he thinks he is doing something great by appealing from the state to society—that is to say from the official summary of society to official society.

It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their *productive forces*—which are the basis of all their history—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity.

The productive forces are therefore the result of practical human energy; but this energy is itself conditioned by the circumstances in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already won, by the social form which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the former generation. Because of this simple fact that every succeeding generation finds itself in possession of the productive forces won by the previous generation, which serve it as the raw material for new production, a connection arises in human history, a history of humanity takes shape which has become all the more a history of humanity since the productive forces of man and therefore his social relations have been extended. Hence it necessarily follows: the social history of men is never anything but the history of their individual development, whether they are conscious of it or not. Their material relations are the basis of all their relations. These material relations are only the

most valuable notes on separate questions are to be found. Engels gives an important place to the reciprocal influence of the superstructure on the economic foundation. He warns against a primitive, undialectical conception of historical materialism, he points out the complex reciprocal interaction which arises in the various fields of human social activity on the basis of developing social production. Both Marx and Engels continually stressed that their theory is no formula which can be simply and easily applied to all phenomena, but that it demands an accurate investigation of the actual social events. Historical materialism provides the guiding principles to which attention must be directed, it demands the investigation of the historical development of society as a concrete whole.—*Ed.*

[1] For the term "civil society," see page 355 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

necessary forms in which their material and individual activity is realised.

M. Proudhon mixes up ideas and things. Men never relinquish what they have won, but this does not mean that they never relinquish the social form in which they have acquired certain productive forces. On the contrary, in order that they may not be deprived of the result attained, and forfeit the fruits of civilisation, they are obliged, from the moment when the form of their intercourse [Fr. *commerce*] no longer corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to change all their traditional social forms. I am using the [French] word *commerce* here in its widest sense, as we use *Verkehr* in German. For example: the institution and privileges of guilds and corporations, the regulatory regime of the Middle Ages, were social relations corresponding only to the acquired productive forces and to the social condition which had previously existed and from which these institutions had arisen. Under the protection of this regime of corporations and regulations, capital was accumulated, overseas trade was developed, colonies were founded. But the fruits of this would themselves have been forfeited if men had tried to retain the forms under whose shelter these fruits had ripened. Hence came two thunder claps—the Revolutions of 1640 and 1688.[1] All the old economic forms, the social relations corresponding to them, the political conditions which were the official expression of the old civil society, were destroyed in England. Thus the economic forms in which men produce, consume, exchange, are *transitory and historical.* When new productive forces are won men change their mode of production and with the mode of production all the economic relations which are merely the necessary conditions of this particular mode of production. . . .

Monsieur Proudhon has very well grasped the fact that men produce cloth, linen, silks, and it is a great merit on his part to have grasped this small amount. What he has not grasped is that these men, according to their powers, also produce the *so-*

[1] In England.—*Ed.*

cial relations amid which they prepare cloth and linen. Still less has he understood that men, who fashion their social relations in accordance with their material productivity, also fashion *ideas* and *categories*, that is to say, the abstract ideal expression of these same social relations. Thus the categories are no more eternal than the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. For M. Proudhon, on the contrary, abstractions and categories are the primordial cause. According to him they, and not men, make history. The *abstraction*, the *category taken as such, i.e.*, apart from men and their material activities, is of course immortal, unmoved, unchangeable, it is only one form of the being of pure reason; which is only another way of saying that the abstraction as such is abstract. An admirable *tautology*!

Thus, regarded as categories, economic relations for M. Proudhon are eternal formulæ without origin or progress.

Let us put it in another way: M. Proudhon does not directly state that *bourgeois existence* is for him an *eternal verity*; he states it indirectly by deifying the categories which express bourgeois relations in the form of thought. He takes the products of bourgeois society for independent eternal existences, endowed with a life of their own, as soon as they present themselves to his mind in the form of categories, in the form of thought. So he does not rise above the bourgeois horizon. As he is operating with bourgeois ideas, the eternal truth of which he presupposes, he seeks a synthesis, an equilibrium for these ideas and does not see that the method by which they reach equilibrium at present is the only possible one.

Indeed he does what all good bourgeois do. They all tell you that in principle, that is as abstract ideas, competition, monopoly, etc., are the only basis of life, but that in practice they leave much to be desired. They all want competition without its tragic effects. They all want the impossible, namely, the conditions of bourgeois existence without the necessary consequences of those conditions. None of them understands that the bourgeois form of production is historic and transitory, just as the feudal form was. This mistake arises from the fact that

the bourgeois man is to them the only possible basis of every society; they cannot imagine a society in which men have ceased to be bourgeois.

M. Proudhon is therefore necessarily a *doctrinaire*. The historic movement which is turning the world upside down today reduces itself for him to the problem of discovering the correct equilibrium, the synthesis, of two bourgeois ideas. And so the clever fellow is able by his cunning to discover the hidden thought of God, the unity of two isolated thoughts—which are only isolated because M. Proudhon has isolated them from practical life, from present-day production, that is, from the union of realities which they express.

In place of the great historic movement arising from the conflict between the productive forces already acquired by men and their social relations, which no longer correspond to these productive forces; in place of the terrible wars which are being prepared between the different classes within each nation and between different nations; in place of the practical and violent action of the masses by which alone these conflicts can be resolved—in place of this vast, prolonged and complicated movement Monsieur Proudhon supplies the whimsical motion of his own head. So it is the men of learning, the men who know how to get God's secret thoughts out of him, who make history. The common people have only to apply their revelations. You will now understand why M. Proudhon is the declared enemy of every political movement. The solution of present problems does not lie for him in public action but in the dialectical rotations of his own mind. Since to him the categories are the moving force, it is not necessary to change practical life in order to change the categories. On the contrary, change the categories and the result will be the transformation of the actual social order.

In his desire to reconcile the contradictions Monsieur Proudhon does not even ask himself if the basis of those contradictions must not itself be overthrown. He is exactly like the political doctrinaire who will have it that the king, the chamber of deputies and the chamber of peers are integral parts of social

life, eternal categories. All he is looking for is a new formula by which to establish an equilibrium between these forces (whose equilibrium depends precisely on the actual movement in which one force is now the conqueror and now the slave of the other). Thus in the eighteenth century a number of mediocre minds were busy finding the true formula which would bring the social orders, king, nobility, parliament, etc., into equilibrium, and they woke up one morning to find that there was in fact no longer any king, nobility, parliament. The true equilibrium in this antagonism was the overthrow of all the social relations which served as a basis for these feudal existences and their antagonisms.

Because M. Proudhon places eternal ideas, the categories of pure reason, on the one side and human beings and their practical life, which according to him is the application of these categories, on the other, one finds with him from the beginning a *dualism* between life and ideas, soul and body, a dualism which recurs in many forms. You can see now that this antagonism is nothing but the incapacity of M. Proudhon to understand the profane origin and history of the categories which he deifies. . . .

Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer

London, March 5, 1852

. . . And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists, the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the *existence of classes* is only bound up with *particular, historic phases in the development of production;* 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a *classless society*. . . .[1]

[1] In a special section [3] of the second chapter of his book, *The State and Revolution*, Lenin has given a very valuable explanation of this extract from Marx's letter:

"In these words Marx succeeded in expressing with striking clarity, first

Marx to Engels

London, September 25, 1857

. . . The history of the *army* brings out more clearly than anything else the correctness of our conception of the connection between the productive forces and social relations. In general, the army is important for economic development. For instance, it was in the army that wages were first fully developed among the ancients. Similarly among the Romans the *peculium*

the chief and radical difference between his doctrine and those of the most advanced and most profound thinkers of the bourgeoisie; and, second, the essence of his doctrine of the state.

"It is often said and written that the core of Marx's theory is the class struggle; but it is not true. And from this error, very often, springs the opportunist distortion of Marxism, its falsification to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. The theory of the class struggle was *not* created by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie before Marx, and generally speaking, it is *acceptable* to the bourgeoisie. Those who recognise *only* the class struggle are not yet Marxists; those may be found to have gone no further than the boundaries of bourgeois reasoning and bourgeois politics. To limit Marxism to the theory of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, reducing it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who *extends* the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the *dictatorship of the proletariat.* This is where the profound difference lies between a Marxist and an ordinary petty (and even big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the *real* understanding and acceptance of Marxism should be tested. And it is not surprising that when the history of Europe brought the working class face to face with this question in a *practical* way, not only all the opportunists and reformists, but all the Kautskyists (those who vacillate between reformism and Marxism) proved to be miserable philistines and petty-bourgeois democrats who *repudiated* the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, published in August 1918, *i.e.*, long after the first edition of the present pamphlet, is an example of the petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it *in practice* while hypocritically recognising it *in words.* (See my pamphlet, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Petrograd and Moscow, 1918.)

"Present-day opportunism in the person of its principal representative, the ex-Marxist, K. Kautsky, fits in completely with Marx's characterisation of the *bourgeois* position as quoted above, for this opportunism limits the field of recognition of the class struggle to the realm of bourgeois relationships. (Within this realm, within its framework, not a single educated liberal will refuse to recognise the class struggle "in principle"! Opportunism *does not carry* the recognition of class struggle to the main point,

castrense[1] was the first legal form in which the right of others than fathers of families to moveable property was recognised. So also the guild system among the corporation of *fabri* [smiths]. Here too the first use of machinery on a large scale. Even the special value of metals and their use as money appears to have been originally based—as soon as Grimm's stone age was passed—on their military significance. The division of labour *within* one branch was also first carried out in the armies. The whole history of the forms of bourgeois society is very strikingly epitomised here. When you can find time you must work the thing out from this point of view. . . .

Marx to Engels

London, July 7, 1866

. . . Is there anywhere where our theory that the *organisation of labour is determined by the means of production* is more brilliantly confirmed than in the human slaughter industry? It would really be worth while for you to write something about it (I have not the necessary knowledge) which I could insert under your name as an appendix to my book. Think this over. But if it is to be done it must be done for the first volume,

to the period of *transition* from capitalism to communism, to the period of the *overthrow* and complete abolition of the bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably becomes a period of unusually violent class struggles in their sharpest possible forms and, therefore, during this period, the state must inevitably be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (for the proletariat and the propertyless in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (against the bourgeoisie).

"To proceed. The essence of Marx's doctrine of the state is assimilated only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a *single* class is necessary not only for class society in general, not only for the *proletariat* which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but for the entire *historical period* between capitalism and "classless society," communism. The forms of the bourgeois state are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same: in one way or another, in the last analysis, all these states are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.* The transition from capitalism to communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there will inevitably be only one: *the dictatorship of the proletariat.*"—*Ed.*

[1] The separate property (as distinguished from family property) which the Roman soldier acquired in camp.—*Ed.*

where I deal with this subject *ex professo* [professionally.] You will understand what great pleasure it would give me if you were also to appear as a direct collaborator in my chief work (hitherto I have only done small things) instead of merely through quotations. . . .

Engels to Conrad Schmidt

August 5, 1890

In general the word *materialistic* serves many of the younger writers in Germany as a mere phrase with which anything and everything is labelled without further study, *i.e.*, they stick on this label and then think the question disposed of. But our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelians. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be individually examined before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-legal, æsthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., notions corresponding to them. Only a little has been done here up to now because only a few people have got down to it seriously. In this field we can utilise masses of help, it is immensely big and anyone who will work seriously can achieve a lot and distinguish himself. But instead of this only too many of the younger Germans simply make use of the phrase historical materialism (and *everything* can be turned into a phrase) in order to get their own relatively scanty historical knowledge (for economic history is still in its cradle!) fitted together into a neat system as quickly as possible and they then think themselves something very tremendous. . . .

You, who have really done something, must have noticed yourself how few of the young literary men who fasten themselves on to the Party give themselves the trouble to study economics, the history of economics, the history of trade, of industry, of agriculture, of the formations of society. How many know anything of Maurer[1] except his name!

[1]Maurer, Georg Ludwig von (1790-1872). Investigator of the peasant "Mark," whose work Engels valued very highly and closely studied.— *Ed.*

The shamelessness of the journalist must accomplish everything here, and the result corresponds. It often seems as if these gentlemen think anything is good enough for the workers. If these gentlemen only knew how Marx thought his best things were still not good enough for the workers and how he regarded it as a crime to offer the workers anything less than the very best! . . .

Engels to Joseph Bloch[1]

London, September 21, 1890

According to the materialist conception of history the determining element in history is *ultimately* the production and reproduction in real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc.—forms of law—and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the combatants: political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas and their further development into systems of dogma—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless *host* of accidents (*i.e.*, of things and events, whose inner connection is so remote or so impossible to prove that we regard it as absent and can neglect it) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history one chose would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.

[1] This letter is an answer to the question: how do Marx and Engels understand the basic principle of the materialist conception of history? According to their conception, is the determining factor in the final analysis *only* production and reproduction in actual life or is this only the basis for all other relations, which themselves exert a further influence?—*Ed.*

We make our own history, but in the first place under very definite presuppositions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are finally decisive. But the political, etc., ones, and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one. The Prussian state arose and developed from historical, ultimately from economic causes. But it could scarcely be maintained without pedantry that among the many small states of North Germany, Brandenburg was specifically determined by economic necessity to become the great power embodying the economic, linguistic and, after the Reformation, also the religious difference between north and south and not by other elements as well (above all by its entanglement with Poland, owing to the possession of Prussia, and hence with international, political relations—which were indeed also decisive in the formation of the Austrian dynastic power). Without making oneself ridiculous it would be difficult to succeed in explaining in terms of economics the existence of every small state in Germany, past and present, or the origin of the High German consonant mutations, which the geographical wall of partition formed by the mountains from the Sudetic range to the Taunus extended to a regular division throughout Germany.

In the second place, however, history makes itself in such a way that the final result always arises from conflicts between many individual wills, of which each again has been made what it is by a host of particular conditions of life. Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which give rise to one resultant—the historical event. This again may itself be viewed as the product of a power which, taken as a whole, works *unconsciously* and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed. Thus past history proceeds in the manner of a natural process and is also essentially subject to the same laws of movement. But from the fact that individual wills—of which each desires what he is impelled to by his physical constitution and external, in the last resort economic, circumstances (either his own personal circumstances or those of society in general)—do not attain

what they want, but are merged into a collective mean, a common resultant, it must not be concluded that their value = 0. On the contrary, each contributes to the resultant and is to this degree involved in it.

I would ask you to study this theory further from its original sources and not at second-hand, it is really much easier. Marx hardly wrote anything in which it did not play a part. But especially *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is a most excellent example of its application. There are also many allusions in *Capital.* Then I may also direct you to my writings: *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, in which I have given the most detailed account of historical materialism which, so far as I know, exists.

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasise this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights. But when it was a case of presenting a section of history, that is, of a practical application, the thing was different and there no error was possible. Unfortunately, however, it happens only too often that people think they have fully understood a theory and can apply it without more ado from the moment they have mastered its main principles, and those even not always correctly. And I cannot exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from this reproach, for the most wonderful rubbish has been produced from this quarter too.

Engels to Conrad Schmidt

London, October 27, 1890

. . . The thing[1] is easiest to grasp from the point of view of the division of labour. Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with. The persons selected for

[1] The preceding part of the letter deals with the relations beween the money market, trade and production.—*Ed.*

these functions form a new branch of the division of labour *within society*. This gives them particular interests, distinct too from the interests of those who gave them their office; they make themselves independent of the latter and—the state is in being. And now the development is the same as it was with commodity trade and later with money trade; the new independent power, while having in the main to follow the movement of production, also, owing to its inward independence, the relative independence originally transferred to it and gradually further developed, reacts in its turn upon the conditions and course of production. It is the interaction of two unequal forces: on one hand the economic movement, on the other the new political power, which strives for as much independence as possible, and which, having once been established, is also endowed with a movement of its own. On the whole, the economic movement gets its way, but it has also to suffer reactions from the political movement which it established and endowed with relative independence itself, from the movement of the state power on the one hand and of the opposition simultaneously engendered on the other. Just as the movement of the industrial market is, in the main and with the reservations already indicated, reflected in the money market and, of course, in inverted form, so the struggle between the classes already existing and already in conflict with one another is reflected in the struggle between government and opposition, but also in inverted form, no longer directly but indirectly, not as a class struggle but as a fight for political principles, and so distorted that it has taken us thousands of years to get behind it again.

The reaction of the state power upon economic development can be one of three kinds: it can run in the same direction, and then development is more rapid; it can oppose the line of development, in which case nowadays state power in every great nation will go to pieces in the long run; or it can cut off the economic development from certain paths, and impose on it certain others. This case ultimately reduces itself to one of the two previous ones. But it is obvious that in cases two and three the political power can do great damage to the economic development and

result in the squandering of great masses of energy and material.

Then there is also the case of the conquest and brutal destruction of economic resources, by which, in certain circumstances, a whole local or national economic development could formerly be ruined. Nowadays such a case usually has the opposite effect, at least among great nations: in the long run the defeated power often gains more economically, politically and morally than the victor.

It is similar with law. As soon as the new division of labour which creates professional lawyers becomes necessary, another new and independent sphere is opened up which, for all its general dependence on production and trade, still has its own capacity for reacting upon these spheres as well. In a modern state, law must not only correspond to the general economic position and be its expression, but must also be an expression which is *consistent in itself*, and which does not, owing to inner contradictions, look glaringly inconsistent. And in order to achieve this, the faithful reflection of economic conditions is more and more infringed upon. All the more so the more rarely it happens that a code of law is the blunt, unmitigated, unadulterated expression of the domination of a class—this in itself would already offend the "conception of justice." Even in the Code Napoleon the pure logical conception of justice held by the revolutionary bourgeoisie of 1792-96 is already adulterated in many ways, and in so far as it is embodied there has daily to undergo all sorts of attenuation owing to the rising power of the proletariat. Which does not prevent the Code Napoleon from being the statute book which serves as a basis for every new code of law in every part of the world. Thus to a great extent the course of the "development of law" only consists: first in the attempt to do away with the contradictions arising from the direct translation of economic relations into legal principles, and to establish a harmonious system of law, and then in the repeated breaches made in this system by the influence and pressure of further economic development, which involves it in further contradictions (I am only speaking here of civil law for the moment).

The reflection of economic relations as legal principles is necessarily also a topsy turvy one: it happens without the person who is acting being conscious of it; the jurist imagines he is operating with *a priori* principles, whereas they are really only economic reflexes; so everything is upside down. And it seems to me obvious that this inversion, which, so long as it remains unrecognised, forms what we call *ideological conception*, reacts in its turn upon the economic basis and may, within certain limits, modify it. The basis of the law of inheritance—assuming that the stages reached in the development of the family are equal—is an economic one. But it would be difficult to prove, for instance, that the absolute liberty of the testator in England and the severe restrictions imposed upon him in France are only due in every detail to economic causes. Both react back, however, on the economic sphere to a very considerable extent, because they influence the division of property.

As to the realms of ideology which soar still higher in the air, religion, philosophy, etc., these have a prehistoric stock, found already in existence and taken over in the historic period, of what we should today call bunk. These various false conceptions of nature, of man's own being, of spirits, magic forces, etc., have for the most part only a negative economic basis; but the low economic development of the prehistoric period is supplemented and also partially conditioned and even caused by the false conceptions of nature. And even though economic necessity was the main driving force of the progressive knowledge of nature and becomes ever more so, it would surely be pedantic to try and find economic causes for all this primitive nonsense. The history of science is the history of the gradual clearing away of this nonsense or of its replacement by fresh but already less absurd nonsense. The people who deal with this belong in their turn to special spheres in the division of labour and appear to themselves to be working in an independent field. And in so far as they form an independent group within the social division of labour, in so far do their productions, including their errors, react back as an influence upon the whole development of society, even on its economic

development. But all the same they themselves remain under the dominating influence of economic development. In philosophy, for instance, this can be most readily proved in the bourgeois period. Hobbes was the first modern materialist (in the eighteenth century sense) but he was an absolutist in a period when absolute monarchy was at its height throughout the whole of Europe and when the fight of absolute monarchy versus the people was beginning in England. Locke, both in religion and politics, was the child of the class compromise of 1688. The English deists and their more consistent successors, the French materialists, were the true philosophers of the bourgeoisie, the French even of the bourgeois revolution. The German petty bourgeois runs through German philosophy from Kant to Hegel, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively. But the philosophy of every epoch, since it is a definite sphere in the division of labour, has as its presupposition certain definite intellectual material handed down to it by its predecessors, from which it takes its start. And that is why economically backward countries can still play first fiddle in philosophy: France in the eighteenth century compared with England, on whose philosophy the French based themselves, and later Germany in comparison with both. But the philosophy both of France and Germany and the general blossoming of literature at that time were also the result of a rising economic development. I consider the ultimate supremacy of economic development established in these spheres too, but it comes to pass within conditions imposed by the particular sphere itself: in philosophy, for instance, through the operation of economic influences (which again generally only act under political, etc., disguises) upon the existing philosophic material handed down by predecessors. Here economy creates nothing absolutely new (*a novo*), but it determines the way in which the existing material of thought is altered and further developed, and that too for the most part indirectly, for it is the political, legal and moral reflexes which exercise the greatest direct influence upon philosophy.

About religion I have said the most necessary things in the last section on Feuerbach.

If therefore Barth supposes that we deny any and every reaction of the political, etc., reflexes of the economic movement upon the movement itself, he is simply tilting at windmills. He has only got to look at Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*, which deals almost exclusively with the *particular* part played by political struggles and events, of course, within their general dependence upon economic conditions. Or *Capital*, the section on the working day, for instance, where legislation, which is surely a political act, has such a trenchant effect. Or the section on the history of the bourgeoisie. (Chapter XXIV.) Or why do we fight for the political dictatorship of the proletariat if political power is economically impotent? Force (that is state power) is also an economic power.

But I have no time to criticise the book now. I must first get Volume III out and besides I think too that Bernstein, for instance, could deal with it quite effectively.

What these gentlemen all lack is dialectic. They never see anything but here cause and there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction, that such metaphysical polar opposites only exist in the real world during crises, while the whole vast process proceeds in the form of interaction (though of very unequal forces, the economic movement being by far the strongest, most elemental and most decisive) and that here everything is relative and nothing is absolute—this they never begin to see. Hegel has never existed for them. . . .

Engels to Franz Mehring [1]

London, July 14, 1893

. . . Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously indeed but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines

[1] The impulse to this letter was provided by Mehring's article "On Historical Materialism" published as an appendix to his book, *Die Lessing-legende* [*The Lessing Legend*]. In this article, Mehring mentions the work of the idealist Barth: *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer bis auf Marx und Hartmann* [*The Philosophy of History of Hegel and the Hegelians, down to Marx and Hartmann*].—*Ed.*

false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because, as all action is produced through the medium of thought, it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres—political, juridical, philosophical, theological—belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit presupposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.

It is above all this appearance of an independent history of state constitutions, of systems of law, of ideological conceptions in every separate domain, which dazzles most people. If Luther and Calvin "overcome" the official Catholic religion or Hegel "overcomes" Fichte and Kant or if the constitutional Montesquieu is indirectly "overcome" by Rousseau with his "Social Contract," each of these events remains within the sphere of theology, philosophy or political science, represents a stage in the history of these particular spheres of thought and never passes outside the sphere of thought. And since the bourgeois illusion of the eternity and the finality of capitalist production has been added as well, even the victory of the physiocrats and Adam Smith over the mercantilists is accounted as a sheer victory of thought; not as the reflection in thought of changed economic facts but as the finally achieved correct understanding of actual

conditions subsisting always and everywhere—in fact if Richard Cœur-de-Lion and Philip Augustus had introduced free trade instead of getting mixed up in the crusades we should have been spared five hundred years of misery and stupidity.

This side of the matter, which I can only indicate here, we have all, I think, neglected more than it deserves. It is the old story: form is always neglected at first for content. As I say, I have done that too and the mistake has always only struck me later. So I am not only far from reproaching you with this in any way, but as the older of the guilty parties I have no right to do so, on the contrary; but I would like all the same to draw your attention to this point for the future. Hanging together with this too is the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any effect upon history. The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregarding of interaction; these gentlemen often almost deliberately forget that once a historic element has been brought into the world by other elements, ultimately by economic facts, it also reacts in its turn and may react on its environment and even on its own causes. *E.g.*, Barth on the priesthood and religion on your page 475.[1]

[1] In the section of the article to which Engels refers, Mehring gives an extract from Barth's work, *The Philosophy of History of Hegel and the Hegelians, down to Marx and Hartmann,* as follows:

> "In the East there was created everywhere by religion a specially privileged priesthood which was freed from physical labour and set apart for spiritual activity by the obligation of tribute laid on the other orders.
>
> "While in Greek and Roman civilisation the activity of the priests was seldom relegated to special organs, Christianity returned to the oriental differentiation, created a special order of priests which it equipped abundantly and thus set apart a part of the economic wealth as the material substrate for religious activity which quickly became a general mental activity."

Mehring further quotes a passage from Marx's *Capital* which explains the economic cause of the prominent role of the priests in ancient Egyptian economy: "The necessity of calculating the periods of the movement of the Nile created Egyptian astronomy and with it the dominance of the priest classes as the leader of agriculture." (*Capital*, Vol. I.)—*Ed.*

Engels to Heinz Starkenburg [1]

London, January 25, 1894

1. What we understand by the economic conditions which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society are the methods by which human beings in a given society produce their means of subsistence and exchange the products among themselves (in so far as division of labour exists). Thus the *entire technique* of production and transport is here included. According to our conception this technique also determines the method of exchange and, further, the division of products and with it, after the dissolution of tribal society, the division into classes also and hence the relations of lordship and servitude and with them the state, politics, law, etc. Under economic conditions are further included the geographical basis in which they operate and those remnants of earlier stages of economic development which have actually been transmitted and have survived—often only through tradition or the force of inertia; also of course the external milieu which surrounds this form of society.

If, as you say, technique largely depends on the state of science, science depends far more still on the *state* and the *requirements* of technique. If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universities. The whole of hydrostatics (Torricelli, etc.) was called forth by the necessity for regulating the mountain streams of Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We have only known anything reasonable about electricity since its technical applicability was discovered. But unfortunately it has become the custom in Germany to write the history of the sciences as if they had fallen from the skies.

2. We regard economic conditions as the factor which ultimately determines historical development. But race is itself an

[1] In this letter, Engels answers two questions: 1) How do economic relations have a causal effect? Are they an adequate cause, basis, agency, permanent condition, etc., for development? 2) What is the role played by the race factor and historical individuality?—*Ed.*

economic factor. Here, however, two points must not be overlooked:

a) Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is not that the economic position is the *cause and alone active*, while everything else only has a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of the economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself. The state, for instance, exercises an influence by tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system; and even the deadly inanition and impotence of the German petty bourgeois, arising from the miserable economic position of Germany from 1648 to 1830 and expressing itself at first in pietism, then in sentimentality and cringing servility to princes and nobles, was not without economic effect. It was one of the greatest hindrances to recovery and was not shaken until the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars made the chronic misery an acute one. So it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that the economic position produces an automatic effect. Men make their history themselves, only in given surroundings which condition it and on the basis of actual relations already existing, among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced by the other political and ideological ones, are still ultimately the decisive ones, forming the red thread which runs through them and alone leads to understanding.

b) Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will or according to a collective plan or even in a definitely defined, given society. Their efforts clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by *necessity*, which is supplemented by and appears under the forms of *accident*. The necessity which here asserts itself amidst all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. This is where the so-called great men come in for treatment. That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at that particular time in that given country is of course pure accident. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute

will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own war, had rendered necessary, was an accident; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are the proof that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan [1] proves that the time was ripe for it and that indeed it *had* to be discovered.

So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history. The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run in a zig-zag. But if you plot the average axis of the curve, you will find that the axis of this curve will approach more and more nearly parallel to the axis of the curve of economic development the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.

In Germany the greatest hindrance to correct understanding is the irresponsible neglect by literature of economic history. It is so hard, not only to disaccustom oneself of the ideas of history drilled into one at school, but still more to rake up the necessary material for doing so. Who, for instance, has read old G. von Gülich,[2] whose dry collection of material nevertheless

[1] The work of the American savant, Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress, from Savagery, through Barbarism, to Civilisation*, appeared in 1877. Engels says in his preface to *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*: "It is Morgan's great merit to have discovered and restored the main features of this prehistorical foundation of our written history and to have found in the sex linkages of the North American Indians the key which unlocks the most important, hitherto insoluble riddles of the most ancient Greek, Roman and German history.—*Ed.*

[2] G. von Gülich: *Historical Account of the Trade, Industry and Agriculture of the Most Important Commercial States of Our Time* (1830).—*Ed.*

contains so much stuff for the clarification of innumerable political facts!

For the rest, the fine example which Marx has given in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* should already, I think, provide you fairly well with information on your questions, just because it is a practical example. I have also, I believe, already touched on most of the points in *Anti-Dühring* I, Chapters 9-11, and II, 2-4, as well as in III, I, or introduction, and then in the last section of *Feuerbach*. . . .[1]

[1] At the conclusion of this letter Engels requests that special importance should not be attached to the actual wording but that rather chief attention should be given to the ideas as a whole. He did not have time, he said, to work out everything as exactly and carefully as was necessary for publication.—*Ed.*

ON HISTORICAL MATERIALISM [1]

I AM perfectly aware that the contents of this work will meet with objection from a considerable portion of the British public. But if we Continentals had taken the slightest notice of the prejudices of British "respectability," we should be even worse off than we are. This book defends what we call "historical materialism," and the word materialism grates upon the ears of the immense majority of British readers. "Agnosticism" [2] might be tolerated, but materialism is utterly inadmissible.

And yet the original home of all modern materialism, from the seventeenth century onwards, is England.

"Materialism is the natural-born son of Great Britain. Already the British schoolman, Duns Scotus, asked, 'whether it was impossible for matter to think?'

"In order to effect this miracle, he took refuge in God's omnipotence, *i.e.*, he made theology preach materialism. Moreover, he was a nominalist. Nominalism,[3] the first form of materialism, is chiefly found among the English schoolmen.

"The real progenitor of English materialism is Bacon. To him natural philosophy is the only true philosophy, and physics

[1] This article of Engels is a part of his English Introduction to the pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The beginning of this introduction is to be found on p. 137 of the present volume and the immediate continuation and remaining part appears here. It is given as a separate article with the title as above because it was published as such by Engels himself in the German organ, the *Neue Zeit*, 1892-93. Vol. I.—*Ed.*

[2] *Agnosticism* is derived from the Greek prefix *a* = not, and *gnosis* = knowing. The agnostic says: *I do not know* whether there is an objective reality which is reflected by our senses, *i.e.*, he refuses openly to acknowledge materialism. For the bourgeois savants, agnosticism represents a partial recognition of materialism.—*Ed.*

[3] *Nominalism* is derived from the Latin *nomen* = name and is a school of mediæval philosophy whose adherents maintained that concepts are only

based upon the experience of the senses is the chiefest part of natural philosophy. Anaxagoras and his homœomeriæ, Democritus and his atoms, he often quotes as his authorities. According to him the senses are infallible and the source of all knowledge. All science is based on experience, and consists in subjecting the data furnished by the senses to a rational method of investigation. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation, experiment, are the principal forms of such a rational method. Among the qualities inherent in matter, motion is the first and foremost, not only in the form of mechanical and mathematical motion, but chiefly in the form of an impulse, a vital spirit, a tension—or a 'qual,' to use a term of Jacob Böhme's [1]—of matter.

"In Bacon, its first creator, materialism still occludes within itself the germs of a many-sided development. On the one hand, matter, surrounded by a sensuous, poetic glamour, seems to attract man's whole entity by winning smiles. On the other, the aphoristically formulated doctrine pullulates with inconsistencies imported from theology.

"In its further evolution, materialism becomes onesided. Hobbes is the man who systematises Baconian materialism. Knowledge based upon the senses loses its poetic blossom, it passes into the abstract experience of the mathematician; geometry is proclaimed as the queen of sciences. Materialism takes to misanthropy. If it is to overcome its opponent, misanthropic, fleshless spiritualism, and that on the latter's own ground, materialism has to chastise its own flesh and turn ascetic. Thus, from a sensual, it passes into an intellectual entity; but thus, too,

names of things themselves, that ideas and concepts had no independent existence. In contrast to Nominalism, another school—that of Realism—took up the point of view that concepts are real in themselves. In this way the second school expressed the standpoint of idealism.—*Ed.*

[1] "Qual" is a philosophical play upon words. Qual literally means torture, a pain which drives to action of some kind; at the same time the mystic Böhme puts into the German word something of the meaning of the Latin *qualitas;* his "qual" was the activating principle arising from and promoting in its turn, the spontaneous development of the thing, relation, or person subject to it, in contradistinction to a pain inflicted from without. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

it evolves all the consistency, regardless of consequences, characteristic of the intellect.

"Hobbes, as Bacon's continuator, argues thus: if all human knowledge is furnished by the senses, then our concepts and ideas are but the phantoms, divested of their sensual forms, of the real world. Philosophy can but give names to these phantoms. One name may be applied to more than one of them. There may even be names of names. It would imply a contradiction if, on the one hand, we maintained that all ideas had their origin in the world of sensation, and, on the other, that a word was more than a word; that besides the beings known to us by our senses, beings which are one and all individuals, there existed also beings of a general, not individual, nature. An unbodily substance is the same absurdity as an unbodily body. Body, being, substance, are but different terms for the same reality. *It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks.* This matter is the substratum of all changes going on in the world. The word infinite is meaningless, unless it states that our mind is capable of performing an endless process of addition. Only material things being perceptible to us, we cannot know anything about the existence of God. My own existence alone is certain. Every human passion is a mechanical movement which has a beginning and an end. The objects of impulse are what we call good. Man is subject to the same laws as nature. Power and freedom are identical.

"Hobbes had systematised Bacon, without, however, furnishing a proof for Bacon's fundamental principle, the origin of all human knowledge from the world of sensation. It was Locke who, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, supplied this proof.

"Hobbes had shattered the theistic prejudices of Baconian materialism; Collins, Dodwall, Coward, Hartley, Priestley similarly shattered the last theological bars that still hemmed in Locke's sensationalism. At all events, for practical materialists, theism is but an easy-going way of getting rid of religion."[1]

[1] Marx and Engels, *Die Heilige Familie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1845, pp. 201-04 [*Note by F. Engels.*]

Thus Karl Marx wrote about the British origin of modern materialism. If Englishmen nowadays do not exactly relish the compliment he paid their ancestors, more's the pity. It is none the less undeniable that Bacon, Hobbes and Locke are the fathers of that brilliant school of French materialists which made the eighteenth century, in spite of all battles on land and sea won over Frenchmen by Germans and Englishmen, a pre-eminently French century, even before that crowning French Revolution, the results of which we outsiders, in England as well as in Germany, are still trying to acclimatise.

There is no denying it. About the middle of this century, what struck every cultivated foreigner who set up his residence in England was what he was then bound to consider the religious bigotry and stupidity of the English respectable middle class. We, at that time, were all materialists, or, at least, very advanced freethinkers, and to us it appeared inconceivable that almost all educated people in England should believe in all sorts of impossible miracles and that even geologists like Buckland and Mantell should contort the facts of their science so as not to clash too much with the myths of the book of Genesis while, in order to find people who dared to use their own intellectual faculties with regard to religious matters, you had to go amongst the uneducated, the "great unwashed," as they were then called, the working people, especially the Owenite socialists.

But England has been "civilised" since then. The exhibition of 1851 sounded the knell of English insular exclusiveness. England became gradually internationalised, in diet, in manners, in ideas; so much so that I begin to wish that some English manners and customs had made as much headway on the Continent as other Continental habits have made here. Anyhow, the introduction and spread of salad oil (before 1851 known only to the aristocracy) has been accompanied by a fatal spread of Continental scepticism in matters religious, and it has come to this, that agnosticism, though not yet considered "the thing" quite as much as the Church of England, is yet very nearly on a par, as far as respectability goes, with

Baptism, and decidedly ranks above the Salvation Army. And I cannot help believing that under these circumstances it will be consoling to many, who sincerely regret and condemn this progress of infidelity, to learn that these "new-fangled notions" are not of foreign origin, are not "made in Germany," like so many other articles of daily use, but are undoubtedly Old English, and that their British originators two hundred years ago went a good deal further than their descendants now dare to venture.

What, indeed, is agnosticism, but, to use an expressive Lancashire term, "shamefaced" materialism? The agnostic's conception of nature is materialistic throughout. The entire natural world is governed by law, and absolutely excludes the intervention of action from without. But, he adds, we have no means either of ascertaining or of disproving the existence of some supreme being beyond the known universe. Now, this might hold good at the time when Laplace, to Napoleon's question, why in the great astronomers' *Mécanique céleste* the Creator was not even mentioned, proudly replied: "*Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse.*" But nowadays, in our evolutionary conception of the universe, there is absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler; and to talk of a supreme being shut out from the whole existing world implies a contradiction in terms, and as it seems to me, a gratuitous insult to the feelings of religious people.

Again, our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based upon the information imparted to us by our senses. But, he adds, how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? And he proceeds to inform us that, whenever he speaks of objects or their qualities, he does in reality not mean these objects and qualities, of which he cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on his senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action. *Im Anfang war die That.* And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented

it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, *so far,* agree with reality outside ourselves. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them—what we call defective reasoning. So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense perceptions of it.

But then come the Neo-Kantian agnostics and say: We may correctly perceive the qualities of a thing, but we cannot by any sensible or mental process grasp the thing-in-itself. This "thing-in-itself" is beyond our ken. To this Hegel, long since, has replied: If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and when your senses have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing-in-itself, Kant's celebrated unknowable *Ding an sich.* To which it may be added, that in Kant's time our knowledge of natural objects

was indeed so fragmentary that he might well suspect, behind the little we knew about each of them, a mysterious "thing-in-itself." But one after another these ungraspable things have been grasped, analysed, and, what is more, *reproduced* by the giant progress of science; and what we can produce, we certainly cannot consider as unknowable. To the chemistry of the first half of this century organic substances were such mysterious objects; now we learn to build them up one after another from their chemical elements without the aid of organic processes. Modern chemists declare that as soon as the chemical constitution of no matter what body is known, it can be built up from its elements. We are still far from knowing the constitution of the highest organic substances, the albuminous bodies; but there is no reason why we should not, if only after centuries, arrive at that knowledge and, armed with it, produce artificial albumen. But if we arrive at that, we shall at the same time have produced organic life, for life, from its lowest to its highest forms, is but the normal mode of existence of albuminous bodies.

As soon, however, as our agnostic has made these formal mental reservations, he talks and acts as the rank materialist he at bottom is. He may say that, as far as *we* know, matter and motion, or as it is now called, energy, can neither be created nor destroyed, but that we have no proof of their not having been created at some time or other. But if you try to use this admission against him in any particular case, he will quickly put you out of court. If he admits the possibility of spiritualism *in abstracto*, he will have none of it *in concreto*. As far as we know and can know, he will tell you there is no Creator and no Ruler of the universe; as far as we are concerned, matter and energy can neither be created nor annihilated; for us, mind is a mode of energy, a function of the brain; all we know is that the material world is governed by immutable laws, and so forth. Thus, as far as he is a scientific man, as far as he *knows* anything, he is a materialist; outside his science, in spheres about which he knows nothing, he translates his ignorance into Greek and calls it agnosticism.

At all events, one thing seems clear: even if I was an

agnostic, it is evident that I could not describe the conception of history sketched out in this little book, as "historical agnosticism." Religious people would laugh at me, agnostics would indignantly ask, was I going to make fun of them? And thus I hope even British respectability will not be overshocked if I use, in English, as well as in so many other languages the term "historical materialism," to designate that view of the course of history, which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another.

This indulgence will perhaps be accorded to me all the sooner if I show that historical materialism may be of advantage even to British respectability. I have mentioned the fact that, about forty or fifty years ago, any cultivated foreigner settling in England was struck by what he was then bound to consider the religious bigotry and stupidity of the English respectable middle class. I am now going to prove that the respectable English middle class of that time was not quite as stupid as it looked to the intelligent foreigner. Its religious leanings can be explained.

When Europe emerged from the Middle Ages, the rising middle class of the towns constituted its revolutionary element. It had conquered a recognised position within mediæval feudal organisation, but this position, also, had become too narrow for its expansive power. The development of the middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, became incompatible with the maintenance of the feudal system; the feudal system, therefore, had to fall.

But the great international centre of feudalism was the Roman Catholic Church. It united the whole of feudalised Western Europe, in spite of all internal wars, into one grand political system, opposed as much to the schismatic Greeks as to the Mohammedan countries. It surrounded feudal institutions with the halo of divine consecration. It had organised its own hierarchy on the feudal model, and, lastly, it was itself by far the most powerful feudal lord, holding, as it did, fully one-third of the soil of the Catholic world. Before profane feudalism

could be successfully attacked in each country and in detail, this, its sacred central organisation, had to be destroyed.

Moreover, parallel with the rise of the middle class went on the great revival of science; astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy, physiology, were again cultivated. And the bourgeoisie, for the development of its industrial production, required a science which ascertained the physical properties of natural objects and the modes of action of the forces of nature. Now up to then science had but been the humble handmaid of the Church, had not been allowed to overstep the limits set by faith, and for that reason had been no science at all. Science rebelled against the Church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and, therefore, had to join in the rebellion.

The above, though touching but two of the points where the rising middle class was bound to come into collision with the established religion, will be sufficient to show, first, that the class most directly interested in the struggle against the pretensions of the Roman Church was the bourgeoisie; and second, that every struggle against feudalism, at that time, had to take on a religious disguise, had to be directed against the Church in the first instance. But if the universities and the traders of the cities started the cry, it was sure to find, and did find, a strong echo in the masses of the country people, the peasants, who everywhere had to struggle for their very existence with their feudal lords, spiritual and temporal.

The long fight of the bourgeoisie against feudalism culminated in three great decisive battles.

The first was what is called the Protestant Reformation in Germany. The war-cry raised against the Church by Luther was responded to by two insurrections of a political nature: first, that of the lower nobility under Franz von Sickingen (1523), then the great Peasants' War, 1525. Both were defeated, chiefly in consequence of the indecision of the parties most interested, the burghers of the towns—an indecision into the causes of which we cannot here enter. From that moment the struggle degenerated into a fight between the local princes and the central power, and ended by blotting out Germany, for two

hundred years, from the politically active nations of Europe. The Lutheran Reformation produced a new creed indeed, a religion adapted to absolute monarchy. No sooner were the peasants of Northeast Germany converted to Lutheranism than they were from freemen reduced to serfs.

But where Luther failed, Calvin won the day. Calvin's creed was one fit for the boldest of the bourgeoisie of his time. His predestination doctrine was the religious expression of the fact that in the commercial world of competition success or failure does not depend upon a man's activity or cleverness, but upon circumstances uncontrollable by him. It is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of the mercy of unknown superior economic powers; and this was especially true at a period of economic revolution, when all old commercial routes and centres were replaced by new ones, when India and America were opened to the world, and when even the most sacred economic articles of faith—the value of gold and silver—began to totter and to break down. Calvin's church constitution was thoroughly democratic and republican; and where the kingdom of God was republicanised, could the kingdoms of this world remain subject to monarchs, bishops and lords? While German Lutheranism became a willing tool in the hands of princes, Calvinism founded a republic in Holland and active republican parties in England, and, above all, Scotland.

In Calvinism, the second great bourgeois upheaval found its doctrine ready cut and dried. This upheaval took place in England. The middle class of the towns brought it on, and the yeomanry of the country districts fought it out. Curiously enough, in all the three great bourgeois risings, the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting; and the peasantry is just the class that, the victory once gained, is most surely ruined by the economic consequences of that victory. A hundred years after Cromwell, the yeomanry of England had almost disappeared. Anyhow, had it not been for that yeomanry and for the *plebeian* element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold. In order

to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the time, the revolution had to be carried considerably further—exactly as in 1793 in France and 1848 in Germany. This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society.

Well, upon this excess of revolutionary activity there necessarily followed the inevitable reaction which in its turn went beyond the point where it might have maintained itself. After a series of oscillations, the new centre of gravity was at last attained and became a new starting point. The grand period of English history, known to respectability under the name of "the Great Rebellion," and the struggles succeeding it, were brought to a close by the comparatively puny event entitled by Liberal historians, "the Glorious Revolution."

The new starting point was a compromise between the rising middle class and the ex-feudal landowners. The latter, though called, as now, the aristocracy, had been long since on the way which led them to become what Louis Philippe in France became at a much later period, "the first bourgeois of the kingdom." Fortunately for England, the old feudal barons had killed one another during the Wars of the Roses. Their successors, though mostly scions of the old families, had been so much out of the direct line of descent that they constituted quite a new body, with habits and tendencies far more bourgeois than feudal. They fully understood the value of money, and at once began to increase their rents by turning hundreds of small farmers out and replacing them by sheep. Henry VIII, while squandering the Church lands, created fresh bourgeois landlords by wholesale; the innumerable confiscations of estates, regranted to absolute or relative upstarts, and continued during the whole of the seventeenth century, had the same result. Consequently, ever since Henry VII, the English "aristocracy," far from counteracting the development of industrial production, had, on the contrary, sought to indirectly profit thereby; and there had always been a section of the great landowners willing, from economical or political reasons, to co-operate with the leading men of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie. The compro-

mise of 1689 was, therefore, easily accomplished. The political spoils of "pelf and place" were left to the great landowning families, provided the economic interests of the financial, manufacturing and commercial middle class were sufficiently attended to. And these economic interests were at that time powerful enough to determine the general policy of the nation. There might be squabbles about matters of detail, but, on the whole, the aristocratic oligarchy knew too well that its own economic prosperity was irretrievably bound up with that of the industrial and commercial middle class.

From that time, the bourgeoisie was a humble, but still a recognised component of the ruling classes of England. With the rest of them, it had a common interest in keeping in subjection the great working mass of the nation. The merchant or manufacturer himself stood in the position of master, or, as it was until lately called, of "natural superior" to his clerks, his workpeople, his domestic servants. His interest was to get as much and as good work out of them as he could; for this end they had to be trained to proper submission. He was himself religious; his religion had supplied the standard under which he had fought the king and the lords; he was not long in discovering the opportunities this same religion offered him for working upon the minds of his natural inferiors, and making them submissive to the behests of the masters it had pleased God to place over them. In short, the English bourgeoisie now had to take a part in keeping down the "lower orders," the great producing mass of the nation, and one of the means employed for that purpose was the influence of religion.

There was another fact that contributed to strengthen the religious leanings of the bourgeoisie. That was the rise of materialism in England. This new doctrine not only shocked the pious feelings of the middle class; it announced itself as a philosophy only fit for scholars and cultivated men of the world, in contrast to religion which was good enough for the uneducated masses, including the bourgeoisie. With Hobbes it stepped on the stage as a defender of royal prerogative and omnipotence; it called upon absolute monarchy to keep down

that *puer robustus sed malitiosus*, to wit, the people. Similarly, with the successors of Hobbes, with Bolingbroke, Shaftesbury, etc., the new deistic form of materialism remained an aristocratic, esoteric doctrine, and, therefore, hateful to the middle class both for its religious heresy and for its anti-bourgeois political connections. Accordingly, in opposition to the materialism and deism of the aristocracy, those Protestant sects which had furnished the flag and the fighting contingent against the Stuarts, continued to furnish the main strength of the progressive middle class, and form even today the backbone of "the Great Liberal Party."

In the meantime materialism passed from England to France, where it met and coalesced with another materialistic school of philosophers, a branch of Cartesianism. In France, too, it remained at first an exclusively aristocratic doctrine. But soon its revolutionary character asserted itself. The French materialists did not limit their criticism to matters of religious belief; they extended it to whatever scientific tradition or political institution they met with; and to prove the claim of their doctrine to universal application, they took the shortest cut, and boldly applied it to all subjects of knowledge in the giant work after which they were named—the *Encyclopédie*. Thus, in one or the other of its two forms—avowed materialism or deism—it became the creed of the whole cultured youth of France; so much so that, when the Great Revolution broke out, the doctrine hatched by English Royalists gave a theoretical flag to French Republicans and Terrorists, and furnished the text for the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The Great French Revolution was the third uprising of the bourgeoisie, but the first that had entirely cast off the religious cloak and was fought out on undisguised political lines; it was the first, too, that was really fought out up to the destruction of one of the combatants, the aristocracy, and the complete triumph of the other, the bourgeoisie. In England the continuity of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary institutions, and the compromise between landlords and capitalists, found its expression in the continuity of judicial precedents and in the religious preservation of the

feudal forms of the law. In France the revolution constituted a complete breach with the traditions of the past; it cleared out the very last vestiges of feudalism, and created in the *Code Civil* a masterly adaptation of the old Roman law—that almost perfect expression of the juridical relations corresponding to the economic stage called by Marx the production of commodities—to modern capitalistic conditions; so masterly that this French revolutionary code still serves as a model for reforms of the law of property in all other countries, not excepting England. Let us, however, not forget that if English law continues to express the economic relations of capitalistic society in that barbarous feudal language which corresponds to the thing expressed, just as English spelling corresponds to English pronunciation—*vous écrivez Londres et vous prononcez Constantinople*, said a Frenchman—that same English law is the only one which has preserved through ages, and transmitted to America and the Colonies the best part of that old Germanic personal freedom, local self-government and independence from all interference but that of the law courts, which on the Continent has been lost during the period of absolute monarchy, and has nowhere been as yet fully recovered.

To return to our British bourgeois. The French Revolution gave him a splendid opportunity, with the help of the Continental monarchies, to destroy French maritime commerce, to annex French colonies, and to crush the last French pretensions to maritime rivalry. That was one reason why he fought it. Another was that the ways of this revolution went very much against his grain. Not only its "execrable" terrorism, but the very attempt to carry bourgeois rule to extremes. What should the British bourgeois do without his aristocracy, that taught him manners, such as they were, and invented fashions for him—that furnished officers for the army, which kept order at home, and the navy, which conquered colonial possessions and new markets abroad? There was indeed a progressive minority of the bourgeoisie, that minority whose interests were not so well attended to under the compromise; this section, composed

chiefly of the less wealthy middle class, did sympathise with the revolution, but it was powerless in Parliament.

Thus, if materialism became the creed of the French Revolution, the God-fearing English bourgeois held all the faster to his religion. Had not the reign of terror in Paris proved what was the upshot, if the religious instincts of the masses were lost? The more materialism spread from France to neighbouring countries, and was reinforced by similar doctrinal currents, notably by German philosophy, the more in fact, materialism and free thought generally became, on the Continent, the necessary qualifications of a cultivated man, the more stubbornly the English middle class stuck to its manifold religious creeds. These creeds might differ from one another, but they were, all of them, distinctly religious, Christian creeds.

While the revolution ensured the political triumph of the bourgeoisie in France, in England Watt, Arkwright, Cartwright, and others, initiated an industrial revolution, which completely shifted the centre of gravity of economic power. The wealth of the bourgeoisie increased considerably faster than that of the landed aristocracy. Within the bourgeoisie itself the financial aristocracy, the bankers, etc., were more and more pushed into the background by the manufacturers. The compromise of 1689, even after the gradual changes it had undergone in favour of the bourgeoisie, no longer corresponded to the relative position of the parties to it. The character of these parties, too, had changed; the bourgeoisie of 1830 was very different from that of the preceding century. The political power still left to the aristocracy, and used by them to resist the pretensions of the new industrial bourgeoisie, became incompatible with the new economic interests. A fresh struggle with the aristocracy was necessary; it could end only in a victory of the new economic power. First, the Reform Act was pushed through, in spite of all resistance, under the impulse of the French Revolution of 1830. It gave to the bourgeoisie a recognised and powerful place in Parliament. Then the repeal of the Corn Laws, which settled, once for all, the supremacy of the bourgeoisie, and

especially of its most active portion, the manufacturers, over the landed aristocracy. This was the greatest victory of the bourgeoisie; it was, however, also the last it gained in its own exclusive interest. Whatever triumphs it obtained later on, it had to share with a new social power, first its ally, but soon its rival.

The industrial revolution had created a class of large manufacturing capitalists, but also a class—and a far more numerous one—of manufacturing work people. This class gradually increased in numbers, in proportion as the industrial revolution seized upon one branch of manufacture after another, and in the same proportion it increased in power. This power it proved as early as 1824, by forcing a reluctant Parliament to repeal the acts forbidding combinations of workmen. During the Reform agitation, the workingmen constituted the Radical wing of the Reform Party; the Act of 1832 having excluded them from the suffrage, they formulated their demands in the People's Charter, and constituted themselves, in opposition to the great bourgeois Anti-Corn Law party, into an independent party, the Chartists, the first workingmen's party of modern times.

Then came the Continental revolutions of February and March 1848, in which the working people played such a prominent part, and, at least in Paris, put forward demands which were certainly inadmissible from the point of view of capitalist society. And then came the general reaction. First the defeat of the Chartists on the 10th April, 1848, then the crushing of the Paris workingmen's insurrection in June of the same year, then the disasters of 1849 in Italy, Hungary, South Germany, and at last the victory of Louis Bonaparte over Paris, 2nd December, 1851. For a time, at least, the bugbear of working class pretensions was put down, but at what cost! If the British bourgeois had been convinced before of the necessity of maintaining the common people in a religious mood, how much more must he feel that necessity after all these experiences? Regardless of the sneers of his Continental compeers, he continued to spend thousands and tens of thousands, year after year, upon the evangelisation of the lower orders; not content with his own

native religious machinery, he appealed to Brother Jonathan, the greatest organiser in existence of religion as a trade, and imported from America revivalism, Moody and Sankey, and the like; and, finally, he accepted the dangerous aid of the Salvation Army, which revives the propaganda of early Christianity, appeals to the poor as the elect, fights capitalism in a religious way, and thus fosters an element of early Christian class antagonism, which one day may become troublesome to the well-to-do people who now find the ready money for it.

It seems a law of historical development that the bourgeoisie can in no European country get hold of political power—at least for any length of time—in the same exclusive way in which the feudal aristocracy kept hold of it during the Middle Ages. Even in France, where feudalism was completely extinguished, the bourgeoisie, as a whole, has held full possession of the government for very short periods only. During Louis Philippe's reign, 1830-48, a very small portion of the bourgeoisie ruled the kingdom; by far the larger part were excluded from the suffrage by the high qualification. Under the second republic, 1848-51, the whole bourgeoisie ruled, but for three years only; their incapacity brought on the second empire. It is only now, in the third republic, that the bourgeoisie as a whole have kept possession of the helm for more than twenty years; and they are already showing lively signs of decadence. A durable reign of the bourgeoisie has been possible only in countries like America, where feudalism was unknown, and society at the very beginning started from a bourgeois basis. And even in France and America, the successors of the bourgeoisie, the working people, are already knocking at the door.

In England, the bourgeoisie never held undivided sway. Even the victory of 1832 left the landed aristocracy in almost exclusive possession of all the leading government offices. The meekness with which the wealthy middle class submitted to this remained inconceivable to me until the great Liberal manufacturer, Mr. W. A. Forster, in a public speech implored the young men of Bradford to learn French, as a means to get on in the world, and quoted from his own experience how sheepish

he looked when, as a Cabinet Minister, he had to move in society where French was, at least, as necessary as English! The fact was, the English middle class of that time were, as a rule, quite uneducated upstarts, and could not help leaving to the aristocracy those superior government places where other qualifications were required than mere insular narrowness and insular conceit, seasoned by business sharpness.[1] Even now the endless newspaper debates about middle class education show that the English middle class does not yet consider itself good enough for the best education, and looks to something more modest. Thus, even after the repeal of the Corn Laws, it appeared a matter of course, that the men who had carried the day, the Cobdens, Brights, Forsters, etc., should remain excluded from a share in the official government of the country, until twenty years afterwards, a new Reform Act opened to them the door of the Cabinet. The English bourgeoisie are, up to the present day, so deeply penetrated by a sense of their social inferiority that they keep up, at their own expense and that of the nation, an ornamental caste of drones to represent the nation worthily at all state functions; and they consider themselves highly honoured whenever one of themselves is found worthy of admission into

[1] And even in business matters, the conceit of national chauvinism is but a sorry adviser. Up to quite recently, the average English manufacturer considered it derogatory for an Englishman to speak any language but his own, and felt rather proud than otherwise of the fact that "poor devils" of foreigners settled in England and took off his hands the trouble of disposing of his products abroad. He never noticed that these foreigners, mostly Germans, thus got command of a very large part of British foreign trade, imports and exports, and that the direct foreign trade of Englishmen became limited, almost entirely, to the colonies, China, the United States and South America. Nor did he notice that these Germans traded with other Germans abroad, who gradually organised a complete network of commercial colonies all over the world. But when Germany, about forty years ago, seriously began manufacturing for export, this network served her admirably in her transformation, in so short a time, from a corn exporting into a first-rate manufacturing country. Then, about ten years ago, the British manufacturer got frightened, and asked his ambassadors and consuls how it was that he could no longer keep his customers together. The unanimous answer was: 1) You don't learn your customer's language but expect him to speak your own; 2) You don't even try to suit your customer's wants, habits, and tastes, but expect him to conform to your English ones. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

this select and privileged body, manufactured, after all, by themselves.

The industrial and commercial middle class had, therefore, not yet succeeded in driving the landed aristocracy completely from political power when another competitor, the working class, appeared on the stage. The reaction after the Chartist movement and the Continental revolutions, as well as the unparalleled extension of English trade from 1848-66 (ascribed vulgarly to Free Trade alone, but due far more to the colossal development of railways, ocean steamers and means of intercourse generally), had again driven the working class into the dependency of the Liberal Party, of which they formed, as in pre-Chartist times, the radical wing. Their claims to the franchise, however, gradually became irresistible; while the Whig leaders of the Liberals "funked," Disraeli showed his superiority by making the Tories seize the favourable moment and introduce household suffrage in the boroughs, along with a redistribution of seats. Then followed the ballot; then in 1884 the extension of household suffrage to the counties and a fresh redistribution of seats, by which electoral districts were to some extent equalised. All these measures considerably increased the electoral power of the working class, so much so that in at least 150 to 200 constituencies that class now furnishes the majority of voters. But parliamentary government is a capital school for teaching respect for tradition; if the middle class look with awe and veneration upon what Lord John Manners playfully called "our old nobility," the mass of the working people then looked up with respect and deference to what used to be designated as "their betters," the middle class. Indeed, the British workman, some fifteen years ago, was the model workman, whose respectful regard for the position of his master, and whose self-restraining modesty in claiming rights for himself, consoled our German economists of the *Katheder-Socialist*[1] school for the incurable communistic and revolutionary tendencies of their own working men at home.

But the English middle class—good men of business as they are—saw farther than the German professors. They had shared

[1] Professorial Socialist.—*Ed.*

their power but reluctantly with the working class. They had learnt, during the Chartist years, what that *puer robustus sed malitiosus*, the people, is capable of. And since that time, they had been compelled to incorporate the better part of the People's Charter in the Statutes of the United Kingdom. Now, if ever, the people must be kept in order by moral means, and the first and foremost of all moral means of action upon the masses is and remains—religion. Hence the parson's majorities on the School Boards, hence the increasing self-taxation of the bourgeoisie for the support of all sorts of revivalism, from ritualism to the Salvation Army.

And now came the triumph of British respectability over the free thought and religious laxity of the Continental bourgeois. The workmen of France and Germany had become rebellious. They were thoroughly infected with socialism, and, for very good reasons, were not at all particular as to the legality of the means by which to secure their own ascendency. The *puer robustus*, here, turned from day to day more *malitiosus*. Nothing remained to the French and German bourgeoisie as a last resource but to silently drop their free thought, as a youngster, when sea-sickness creeps upon him, quietly drops the burning cigar he brought swaggeringly on board; one by one, the scoffers turned pious in outward behaviour, spoke with respect of the Church, its dogmas and rites, and even conformed with the latter as far as could not be helped. French bourgeois dined *maigre* on Fridays, and German ones sat out long Protestant sermons in their pews on Sundays. They had come to grief with materialism. "*Die Religion muss dem Volk erhalten werden*,"—religion must be kept alive for the people—that was the only and the last means to save society from utter ruin. Unfortunately for themselves, they did not find this out until they had done their level best to break up religion for ever. And now it was the turn of the British bourgeois to sneer and to say: "Why, you fools, I could have told you that two hundred years ago!"

However, I am afraid neither the religious stolidity of the British, nor the *post festum* conversion of the Continental bourgeois will stem the rising proletarian tide. Tradition is a great

retarding force, is the *vis inertiæ* of history, but, being merely passive, is sure to be broken down; and thus religion will be no lasting safeguard to capitalist society. If our juridical, philosophical and religious ideas are the more or less remote offshoots of the economic relations prevailing in a given society, such ideas cannot, in the long run, withstand the effects of a complete change in these relations. And, unless we believe in supernatural revelation, we must admit that no religious tenets will ever suffice to prop up a tottering society.

In fact, in England too, the working people have begun to move again. They are, no doubt, shackled by traditions of various kinds. Bourgeois traditions, such as the widespread belief that there can be but two parties, Conservatives and Liberals, and that the working class must work out its salvation by and through the great Liberal Party. Workingmen's traditions, inherited from their first tentative efforts at independent action, such as the exclusion, from ever so many old trade unions, of all applicants who have not gone through a regular apprenticeship; which means the breeding, by every such union, of its own blacklegs. But for all that the English working class is moving, as even Professor Brentano has sorrowfully had to report to his brother *Katheder-Socialists*. It moves, like all things in England, with a slow and measured step, with hesitation here, with more or less unfruitful, tentative attempts there; it moves now and then with an over-cautious mistrust of the name of socialism, while it gradually absorbs the substance; and the movement spreads and seizes one layer of the workers after another. It has now shaken out of their torpor the unskilled labourers of the East End of London, and we all know what a splendid impulse these fresh forces have given it in return. And if the pace of the movement is not up to the impatience of some people, let them not forget that it is the working class which keeps alive the finest qualities of the English character, and that, if a step in advance is once gained in England, it is, as a rule, never lost afterwards. If the sons of the old Chartists, for reasons explained above, were not quite up to the mark, the grandsons bid fair to be worthy of their forefathers.

But the triumph of the European working class does not depend upon England alone. It can only be secured by the co-operation of, at least, England, France and Germany. In both the latter countries the working class movement is well ahead of England. In Germany it is even within measurable distance of success. The progress it has there made during the last twenty-five years is unparalleled. It advances with ever increasing velocity. If the German middle class have shown themselves lamentably deficient in political capacity, discipline, courage, energy and perseverance, the German working class have given ample proof of all these qualities. Four hundred years ago, Germany was the starting point of the first upheaval of the European middle class; as things are now, is it outside the limits of possibility that Germany will be the scene, too, of the first great victory of the European proletariat?

April 20, 1892.

LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE OUTCOME OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

Foreword

In the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, published in Berlin, 1859, Karl Marx relates how the two of us in Brussels in the year 1845 set about working out in common "the opposition of our view"—the materialist conception of history which was worked out especially by Marx—"to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our previous philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes, had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly since we had achieved our main purpose—to clear our own minds."[1]

Since then more than forty years have elapsed and Marx died without either of us having had an opportunity of returning to the subject. We have expressed ourselves in various places regarding our relation to Hegel, but nowhere in a comprehensive, connected account. To Feuerbach, who in many respects forms an intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never returned.

In the meantime the Marxist world outlook has found representatives far beyond the boundaries of Germany and Europe

[1] This MS. was published in full (with the exception of a few chapters which have been lost) in 1932 by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, under the title: *German Ideology.—Ed.*

and in all the languages of the civilised world. On the other hand, classical German philosophy is experiencing a kind of rebirth abroad, especially in England and Scandinavia, and even in Germany itself people appear to be getting tired of the pauper's broth of eclecticism which is ladled out in the universities there under the name of philosophy.

In these circumstances a short, connected account of our relation to the Hegelian philosophy, of our point of departure as well as of our separation from it, appeared to me to be required more and more. Equally, a full acknowledgment of the influence which Feuerbach, more than any other post-Hegelian philosopher, had upon us during our period of storm and stress, appeared to me to be an undischarged debt of honour. I therefore willingly seized the opportunity when the editor of *Die Neue Zeit* asked me for a critical discussion of Starcke's book on Feuerbach. My contribution was published in that paper in the fourth and fifth numbers of 1886 and appears here in revised form as a separate publication.

Before sending these lines to press I have once again ferreted out and looked over the old manuscript of 1845-46. The section dealing with Feuerbach is incomplete. The completed portion consists of an exposition of the materialist conception of history which proves only how incomplete our knowledge of economic history was at that time. It contains no criticism of Feuerbach's doctrine itself; for the present purpose, therefore, it was unusable. On the other hand, in an old notebook of Marx's I have found the eleven theses on Feuerbach, printed here as an appendix. These are notes hurriedly scribbled down for later elaboration, absolutely not intended for publication, but they are invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook.

FREDERICK ENGELS

London, February 21, 1888.

I

From Hegel to Feuerbach[1]

The volume[2] before us carries us back to a period which, although in time no more than a full generation behind us, has become as foreign to the present generation in Germany as if it were already a hundred years old. Yet it was the period of Germany's preparation for the Revolution of 1848, and all that has happened since then in Germany has been merely the continuation of 1848, merely the execution of the last will and testament of the revolution.

Just as in France in the eighteenth century, so in Germany in the nineteenth, a philosophical revolution ushered in the political collapse. But how different the two appeared! The French were in open combat against all official science, against the Church and often also against the state; their writings were printed across the frontier, in England or Holland, while they themselves were often in jeopardy of imprisonment in the Bastille. On the other hand, the Germans were professors, state-appointed instructors of youth; their writings were recognised textbooks, and the culminating system of the whole development—the Hegelian system—was even raised, in some degree, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of state! Was it possible that a revolution could hide behind these professors, behind their obscure, pedantic phrases, their wearisome, ponderous sentences? Were not precisely those people who were then regarded as the representatives of the revolution, the liberals, the bitterest opponents of this brain-confusing philosophy? But what neither the government nor the liberals were able to see, was seen at least by one man as early as 1833, and this man was indeed none other than Heinrich Heine.[3]

[1] For clearness titles have been added to the numbered sections.—*Ed.*

[2] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, by C. N. Starcke, Ph. D., Stuttgart, Ferd. Enke, 1885. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

[3] Engels refers to the articles *On Germany* written by the famous German poet Heine in which he expounded the history of the civilisation of the German people for the French public. He divided it into three parts: 1) before Luther; 2) from Luther to Kant; 3) from Kant to Hegel. These articles contain his characterisation of German philosophy and the role it filled in its day.—*Ed.*

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Let us take an example. No philosophical proposition has earned more gratitude from narrow-minded governments and wrath from equally narrow-minded liberals than Hegel's famous statement: "All that is real is rational: and all that is rational is real." That was tangibly a sanctification of things that be, a philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police-government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship. That is how Frederick William III and his subjects understood it. But according to Hegel everything that exists is certainly not also *real*, without further qualification. For Hegel the attribute of reality belongs only to that which at the same time is necessary: "The reality proves itself to be the necessary in the course of its development." A particular governmental act—Hegel himself cites the example of "a certain tax regulation"—is therefore for him by no means real without qualification. That which is necessary, however, proves itself in the last resort to be also rational; and, applied to the Prussian state of that time, the Hegelian proposition therefore merely means: this state is rational, it corresponds to reason in so far as it is necessary; and if it nevertheless appears to us to be evil, but still, in spite of its evil character, it continues to exist, then the evil character of the government is explained and justified by the corresponding evil character of the subjects. The Prussians of that day had the government that they deserved.

Now, according to Hegel, reality is, however, in no way an attribute of any given state of affairs, social or political, in all circumstances and for all time. On the contrary. The Roman Republic was real, but so was the Roman Empire which superseded it. In 1789 the French monarchy had become so unreal, that is to say, it had been so robbed of all necessity, so non-rational, that it had to be destroyed by the Great Revolution—of which Hegel always speaks with the greatest enthusiasm. In this case the monarchy was the unreal and the revolution was the real. And so, in the course of development, all that was previously real becomes unreal, loses its necessity, its right of existence, its rationality. And in the place of moribund reality comes a new reality capable of living—peacefully if the old has enough intel-

ligence to go to its death without a struggle: forcibly if it resists this necessity. Thus the Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dialectics itself: All that is real in the sphere of human history becomes irrational in the process of time and is therefore irrational already by its destination, is tainted beforehand with irrationality, and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to become real, however much it may contradict the apparent reality of existing conditions. In accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish.[1]

But precisely here lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and for all dealt the deathblow to the finality of all products of human thought and action. Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, became in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth,[2] a point at which it can proceed no further and where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and admire the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good for the realm of philosophic knowledge holds good also for that of every other kind of knowledge and also for practical affairs. Just as knowledge is unable to reach a perfected termination in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect "state," are things which can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical situations

[1] The words of Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust: "Alles was entsteht, ist wert, dass es zugrunde geht."—Ed.*

[2] Engels here has in view the metaphysical conception of absolute truth as completed, exhaustive knowledge, immutable for all time.—*Ed.*

are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the newer and higher conditions which gradually develop in its own bosom, each loses its validity and justification. It must give way to a higher form which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition and the world market dissolves in practice all stable, time-honoured institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final absolute truth and of a final absolute state of humanity corresponding to it. For it nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendency from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side: it recognises that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute—the only absolute it admits.

It is not necessary, here, to go into the question of whether this mode of outlook is thoroughly in accord with the present position of natural science which predicts a possible end for the earth, and for its habitability a fairly certain one; which therefore recognises that for the history of humanity also there is not only an ascending but also a descending branch. At any rate we still find ourselves a considerable distance from the turning point at which the historical course of society becomes one of descent, and we cannot expect Hegelian philosophy to be concerned with a subject which natural science, in its time, had not at all placed upon the agenda as yet!

But what must, in fact, be said here is this: that in Hegel the above development is not to be found in such precision. It is a necessary conclusion from his method, but one which he himself never drew with such explicitness. And this, indeed, for the sim-

ple reason that he was compelled to make a system, and, in accordance with all the traditional requirements, a system of philosophy must conclude with some sort of absolute truth. Therefore, however much Hegel, especially in his *Logic*, emphasised that this eternal truth is nothing but the logical, *i.e.*, the historical, process itself, he nevertheless finds himself compelled to make an end to this process, just because he has to bring his system to a termination at some point or other. In the *Logic* he can make this end a beginning again, since here the point of conclusion, the absolute idea [1]—which is only absolute in so far as he has absolutely nothing to say about it—"alienates," that is, transforms, itself into nature and comes to itself again later in the mind, *i.e.*, in thought and in history. But at the end of the whole philosophy a similar return to the beginning is possible only in one way, namely, by putting as the end of all history the arrival of mankind at the cognition of this self-same absolute idea, and by explaining that this cognition of the absolute idea is reached in Hegelian philosophy. In this way, however, the whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system is declared to be absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, which dissolves all dogmatism. Thus the revolutionary side becomes smothered beneath the overgrowth of the conservative side. And what applies to philosophical cognition applies also to historical practice. Mankind, which, in the person of Hegel, has reached the point of working out the absolute idea, must also in practice have arrived so far that it can carry out this absolute idea in reality. Hence the practical political demands of the absolute idea on contemporaries may not be stretched too far. And so we find at the conclusion of the philosophy of law that the absolute idea is to be realised in that monarchy based on estates which Frederick William III so persistently but vainly promised to his subjects, *i.e.*, in a limited, moderate, indirect rule of the possessing classes suited to the petty-bourgeois German conditions of that time. Herewith also

[1] Under this Hegelian conception, the conception of god is concealed.—*Ed.*

the necessity of the nobility is demonstrated to us in a speculative fashion.

The inner necessities of the system are therefore of themselves sufficient to explain why such a thoroughly revolutionary method of thinking produced such an extremely tame political conclusion. As a matter of fact the specific form of this conclusion springs from this, that Hegel was a German, and like his contemporary Goethe had a bit of the philistine's queue dangling behind. Each of them was an Olympian Zeus in his own sphere, yet neither of them ever quite freed himself from German philistinism.

But all this did not prevent the Hegelian system from covering an incomparably greater domain than any earlier system; nor from developing in this domain a wealth of thought which is astounding even today. The *phenomenology of mind* (which one may call a parallel of the embryology and palæontology of the mind, a development of the individual consciousness through its different stages, couched in the form of an abbreviated recapitulation of the stages through which the consciousness of man has passed in the course of history), logic, natural philosophy, philosophy of mind, and the latter worked out in its separate, historical sub-divisions: philosophy of history, of law, of religion, history of philosophy, æsthetics, etc.—in all these different historical fields Hegel laboured to discover and demonstrate the pervading thread of development. And as he was not only a creative genius but also a man of encyclopædic erudition, he played an epoch-making role in every sphere. It is self-evident that owing to the needs of the "system" he very often had to resort to those forced constructions about which his pigmy opponents make such a terrible fuss even today. But these constructions are only the frame and scaffolding of his work. If one does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the "system" which is perishable; and for the simple reason that it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind—the desire to overcome all contradictions. But if all con-

tradictions are once and for all disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth: world history will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing more left for it to do—thus, a new insoluble contradiction arises. As soon as we have once realised—and in the long run no one has helped us to realise it more than Hegel himself—that the task of philosophy thus stated means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive development—as soon as we realise that, there is an end of all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. One leaves alone "absolute truth," which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable, relative truths along the path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of dialectical thinking. At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he comprehended its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and on the other hand, because, even if unconsciously, he showed us the way out of the labyrinth of "systems" to real positive knowledge of the world.

One can imagine what a tremendous effect this Hegelian system must have produced in the philosophy-tinged atmosphere of Germany. It was a triumphal procession which lasted for decades and which by no means came to a standstill on the death of Hegel. On the contrary, from 1830 to 1840 Hegelianism reigned most exclusively, and to a greater or less extent infected even its opponents. It was precisely in this period that Hegelian views, consciously or unconsciously, most extensively permeated the most diversified sciences and saturated even popular literature and the daily press from which the average "educated consciousness" derived its mental pabulum. But this victory along the whole front was only the prelude to an internal struggle.

As we have seen, the doctrine of Hegel, taken as a whole, left plenty of room for giving shelter to the most diverse practical party views. And in the theoretical Germany of that time

two things above all were practical: religion and politics. Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian *system* could be fairly conservative in both spheres; whoever regarded the dialectical *method* as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion. Hegel himself, despite the fairly frequent outbursts of revolutionary wrath in his works, seemed on the whole to be more inclined to the conservative side. Indeed, his system had cost him much more "bitter work of thought" than his method. Towards the end of the 'thirties, the cleavage in the school became more and more apparent. The Left wing,[1] the so-called young Hegelians, in their fight with the pietist orthodox and feudal reactionaries, abandoned bit by bit that philosophical-aristocratic reserve in regard to the burning questions of the day which up to that time had secured state toleration and even protection for their teachings. And when, in 1840, orthodox pietism and absolutist feudal reaction ascended the throne with Frederick William IV, open partisanship became unavoidable. The fight was still carried on with philosophical weapons, but no longer for abstract philosophical aims. It turned directly on the destruction of traditional religion and of the existing state. And although in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* the practical ends were still predominantly put forward in philosophical disguise, in the *Rheinische Zeitung*[2] of 1842 the young Hegelian school revealed itself directly as the philosophy of the aspiring radical bourgeoisie and still used the meagre cloak of philosophy only to deceive the censorship.

[1] In contrast to the Right Hegelians who defended the conservative views and supported autocracy, the privileged position of the nobility and the ruling religion (Protestantism,) the young, or Left, Hegelians, headed by Bruno Bauer, endeavoured to draw atheist and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.—*Ed.*

[2] *The Deutsche Jahrbücher* [*German Annuals*] were magazines published by the Left Hegelians, A. Ruge and T. Echtermeyer, in 1838-43. The *Rheinische Zeitung* [*Rhenish Gazette*], 1842-43, was founded by Rhenish radical bourgeois. Marx was one of the main contributors to the *Gazette*. From October 1842 to the end of the year Marx was its editor-in-chief. Under Marx's leadership the *Gazette* adopted a revolutionary-democratic policy, and was suppressed by the Prussian government at the end of March 1843.—*Ed.*

At that time, however, politics was a very thorny field, and hence the main fight came to be directed against religion; this fight, particularly since 1840, was also indirectly political. Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, published in 1835, had provided the first impulse. The theory therein developed of the formation of the gospel myths was combated later by Bruno Bauer with the proof that a whole series of evangelical stories had been fabricated by the authors themselves. The controversy between these two was carried out in the philosophical disguise of a battle between "self-consciousness" and "substance."[1] The question whether the miracle stories of the gospels came into being through an unconscious-traditional myth-creation within the bosom of the community or whether they were fabricated by the evangelists themselves was magnified into the question whether, in world history, "substance" or "self-consciousness" was the decisive driving force. Finally came Stirner, the prophet of contemporary anarchism—Bakunin has taken a great deal from him—and capped the sovereign "self-consciousness" by his sovereign "ego."[2]

We will not go further into this side of the decomposition process of the Hegelian school. More important for us is the following: the main body of the most determined young Hegelians was, by the practical necessities of its fight against positive religion, driven back to Anglo-French materialism.[3] This brought

[1] "Strauss in his book pictured Jesus as an outstanding historical personage and not as a god. Strauss considered the gospel stories to be myths which took shape in the Christian communities; he thus adhered to the opinion that these stories arose unconsciously, as it were. B. Bauer, in criticising Strauss, rebuked him for not crediting consciousness with the importance due it. In Bauer's opinion, the gospel myths in the historical process of their formation passed through the consciousness of the people who had composed them intentionally to accomplish this or that religious object." (G. Plekhanov.) The "self-consciousness" which the young Hegelians brought to the fore reflected the self-consciousness of the revolutionary-minded bourgeois intelligentsia of Germany during the pre-revolutionary epoch.—*Ed.*

[2] Engels refers to Max Stirner's (pseudonym for Caspar Schmidt) *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* [*The Ego and His Own*], which appeared in 1845. Marx and Engels criticised it in their *German Ideology*.—*Ed.*

[3] In the seventeenth century in Great Britain and in the eighteenth century in France, natural science and materialistic philosophy developed

it into conflict with its school system. While materialism conceives nature as the sole reality, nature in the Hegelian system represents merely the "alienation" of the absolute idea, so to say, a degradation of the idea. In all circumstances thinking and its thought-product, the idea, is here the primary, nature the derived element, which only exists at all by the condescension of the idea. And in this contradiction they floundered as well or as ill as they could.

Then came Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. With one blow it pulverised the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence.

The spell was broken. The "system" was exploded and cast aside. And the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much—in spite of all critical reservations—he was influenced by it, one may read in *The Holy Family*.[1]

Even the shortcomings of the book contributed to its immediate effect. Its literary, sometimes even highflown, style secured for it a large public and was at any rate refreshing after long years of abstract and abstruse Hegelianising. The

in connection with the development of the bourgeois method of production in these countries. (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and others were representatives of English materialism.) In France the materialist philosophers of the eighteenth century (Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, etc.)—representatives of the revolutionary bourgeoisie—conducted a relentless struggle against serfdom in institutions and ideas, making use of the lessons of the English revolution while being disciples and continuers of English materialism in philosophy.—*Ed.*

[1] The full title of this book of Marx and Engels is: *The Holy Family, or a Criticism of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.* "*The Holy Family* is a humorous nickname for the Bauer brothers, philosophers, and their disciples. These gentlemen preached criticism, which stands

same is true of its extravagant deification of love, which, coming after the intolerable sovereign rule of "pure reason," had its excuse, if not justification. But what we must not forget is that it was precisely to these two weaknesses of Feuerbach that the "true socialism" which was spreading like a plague in "educated" Germany after 1844 became linked, putting literary phrases in the place of scientific knowledge, the liberation of mankind by means of "love" in place of the emancipation of the proletariat through the economic transformation of production—in short, losing itself in the nauseous fine writing and sentimentalising typified by Herr Karl Grün.[1]

Another thing we must not forget is this: the Hegelian school was broken up, but Hegelian philosophy was not overcome through criticism; Strauss and Bauer each took one of its sides and set in polemically against the other. Feuerbach broke through the system and simply discarded it. But a philosophy is not disposed of by the mere assertion that it is false. And so powerful a work as Hegelian philosophy—which had exercised so enormous an influence on the intellectual development of the nation—did not allow itself to be disposed of by simply being ignored. It had to be "sublated" in its own sense, that is, in the sense that while its form had to be annihilated through criticism, the new content which had been won through it had to be saved. How this was brought about we shall see below.

But in the meantime the Revolution of 1848 thrust the whole of philosophy aside as unceremoniously as Feuerbach had himself thrust aside Hegel. And in the process Feuerbach himself was also pushed into the background.

above any reality, above parties and politics, rejecting all practical activity, and only 'critically' contemplates the surrounding world and the events which take place in it. The Messrs. Bauer judged the proletariat disdainfully as an uncritical mass. Marx and Engels decidedly attacked this absurd and harmful tendency. In the name of the real human personality—the worker, downtrodden by the ruling classes and the government—they called not for contemplation but for a struggle for a better order of society. They considered, of course, the proletariat as the power that is capable of waging such a struggle and that is interested in it." (Lenin, *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, "Frederick Engels," p. 38.)—*Ed.*

[1] For a characterisation of German "true socialism," see *The Communist Manifesto*, pp. 232-35 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

II

Idealism and Materialism

The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. From the very early times when men, still completely ignorant of the structure of their own bodies, under the stimulus of dream apparitions[1] came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not activities of their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and leaves it at death—from this time, men have been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world. If in death it took leave of the body and lived on, there was no occasion to invent yet another distinct death for it. Thus arose the idea of its immortality which at that stage of development appeared not at all as a consolation but as a fate against which it was no use fighting, and often enough, as among the Greeks, as a positive misfortune. Not religious desire for consolation, but the quandary arising from the common universal ignorance of what to do with this soul (once its existence had been accepted) after the death of the body—led in a general way to the tedious notion of personal immortality. In an exactly similar manner the first gods arose through the personification of natural forces. And these gods in the further development of religions assumed more and more an extra-mundane form, until finally by a process of abstraction, I might almost say of distillation, occurring naturally in the course of man's intellectual development, out of the many more or less limited and mutually limiting gods there arose in the minds of men the idea of the one exclusive god of the monotheistic religions.

Thus the question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature—the paramount question of the whole

[1] Among savages and lower barbarians the idea is still universal that the human forms which appear in dreams are souls which have temporarily left their bodies; the real man is therefore held responsible for acts committed by his dream apparition against the dreamer. Thus B. Imthurn found this belief current, for example, among the Indians of Guiana in 1884. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

of philosophy—has, no less than all religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery. But this question could for the first time be put forward in its whole acuteness, could achieve its full significance, only after European society had awakened from the long hibernation of the Christian Middle Ages. The question of the position of thinking in relation to being, a question which, by the way, had played a great part also in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the question: which is primary, spirit or nature—that question, in relation to the Church, was sharpened into this: "Did god create the world or has the world been in existence eternally?"

The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other—(and among the philosophers, Hegel, for example, this creation often becomes still more intricate and impossible than in Christianity)—comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.

These two expressions, idealism and materialism, primarily signify nothing more than this; and here also they are not used in any other sense. What confusion arises when some other meaning is put into them will be seen below.

But the question of the relation of thinking and being has yet another side: in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality? In philosophical language this question is called the question of the "identity of thinking and being," and the overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question. With Hegel, for example, its affirmation is self-evident; for what we perceive in the real world is precisely its thought content—that which makes the world a gradual realisation of the absolute idea, which absolute idea has existed somewhere from eternity, independent of the world and before the world. But it is manifest without more

ado that thought can know a content which is from the outset a thought-content. It is equally manifest that what is here to be proved is already tacitly contained in the presupposition. But that in no way prevents Hegel from drawing the further conclusion from his proof of the identity of thinking and being that his philosophy, because it is correct for his own thinking, is therefore the only correct one, and that the identity of thinking and being must prove its validity by mankind immediately translating his philosophy from theory into practice and transforming the whole world according to Hegelian principles. This is an illusion which he shares with well-nigh all philosophers.

In addition there is yet another set of different philosophers—those who question the possibility of any cognition (or at least of an exhaustive cognition) of the world. To them, among the moderns, belong Hume and Kant,[1] and they have played a very important role in philosophical development. What is decisive in the refutation of this view has already been said by Hegel—in so far as this was possible from an idealist standpoint. The materialistic additions made by Feuerbach are more ingenious than profound. The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, *viz.*, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible "thing-in-itself." The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just

[1] Engels calls the philosophy of Hume agnosticism. The agnostic says: I *do not know* whether there is an objective reality which is reflected by our senses. Engels calls Kant an agnostic also, who, it is true, admits of objective reality, the "thing-in-itself," but maintains that this "thing-in-itself" is beyond our ken. Engels therefore remarks: "To this Hegel, long since, has replied: If you know all the qualities of a thing, you know the thing itself; nothing remains but the fact that the said thing exists without us; and when your senses have taught you that fact, you have grasped the last remnant of the thing-in-itself, Kant's celebrated unknowable *Ding an sich*." (Engels, *On Historical Materialism*, p. 400 of the present volume.)—*Ed.*

such "things-in-themselves" until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the "thing-in-itself" became a thing for us, as, for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For three hundred years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favour, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the necessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet, the Copernican system was proved. If, nevertheless, the Neo-Kantians are attempting to resurrect the Kantian conception in Germany and the agnostics that of Hume in England (where in fact it had never ceased to survive), this is—in view of their theoretical and practical refutation accomplished long ago—scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.[1]

But during this long period from Descartes to Hegel and from Hobbes to Feuerbach, the philosophers were by no means impelled, as they thought they were, solely by the force of pure

[1] "The principal feature of the philosophy of Kant is an attempted reconciliation of materialism and idealism, a compromise between the claims of both, a fusion of heterogeneous and contrary philosophic tendencies into one system. When Kant admits that something outside of us—a thing-in-itself—corresponds to our perceptions he seems to be a materialist. When he, however, declares this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcendent, 'trans-intelligible'—he appears to be an idealist. Regarding experience as the only source of our knowledge, Kant seems to be turning towards sensationalism and by way of sensationalism, under certain special conditions, toward materialism. Recognising the apriority of space, time, and causality, etc., Kant seems to be turning towards idealism. Consistent materialists, and consistent idealists, as well as the 'pure' agnostics and Humists, criticise him for this inconsistency." (*Lenin*, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," *Collected Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 163, English edition.)

This dual philosophy was resurrected by the Neo-Kantians (Cohen, Natorp, etc.).—*Ed.*

reason. On the contrary, what really pushed them forward was the powerful and ever more rapidly onrushing progress of natural science and industry. Among the materialists this was plain on the surface, but the idealist systems also filled themselves more and more with a materialist content and attempted pantheistically[1] to reconcile the antithesis between mind and matter. Thus, ultimately, the Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content.

It is, therefore, comprehensible that Starke in his characterisation of Feuerbach first of all investigates the latter's position in regard to this fundamental question of the relation of thinking and being. After a short introduction, in which the views of the preceding philosophers, particularly since Kant, are described in unnecessarily ponderous philosophical language, and in which Hegel, by an all too formalistic adherence to certain passages of his work, gets far less than his due, there follows a detailed description of the course of development of Feuerbach's "metaphysics" itself, as this course was reconstructed out of the sequence of those writings of this philosopher which have a bearing here. This description is industriously and carefully elaborated, only, like the whole book, it is loaded with a ballast of philosophical phraseology by no means everywhere unavoidable, which is the more disturbing in its effect the less the author keeps to the manner of expression of one and the same school, or even of Feuerbach himself, and the more he interjects expressions of very different schools—especially of the tendencies now rampant and calling themselves philosophical.

The course of evolution of Feuerbach is that of a Hegelian—a never quite orthodox Hegelian, it is true—into a materialist; an evolution which at a definite stage necessitates a complete rupture with the idealist system of his predecessor. With irresistible force Feuerbach is finally forced to the realisation that the Hegelian pre-mundane existence of the "absolute idea,"

[1] Pantheism—world outlook which identifies god with nature. Spinoza was one of the most prominent representatives of pantheism.—*Ed.*

the "pre-existence of the logical categories"[1] before the world existed, is nothing more than the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extra-mundane creator; that the material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality; and that our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialism. But, having got so far, Feuerbach stops short. He cannot overcome the customary philosophical prejudice, prejudice not against the thing but against the name materialism. He says: "To me materialism is the foundation of the edifice of human essence and knowledge, but to me it is not what it is to the physiologist, to the natural scientist in the narrower sense, for example, Moleschott, and necessarily so indeed from their standpoint and profession, the building itself. Backwards I fully agree with the materialists; but not forwards."

Here Feuerbach lumps together the materialism that is a general world outlook resting upon a definite conception of the relation between matter and mind, and the special form in which this world outlook was expressed at a definite stage of historical development, *viz.*, in the eighteenth century. More than that, he confuses it with the shallow and vulgarised form in which the materialism of the eighteenth century continues to

[1] In his *Logic*, Hegel classifies the principal conceptions as follows: being, becoming, quality, quantity, essence, appearance, possibility, accident, necessity, reality, etc. These abstract basic conceptions are called "logical categories." According to Hegel, these categories have self-sustaining "eternal" existence, independent of man. In reality, conceptions and inferences are merely the reflection in man's mind of the processes going on in the material world. "Categories of Logic are factors of the cognition (ideas) of nature by man." "The practices of man, repeated a billion times, become fixed in man's consciousness as figures of logic. These figures have the endurance of prejudice, and are axiomatic in character precisely (and only) by virtue of this myriad repetition." (Lenin, *Miscellany*, Russian edition, Vol. IX, pp. 230 and 267.) The "logical categories" are precisely the ideal of which Marx speaks in the postscript to the second German edition of the first volume of *Capital*: "The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought."—*Ed.*

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exist today in the minds of naturalists and physicians, the form which was preached on their tours in the 'fifties by Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott. But just as idealism underwent a series of stages of development, so also did materialism. With each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science it has to change its form; and after history also was subjected to materialistic treatment, here also a new avenue of development has opened.[1]

The materialism of the last century was predominantly mechanical, because at that time, of all natural sciences, mechanics and indeed only the mechanics of solid bodies—celestial and terrestrial—in short, the mechanics of gravity, had come to any definite close. Chemistry at that time existed only in its infantile, phlogistic form.[2] Biology still lay in swaddling clothes; vegetable and animal organisms had been only roughly

[1] In this connection it is important to remember the following words of Stalin:

"Engels said that 'materialism must take on a new aspect with each new great discovery.' We all know that none other than Lenin fulfilled this task, as far as his own time was concerned, in his remarkable work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.*

"It is well known that Plekhanov, who loved to chaff Lenin for his 'lack of concern' for matters of philosophy, did not even dare to make a serious attempt to undertake such a task."

It is this "new aspect" of materialism given by Lenin to the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels which is properly designated as the "Leninist stage of Marxian philosophy." The "new aspect" of materialism developed by Lenin is, of course, nothing more than the further development of the philosophy of Marx and Engels according to the development of the sciences, primarily of the natural sciences, in the epoch in which Lenin lived. This must be accentuated, inasmuch as the social-democrats distort the facts by maintaining that Marxist philosophy and its Leninist aspect differ from one another.—*Ed.*

[2] According to this theory, the essence of combustion consisted in this: that a burning body gives off a special igneous substance called phlogiston. At the end of the eighteenth century, scientists were groping for another explanation of the process of combustion. Lavoisier, a French chemist, taking advantage of certain suggestions made by Priestley, an English chemist, advanced the theory that during combustion no secret substance such as phlogiston was being given off by the burning body, but that, on the contrary, a separate element, oxygen, unites with the burning body. By this discovery, as Engels says, Lavoisier "placed chemistry, which . . . had so long stood on its head, on its feet for the first time." (Engels, "From the Preface to *Capital*, Volume II," p. 348 of the present volume.)—*Ed.*

examined and were explained as the result of purely mechanical causes. As the animal was to Descartes, so was man a machine to the materialists of the eighteenth century. This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature—in which processes, it is true, the laws of mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the background by other and higher laws—constitutes a specific but at that time inevitable limitation of classical French materialism.

The second specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe as a process—as matter developing in an historical process. This was in accordance with the level of the natural science of that time, and with the metaphysical, *i.e.*, anti-dialectical manner of philosophising connected with it. Nature, it was known, was in constant motion. But according to the ideas of that time, this motion turned eternally in a circle and therefore never moved from the spot; it produced the same results over and over again. This conception was at that time inevitable. The Kantian theory of the origin of the solar system[1] had been put forward but recently and was regarded merely as a curiosity. The history of the development of the earth, geology, was still totally unknown, and the conception that the animate natural beings of today are the result of a long sequence of development from the simple to the complex could not at that time scientifically be put forward at all. The unhistorical view of nature was therefore inevitable. We have the less reason to reproach the philosophers of the eighteenth century on this account, since the same thing is found in Hegel. According to him, nature, as a mere "alienation" of the idea, is incapable of development in time—capable only of extending its manifoldness in space, so that it displays simultaneously and alongside of one another all the stages of development comprised in it, and is condemned to an eternal repetition of the same process. This absurdity of a development in space, but outside of time—the fundamental condition of

[1] The theory which holds that the sun and the planets originated from revolving, incandescent nebulous masses.—*Ed.*

all development—Hegel imposes upon nature just at the very time when geology, embryology, the physiology of plants and animals, and organic chemistry were being built up, and when everywhere on the basis of these new sciences brilliant foreshadowings of the later theory of evolution were appearing (*e.g.*, Goethe and Lamarck). But the system demanded it; hence the method, for the sake of the system, had to become untrue to itself.

This same unhistorical conception prevailed also in the domain of history. Here the struggle against the remnants of the Middle Ages blurred the view. The Middle Ages were regarded as a mere interruption of history by a thousand years of universal barbarism. The great progress made in the Middle Ages—the extension of the area of European culture, the bringing into existence there of great nations, capable of survival, and finally the enormous technical progress of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—all this was not seen. Consequently a rational insight into the great historical inter-connections was made impossible, and history served at best as a collection of examples and illustrations for the use of philosophers.

The vulgarising pedlars who in Germany in the 'fifties busied themselves with materialism by no means overcame the limitations of their teachers. All the advances of natural science which had been made in the meantime served them only as new proofs against the existence of a creator of the world; and, in truth, it was quite outside their scope to develop the theory any further. Though idealism was at the end of its tether and was dealt a death blow by the Revolution of 1848, it had the satisfaction of seeing that materialism had for the moment fallen lower still. Feuerbach was unquestionably right when he refused to take responsibility for this materialism; only he should not have confounded the doctrines of these hedge-preachers with materialism in general.

Here, however, two things must be pointed out.

First, during Feuerbach's lifetime, natural science was still involved in a process of violent fermentation—which only during the last fifteen years has reached a relatively clear con-

clusion. New scientific data were acquired to a hitherto unheard-of extent, but the establishing of interrelations, and thereby the bringing of order into this chaos of discoveries following closely upon each other's heels has only quite recently become possible for the first time. It is true that Feuerbach had lived to see all three of the decisive discoveries—that of the cell, the transformation of energy and the theory of evolution named after Darwin. But how could the lonely philosopher, living in rural solitude, be able sufficiently to follow scientific developments in order to appreciate at their full value discoveries which scientists themselves at that time either contested or did not adequately know how to make use of? The blame for this falls solely upon the wretched conditions in Germany, in consequence of which cobweb-spinning eclectic flea-crackers had taken possession of the chairs of philosophy, while Feuerbach, who towered above them all, had to rusticate and grow sour in a little village. It is therefore not Feuerbach's fault that the historical conception of nature, which had now become possible and which removed all the one-sidedness of French materialism, remained inaccessible to him.

Secondly, Feuerbach is quite correct in asserting that the exclusively natural-scientific materialism was indeed "the foundation of the edifice of human . . . knowledge, but . . . not . . . the building itself." For we live not only in nature but also in human society, and this also no less than nature has its history of development and its science. It was therefore a question of bringing the science of society (*i.e.*, the sum total of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences) into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon. But it did not fall to Feuerbach's lot to do this. In spite of the "foundation," he remained here bound by the traditional idealist fetters, a fact which he recognises in these words: "Backwards I . . . agree with the materialists; but not forwards!" But it was Feuerbach himself who did not go "forward" here, in the social domain, who did not get beyond his standpoint of 1840 or 1844. And this indeed was again chiefly due to this isolation—which compelled him, who, of all philosophers, was

the most inclined to social intercourse, to produce thoughts out of his solitary head instead of in amicable and hostile encounters with other men of his own calibre. Later we shall see in detail how much he remained an idealist in this sphere.

It need only be added here that Starcke looks for Feuerbach's idealism in the wrong place. "Feuerbach is an idealist; he believes in the progress of mankind" (p. 19). "The foundation, the substructure of the whole, remains nevertheless idealism. Realism for us is nothing more than a protection against wrong paths, while we follow our ideal trends. Are not compassion, love and enthusiasm for truth and justice ideal forces?" (P. *viii.*)

In the first place, idealism here means nothing but the pursuit of "ideal" aims. But these necessarily have to do at the most with Kantian idealism and its "categorical imperative,"[1] but Kant himself called his philosophy "transcendental idealism" by no means because he dealt therein also with moral ideals, but for quite other reasons, as Starke will remember. The superstition that philosophical idealism is pivoted round a belief in moral, *i.e.*, social, "ideals," arose outside philosophy, among the German philistines who learned by heart from Schiller's poems the few morsels of philosophical culture they needed. No one has criticised more severely the impotent "categorical imperative" of Kant—impotent because it demands the impossible, and therefore never attains to any reality—no one has more cruelly derided the philistine sentimental enthusiasm for unrealisable ideals purveyed by Schiller than the complete idealist Hegel. (See, for example, his *Phenomenology.*)

In the second place, we cannot get away from the fact that everything that sets men acting must find its way through their brain—even eating and drinking, which begins as a consequence of the sensation of hunger or thirst transmitted through

[1] In Kantian philosophy this is the term applied to the unconditional obligation which forms the so-called highest moral law of pure reason, *a priori*, in its very nature. According to the idealistic doctrine of Kant, this law is immutable, established for all eternity and imperatively prescribes human conduct. The Kantian practical philosophy was basically only the abstract ideological expression of bourgeois morality with all the marks of the weakness and immaturity of the German bourgeoisie.—*Ed.*

the brain, and ends as a result of the sensation of satisfaction likewise transmitted through the brain. The influences of the external world upon man express themselves in his brain, are reflected therein as feelings, thoughts, instincts, volitions—in short, as "ideal tendencies," and in this form become "ideal powers." If, then, a man is converted into an idealist because he "follows ideal tendencies" and admits that "ideal powers" have an influence over him—then every person who is at all normally developed is a born idealist and how, in that case, can there still be any materialists?

In the third place, the conviction that humanity, at least at the present moment, moves on the whole in a progressive direction has absolutely nothing to do with the antithesis between materialism and idealism. The French materialists equally with the deists[1] Voltaire and Rousseau held this conviction to an almost fanatical degree, and often made the greatest personal sacrifices for it. If ever anybody dedicated his whole life to the "enthusiasm for truth and justice"—using this phrase in the good sense—it was Diderot. If, therefore, Starcke declares all this to be "idealism," this merely proves that the word materialism has lost all meaning for him—as has also the whole antithesis between the two standpoints.

The fact is that Starcke, although perhaps unconsciously, in this makes an unpardonable concession to the traditional philistine prejudice against the word materialism resulting from the long-continued defamation by the priests. By the word materialism the philistine understands gluttony, drunkenness, lust

[1] Deism—a philosophical school inimical to the positive religions with their cult of a personal god but which does not completely reject the idea of god. This school retains god as the original cause of everything, as the force which gives the first impulse. The deists do not break finally with the idea of god as do the consistent materialists (who are atheists). The deists recognise a god who plays the same role as the king under the English constitution who is limited by laws which he cannot revoke without Parliament. Similarly the god of the deists, who according to them created nature, is limited by the laws of nature and cannot act arbitrarily, create miracles in contravention of these laws. Thus deism afforded the possibility of recognising the conclusions of materialism in inconsistent, concealed form.—*Ed.*

of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, avarice, miserliness, profit-hunting and stock-exchange swindling—in short, all the filthy vices in which he himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he understands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in a general way a "better world" of which he boasts before others, but in which he himself at the utmost believes only so long as he is going through the depression or bankruptcy consequent upon his customary "materialist" excesses. It is then that he sings his favourite song, "What is man?—Half beast! Half angel!"

For the rest, Starcke takes great pains to defend Feuerbach against the attacks and doctrines of the vociferous lecturers who today go by the name of philosophers in Germany. For people who are interested in this afterbirth of German classical philosophy this is a matter of importance; for Starcke himself it may have appeared necessary. We, however, will spare the reader this.

III

Feuerbach's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics

The real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics. He by no means wishes to abolish religion: he wants to perfect it. Philosophy itself must be absorbed in religion. "The periods of humanity are distinguished only by religious changes. A historical movement is fundamental only when it is rooted in the hearts of men. The heart is not a form of religion, so that the latter should exist also in the heart; the heart is the essence of religion." (Quoted by Starcke, p. 168, German edition.) According to Feuerbach, religion is the relation based on the affections, the relation based on the heart, between man and man, which until now has sought its truth in a fantastic reflection of reality—in the fantastic reflection of human qualities through the medium of one or many gods. But now it finds its truth directly and without any intermediary in the love between the "I" and the "Thou." Thus, finally, with Feuerbach sex love becomes one

of the highest forms, if not the highest form, of the practice of his religion.

Now relations between man and man, based on affection, and especially between the sexes, have existed as long as mankind has. Sex love in particular has undergone a development and won a place during the last eight hundred years which has made it a compulsory pivotal point of all poetry during this period. The existing positive religions have limited themselves in this matter to the bestowal of a higher consecration upon state-regulated sex love (*i.e.*, upon the marriage laws) and they could all disappear completely tomorrow without changing in the slightest the practice of love and friendship. The Christian religion in France was, as a matter of fact, so completely swept away in the years 1793-98 that even Napoleon could not re-introduce it without opposition and difficulty; and this without any desire for a substitute, in Feuerbach's sense, making itself felt in the interval.

Feuerbach's idealism consists here in this: he does not simply accept mutual relations based on reciprocal inclination between human beings, such as sex love, friendship, compassion, self-sacrifice, etc., as what they are in themselves—without associating them with any particular religion which to him, too, belongs to the past; but instead he asserts that they will come to their full realisation for the first time as soon as they are consecrated by the name of religion. The chief thing for him is not that these purely human relations exist, but that they shall be conceived of as the new, true religion. They are to have full value only after they have been marked with a religious stamp. Religion is derived from *religare* and meant originally "a bond." Therefore, every bond between two men is a religion. Such etymological tricks are the last resource of idealist philosophy. Not what the word has meant according to the historical development of its actual use, but what it ought to mean according to its derivation is what counts. And so sex love and the intercourse between the sexes is apotheosised to a "religion," merely in order that the word religion, which is so dear to idealistic memories, may not disappear from the language. The Parisian

reformers of the type of Louis Blanc[1] used to speak in precisely the same way in the 'forties. They likewise could conceive of a man without religion only as a monster, and used to say: "*Donc, l'athéisme c'est votre réligion!*" [2] If Feuerbach wishes to establish a true religion upon the basis of an essentially materialist conception of nature, that is the same as regarding modern chemistry as true alchemy. If religion can exist without its god, alchemy can exist without its philosopher's stone. By the way, there exists a very close connection between alchemy and religion. The philosopher's stone has many god-like properties and the Egyptian-Greek alchemists of the first two centuries of our era contributed their share to the development of Christian doctrines, as the data given by Kopp and Berthelot have proved.

Feuerbach's assertion that "the periods of human development are distinguished only by religious changes" is decidedly false. Great historical turning points have been *accompanied* by religious changes only so far as the three world religions which have existed up to the present—Buddhism, Christianity and Islam—are concerned. The old primitive tribal and national religions did not proselytise and lost all their power of resistance as soon as the independence of the tribe or people was lost. For the Germans it was sufficient to have simple contact with the decaying Roman Empire and with its newly adopted Christian world religion which fitted its economic, political and ideological conditions. Only with these more or less artificially created world religions, particularly Christianity and Islam, do we find that general historical movements acquire a religious imprint. Even in regard to Christianity the religious stamp in revolutions of really universal significance is restricted to the first stages of the struggle for the emancipation of the bourgeoisie—from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries—and is to be accounted for not as Feuerbach thinks by the hearts of men and their religious needs but by the entire previous history of the Middle Ages which knew no other form of ide-

[1] The so-called Social-Democrats dealt with in Section IV of *The Communist Manifesto*. See p. 240 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

[2] Well, then, atheism is your religion!—*Ed.*

ology than religion and theology. But when the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century was strengthened enough likewise to possess an ideology of its own, suited to its own class standpoint it made its great and conclusive revolution, the French, appealing exclusively to juristic and political ideas, and troubling itself with religion only in so far as this stood in its way. But it never occurred to it to put a new religion in place of the old. Everyone knows how Robespierre failed in his attempt.

The possibility of purely human sentiments in the intercourse with other human beings has nowadays been sufficiently curtailed by the society in which we live, which is based upon class antagonism and class rule. We have therefore no reason to curtail it still more by exalting these sentiments to a religion. And similarly the understanding of the great historical class struggles has already been sufficiently obscured by current historiography, particularly in Germany, so that there is also no need for us to make such an understanding totally impossible by transforming the history of these struggles into a mere appendix of ecclesiastical history. Already here it becomes evident how far today we have moved beyond Feuerbach. His "finest passages" in glorification of his new religion of love are totally unreadable today.

The only religion which Feuerbach examines seriously is Christianity, the world religion of the Occident based upon monotheism. He proves that the Christian god is only a fantastic reflection, a mirror-image, of man. Now, this god is, however, himself the product of a tedious process of abstraction, the concentrated quintessence of the numerous earlier tribal and national gods. And man, whose image this god is, is therefore also not a real man, but likewise the quintessence of the numerous real men, man in the abstract, therefore himself again a mental image. The same Feuerbach who, on every page, preaches sensuousness, absorption in the concrete, in actuality, becomes thoroughly abstract as soon as he begins to talk of any other than mere sex relations between human beings.

Of these relations only one aspect appeals to him: morality. And here Feuerbach's astonishing poverty when compared with

Hegel again becomes striking. The latter's ethics or doctrine of moral conduct is the philosophy of law and embraces: 1) abstract right; 2) morality; 3) moral conduct under which again are comprised: the family, civil society and the state. Here the content is as realistic as the form is idealistic. Besides morality the whole sphere of law, economy, politics is here included. With Feuerbach it is just the reverse. In form he is realistic since he takes his start from man; but there is absolutely no mention of the world in which this man lives; hence this "man" remains always the same abstract man who occupied the field in the philosophy of religion. For this man is not born of woman: he issues, as from a chrysalis, from the god of the monotheistic religions. He therefore does not live in a real world historically created and historically determined. It is true he has intercourse with other men, but each one of them is, however, just as much an abstraction as he himself is. In the *Philosophy of Religion* we still had men and women, but in the *Ethics* even this last distinction disappears altogether. Feuerbach, to be sure, at long intervals makes such statements as: "A man thinks differently in a palace and in a hut." "If because of hunger, of misery, you have no foodstuff in your body, you likewise have no stuff for morality in your head or heart." "Politics must become our religion," etc. But Feuerbach is absolutely incapable of achieving anything with these remarks. They remain purely figures of speech; and even Starcke has to admit that for Feuerbach politics constituted an impassable frontier and the "science of society, sociology, was *terra incognita*[1] to him."

He appears just as superficial, in comparison with Hegel, in his treatment of the antithesis of good and evil. "One believes one is saying something great," Hegel remarks, "if one says that 'man is naturally good.' But one forgets that one says something far greater when one says 'man is naturally evil.'" According to Hegel, evil is the form in which the motive force of historical development presents itself. This, indeed, contains the twofold significance that while, on the one hand, each new

[1] Unknown land.—*Ed.*

advance necessarily appears as a sacrilege against things hallowed, as a rebellion against conditions which, however old and moribund, have still been sanctified by custom; on the other hand, it is precisely the wicked passions of man—greed and lust for power—which, since the emergence of class antagonisms, serve as levers of historical development—a fact of which the history of feudalism and of the bourgeoisie, for example, constitutes a single continual proof. But it does not occur to Feuerbach to investigate the historical role of moral evil. To him history is altogether a mysterious domain in which he feels ill at ease. Even his dictum: "Man as he sprang originally from nature was only a mere creature of nature, not a man. Man is a product of men, of culture, of history"—even this dictum with him remains absolutely sterile.

What Feuerbach has to tell us about morals can, therefore, only be extremely meagre. The urge towards happiness is innate in man, and must therefore form the basis of all morals. But the urge towards happiness is subject to a double correction. First, by the natural consequences of our actions: after the debauch come the "blues," and habitual excess is followed by illness. Secondly, by its social consequences: if we do not respect the similar urge of other people towards happiness they will defend themselves, and so interfere with our own urge towards happiness.

Consequently, in order to satisfy our urge, we must be in a position to appreciate rightly the results of our conduct and must likewise allow others an equal right to seek happiness. Rational self-restraint with regard to ourselves, and love—again and again love!—in our intercourse with others—these are the basic laws of Feuerbach's morality; from them all others are derived. And neither the most talented utterances of Feuerbach nor the strongest eulogies of Starcke can hide the tenuity and superficiality of these few propositions.

Only very exceptionally, and in no case to his and other people's profit, can an individual satisfy his urge towards happiness by preoccupation with himself. Rather it requires preoccupation with the outside world, means to satisfy his needs, that is to say,

means of subsistence, an individual of the opposite sex, books, conversation, argument, activities, objects for use and working up. Feuerbach's morality either presupposes that these means and objects of satisfaction are given to every individual as a matter of course, or else it offers only inapplicable good advice and is therefore not worth a brass farthing to people who are without these means. And Feuerbach himself states this in the dry words: "A man thinks differently in a palace and in a hut. If because of hunger, of misery, you have no foodstuff in your body you likewise have no stuff for morality in your head or heart."

Do matters fare any better in regard to the equal right of others to the pursuit of happiness? Feuerbach posed this claim as absolute, as holding good in all times and circumstances. But since when has it been valid? Was there ever in antiquity between slaves and masters, or in the Middle Ages between serfs and barons, any talk about an equal right to the pursuit of happiness? Was not the urge towards happiness of the oppressed class sacrificed ruthlessly and "by right of law" to the interests of the ruling class?—Yes, that was indeed immoral; nowadays, however, equality of rights is recognised—recognised in words, since the bourgeoisie, in its fight against feudalism and in the development of capitalist production, was compelled to abolish all privileges of estate, *i.e.*, personal privileges, and to introduce the equality of all individuals before the law, first in the sphere of private law, then gradually also in the sphere of state law. But the urge towards happiness thrives only to a trivial extent on ideal rights. To the greatest extent of all it thrives on material means; and capitalist production takes care to ensure that the great majority of those with equal rights shall get only what is essential for bare existence. Capitalist production has therefore little more respect, if indeed any more, for the "equal right to the pursuit of happiness" of the majority than had slavery or serfdom. And are we better off in regard to the mental means to happiness, the educational means? Is not "the schoolmaster of Sadowa" [1] himself a mythical person?

[1] The victory of Königgrätz (Sadowa) was called a victory of the Prussian schoolmaster, *i.e.*, of the superior Prussian culture.—*Ed.*

More than that. According to Feuerbach's theory of morals the Stock Exchange is the highest temple of moral conduct provided only that one always speculates correctly! If my urge towards happiness leads me to the Stock Exchange, and if there I correctly gauge the consequences of my actions so that only agreeable results and no disadvantages ensue, that is, if I always win, then I am fulfilling Feuerbach's precept. Moreover, I do not thereby interfere with the equal right of another person to pursue his happiness: for that other man went to the Exchange just as voluntarily as I did and in concluding the speculative transaction with me he has followed his urge towards happiness as I have followed mine. Should he lose his money, then by that very fact his activity is proved to have been immoral, because of his bad reckoning, and since I have given him the punishment he deserves, I can even slap my chest proudly, like a modern Rhadamanthus.[1] Love, too, rules on the Stock Exchange, in so far as it is not simply a sentimental figure of speech, for each finds in others the satisfaction of his own urge towards happiness, which is just what love ought to achieve and how it acts in practice. And if I gamble with correct prevision of the consequences of my operations, and therefore with success, I fulfil all the strictest injunctions of Feuerbachian morality—and become a rich man into the bargain. In other words, Feuerbach's morality is cut exactly to the pattern of modern capitalist society, little as Feuerbach himself might imagine or desire it.

But love!—yes, with Feuerbach, love is everywhere and at all times the wonder-working god who should help to surmount all difficulties of practical life—and at that in a society which is split into classes with diametrically opposite interests. At this point the last relic of its revolutionary character disappears from the philosophy, leaving only the old cant: Love one another—fall into each other's arms regardless of distinctions of sex or estate—a universal orgy of reconciliation.

In short, the Feuerbachian theory of morals fares like all its predecessors. It is designed to suit all periods, all peoples and

[1] According to Greek mythology, Rhadamanthus was appointed judge in hell because of his righteousness.—*Ed.*

all conditions, and precisely for that reason it is never and nowhere applicable. It remains, as regards the real world, as powerless as Kant's categorical imperative. In reality every class, even every profession, has its own morality, and even this it violates whenever it can do so with impunity. And "love," which is to unite all, manifests itself in wars, altercations, lawsuits, domestic broils, divorces and every possible exploitation of one by another.

Now how was it possible that the powerful impetus given by Feuerbach turned out to be so unfruitful for himself? For the simple reason that Feuerbach himself never contrives to escape from the realm of abstraction—for which he has a deadly hatred—into that of living reality. He clings hard to nature and humanity; but nature and humanity remain always mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract men of Feuerbach one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history. And that is what Feuerbach resisted, and therefore the year 1848, which he did not understand, signified for him merely the final break with the real world, retirement into solitude. The blame for this again chiefly falls on the conditions then obtaining in Germany, which condemned him to rot away miserably.

But the step which Feuerbach did not take nevertheless had to be taken. The cult of abstract man which formed the kernel of Feuerbach's new religion had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach's standpoint beyond Feuerbach himself was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in *The Holy Family*.

IV

Dialectical Materialism

Strauss, Bauer, Stirner, Feuerbach—these were the offshoots of Hegelian philosophy, in so far as they did not abandon the field of philosophy. Strauss, after his *Life of Jesus* and *Dogmatics*, produced only literary studies in philosophy and ecclesi-

astical history after the fashion of Renan. Bauer only achieved something in the field of the history of the origin of Christianity, though what he did here was important. Stirner remained a curiosity, even after Bakunin blended him with Proudhon and labelled the blend "anarchism." Feuerbach alone was of significance as a philosopher. But not only did philosophy—claimed to soar above all sciences and to be the all comprehensive science of sciences—remain for him an impassable barrier, an unassailable holy thing, but as a philosopher, too, he stopped halfway; the lower half of him was materialist, the upper half idealist. He was incapable of disposing of Hegel through criticism; he simply threw him aside as useless, while he himself, compared with the encyclopædic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond a grandiloquent religion of love and a meagre, impotent system of morals.

Out of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, however, there developed still another tendency, the only one which has borne real fruit. And this tendency is essentially connected with the name of Marx.[1]

The separation from the Hegelian school was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world—nature and history—just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from pre-conceived idealist fancies. It was decided relentlessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into

[1] Here I may be permitted to make a personal explanation. Lately repeated reference has been made to my share in this theory, and so I can hardly avoid saying a few words here to settle this particular point. I cannot deny that both before and during my forty years' collaboration with Marx I had a certain independent share in laying the foundations, and more particularly in elaborating the theory. But the greater part of its leading basic principles, particularly in the realm of economics and history, and, above all, its final, clear formulation, belong to Marx. What I contributed—at any rate with the exception of a few special studies—Marx could very well have done without me. What Marx accomplished I would not have achieved. Marx stood higher, saw farther, and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a genius; we others were at best talented. Without him the theory would not be what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

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harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic connection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently—at least in its basic features—in all domains of knowledge concerned.

Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist—where unknown—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the *Logic* and which are all included in it. Then it "alienates" itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, disguised as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development and finally comes again to self-consciousness in man. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history from the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, *i.e.*, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zig-zag movements and temporary setbacks, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological reversal had to be done away with. We comprehended the concepts in our heads once more materialistically—as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of development of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought—two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part

in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of the concept itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed upon its feet again. And this materialist dialectic which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us, but also independently of us and even of Hegel by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen.[1]

In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trammels which in Hegel's hands had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind-images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidents and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end—this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things. If, however, investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for final solutions and eternal truths ceases once for all; one is always conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it was acquired. On the other hand, one no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antitheses, insuperable for the still common old metaphysics, between true and false, good and bad, identical and dif-

[1] See *Das Wesen des menschlichen Kopfarbeit, dargestellt von einem Handarbeiter* [*The Nature of Human Brainwork, Described by an Artisan*]. Another critique of pure and practical reason. Hamburg, Meissner, 1869. [*Note by F. Engels.*]

ferent, necessary and accidental. One knows that these antitheses have only a relative validity; that that which is recognised now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself, just as that which is now regarded as false has also its true side by virtue of which it could previously have been regarded as true. One knows that what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents and that the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself—and so on.

The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls "metaphysical," which preferred to investigate *things* as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt people's minds, had a good deal of historical justification in its day. It was necessary first to examine things before it was possible to examine processes. One had first to know what a particular thing was before one could observe the changes going on in connection with it. And such was the case with natural science. The old metaphysics which accepted things as finished objects arose from a natural science which investigated dead and living things as finished objects. But when this investigation had progressed so far that it became possible to take the decisive step forward of transition to the systematic investigation of the changes which these things undergo in nature itself, then the last hour of the old metaphysics sounded in the realm of philosophy also. And in fact, while natural science up to the end of the last century was predominantly a *collecting* science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a *classifying science*, a science of the processes, of the origin and development of these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole. Physiology, which investigates the processes occurring in plant and animal organisms; embryology, which deals with the development of individual organisms from germ to maturity; geology, which investigates the gradual formation of the earth's surface—all these are the offspring of our century.

But, above all, there are three great discoveries which have enabled our knowledge of the interconnection of natural pro-

cesses to advance by leaps and bounds: first, the discovery of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and differentiation the whole plant and animal body develops—so that not only is the development and growth of all higher organism recognised to proceed according to a single general law, but also, in the capacity of the cell to change, the way is pointed out by which organisms can change their species and thus go through a more than individual development. Second, the transformation of energy, which has demonstrated that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature—mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy—are different forms of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another in definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of the one which disappears, a certain quantity of another makes its appearance and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced to this incessant process of transformation from one form into another. Finally, the proof which Darwin first developed in connected form that the stock of organic products of nature surrounding us today, including mankind, is the result of a long process of evolution from a few original unicellular germs, and that these again have arisen from protoplasm or albumen which came into existence by chemical means.

Thanks to these three great discoveries and the other immense advances in natural science, we have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate as a whole the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also in the interconnection of these particular spheres themselves, and so can present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the interconnection in nature by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself. To furnish this comprehensive view was formerly the task of so-called natural philosophy. It could do this only by putting in place of the real but as yet unknown interconnections ideal and imaginary ones, filling out the missing facts by figments of the mind and bridging the actual gaps merely in imagination. In

the course of this procedure it conceived many brilliant ideas and foreshadowed many later discoveries, but it also produced a considerable amount of nonsense, which indeed could not have been otherwise. Today, when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific investigation only dialectically, that is, in the sense of their own interconnections, in order to arrive at a "system of nature" sufficient for our time; when the dialectical character of this interconnection is forcing itself against their will even into the metaphysically-trained minds of the natural scientists, today this natural philosophy is finally disposed of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous but a *step backwards.*

But what is true of nature, which is hereby recognised also as a historical process of development, is also true of the history of society in all its branches and of the totality of all sciences which occupy themselves with things human (and divine). Here, too, the philosophy of history, of law, of religion, etc., has consisted in the substitution of an interconnection fabricated in the mind of the philosopher for the actual interconnection to be demonstrated in the events; and in the comprehension of history as a whole as well as in its separate parts, as the gradual realisation of ideas—and, indeed, naturally always the pet ideas of the philosopher himself. According to this, history worked unconsciously but with necessity towards a certain pre-determined, ideal goal—as, for example, according to Hegel, towards the realisation of his absolute idea—and the unalterable trend towards this absolute idea formed the inner interconnection in the events of history. A new mysterious providence—unconscious or gradually coming into consciousness—was thus put in the place of the real, still unknown interconnection. Here, therefore, just as in the realm of nature, it was necessary to do away with these fabricated, artificial interconnections by the discovery of the real ones; a task which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws of motion which assert themselves as the ruling ones in the history of human society.

In one point, however, the history of the development of so-

ciety proves to be essentially different from that of nature. In nature—in so far as we ignore man's reactions upon nature—there are only blind unconscious agencies acting upon one another and out of whose interplay the general law comes into operation. Nothing of all that happens—whether in the innumerable apparent accidents observable upon the surface of things, or in the ultimate results which confirm the regularity underlying these accidents—is attained as a consciously desired aim. In the history of society, on the other hand, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim. But this distinction, important as it is for historical investigation, particularly of single epochs and events, cannot alter the fact, that the course of history is governed by inner general laws. For here, also, on the whole, in spite of the consciously desired aims of all individuals, accident apparently reigns on the surface. That which is willed happens but rarely; in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realisation or the means of attaining them are insufficient. Thus the conflict of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produces a state of affairs entirely analogous to that in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.

Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon the

outer world that constitutes history. Thus it is also a question of what the many individuals desire. The will is determined by passion or deliberation. But the levers which immediately determine passion or deliberation are of very different kinds. Partly they may be external objects, partly ideal motives, ambition, "enthusiasm for truth and justice," personal hatred or even purely individual whims of all kinds. But, on the one hand, we have seen that the many individual wills active in history for the most part produce results quite other than those they intended—often quite the opposite; their motives therefore in relation to the total result are likewise of only secondary significance. On the other hand, the further question arises: What driving forces in turn stand behind these motives? What are the historical causes which transform themselves into these motives in the brains of the actors?

The old materialism never put this question to itself. Its conception of history, in so far as it has one at all, is therefore essentially pragmatic; it judges everything according to the motives of the action; it divides men in their historical activity into noble and ignoble and then finds that as a rule the noble are defrauded and the ignoble are victorious. Hence it follows for the old materialism that nothing very edifying is to be got from the study of history, and for us that in the realm of history the old materialism becomes untrue to itself because it takes the ideal driving forces which operate there as ultimate causes, instead of investigating what is behind them, what are the driving forces of these driving forces. The inconsistency does not lie in the fact that *ideal* driving forces are recognised, but in the investigation not being carried further back behind these into their motive causes. On the other hand, the philosophy of history, particularly as represented by Hegel, recognises that the ostensible and also the really operating motives of men who figure in history are by no means the ultimate causes of historical events; that behind these motives are other motive forces, which have to be discovered. But it does not seek these forces in history itself, it imports them rather from outside, from out of philosophical ideology, into history. Hegel,

for example, instead of explaining the history of ancient Greece out of its own inner interconnections, simply maintains that it is nothing more than the working out of "types of beautiful individuality," the realisation of a "work of art" as such. He says much in this connection about the old Greeks that is fine and profound but that does not prevent us today from refusing to be put off with such an explanation, which is a mere manner of speech.

When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving forces which—consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often unconsciously—lie behind the motives of men in their historical actions and which constitute the real ultimate driving forces of history, then it is not a question so much of the motives of single individuals, however eminent, as of those motives which set in motion great masses, whole peoples, and again whole classes of the people in each people; and here, too, not the transient flaring up of a straw-fire which quickly dies down, but a lasting action resulting in a great historical transformation. To ascertain the driving causes which here in the minds of acting masses and their leaders—the so-called great men—are reflected as conscious motives, clearly or unclearly, directly or in ideological, even glorified form—that is the only path which can put us on the track of the laws holding sway both in history as a whole, and at particular periods and in particular lands. Everything which sets men in motion must go through their minds; but what form it will take in the mind will depend very much upon the circumstances. The workers have by no means become reconciled to capitalist machine industry, even though they no longer simply break the machines to pieces as they still did in 1848 on the Rhine.

But while in all earlier periods the investigation of these driving causes of history was almost impossible—on account of the complicated and concealed interconnections between them and their effects—our present period has so far simplified these interconnections that the riddle could be solved. Since the establishment of large-scale industry, *i.e.*, at least since the peace of Europe in 1815, it has been no longer a secret to any man

in England that the whole political struggle there has turned on the claims to supremacy of two classes: the landed aristocracy and the middle class. In France, with the return of the Bourbons, the same fact was perceived; the historians of the Restoration period, from Thierry to Guizot, Mignet and Thiers, speak of it everywhere as the key to the understanding of all French history since the Middle Ages. And since 1830 the working class, the proletariat, has been recognised in both countries as a third competitor for power. Conditions had become so simplified that one would have had to close one's eyes deliberately not to see in the fight of these three great classes and in the conflict of their interests the driving force of modern history—at least in the two most advanced countries.

But how did these classes come into existence? If it was possible at first glance still to ascribe the origin of the great, formerly feudal landed property—at least in the first instance—to political causes, to taking possession by force, this could no longer be done in regard to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Here the origin and development of two great classes was seen to lie clearly and palpably in purely economic causes. And it was just as clear that in the struggle between landed property and the bourgeoisie, no less than in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it was a question in the first instance of economic interests, to the furtherance of which political power was intended to serve merely as a means. Bourgeoisie and proletariat both arose in consequence of a transformation of the economic conditions, more precisely, of the mode of production. The transition, first from guild handicrafts to manufacture, and then from manufacture to large-scale industry, with steam and mechanical power, had caused the development of these two classes. At a particular stage the new forces of production set in motion by the bourgeoisie—in the first place the division of labour and the combination of many workers, each producing a particular part, in one complete manufacture—and the conditions and requirements of exchange, developed through these productive forces, became incompatible with the existing order of production historically established

and sanctified by law, that is to say, incompatible with the privileges of the guild and the numerous other local and personal privileges (which were only so many fetters to the unprivileged) of the feudal social organisation. The forces of production represented by the bourgeoisie rebelled against the order of production represented by the feudal landlords and the guildmasters. The result is known: the feudal fetters were smashed, gradually in England, at one blow in France. In Germany the process is not yet finished. But just as, at a definite stage of its development, manufacture came into conflict with the feudal order of production, so now big industry has already come into conflict with the bourgeois order of production established in its place. Tied down by this order, by the narrow limits of the capitalist mode of production, big industry produces on the one hand an ever increasing proletarianisation of the great mass of the people, and on the other hand an ever greater mass of unsaleable products. Overproduction and mass misery, each the cause of the other—that is the absurd contradiction which is its outcome, and which of necessity calls for the liberation of the productive forces by means of a change in the mode of production.

In modern history at least it is therefore proved that all political struggles are class struggles, and all class struggles for emancipation in the last resort, despite their necessarily political form—for every class struggle is a political struggle—turn ultimately on the question of economic emancipation. Therefore, here at least, the state—the political order—is the subordinate, and civil society—the realm of economic relations—the decisive element. The traditional conception, to which Hegel. too, pays homage, saw in the state the determining element, and in civil society the element determined by it. Appearances correspond to this. As all the driving forces of the actions of any individual person must pass through his brain, and transform themselves into motives of his will in order to set him into action, so also all the needs of civil society—no matter which class happens to be the ruling one—must pass through the will of the state in order to secure general validity in the

form of laws. That is the formal aspect of the matter—the one which is self-evident. The question arises, however, what is the content of this merely formal *will*—of the individual as well as of the state—and whence is this content derived? Why is just this intended and not something else? If we enquire into this we discover that in modern history the will of the state is, on the whole, determined by the changing needs of civil society, by the supremacy of this or that class, in the last resort, by the development of the productive forces and relations of exchange.

But if already in our modern era, with its gigantic means of production and communication, the state is not an independent domain with an independent development, but one whose stock as well as development is to be explained in the last resort by the economic conditions of life of the society, then this must be still more true of earlier times when the production of the material life of man was not carried on with these abundant auxiliary means, and when, therefore, the necessity of such production must necessarily have exercised a still greater mastery over men. If the state today, in the era of big industry and of railways, is on the whole only a reflex, in comprehensive form, of the economic needs of the class controlling production, then this must have been much more so in an epoch when each generation of men was forced to spend a far greater part of its aggregate lifetime in satisfying material needs, and was therefore much more dependent on them than we are today. An examination of the history of earlier periods, as soon as it is seriously undertaken from this angle, most abundantly confirms this. But, of course, this cannot be gone into here.

If the state and public law are determined by economic relations, so, too, of course is private law[1] which indeed in essence sanctions only the existing economic relations between individuals which are normal in the given circumstances. The form in

[1] The division always made by bourgeois law itself. Public law deals with state institutions, the structure of the administrative apparatus and the political rights of citizens. Civil or private law is mainly concerned with the property rights of citizens (law of property, of debts, of family, of inheritance).—*Ed.*

which this happens can, however, vary considerably. It is possible, as happened in England, in harmony with the whole national development, to retain in the main the forms of the old feudal laws while giving them a bourgeois content; in fact, directly giving a bourgeois meaning to the old feudal name. But, also, as happened in western continental Europe, Roman Law, the first world law of a commodity-producing society, with its unsurpassably acute elaboration of all the essential legal relations of simple commodity owners (of buyers and sellers, debtors and creditors, contracts, obligations, etc.) can be taken as a foundation. In this case, for the benefit of a still petty-bourgeois and semi-feudal society, it can be adapted to the situation of such a society either simply through every-day legal practice (the common law) or, with the help of allegedly enlightened, moralising jurists a special law code can be worked out from it to correspond with such social conditions—a code which in these circumstances will also be a bad one from a legal standpoint (*e.g.*, the Prussian *Landrecht*). Whereby again after the great bourgeois revolution, such a classic law code of bourgeois society as the French *Code Civil*[1] can be worked out upon the basis of this same Roman Law. If, therefore, bourgeois legal regulations merely express the economic life-conditions of society in legal form, then this can take place well or ill according to circumstances.

The state presents itself to us as the first ideological power over mankind. Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its general interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself independent in regard to society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class. The fight of the oppressed class against the ruling class becomes necessarily a political fight, a fight first of all against the political dominance of this class. The consciousness of the interconnection between this political struggle and

[1] The bourgeois law code issued under Napoleon I which became a model for legislation in other countries.—*Ed.*

its economic roots becomes dulled and can be lost altogether. While this is not altogether the case with the participants, it almost always happens with the historians. Of the ancient sources on the struggles within the Roman Republic only Appian[1] tells us clearly and distinctly what was at issue in the last resort—namely, landed property.

But once the state has become an independent power in regard to society, it produces forthwith a further ideology. It is indeed only among professional politicians, theorists of constitutional law and jurists of private law, that the connection with economic facts gets completely lost. Since in each particular case the economic facts must assume the form of juristic motives in order to receive legal sanction; and since, in so doing, consideration of course has to be paid to the whole legal system already in operation, the consequence is that the juristic form is made everything and the economic content nothing. Public law and private law are treated as independent spheres, each having its own independent historical development, each being capable of and needing a systematic presentation by the thorough-going elimination of all inner contradictions.

Still higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from the material, economic basis, take the form of philosophy and religion. Here the interconnection between the ideas and their material condition of existence becomes more and more complicated, more and more obscured by intermediate links. But the interconnection exists. Just as the whole Renaissance period from the middle of the fifteenth century was an essential product of the towns and therefore of the bourgeoisie so also was the subsequently newly awakened philosophy. Its content was in essence only the philosophical expression of the thoughts corresponding to the development of the small and middle bourgeoisie into a big bourgeoisie. Among last century's Englishmen and Frenchmen who in many cases were just as much political economists as philosophers, this is clearly evident; and we have proved it above in regard to the Hegelian school.

[1] Roman historian of the second century who wrote mainly about the civil wars of ancient Rome.—*Ed.*

We will now in addition deal only briefly with religion, since the latter appears to stand furthest away from, and to be the most foreign to, material life. Religion arose in very primitive times from erroneous and primitive ideas of men about their own nature and that of the external world surrounding them. Every ideology, however, once it has arisen, develops in connection with the given concept-material, and develops this material further; otherwise it would cease to be ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws. That the material life conditions of the persons inside whose heads this thought process goes on, in the last resort determine the course of this process, remains of necessity unknown to these persons, for otherwise there would be an end to all ideology. These primitive religious notions, therefore, which in the main are common to each group of kindred peoples, develop, after the separation of the group, in a manner peculiar to each people, according to the living conditions falling to their lot. For a number of groups of peoples, and particularly for the Aryans (so-called Indo-Europeans) this process has been shown in detail by comparative mythology. The gods so created by each people were national gods, whose domain extended no farther than the national territory which they were to defend; on the other side of its boundaries other gods held undisputed sway. The idea of them could only continue to exist as long as the nation existed; they fell with its fall. The Roman world empire, the economic conditions of whose origin we do not need to examine here, brought about this downfall of the old nationalities. The old national gods decayed, even those of the Romans, which themselves also were fashioned only to suit the narrow confines of the city of Rome. The need to complement the world empire by means of a world religion was clearly revealed in the attempts made to provide in Rome recognition and altars for all the foreign gods to the slightest degree respectable alongside of the indigenous ones. But a new world religion is not to be made in this fashion, by imperial decree. The new world religion, Christianity, had already quietly come into being, out of a mixture of

generalised Oriental, particularly Jewish, theology and vulgarised Greek, particularly Stoic, philosophy. What it originally looked like has to be first laboriously discovered again, since its official form, as it has been handed down to us, is merely that in which it became a state religion, to which purpose it was adapted by the Council of Nicæa. The fact that already after 250 years it became a state religion suffices to show that it was a religion in correspondence with the conditions of the time. In the Middle Ages, in the same measure as feudalism developed, it grew into the religious counterpart to it, with a corresponding feudal hierarchy. And as the bourgeoisie arose, there developed within it, in opposition to feudal Catholicism, the Protestant heresy, which first appeared in Southern France, among the Albigenses[1] at the time of the highest flourishing of the cities there. The Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology—philosophy, politics, jurisprudence—and made them sub-divisions of theology. It thereby constrained every social and political movement to take on a theological form. To the masses whose minds were fed with religion to the exclusion of all else, it was necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious guise in order to produce a great agitation. And since the bourgeoisie from the beginning brought into being an appendage of propertyless urban plebeians, day-labourers and servants of all kinds, belonging to no recognised social estate, precursors of the later proletariat, so likewise heresy soon became divided into a bourgeois moderate heresy and a plebeian revolutionary one, the latter an abomination to the bourgeois heretics themselves.

The ineradicability of the Protestant heresy corresponded to

[1] The Albigenses, Cathari, participated in a movement which covered Southern France during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (The name is derived from the town of Albi, in the south of France.) The movement was directed against the exploiting Roman Catholic church headed by the Pope. The urban trading bourgeoisie, the artisans, the city poor and the peasants all took part in the movement. In the beginning of the twelfth century a special crusade was organised by the Pope against the Albigenses resulting in protracted warfare (lasting over 20 years) and ending with the defeat of the Albigenses.—*Ed.*

the invincibility of the rising bourgeoisie. When the bourgeoisie had become sufficiently strengthened, its struggle against the feudal nobility, which till then had been predominantly local, began to assume national dimensions. The first great action occurred in Germany—the so-called Reformation. The bourgeoisie was neither powerful enough nor sufficiently developed to be able to unite under its banner the rest of the rebellious estates—the plebeians of the towns, the lower nobility and the peasants on the land. At first the nobles were defeated; the peasants rose in a revolt which forms the peak of the whole revolutionary struggle; the cities left them in the lurch, and thus the revolution succumbed to the armies of the secular princes who reaped the whole profit.[1] Thenceforward Germany disappears for three centuries from the ranks of countries playing an independent part in history. But besides the German, Luther, appeared the Frenchman, Calvin. With true French acumen he put the bourgeois character of the reformation in the forefront, republicanised and democratised the church. While the Lutheran reformation in Germany degenerated and reduced the country to rack and ruin, the Calvinist reformation served as a banner for the republicans in Geneva, in Holland and in Scotland, freed Holland from Spain and from the German empire and provided the ideological costume for the second act of the bourgeois revolution which took place in England. Here Calvinism justified itself as the true religious disguise of the interests of the bourgeoisie of that time, and on this account did not reach full acceptance, as the revolution was completed in 1689 by a compromise between one part of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The English state church was re-established; but not in its earlier form of a Catholicism which had the king for its pope, being, instead, strongly Calvinised. The old state church had celebrated the merry Catholic Sabbath and had fought against the dull Calvinist one. The new bourgeois church introduced the latter, which adorns England to this day.

In France, the Calvinist minority was suppressed in 1685 and

[1] See Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany.—Ed.*

either Catholicised or driven out of the country. But what was the good? Already at that time the free-thinker Pierre Bayle was at work, and in 1694 Voltaire was born. The forcible measures of Louis XIV only made it easier for the French bourgeoisie to carry through its revolution in the irreligious and exclusively political form which alone was suited to the developed bourgeoisie. Instead of Protestants, free-thinkers took their seats in the national assemblies. Thereby Christianity entered into its final stage. It had become incapable for the future of serving any progressive class as the ideological garb of its aspirations. It became more and more the exclusive possession of the ruling classes and these apply it as a mere means of government, to keep the lower classes within limits. For this each of the different classes uses its own appropriate religion: the landowning class—Catholic Jesuitism or Protestant orthodoxy; the liberal and radical bourgeoisie—rationalism; and it makes little difference whether these gentlemen themselves believe in their respective religions or not.

We see, therefore: religion, once formed, always contains traditional material, just as in all ideological domains tradition forms a great conservative force. But the transformations which this material undergoes spring from class relations, that is to say, out of the economic relations of the persons who execute these transformations. And here that is sufficient.

In the above it could only be a question of giving a general sketch of the Marxist conception of history, at most with a few illustrations as well. The proof is to be found in history itself; and in this regard I may be permitted to say that it has been sufficiently furnished in other writings. This conception, however, puts an end to philosophy in the realm of history, just as the dialectical conception of nature made all natural philosophy both unnecessary and impossible. It is no longer a question anywhere of inventing interconnections from out of our brains, but of discovering them in the facts. For philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains only the realm of pure thought (so far as it is left): the theory of the laws of the thought process itself, logic and dialectics.

With the Revolution of 1848, "educated" Germany said farewell to theory and went over to the field of practice. Small production, based upon handicraft and manufacture, were superseded by really large-scale industry. Germany again appeared on the world market. The new little German empire[1] abolished at least the more crying of the anomalies which had been placed in the way of its development by the system of petty states, the relics of feudalism and bureaucratic economy. But to the same degree that speculation abandoned the philosopher's study in order to set up its temple in the Stock Exchange, educated Germany lost the great aptitude for theory which had been the glory of Germany in the days of its deepest political humiliation—the aptitude for purely scientific investigation, irrespective of whether the result obtained was practically applicable or not, whether likely to meet with the approval or disapproval of the police authorities. Official German natural science, it is true, maintained its position in the front rank, particularly in the field of specialised research. But already the American journal, *Science*, remarks with truth that the decisive advances in the sphere of the comprehensive correlation of particular facts and their generalisation into laws, are now being made much more in England, instead of, as formerly, in Germany. And in the sphere of the historical sciences, philosophy included, the old fearless zeal for theory has now disappeared completely, along with classical philosophy. Empty eclecticism and an anxious concern for career and income, descending to the most vulgar place-hunting, occupies its place. The official representatives of these sciences have become the undisguised ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the existing state—but at a time when both stand in open antagonism to the working class.

Only among the working class does the German aptitude for theory remain unimpaired. Here it cannot be exterminated. Here there is no concern for careers, for profit-making, or for gracious patronage from above. On the contrary, the more ruthlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds the more it finds itself in

[1] *I.e.*, not embracing all German-speaking lands.—*Ed.*

harmony with the interests and efforts of the workers. The new tendency, which recognised that the key to the understanding of the whole history of society lies in the historical development of labour, from the outset addressed itself by preference to the working class and here found the response which it neither sought nor expected from officially recognised science. The German working class is the inheritor of German classical philosophy.

MARX'S THESES ON FEUERBACH [1]

(Jotted down in Brussels in the spring of 1845)

I

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the object, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object* or *contemplation*[2] but not as *human sensuous activity*, *practice*, not subjectively. Thus it happened that the *active* side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as activity *through objects*. Consequently, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of practical-critical, activity.

II

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the 'this-sidedness' of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

[1] The text of these theses is that given by Engels in the appendix to *Ludwig Feuerbach.—Ed.*

[2] German—*Anschauung.—Ed.*

III

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that circumstances are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one towers above society (in Robert Owen, for example).

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can only be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionising practice.

IV

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work consists in the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular foundation lifts itself above itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm is only to be explained by the self-cleavage and self-contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be theoretically criticised and radically changed in practice.

V

Feuerbach, not satisfied with *abstract thinking*, appeals to *sensuous contemplation*, but he does not conceive sensuousness as a practical, human-sensuous activity.

VI

Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single in-

dividual. In its reality it is the *ensemble* of the social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not attempt the criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something for itself and to presuppose an abstract—*isolated*—human individual.

2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended only as "genus," as a dumb internal generality which merely *naturally* unites the many individuals.

VII

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the "religious sentiment" is itself a *social product*, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.

VIII

Social life is essentially *practical.* All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

IX

The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, *i.e.*, materialism which does not understand sensuousness as practical activity, is the outlook of single individuals in "civil society." [1]

X

The standpoint of the old materialism is "civil society"; the standpoint of the new is *human* society or socialised humanity.

XI

The philosophers have *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it.

[1] Here not "bourgeois society," but "civil society" [bürgerliche Gesellschaft], as in Hegel, in the sense of the totality of social (economic, personal, cultural, etc.) relations, as distinguished from the political organism, the state.—*Ed.*

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